

Authority EO 12958By RAA ARA Date 7-1-03

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLYINFORMATION  
January 5, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt *ts.*

SUBJECT: Dobrynin's Complaint on CSCE - Next Steps With Him

Background

We are not introducing MBFR into the European Conference. We have had, however, protracted wrangling with our Allies on keeping the issues separate because of Soviet foot-dragging on MBFR (they have failed so far to reply to the Allied notes of invitation to the January 31 talks), and because it is inconceivable that a European security Conference would ignore military affairs.

As a consequence, the Western countries will introduce an item for discussions, under the "security" heading, that we call "confidence building measures" (the Soviets are well aware of this). This would be defined as "appropriate measures, including certain military measures aimed at strengthening confidence and increasing stability with a view to reducing the dangers of military confrontation."

As a practical matter what we will propose is (a) advance notification of major maneuvers, and (b) exchange of observers at maneuvers. Both actions would be voluntary. There would be a designated sub-committee to negotiate this issue.

This is a minimal effort, far short of what many of our Allies want. There is still some chance that individual Allies will propose adding some kind of joint declaration on the "level and activities" of forces in Europe, as well as some tie into the MBFR talks, perhaps only a statement approving MBFR, force cuts in general.

The Soviets cannot legitimately complain about this.

-- They have pressed for a security conference and they propose non-use of force and principles of security.

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*Answer  
to Sonnenfeldt  
voluntary  
rights*

*MFN for SA*

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-- They have delayed MBFR and want it to convene after CSCE is finished.

In this light it is little wonder that some of our Allies, as well as their Ally, Romania, are dismayed that military security will not be discussed. Moreover, various neutrals will introduce far more contentious issues.

. In sum, if the Soviets want to control the discussion of military security in the CSCE they would be well advised to cooperate with us in developing a very limited substantive program of "confidence building measures."

If they go along with us, then we might be more flexible on their idea of permanent machinery. Since all of our Allies will fall back to accepting some sort of post-conference secretariat, we can join our Allies but perhaps sell this to Dobrynin as a concession to the Soviets.

#### Other Problems

Our ability to hold to the June date, as agreed, depends on a fairly thorough discussion in Helsinki of the agenda. If the Soviets try to block debate and discussions the smaller countries will not go along and we will not be able to overpower them, whatever the Soviets may think. (If we really try, fears of US-Soviet collusion will be rampant.)

#### Your Talking Points -- the Terms of an Understanding

-- The Soviets cannot expect to hold a conference on security and cooperation and ignore military matters entirely.

-- Some gesture has to be made to military restraint, especially in the context of the Soviet proposal for non-use of force.

-- Our proposals are minimal: some "confidence building" measures such as advance notification of maneuvers and exchange of observers.

-- If the Soviets can support this modest approach, including a separate sub-committee to work out an agreement, then we can restrain our Allies from more sweeping proposals.

-- Much of the pressure for introducing issues related to MBFR will come from Romania and Yugoslavia, in any case.

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On Permanent Machinery

-- We have been skeptical of the idea of creating new institutions.

-- We assumed the Soviets did not want a post-conference institution that would deal with military security issues in any way.

-- If this is so, we could support some post-conference secretariat without any executive powers.

Timetable

-- If we are to meet the June date for convening the full conference, The Soviets will have to agree to discuss more than merely the heading of agenda items.

-- We will introduce some rather brief descriptions of what the various working groups should consider.

-- If the Soviets cooperate, the meeting can probably be held in June and be finished by September (as Brezhnev suggested to you last September in Moscow).

-- It is in the Soviet interest to accomplish as much as possible between now and June, if they want CSCE completed before CSCE in September-October.

(The point here is that the Allies do not want to be hustled into hasty conclusions when the conference meets in June. If inadequate preparatory work is done, they will want to proceed at a deliberate pace which would take the CSCE into the time period set aside for the first substantive MBFR meeting and thereby create the de facto linkage which the Soviets don't want. Hence, again, the more preparatory work is accomplished in Helsinki, the surer we can be that CSCE is finished when MBFR starts.)

(NOTE: Dobrynin may ask you to put this on paper. You should avoid this for now and ask him instead to think about your proposal. You can then, in light of his comments, give him a paper after you are back from Paris.)

