THIS IS AN UNEDITED TRANSCRIPT
Hello, I'm John Milewski, and this is Wilson Center NOW, a production of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
My guests today are Shihoko Goto, who is director of the Wilson Center's Indo-Pacific program, and Michael Kugelman, who also works with that program as director of the South Asia Institute. They join us to discuss the fourth Annual Quad Leaders Summit just concluded in Wilmington, Delaware, a couple of days ago. Welcome to both of you. Thanks for joining us.
Great to be here. So we had four prime minister, four World leaders, a president and four prime, three prime ministers from Australia, Japan and India, and 50% of that group. President Biden and Prime Minister Fumio will be leaving office soon. Does that have any bearing on the nature of this meeting and how we look forward to the Quad Alliance in the days and years to come?
Shihoko, let's begin with you. Yeah. So looking specifically at this particular quad meeting. Definitely. So this was very much Biden's swan song. He had it in his hometown, not only in Delaware, but actually at his home. And the official dinner was held at his alma mater, his high school, from when he was a student, and Delaware as well.
So it was very much a sentimental last hurrah from a president who will be leaving office, said that is both a strength and a weakness. It is a strength because it shows personal commitment to the quad. Again, as you said, this is the fourth time that the leaders are meeting, but we should bear in mind that the quad itself originated in 2007 in response to the the disaster, the tsunami in the Indian Ocean.
And there was this effort for regional cooperation, for reconstruction and human humanitarian assistance, in particular since the pandemic. We've seen efforts for countries to come together, ostensibly to ensure or the rules based international order, but quite frankly, with an eye towards pushing back against China. Now, the question becomes, is this going to be possible? The how? To what extent are they actually in an alignment and how are they going to take this moving forward?
Michael, you know, she mentions China. And by doing so, she did more than a lot of the quad official announcements did. It was really an interesting dance where China was referred to indirectly throughout, but rarely directly. Is there any particular relevance to the fact that China was treated in that manner as far as official announcements? Well, this is standard procedure for the quad, and maybe it's a bit of an irony that, you know, at the end of the day, at least in my view, the quad is very much about cooperating to counter China and its power.
And yet you rarely, if ever, hear China mentioned publicly, explicitly in quad documents, though, you know, I should say if you review the joint statement that came out of this most recent meeting. Now, I think that some of the language used to describe what's happening in the South China Sea were some of the strongest we've seen yet, referring to China's provocations there, even though China wasn't mentioned specifically.
And I think that's that's really a reflection of the fact that all of the quad states, I think, are increasingly worried about what China is up to in the South China Sea. But yeah, I think this is just the reality of how the quad has has has long been. And I think that at an earlier time, several of the quad members were a bit uncomfortable about the idea of being associated with something that is meant to be working to counter China's power.
But I think that even now things are changing. But I still don't think you're going to see the Quad States start referring to specifically to China criticizing China or anything like that. But, you know, at the end of the day, I think that today and really for the last two years, all of the Quad States have seen their relations with China fall to their lowest levels in many years.
That, honestly, I think, is one of the major reasons why the quad has resurge. She mentioned that this is actually a group that's been around for a very long time. In its early years, it was focused not on strategic issues but on humanitarian responses. But I think that, you know, it went quiet for a while and then it came back.
Suddenly it gained momentum. And a big reason for that is the fact that all four countries had a strong interest in working together to counter this growing China threat. Our China challenge is what you describe also a reflection of this long intended pivot to the Pacific that the United States has been talking about for what seems like decades.
This sort of resurgence in interest in the quad. Yeah, I mean, was that directed to me either or both, actually. I'd like to get both of your thoughts on it. Sure. I could I could respond first, briefly. I think it's part and parcel. I mean, I think that the speaking, at least from the U.S. perspective, the quad and what it is meant to do is a very big part of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy.
The Indo-Pacific strategy is all about this idea of working to to promote or implement this vision of a free and a free and open Indo-Pacific region. And that entails really trying to push back against what China has been doing, which the U.S. uses running counter to that to that vision. And in that regard, the quad, I think, is seen as a useful tool to help move toward that toward that outcome.
