What Syria’s Opposition Resurgence Means for Ankara

"The target is Damascus," stated President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, emphasizing Ankara's aspirations for a progression of operations. Despite originating from Al-Qaeda, the group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), listed as a terrorist organization by the United Nations, launched an operation from opposition-held Idlib alongside its allies. Within two days, this offensive forced the Syrian central government’s forces to withdraw from Aleppo. 

Subsequently, Turkey-backed opposition groups, specifically the Syrian National Army (SNA), initiated operations targeting the eastern parts of Aleppo and the YPG-controlled region of Tel Rifaat. Since December 2, reports of clashes have also emerged from Deir ez-Zor. A complex and multi-faceted atmosphere has developed, characterized by conflicts in multiple regions involving actors with differing objectives and dynamics, with Turkey as one of the key players.

While Turkey officially denies involvement, it would be a stretch to think the offensive would have occurred without Ankara's greenlighting of the operations. 

While Turkey officially denies involvement, it would be a stretch to think the offensive would have occurred without Ankara's greenlighting of the operations. In fact, according to an intelligence briefing released by the Soufan Center, Ankara had intervened to delay the offensive, which was initially planned for mid-October. Turkey’s strategic priorities remain evident: countering Kurdish groups perceived as threats to national security, addressing the refugee crisis, and positioning itself as a pivotal player in shaping Syria's post-conflict order.

Resurgence of the opposition

While the world was focused on Ukraine and Gaza, the rapid offensive by the Syrian opposition has surprised many, even those following the war-torn country since the civil war began in 2011. For the first time, groups like HTS, SNA, and other factions have united, showcasing a level of institutionalized capability previously unseen, argues Ömer Özkizilcik, a Fellow with the Atlantic Council. Özkizilcik stated, "They [the opposition] have a winning moment and have learned much from their previous mistakes.” 

In parallel, Steven Heydemann, a Wilson Center fellow and professor at Smith College, noted that HTS’ pragmatic approach has included rebranding itself and adopting governance practices to gain legitimacy. According to Heydemann, the group’s governance in Idlib, characterized by relative administrative stability, demonstrated its efforts to project itself as a viable alternative to the Assad regime. 

Yet, the unity of the opposition will depend on how the reality on the ground changes. Turkey’s ability to mediate between factions, especially given its complicated relationship with HTS (Ankara considers it a terrorist organization), will be critical.  The behavior of HTS so far—avoiding looting in captured areas and ensuring stability—reflects its awareness of the need to maintain cohesion. Its rebranding efforts may bolster its legitimacy in the short run, but its classification as a terrorist organization complicates its international acceptance as a credible actor. Nonetheless, tensions between HTS and Turkish-backed groups like the SNA could resurface, particularly if competition for resources intensifies while the rapid offensive continues.

The success of this offensive will serve as a critical test of the opposition’s unity and coordination. The capture of Hama has far-reaching implications. The city’s location as a strategic junction opens pathways toward key areas like Homs and Damascus. Controlling Hama disrupts regime supply lines and undermines the Assad government’s territorial cohesion. Furthermore, HTS's ability to gain the neutrality of local sectarian minorities could reflect its evolving strategy to consolidate power without alienating local populations, at least so far. 

The potential advance toward Homs marks a pivotal juncture in the Syrian conflict. Securing control of Homs would not only disrupt the Assad regime’s logistical supply lines but also sever critical physical and psychological connections between its strongholds in Damascus and Latakia. On December 6, the opposition forces intensified their campaign by achieving significant territorial gains, including advances on the strategically vital city of Homs and capturing the Jordanian border crossing at Daraa.  Assad's grip on power appears more precarious than ever, with Russia and Iran showing limited ability to come to his rescue, with Moscow focused on Ukraine and Iran on Israel. 

Ankara’s approach

Turkey’s actions in Syria are heavily influenced by three primary questions: The refugees, the Kurds, and territorial ambitions. Hosting nearly 4 million Syrian refugees, the Erdoğan administration faces growing economic, social, and political pressures. President Erdoğan has promoted the creation of a buffer zone as a solution, but the feasibility of large-scale returns remains uncertain. 