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## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLYACTION  
January 13, 1973

## MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt *HS*

SUBJECT: Your Discussion with Dobrynin on CSCE

You asked for a paper that you might give Dobrynin. Bill and I have constructed a paper that addresses those issues that will probably trouble the Soviets once they digest the agenda, the committee structure, and the mandates that the West will table this week. (I sent you the Western document and comments on it while you were in Paris.) It assumes that we want to cooperate with the Soviets to the extent that cooperation does not pit us against the Allies.

1. Date. We are committed to convene the conference in June, and most of the CSCE participants go along with this date. The problem is that some of our Allies condition this date on adequate progress in the preparatory talks, which could be defined in fairly stringent terms -- such as full agreement on mandates for committees.

The Soviets will want to pin down the date (and the Helsinki site) without conditions. The obvious compromise path is to move simultaneously in Helsinki by fixing a tentative date while pursuing the agenda discussions.

There are some indications that the Soviets might want an earlier date than June. The French have mentioned April, and the Franco-Soviet communiqué refers to the "nearest months to come." You might ask Dobrynin if they are considering another date. While we would not oppose it in principle, there are some practical problems if there is to be a Brezhnev visit in May, or Presidential travel to Europe in April.

2. Mandates. The origin of the mandates for the working committees is the EC Nine, under active French leadership (you should not accept Dobrynin's accusation of US blame for this approach). While the EC

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countries set considerable store by these mandates, there is no consensus on their disposition. The Western countries would prefer to negotiate agreed mandates, but realize the Soviets may not be willing. The USSR may decide, however, to table its own mandates or declarations so as not to be confined to Western texts. A viable compromise is to settle for a thorough discussion of the Western mandates and any Soviet or other proposals and agree that they will be considered by the relevant committees, but do not require prior agreement.

3. Military Security Issues. As reported to you in the earlier memorandum, the Western "confidence building measures" are minimal and have been supported by US in an effort to head off broader issues. Some of our Allies -- Belgium and the Dutch -- will probably break ranks, and Yugoslavia and Romania will almost certainly make some proposals on force movements and on MBFR. The real problem for the Soviets, therefore, is that this agenda item opens the door to a military-security debate. This is also a problem for us.

We can probably hold the line on our present proposals and develop an agreement on announcing major maneuvers and inviting observers which would represent a statement of intention, but not a legal or political commitment.

Our ability to work this out with the Soviets and the Allies would be facilitated by a smooth MBFR preparatory meeting, which may placate some of the Allies. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia and Romania will try to force more military issues into the discussion.

4. Permanent Machinery. This is a Soviet desideratum that will be countered in the first instance by our concept of subsuming the issue within the mandates of the committees and using existing institutions. These committees might create some limited ad hoc groups to work beyond the Conference's termination. In other words, there might, for example, be an ad hoc economic group established to complete some specified work.

What the Soviets want, however, is some kind of pseudo political organ or secretariat that could serve as a bridge to the next conference, and perhaps allow some Soviet interference in Western affairs.

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The current status is that the EC Nine have suggested to the NATO Allies a fallback position to inscribe on the agenda a separate item called "Follow-On to Recommendations and Results of the Conference." This would be undefined for now and negotiated after other work had been completed, and the participants could judge whether some follow-on machinery was necessary. Given the commitment of most Europeans to a successful Conference, it is likely that they will fall into some compromise scheme with the Soviets on permanent machinery.

This allows us some room to appear cooperative with the Soviets: (a) we can avoid opposing inscription on the agenda, (b) discuss the purposes and functions of the machinery before the ministers adopt the agenda.

\* \* \* \* \*

In the attached paper (Tab A), which you may wish to give Dobrynin, each of the foregoing compromises is set forth as a position on which the US could cooperate with the USSR in the Conference.

If you give this to Dobrynin, it will be important that when you come to some understanding with Dobrynin that arrangements will be made on this staff to permit the required monitoring and steering of the daily work in Helsinki to move to whatever agreements you have accepted.

At Tab A is the paper for Dobrynin.

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TAB A

The United States will continue to support the convocation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in June, 1973. It would facilitate agreement on this date by all participants, if there is progress in establishing an agenda.

We should aim for agreement on an agenda in as much detail as possible, and a general understanding of which committees would be established by the Foreign Ministers when they meet in June.