Chicago, your thoughts now. So when we look at the origins of the Indo-Pacific, that terminology, it is actually very much in vogue. We no longer talk about an Asia-Pacific or even Asia. We talk about an Indo-Pacific. It was actually the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, that came up with this idea of the confluence of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean and the need for likeminded strong democracies to come together to ensure the rule of law and a free and open Indo-Pacific and the Japanese have really run with that.
And I point this out because Japan's position on the Indo-Pacific is that it remains committed and even though there will be a new prime minister by the end of this month, the new leader is also expected to continue to be committed to a free and open Indo-Pacific. But he cannot do so alone and is. It's instrumental for Japan to ensure that the United States continues to be engaged.
And so we the strategy has been to make sure that it is inclusive, not just to include the other Asian partners and to potentially expand the quad. We've seen countries like South Korea, Australia, Vietnam being included on occasions to quad talks. But that that aside, there is this expectation to continue to have the United States engaged as well.
And so there is this careful language to ensure that on the one hand it talks about de-risking from China, but it also wants to ensure continued U.S. engagement regardless of who wins the White House in November. And Shihoko, you covered the sentimental aspects of this meeting, almost like a going away party for President Biden. Beyond that, is there any news, noteworthy news that either of you can identify from this meeting that we should look at as a significant change or a new focus or anything that would qualify as headline material?
Yeah. So there are a couple of things that I want to point out. The one the biggest one, of course, is how the China issue is addressed. The second one is the actual content of the statement that came out after the summit meeting. It's very ambitious. It covers everything from this moonshot about developing a cancer vaccine to humanitarian assistance, to infrastructure investment, to military security cooperation and the like.
It runs the gamut. It is very difficult to grapple with it, to really get a handle on because it is so ambitious. There is one other thing that I do want to point out is at the top of that statement, they talk about a global force for good, unquote. And so there is this kind of moral directive towards the quad, certainly from the United States, being at the at the helm of this this time around, talking about, you know, if there is a force for good, then there must be a force for evil.
And so the United States and the quad members are this positive force that is trying to counterbalance some of the instability, some of the damages that are being made into the international order. But I do want to point out that that is not necessarily a perspective that is shared across the region, let alone across the world, and that there as we talk about de-risking from China, there is this movement to de-risk also from the United States as well.
And the turmoil that the United States is also facing. Yeah, that's really interesting that you mention this. If there's a good there's got to be an evil, right. You're talking about somebody. It's back to this indirect notion of, you know, who you are. We don't have to name you by name. Michael, following up on this notion of a headline and let me just add to this specifically the incredibly ambitious agenda that Yoko referenced.
Here's the language from the the summary language from the report. Address pandemics and disease. Respond to natural disasters. Strengthen maritime domain awareness and maritime security, Mobilizing, build high standard physical and digital infrastructure. Invest in and benefit from critical and emerging technologies, confront the threat of climate change, bolster cybersecurity and cultivate the next generation of technology leaders. I was saying to Chicago before we began recording, this sounds more like a State of the Union address for a nation that covers the waterfront than it does for a particular focused agenda for any one alliance.
Michael, your thoughts on this ambitious agenda and any headlines that emerge from the summit? Yeah, no, definitely it's ambitious. It's too ambitious. But, you know, these are themes that we've been hearing for quite for quite some time. And the quad is very much about continuity. And so I think that one of the big takeaways for me, reading through a very long joint statement, they're always so long.
And indeed this year seemed especially long, is that we were seeing really doubling down on commitments that had been made previously. So, you know, many of those areas that you just mentioned and particularly things like, you know, clean energy and pandemic public health, you know, these are there have been commitments, pledges from the Quad States for a number of years to work on projects related to those areas.
This is one of the criticisms of the quad. And, you know, a lot of it's interesting by the strong feelings about the quad, there are a lot of people that feel very strongly against it and those that feel very strongly for it. Now, some of the hardest criticism is essentially that, you know, that's basically a lot of talk about all these big plans.
And you have initiatives that are announced, such as one early on during the pandemic to develop this initiative to produce, manufacture and disseminate COVID vaccines across the Indo-Pacific. But, you know, there's been some criticism. How far was that taken? How successful was it? And so on. But, you know, for me, one one of the big takeaways, I don't know if I call it a headline, but a takeaway from this latest summit is, you know, you are seeing that consistency.
