A Discussion of “Arabs and Israelis: From October 7 to Peacemaking”

The Wilson Center's Middle East Program hosted a timely discussion on a new monograph published by the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University. In this monograph, Abdel Monem Said Aly, Shai Feldman, and Khalil Shikaki discussed how the Hamas attacks of October 7 could be harnessed to reach a durable peace in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Moderated by Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow Robin Wright, the discussion laid out the five guiding premises for a solution that addresses the fundamental needs of both peoples.

The Impact of War
The brutalities of war have inflicted deep pain on both Israelis and Palestinians. If approached wisely, this moment could serve as a turning point. Throughout history, major calamities have sometimes led to positive change—this could be one such moment. This was never purely a bilateral conflict—two core issues, refugees and Jerusalem, lack bilateral solutions. The first proposals emphasize the region's critical role in transitioning from the current state to the final resolution. No previous efforts have successfully addressed how to market an agreement for public acceptance. There has been a reluctance, particularly from the U.S. president, to apply leverage on either party to push for a real agreement. The costs of conflict management include the reality that managing the conflict rather than solving it led to October 7—this approach perpetuates violence. The physical cost of rebuilding Gaza is estimated at $53 billion, beyond what any single actor can bear. Reconstruction cannot begin unless there is assurance that this will be the last time.

Institutional Requirements for Peace
A new Palestinian government should be led by a strong, technocratic prime minister endorsed by all factions. This government should not have a parliament to avoid political gridlock. It will be tasked with reconstruction in Gaza and maintaining the ceasefire, replacing Hamas in Gaza and overseeing disarmament. Regional institutions with Arab countries will be partners in Gaza’s reconstruction, taking on economic, security, and social responsibilities. Multilateral institutions, including major powers, will guarantee implementation, leverage influence, and assign roles to key players. Without a structured framework, any ceasefire will be unsustainable.
The notion persists that Arab leaders who pursue peace are “cursed.” However, Sadat—despite facing backlash and assassination—ended the war between Egypt and Israel. Jordan and Saudi Arabia’s cooperation with Israel has been mutually beneficial. The Arab Spring produced a new class of states—Gulf countries, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco—focused on economic growth and stability. A stable region is in everyone’s interest. All previous peace agreements originated from regional initiatives. Cities have been built from scratch in the region—similar reconstruction is possible in Gaza. Palestinians must remain in their homeland to establish their own state. A ceasefire must precede reconstruction. Israel must be offered a peace agreement it cannot refuse, emphasizing both Jewish and Palestinian heritage in the region. If Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia push for a deal, it will be difficult for Abbas to refuse.

Israeli Public Opinion and Government
The current outlook suggests that a peace deal is not viable right now, and the focus should be on creating conditions that make it viable. Historical precedent shows that Israeli public opinion can shift when necessary, as demonstrated by Ariel Sharon’s Gaza disengagement. After this war, Israel will eventually undergo a period of introspection—already, demands for a national inquiry are emerging. There are signs of flexibility, suggesting public opinion could change. Examining Israeli policies leading up to October 7 can help understand why this happened.

Key Questions
Can Hamas be eliminated? Is a two-state solution viable? Can the Palestinian Authority be reformed? The biggest obstacles stem from political dysfunction. The Palestinian leadership has lacked electoral legitimacy for years, and public opinion on both sides has been deeply dehumanized. The region—not just the U.S.—must exert strong leverage. When a comprehensive solution with clear incentives is presented, public opinion can shift significantly. The two-state solution remains viable but requires leadership, which is currently lacking. For Abbas: If the benefits outweigh the risks, he could sign on. For Netanyahu: He faces an inquiry and possible ICC charges. He will not call elections unless pressured. Regional leaders (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia) must present a deal directly in Jerusalem, forcing Netanyahu to choose between aligning with religious Zionists or the broader Israeli public. For Hamas: It will not vanish overnight, but it has a base of support. For now, it must relinquish control over Gaza. A strong technocrat should be appointed to oversee reconstruction.

The Future 
All regional powers can participate as observers in the Arab League, helping to establish a new security and political framework similar to European institutions to promote regional dialogue. Hamas is showing signs of flexibility, now open to ceding Gaza’s governance to the PLO while retaining arms oversight. Peace is as difficult to achieve as war. Israel has attempted meaningful changes. People-to-people contact in Abraham Accords countries has progressed better than past peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict will continue to erupt unless resolved. People are protesting today to create a better future for their grandchildren. The youth in Israel and Palestine are the most radicalized—they must be given hope and a viable future.