It would also be desirable to discuss the terms of reference or mandates for these committees and to consider proposals by all the participants including any documents the USSR might submit. Committee mandates need not be finally agreed at this time, if it is understood that the proposals made in this phase would be promptly considered by the working committees once these committees were established.

In light of the known views of many participants, it is unavoidable that the Conference should consider certain military security measures that will be useful in creating confidence in Europe. The US supports two limited measures: announcement in advance of major military maneuvers and invitations for observers to attend these maneuvers. In our view both measures could be voluntary and it would be left to each party to determine their implementation. Although a number of countries hold strong views on military security measures, the US is prepared to work to limit the military security measures to these items.

The US has considered the idea of establishing an institution to follow the work of the Conference after its formal adjournment. It would be preferable to handle as much as possible of the post-conference work through existing institutions or through temporary organs that might be required under each agenda heading. The US will not oppose inscription on the provisional agenda of items related to the establishment of a permanent organ. Before consideration of this by the Foreign Ministers and the opening of work by the Committees, there should be further discussions in this channel on the purposes and functions of a permanent institution. In any case, detailed discussion of this issue at Helsinki should logically come after discussion of other agenda items.

The US is willing to work with the Soviet side on the foregoing questions.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 PARIS 1297

EXDIS

SURJ: POMPIDOU-BREZHNEV TALKS

REF: MOSCOW 483

1. SUMMARY: ELYSEE DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR RAIMOND AND NEW QUAI SEC GEN DE COURCEL HAVE GIVEN US BRIEFINGS ON POMPIDOU-BREZHNEV TALKS, WHICH CLOSELY PARALLEL AMB DEYDOUX'S REMARKS REFTEL. THEY EMPHASIZED THAT SOVS WERE MAINLY INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING EUROPEAN SECURITY QUESTIONS-- PARTICULARLY IN CONTEXT OF CSCE AND MBFR. FOL ARE HIGHLIGHTS OF THEIR REMARKS ON THESE AND OTHER FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES DISCUSSED AT SUMMIT IN BELORUSSIA. END SUMMARY.

2. ON JAN 17 ELYSEE DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR RAIMOND, WHO ACCOMPANIED POMPIDOU TO BELORUSSIA, BRIEFED POLCOUNS ON FRANCO-SOV TALKS AND AT SEPARATE MEETING NEW QUAI SEC GEN DE COURCEL (WHO DID NOT ACCOMPANY BUT SPOKE FROM NOTES TAKEN AT SCHUMANN'S DEBRIEFING FOR TOP QUAI OFFICIALS) DID SAME FOR CHARGE. BOTH SAID SOVS WERE PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING EUROPEAN SECURITY QUESTIONS. RAIMOND, A CAREER DIPLOMAT AND SELF-PROFESSED LONG-TIME OBSERVER OF SOV BEHAVIOUR, SAID HE WAS ESPECIALLY IMPRESSED BY BREZHNEV'S MASTERY OF ISSUES DISCUSSED, HIS SELF-CONFIDENCE, EASE AND GOOD HUMOR AND HIS MARKED PREFERENCE FOR COLLEGIAL RULE--HIS PREDILECTION FOR PLENARY SESSIONS WHERE HE WAS SURROUNDED BY CLOSE ADVISORS SUCH AS GROMYKO AND ALEXANDROV. BREZHNEV AGREED TO HAVE JAN 12 TET-A-TETE AT

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POMPIDOU'S INSISTENCE. DE COURCEL SAID THAT POMPIDOU HAD WANTED A DOWN-TO-EARTH, WORKING-GET-TOGETHER AND THAT MEETINGS HAD BEEN RELATIVELY INFORMAL AND FRANK.