And I think that's important, even if it's too ambitious, even if it's impossible to address all these issues that are highlighted. I think it's important to signify that the four states do agree on, you know, a variety of issues that they want to somehow build cooperation around. You know, the other what I would describe as a headline, even though it's not particularly sexy, is the fact that the that the meeting happened right.
There had been some concern that this leaders summit would not take place because India was scheduled to host. But India was very busy for much of the first half of the year because of its election. And then, you know, also there was concern that Biden would not be able to participate, go to India because of the U.S. election.
So then, you know, as we all know, in the final hours, switch was made where the U.S. took over the hosting duties, taking advantage of all the the quad leaders being in the U.S. for the UNGA summit. And they were able to do it. And I think that's important. It's it is, what, four years now, four years in a row that there's been a a leaders summit.
That's pretty significant for a group that is not formal. Right. In the sense that it doesn't have a letterhead. There's no secretariat. There's no formal formality to it. But despite that, and even with all the distractions happening in the world, the fact that you had leaders summits four years in a row for this one entity, I think that's a pretty good thing.
And that, I think, reflects the strength of the quad and the commitment to it, you know, based on what you just said. But do either of you know, had this been on the on the schedule before President Biden dropped out of the race and handed over the the reins to Kamala Harris? Because I'm just wondering if that created the space that allowed this meeting to occur.
Based on what you were saying earlier, Michael, about India having its own issues so that it didn't really have time to host, suddenly President Biden had some extra time on his hands. Yeah, I'm not sure. My sense is that the decision to make the change happened fairly recently after after Biden had dropped out of the race. But I don't know the specifics at the time.
I don't we don't want to. Yeah, well, we look it up or you should look it up. I don't we're just speculating at this point. So I want to ask you on this just broad agenda and this really ambitious agenda that everything from a moonshot to cancer to space exploration to combating disinformation, you know, the list is is quite extensive.
I'm going to ask each of you to sort of play triage. Right. And where are the greatest needs and where do you think that these nations will be focusing their collective efforts in some hierarchical fashion? I'm guessing you talked about security in the South China Sea. There are things that are going to demand attention. But if each of you could give us sort of the list of of from this larger list of where you think the priorities are.
Sure. Can we begin with you? Yeah. So one, I think the quad is actually facing competition from other multilateral arrangements. So we have things like the G7, the G20. They and the G7 in particular is having a bit of a working around how it should be organized, what kind of countries should be involved in the G7 meetings, depending on the host nation.
There is the need for the quad to actually focus and say that this is an area that they it requires this quadrilateral arrangement. It is a region focused. It is focused on the Indo-Pacific. And yes, the the thread of focusing on the international order, looking at the China challenge is important. But I would also argue that the third one is really about economic development.
If we look across the region, it is a very disparate region, but one the issue that brings it together is this commitment to to trade, a commitment to ensuring that all boats are lifted. There is has been healthy competition and in economic growth. If the quad can tap into that desire and focus on infrastructure development, focus not just on the development of a cervical cancer vaccine, but talk more broadly about developing the health care and pharmaceutical industry and the health care industry and play to the strengths of each of the four countries.
I think that will give it legs, that that will ensure that there is also private as well as public commitment to ensure the success and the longevity of this arrangement. Michael, final. I agree with you. All I would add is, you know, something you mentioned earlier, John, I think maritime security is important. I mean, this the quad is very much about countering China, but it is not an alliance and none of the members want it to become one.
So there's limited degrees of security cooperation that could come out of the quad on operational levels. But I think that, you know, maritime security is certainly within permissible limits, so to speak. And, you know, one of the outcomes of this latest summit was to announce this new initiative for the four countries to work together through maritime channels to try to combat illegal fishing in the waters of the Indo-Pacific.
And clearly that's directed at China. So I think that's that's something that that should definitely be pursued and sustained as well. And, you know, going back to, you know, the goals of the quad over the last few years, there's been this insistent focus on the idea of public goods delivery that's also meant to counter China. The idea is to provide alternatives to what China is offering in terms of its own public goods.