According to Özkizilcik, refugees are more likely to return to areas controlled by Syrian rebels rather than regime-held territories. Sustained stability in opposition-controlled regions, such as Aleppo, will be key to facilitating significant repatriation. Özkizilcik believes that avoiding security chaos in these areas could encourage many refugees in Turkey to return. Ankara’s potential push for large-scale refugee returns faces not only logistical challenges but also questions about the voluntariness and safety of these movements.

Gönül Tol, the Director of the Turkey Program at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC, highlights another critical dimension, emphasizing that it is unlikely to send millions of refugees back to a war zone, particularly as many have built lives in Turkey. Even if an agreement is reached with the Assad regime, or whatever may replace it, and peace prevails, large-scale returns may not materialize, though some might voluntarily choose to go back under improved conditions, according to Tol. Moreover, Syrians have become an integral part of the labor force, often subjected to exploitation as a source of cheap labor, raising the possibility that some businesses may resist the idea of Syrians returning to their homeland.

The establishment of a buffer zone serves purposes beyond resettling Syrian refugees: it is a move to counter Kurdish influence in Northern Syria. Ankara sees PYD and SDF as major threats to its national security and is against Kurds gaining ground in Northern Syria from day one. Gönül Tol argues that weakening the Syrian Kurdish militia could bolster President Erdogan’s leverage in negotiations with Turkey’s Kurds, particularly if the United States under Trump follows through on its commitment to withdraw from Syria. 

Heydemann adds that Turkey’s primary objective is to neutralize the PYD and SDF as meaningful military and political actors. This could be achieved through various means, including the return of Syrian sovereignty over these areas, the military defeat of the SDF (unlikely as long as US forces remain present), or a negotiated agreement involving Russia and Damascus. Heydemann also highlights that Turkey’s longstanding ties with opposition armed groups, such as those affiliated with the SNA, are part of its broader strategy, even as relations with groups like HTS remain fraught. The recent offensive has disrupted a fragile equilibrium, escalating attacks on Kurdish areas and creating new opportunities for Turkey to pursue its objectives. 

However, the presence of US forces in northeast Syria remains a major constraint for Turkey, as it limits Ankara's ability to target Kurdish forces. Turkish policymakers are watching for signs of a potential US withdrawal, as such a move could create a strategic vacuum, leaving the Kurdish forces more vulnerable to Turkish military operations.  In the coming second Trump term, Ankara would likely expect a clearer commitment to withdrawal. 

Domestic implications

Domestically, Ankara’s Syria policy has significant ramifications for Erdoğan’s political strategy. Weakening Kurdish militias bolsters his position in negotiations with Turkey’s Kurdish actors, particularly amid growing economic challenges and political opposition. If Kurdish forces are sufficiently weakened in Syria, Erdoğan believes his hand in domestic negotiations will be strengthened. The AKP leader seeks to remain in power for at least another term despite constitutional limitations.

Turkey’s Syria policy will continue to adapt to shifting dynamics, but it is increasingly clear that Ankara will remain a key player in the region.  

His approach to the Kurds in Syria is influenced, in part, by his efforts to secure Kurdish support within Turkey for a potential constitutional amendment that would enable him to extend his rule. The main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), has largely supported efforts to normalize relations with Assad, reflecting a rare point of consensus with Erdoğan, argues Gönül Tol. However, the opposition has also deeply criticized aspects of Ankara’s Syria policy, particularly its handling of the refugee crisis and entanglement in Syria’s convoluted war that has triggered terror attacks within Turkey, killing many Turkish citizens. 

Turkey’s Syria policy will continue to adapt to shifting dynamics, but it is increasingly clear that Ankara will remain a key player in the region.  

Donald Trump's victory in the US presidential election has triggered geopolitical shifts. HTS operations in Syria could distract and weaken Russia ahead of a potential Ukraine ceasefire negotiation. Syria is also central to broader US goals, such as disrupting Iran's land bridge to Hezbollah in Lebanon. 

Critical factors to watch include the sustainability of Syrian opposition unity, their capacity to govern the territories under their control—particularly given their Islamist and radical roots—the effectiveness of refugee repatriation efforts, and potential shifts in the policies of major regional actors.

The views expressed in this piece are those of the author and do not express the official position of the Wilson Center.