3. CSCE. BREZHNEV WENT INTO SURPRISING DETAIL ON CSCE MATTERS, WHICH APPEARED TO BE UPPERMOST IN HIS MIND, ESPECIALLY ON THE FIRST AGENDA POINT OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. HE DISPLAYED CONSIDERABLE APPREHENSION ABOUT WHAT SURPRISES MANDATES MIGHT CONTAIN WHEN REVEALED AT MPT II. HE EMPHASIZED SOV INTEREST IN ESTABLISHING PERMANENT MACHINERY TO DEAL WITH ON-GOING QUESTIONS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF CSCE. HERE, THE FRENCH ONCE AGAIN RESERVED THEIR POSITION, STATING IT WAS PREMATURE TO CONSIDER THIS QUESTION BEFORE CONFERENCE HAD EVEN BEGUN, ALTHOUGH FRENCH DID NOT EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY OF SEVERAL FOLLOW-ON COMMISSIONS DEPENDING ON RESULTS OF EACH COMITE'S WORK. SOVS ALSO REITERATED THEIR PREFERENCE FOR FINAL STAGE OF CSCE AT HIGHEST LEVEL. FRENCH AGAIN RESERVED THEIR POSITION. SOVS RELUCTANTLY RECOGNIZED NECESSITY TO DEAL WITH QUESTION OF EXCHANGE OF PEOPLES AND IDEAS AT CSCE. RAIMOND SAID FRENCH WERE SURPRISED TO FIND SOVS RECEPTIVE TO AGENDA ITEM ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. RAIMOND COMMENTED THIS PARTICULARLY SURPRISING IN VIEW OF BREZHNEV INSISTENCE ON TOTAL SEPARATION OF CSCE AND MBFR. DE COURCEL SAID BREZHNEV AGREED TO DIVIDING THE MAJOR AGENDA HEADING ON "COOPERATION" INTO TWO SEPARATE AGENDA ITEMS, ONE ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND THE OTHER ON CULTURAL COOPERATION. DE COURCEL ADDED THAT BREZHNEV AND POMPIDOU AGREED THEY SHOULD NOT SEEK TO ESTABLISH A COMMON FRANCO-SOV POSITION AT HELSINKI BUT THAT THEY WOULD REMAIN IN CLOSEST TOUCH CONCERNING MAJOR QUESTIONS AS THE CSCE SCENARIO UNFOLDED.

4. MBFR. BREZHNEV AND GROMYKO HAD "INSISTED" THAT  
FRENCH JOIN MBFR. RAYMOND ACKNOWLEDGED THIS MIGHT

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US AFFECTING EUROPEAN SECURITY WITHOUT FULL CONSULTATION WITH FRANCE.

6. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. RAIMOND SAID BREZHNEV WENT THROUGH FAMILIAR DIATRIBE AGAINST DISCRIMINATORY "EFFECTS" OF COMMON MARKET POLICIES VIS-A-VIS USSR AND OTHER COMECON COUNTRIES. FRENCH ATTEMPTS TO COUNTER THESE CRITICISMS WERE APPARENTLY OF LITTLE AVAIL.

7. SOVIET JEWS. THIS SUBJECT WAS ALSO DISCUSSED IN THE TETE-A-TETE. RAIMOND SAID HE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO DISCUSS WHAT WAS SAID.

8. CHINA. RAIMOND SAID SOVS APPEARED AS PARANOID AS EVER ABOUT CHINA, ASCRIBING DARK INTENTIONS TO CHINESE ALONG THEIR COMMON BORDER. DURING TALKS, SOVS HAD NOT FAILED TO NOTE CHINA'S DIPLOMATIC OVERTURES TO WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. DE COURCEL SAID DISCUSSION AMOUNTED TO A LONG MONOLOGUE BY BREZHNEV WHO PROTESTED CHINA'S CHARACTERIZING SOVIET POSTURE AS MENACING. BREZHNEV SAID SOVIETS DO NOT THREATEN CHINA AND HAVE NO INTENTION OF DOING SO. INDEED, BREZHNEV SAID HE HAD PROPOSED A NON-AGRESSION TREATY TO CHINA, BUT THEY WERE IGNORING IT.

9. VIETNAM. ELYSEE CONSIDERED BREZHNEV VERY OPTIMISTIC REGARDING AN EARLY SETTLEMENT OF VIETNAM WAR.

10. ON ALL OTHER MATTERS, INCLUDING MIDDLE EAST, BILATERAL COOPERATION, ETC., SUBSTANCE OF DISCUSSIONS WAS REFLECTED IN COMMUNIQUE.

11. DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS DESIRED TO OTHER POSTS.

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TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

FOR MR. KISSINGER FROM TED ELIOT  
MOSCOW CODE ROOM -- SECRETARY ROGERS REQUESTS THAT THIS  
MESSAGE BE DELIVERED DIRECTLY TO MR. KISSINGER

E.O. 11652 GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, OCON  
SUBJECT: INVIOABILITY OF BORDERS IN CONNECTION WITH CSCE

1. THE SECRETARY HAS ASKED THAT I BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION  
HIS PARTICULAR INTEREST IN THE WAY THE QUESTION OF THE  
INVIOABILITY OF BORDERS IS DEALT WITH IN THE CSCE  
DISCUSSIONS. DURING THE BRANDT VISIT FOREIGN MINISTER  
SCHEEL STRONGLY EMPHASIZED THE GERMAN VIEW THAT ANY  
PROVISION IN A PRINCIPLES DECLARATION REACHED AT A  
CONFERENCE ON COOPERATION AND SECURITY IN EUROPE DEALING  
WITH THIS QUESTION MUST BE COUPLED DIRECTLY WITH THE  
PRINCIPLE OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE.

2. THERE HAD BEEN SOME INDICATIONS PRIOR TO THE VISIT  
THAT THE GERMANS WERE MOVING AWAY FROM INSISTENCE ON  
THIS POINT. SCHEEL, STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY MINISTER

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EGON BAHR AND AMBASSADOR BRUNNER, THE GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE AT HELSINKI, VERY FORCEFULLY EXPRESSED THE REASONS WHY THEY FEEL THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC MUST CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THE TWO CONCEPTS BE CONNECTED. IN THE GERMAN VIEW, THE ACCEPTANCE OF A SEPARATE PRINCIPLE OF INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS WOULD MEAN A TERRITORIAL FREEZE IN EUROPE

WHICH COULD BE CHANGED, IF AT ALL, ONLY WITH THE PARTICIPATION AND PERMISSION OF THE USSR. THUS, THE EVENTUAL ELIMINATION OF FRONTIERS WITHIN A UNITED WESTERN EUROPE WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE. SIMILARLY, IN THE SPECIFIC CASE OF GERMANY THE EVENTUAL GOAL OF THE ELIMINATION OF THE DIVISION BETWEEN THE GDR AND THE FRG WOULD BE DEFEATED. BAHR POINTED OUT IN ADDITION THAT TO ACCEPT WITHOUT QUALIFICATION THE INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS IN THE CASE OF GERMANY WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF THE CONTINUING RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FOUR POWERS FOR GERMANY AS A WHOLE (PRESUMABLY ON THE THEORY THAT THIS COULD BE CONSTRUED AS A FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE GERMAN QUESTION).

3. SCHEEL ARGUED THAT WHILE THE COMMUNIQUE AGREED UPON BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION IN MOSCOW DID NOT LINK IN SEQUENCE THE INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS TO THE NON-USE OF FORCE, THE GERMANS HAD SUCCEEDED IN DOING THIS IN THEIR MOSCOW TREATY. THEY WISH TO AVOID LOSING AT CSCE WHAT THEY WERE ABLE TO MAINTAIN IN MOSCOW. THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT IF A TERRITORIAL FREEZE IS ESTABLISHED WHICH IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE ONLY THROUGH THE PERMISSION OF THE SOVIET UNION THE SOVIETS WILL NOT ONLY HAVE GAINED A MAJOR OBJECTIVE IN HELSINKI BUT ALSO AN ENHANCED POTENTIAL FOR INFLUENCE IN WESTERN EUROPE.

4. THE SECRETARY CONSIDERS THAT THESE ARE IMPORTANT POINTS WHICH THE US SIDE MUST BEAR IN MIND AS THE CSCE DISCUSSIONS PROGRESS. THE GERMANS HAVE SHOWN SOME WILLINGNESS TO FIND COMPROMISE LANGUAGE IN AN EFFORT TO BRIDGE DRAFTING PROBLEMS WITH THE SOVIETS. IT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THEY ARE NOT PREPARED TO DROP A LINKAGE BETWEEN THE INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS AND THE NON-USE OF FORCE. THE SECRETARY CONSIDERS THAT THIS POSITION

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HAS INTRINSIC MERIT FROM THE US POINT OF VIEW QUOTE  
APART FROM THE SUPPORT WHICH WE WOULD BE WELL ADVISED  
IN ANY EVENT TO RENDER THE GERMANS ON THIS SUBJECT. ROGERS

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs  
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA  
Georgi M. Kornienko, Head of USA Division,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Victor M. Sukhodrev, First Secretary, Ministry  
of Foreign Affairs, Interpreter

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, NSC Senior Staff  
Mr. William Hyland, NSC Staff  
Peter Rodman, NSC Staff  
Richard Campbell, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME:

Sunday, May 6, 1973  
12:15 to 2:40 p.m.