And, you know, we've seen some pretty good forward movement here with, you know, clean energy technologies and things like that. So I think that that would certainly be worth worth pursuing as well. And Michael, when you say not an line, you're specifically not a military alliance, correct? Correct. Yeah. Yeah. Because I but then, you know, there are interesting things like this announcement that the US Coast Guard, the Japan Coast Guard, the Australian Border Force and the Indian Coast Guard are going to launch what they call this first ever quad at sea ship Observer mission in 2025.
What is a quad at sea Ship Observer mission? What are they observing that there is no infraction of the freedom of navigation. And again, this is a region that does not have a nature. There is no collective security arrangement. And quite frankly, the prospect of having that kind of multinational military cooperation is is going to be very challenging.
But there are arrangements, and I think this is a very good example of having a concrete goal to ensure that the lanes of the seas are remain open and secure. You think China will do this joint operation as a direct challenge in any way, or should they?
Yeah, well, absolutely. I mean, China and also Russia are very sensitive to anything coming out of the quad. And there's a tendency there to to attribute malign intentions to to anything that could suggest any level of security cooperation or even non-security cooperation for sure. Absolutely. China and Russia, you know, view this as an Asian NAITO or that's the that's the perception that they want to be projected.
So absolutely, they're going to be concerned about, you know, any of any anything like that. But, you know, just just one more point to to your earlier question, you know, about how the quad goes about this this goal of practicing security cooperation. If it's not a military alliance, I think that the U.S. India relationship can offer a useful case study because the U.S. and India have had to be very creative about fashioning security partnerships in a context where there's not an alliance because India doesn't do alliances.
And they're you seen, you know, increasing cooperation through joint military exercises. There have been a number of agreements that that really allow them to two militaries to work more closely together, even though they're not in contingency, They're preparing for contingencies where they would be fighting wars together. So my point is that it's very possible for a security grouping, not an alliance, to figure out ways to work together that do not, you know, risk going beyond that threshold of of an alliance, so to speak, which the quad can't do and which the end which were India in a bilateral context with its partners can't do either.
The infrastructure, as was mentioned prominently throughout all of the documents and references to things like ports of the future undersea cables building up 5G. Is this one of those broad brush strokes? Are there specific projects that will be jointly funded by the four members that are actually on the agenda? So some of the projects that were highlighted were actually in the Pacific Islands.
And of course, this is a source of contention between China and the Quad Countries. So that the challenge, of course, is going to be in the financing. These projects. We hear we talk about a slowdown in the Chinese economy. Nonetheless, there is that drive to continue investment in not just the Pacific Islands, but also across south and Southeast Asia as well.
We're not seeing that kind of investment, the financial support that would be required to make this into a reality. And there have been talks initially about the quad establishing some kind of slush fund so that they could use this pot of money that the poor countries would contribute to either disaster relief or imminent needs. But that is going to be very challenging as well.
Often comes down to funding, doesn't it, or commitments. The another thing that I jumped out at me and then I'll ask before we close, if there's anything we've not talked about that you'd like to, is a focus on people to people ties. You know, these are four nations that already have very deep cultural connections. What are the plans there and what does this say about how the quad views itself?
I mean, these are these are four countries that, as you say, they have very robust formal government to government partnerships. But if you have four countries that are pushing to build even more goodwill and cooperation amongst themselves bilaterally and multilaterally, you know, anything helps. And I think in that regard, you know, people to people ties are sometimes overlooked, even in very close partnerships, quite frankly.
So I think that, you know, the more of that, the better. The only other point I'll make to to go back to your point about infrastructure, I think that's such an important priority for the quad, just because when you think of infrastructure and you think of the Indo-Pacific and you think of China, China is all over that, right, because of what it's been able to do with Bri over the years, I think it's really been able to develop that very unique value add.
But I think that there might be an opportunity for the Quad Countries and other competitors and rivals of China to try to step up and push back just because Bri has in the last year or so experienced some slowdowns in momentum. And so it's not that it's going away, but there might be an extra, you know, window of opportunity for the Quad countries to be creative and to try to provide, you know, offer up new new forms of of alternatives.
You know, this is this is a throwback to my my mentorship under the C span methodology, you know, and Brian LAMB was a master of this. He would have interrupted Michael and said, what's Bri? Because, you know, it's a we won't assume that ever we don't want to leave anybody behind. Belt and Road initiative right, is what you're referencing.