PLACE:

Winter Garden, Politburo Villa, Zavidovo

SUBJECTS:

CSCE, MBFR; Nuclear Agreement, UN  
Membership for FRG and GDR

Gromyko: As I said as you came in, I suggest we talk about European affairs. That is how we agreed with the General Secretary, and if we have time we might pass on to other matters.

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: I would like to put forward the general idea that we might start off by talking about the all-European Security Conference. Here, strokes all that consider preparatory work, but the consultations seem to be lacking the necessary dynamism, if I may use that word, and considering the understanding we reached to begin the Conference in June. That seems to be the general view.

Several days ago your representative at Helsinki suggested to our representative, that perhaps it would be wise at this time to officially inform the Finns in the nearest future that we have in view convening the

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the actual Conference at the end of June, so they could start the necessary preparations. That suggestion made by your representative is certainly in line with our wishes. And if that is the case perhaps we can reach an understanding among our two delegations to exert their efforts with allies and friends to give it that dynamism which I said the consultations lack.

Kissinger: Who handles the Swedes?

When we were here in September, we agreed in principle to the convening of the Security Conference at the end of June. We maintain our position. There is no reason to delay the opening of the Conference. We believe it is possible to open then. We have already talked with Brandt in Washington in that sense; we expressed our view. We see no obstacle on his side.

The difficulty on the Security Conference is not between you and us. The difficulty is that the Foreign Ministries in almost every country that have been inactive before, now have been given something to do. There are endless papers and preparations. There is no issue between you and us. The problem is in other countries.

We believe the schedule we agreed upon with the General Secretary will be kept.

There is another question of whether the final meeting will be at the Head of State level or the Foreign Minister level. It will in any event be at the Politburo level. [Gromyko and Dobrynin smile]

Gromyko: We are certainly pleased with your confirming the time limits we agreed upon last year, to hold the Conference at the end of June. We believe we should on both sides continue our efforts to stick to that time limit and to act accordingly with allies and other participants to the Conference. So if there are any waverers, we can bring influence to bear.

As regards the suggestion to have the Conference in three stages, Comrade Dobrynin informed me that just before his departure you informed him of the idea of the first two stages--the Foreign Ministers and then the Commission. You have reservations with the third stage--but are giving it sympathetic consideration.

Kissinger: If the first two go well, it will be all right for the heads to meet. If not, the Foreign Ministers.

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Gromyko: We think to hold the final stage at the highest level would be in the interest of all sides. No one could deny that a meeting at the highest level would be significant. The very fact of a meeting of the highest statesmen would be of paramount importance. Therefore I wish to say on behalf of the General Secretary, we are earnestly hoping that the President and you as the closest assistant will have that goal.

We appreciate your remark that it will be--at least in the Soviet Union--at the Politburo level.

Kissinger: I told your Ambassador the American equivalent of the Politburo, but I doubt he reported it.

Gromyko: He didn't. It is the most confidential part of the confidential channel!

Kissinger: We won't be the obstacle to such a meeting, I believe, if matters take a reasonable course. This is one subject that the President and the General Secretary might discuss in the United States. It is not a matter of principle for us.

Gromyko: We don't think that a meeting at the highest level will be protracted. It should be well prepared.

Kissinger: How many heads are there?

Sonnenfeldt: Thirty-one.

Kissinger: I insist that Princess Grace be included. I already consulted her preliminarily in Washington. Her attitude was positive.

Gromyko: Thirty-four heads.

Kissinger: Including Liechten and the Vatican.

Sonnenfeldt: The Vatican can give an invocation.

Kissinger: All thirty-four will want to speak. They are not usually selected for their retiring natures.

Gromyko: Who will represent Spain?

Kissinger: Franco. [Laughter]

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Gromyko: Maybe we should stop there and not go deeper!

Kissinger: San Marino will be there too.

Dobrynin: Yes.

Kissinger: Did you know that San Marino's Foreign Minister was in China?

Gromyko: Really? Did they conclude a Treaty against us?

Kissinger: I don't know, but the Chinese Foreign Minister was going to go there on his European tour. I don't know why.

We will give it sympathetic consideration. If all goes well, there won't be any problem.

Gromyko: As for representation at the highest level, there can be cases where a country can choose who it wishes to represent it. As for the United States and the Soviet Union, it is clear who will represent them.

Kissinger: We will give it sympathetic consideration. It is not a question of principle for us. It won't be a problem.

Gromyko: We could briefly discuss certain other matters--I list them not in order of importance. I recall you had a conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin on the possibility of exchange of information on military maneuvers, and the possible exchange of observers at those maneuvers, with the aim of lessening tensions. Also we mentioned an exchange of observers on a voluntary basis. The suggestion was then made by others at Helsinki, not by the United States and the Soviet Union, on the exchange of information on large scale troop movements, within borders or without, regardless of maneuvers. This goes beyond the understanding between us, and we accepted your idea. It would lead us into a jungle which we could not escape. The problem of what is considered a large-scale movement. Where is the criterion by which to judge? So we think the suggestion is an unconvincing one, and we should abide by our previous understanding.

We want to raise this because we think the U.S. representative at Helsinki doesn't always stick to the understanding we reached.

Dobrynin tells me instructions have been sent to your representative at Helsinki, but we don't know what the instructions are.

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Kissinger: Let me explain. We have discussed with Ambassador Dobrynin the scenario we plan to follow. Our difficulties arise from the fact that our own allies are taking extremely strong positions. It is difficult for us not to support our allies in the discussions. Our instructions are for our representative to talk to your representative on the suggestion of maneuvers. We expect you will reject our proposal. If our intelligence is correct, you won't accept--though we don't tell you how to run your Foreign Office. Our representative will then tell our allies that we made a major effort.

Gromyko: Thank you for that clarification, which concerns your tactical approach. I appreciate your understanding of our situation.

Kissinger: But our Ambassador doesn't yet know this. After he reports your negative reaction, we will send him new instructions.

Gromyko: It is clear, clear. I trust you will agree that regarding the question of large-scale maneuvers, there will be as many views as there are states in the world. It is not in our interest to engage in a dispute on this.

Kissinger: If there are any difficulties, your Ambassador will let me know and I will straighten it out.

Gromyko: I trust most probably your attention has been drawn to the question of the principle of inviolability of borders in the list of major political principles. You know one of the Commissions at work in Helsinki is at work on political principles. In our view, the principle of inviolability of boundaries should occupy the principal place, and we are operating from the assumption that our two sides have an understanding on that.

Kissinger: When did we do that?

Gromyko: There is no need to go into the positions of previous U.S. Presidents, but suffice it to say it was in the Communique last May. Suffice it to say, we expect the United States and the Soviet Union will proceed from the joint line as expressed in the Communique and that it will be reflected in the principles and will occupy the first priority place it deserves.

Kissinger: In the Communique we had both the inviolability of frontiers and the renunciation of force. The German position is to accept the inviolability of frontiers in the context of renunciation of force, but in

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a sense that preserves the possibility of German reunification or European unification. The Germans are prepared to have the same language as in the Moscow Treaty.

Gromyko: Nothing in the Moscow Treaty has that language about the context.

Kissinger: Basically this is a matter between you and the Germans, whom you will be seeing soon. We are not urging the Germans in any particular direction.

As the Germans explained to us in Washington, their concern is that they want inviolability linked sequentially with renunciation and we of course agree. But this is a matter for you to discuss with them.

Gromyko: The notion that the principle of inviolability of boundaries should be reflected in context with the question of the non-use of force is a false and artificial invention. It suffices to read the Soviet-Federal Republic of Germany treaty to see they are listed as two separate points. In fact we drew West Germany's attention to this fact, and they agreed with us there were no grounds for the view. This is what they said to us, and they have abided by this understanding. But they have said since that non-use of force should be in the first position and inviolability should be in the second. You can't have it that one principle absorbs or swallows the others; they should be equal. The West Germans corrected their position--at least they say they understand our position. But they still say they want non-use first and inviolability second--not in the sense of interdependability but by enumeration.

You know how wars begin. We think inviolability should be first. But in the Soviet-German Treaty you listed non-use first and non-violability second.