I'm pretty sure a Wilson audience knows that. But just in case anyone's watching who needed help with that, there's my public service show. Go back to you. Sorry about that. No, no, no, not not at all. So, you know, kind of tying this idea of infrastructure development and investment and going back to your question about people, to people exchange.
One of the weaknesses of China is capacity building, which is to say ensuring that there is that workforce development, the desire here amongst the recipient countries of development assistance is to go up the value chain and for that ensuring that there is not just technical support but the ability to be part of that technical labor force is going to be critical.
The United States in particular just as well. And regardless of the whatever criticism the United States may face, it continues to be a magnet for global talent, including from Australia, from Japan, and especially from India. And if we look across the Indo-Pacific, the al-Yawer of the United States and the U.S., higher education, especially in the sciences, is tremendous.
And so if we can continue to capitalize on that and make sure that there is this kind of positive exchange of people that will go far in in terms of investing in the future. Thanks. I want to ask each of you for a final thought. Michael, do you want to add something to that? I'm sorry. I thought I'd now audio glitch here.
It's the beauty of using Zoom is, you know, sometimes I'm hearing phantom noises. So anyway, but I'll get some help for that. But I want to ask each of you for a final thought. And really, you know, this is such a huge
agenda that the quad publicly shared through its documents. And so as in preparing to speak to both of you about this, not really.
I was wondering where we would focus because there's so much to focus on and we covered a lot of ground. But before we close, I want to make sure there's not something we've left on the table that you think is particularly important for people to hear about. So as you look at the quad and you look ahead and Michael, you mentioned that one of the criticisms is create a lot of expectations, but not necessarily deliver.
And many in some of the cases I'm paraphrasing how you put it. So with all of that in mind, if I can get a closing thought from each of you, Michael, begin with you. What will you be watching as it relates to the quad moving forward? What do you think that's important for people to know who are taking a look at this, who that we haven't yet covered today?
Well, you know, I would step back from the policy nitty gritty here again and look at the something that I think you referred to at the start, that half of the quad leaders will soon no longer be in office with the Japanese and us leaders on their way out. And I think an important signpost to watch will be if their successors remain fully committed to the quad, I imagine they will.
I defer to Toshihiko on the Japan question, but I'm pretty sure that the next Japanese leader will be fully committed to the quad. I think the next US president, regardless of who it is, will remain fully committed to it, particularly if it continues to be seen, at least in part through the lens of China. There is multi partizan support in Washington for the idea of working to counter China, but still I think that is important.
I you know, I think that there may be a few concerns in some quarters that, you know, this change of leadership could could perhaps have some kind of unwelcome impact on the quad. I don't think that's going to be the case at all. But what assuming that we see the successors to the to the Japanese and U.S. leaders, assuming that we see their, you know, express reasserting their commitment and support for the quad, that certainly would be a good thing and I think an encouraging thing moving forward.
Thanks, Michael. You go. You get the final word. Yeah. So on on the Japan angle, the Japanese leader, whoever that person may be, will continue to be committed to pursuing this free and open Indo-Pacific and be continue to be committed to international groupings and multilateral frameworks for cooperation. So that will stay constant, but it will also want to ensure that the United States remains committed.
The challenge for the Quad is to ensure that it has a strong identity, that it doesn't get lost with being so ambitious, that it's very difficult to put a finger on what exactly it is beyond the membership. So defining what it stands for is good. The other point I would say is that meeting ensuring that the summit meetings continue to happen will go a long way.
They say that in diplomacy showing off is half the battle and in this case the quad actually having the summit meeting because it wasn't initially at the leadership level, it was much more at the foreign ministry. With a working level. It's been elevated. We want to ensure that that continues and hopefully that appetite will continue on the part of the United States as well as Australia, Japan and India.
Well, speaking of showing up, thanks to both of you for showing up today and helping us sort through this issue. Really appreciate your time and interest and gear. Thank you, John. And if you'd like to hear more from the Indo-Pacific program and from the South Asia Institute, come to the Wilson Center website and there's a programs tab at the top of the page where you can find more of the work from Shihoko and Michael and all of their colleagues.
Terrific work on a range of issues. We hope you enjoyed this edition of Wilson Center now and that you'll join us again next week. Until then, for all of us at the center, I'm John Mikewski. Thank you.