Gromyko: They are not listed in that way to show any interdependability--but because that Treaty was written in ascending order. [laughter]

Kissinger: [Showing Gromyko the final page of the Soviet-FRG Treaty, on which his signature is the last]: I must point out that your ego is rising to my level: The signatures rise to Gromyko! [Laughter]

If I may quote the Foreign Minister, it would help us with Bonn. Because they pointed out that in the Moscow Communique we listed the non-use of force last. We neglected to point out that it was written in rising order and that your Treaty had it first.

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Gromyko: We are not suggesting in any way that in listing principles we should explain that the first one is of the first importance and that the others are in declining scale. But surely as politicians we must realize what the situation is. When I referred to the Soviet-German Treaty, I did so only as . . .

Kissinger: It is an almost Talmudic point. I think that if non-violability is second and renunciation is first it could be solved. But it is between you and the Germans. I must tell you the Germans made an extremely strong case to us, and you can expect very strong representations from them in Bonn.

Gromyko: In what sense?

Kissinger: The Germans claim that the implication of Articles 2 and 3 [of the Soviet-German Treaty] is that they have agreed to inviolability only in the context of nonuse--"in accordance with the foregoing purposes." That is their view. They can't agree to something which prevents changes of frontiers by peaceful means. It also would rule out the unification of Europe. They haven't explained to me how they can achieve both the unification of Germany and the unification of Europe. But I can't solve all problems.

Gromyko: Let me give you the precise explanation on this score. That is their unilateral interpretation. It is not a bilateral one. In the negotiations, we did not set that as an objective. That is my first point. My second point is that when the Treaty was already drafted and in the final stage and Foreign Minister Scheel came to Moscow and raised it in conversation with me whether it might be possible to make even some slight and weak linkage--not even in the sense of interdependence or subordination, but just some weak linking--to that I said there is no question, and we will not accept any moving of any comma or anything in this Treaty. That was the only time this came up.

Third, it is sometimes asked, what is the situation? Does the Soviet Union categorically rule out completely the possibility of any voluntary corrections or rectification of borders? This was something that the West German representatives raised during the negotiations with them on the Treaty. We said that wasn't the issue at stake; we didn't want the Treaty to include any clause which could in any way justify a revanchist political struggle in favor of a change of boundaries. We could not give our blessing to a struggle for a change of boundaries.

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This was what we wanted. They are trying to substitute one question for another.

You say this is primarily between the Soviet Union and West Germany. We are in contact with them on this point. What they say is, let's list that principle [inviolability] but as a separate and independent principle. But recognizing it as separate and independent they are taking a realistic stand. But we think it should be first and we want you to support our stand. This reflects the view of President Nixon, because it is in the US-Soviet Communique. I keep showing you the document but you don't want to look.

Kissinger: I understand it. I am following the theory of the Foreign Minister who said that in the Soviet-German Treaty it was rising.

Kornienko: It doesn't mean every document is in that form!

Kissinger: Don't you have a standard form?

I won't play any games. We don't think any one is more important than others. [In the US-Soviet Communique] they are also related because they are in the same sentence.

In our nuclear document we try to link Article I and II with the language "in accordance with the purposes of Article I." I would be disconcerted to hear that these are not interrelated, since the Foreign Minister says Article 2 and 3 of the German Treaty are not interrelated.

Gromyko: All the principles are interrelated. All principles of international relationships are, and one can't say that some are for the short term and the others last for 150 years. We would have complete chaos.

Kissinger: Can I get the Foreign Minister's understanding, at least on the matter of bilateral concern, namely the nuclear treaty, that Article I and II are related to each other?

Gromyko: We understand it very simply: Article I relates to the prevention of nuclear war, and Article II relates to the prevention of war in general.

Kissinger: Our argument is that nuclear war cannot be prevented unless war in general is prevented.

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Gromyko: There can be a situation where there is war but not a nuclear war. You have seen it yourselves in Vietnam.

Kissinger: We don't want to make it possible for a signatory to start a conventional war and cite Article I to prevent nuclear war. That is certainly the position we will take.

Gromyko: What is the analogy?

Kissinger: Last night, Article II says, "in accordance with Article I and to realize its objectives."

Gromyko: Article II is about the prevention of war in general and Article I applies to nuclear war. Article II is broader in scale.

Kissinger: If Article II is violated, Article I becomes inapplicable.

Dobrynin: The second includes the first.

Kissinger: That is what I am saying. If Article II is violated, Article I is inapplicable.

Gromyko: No, no, no. You know many cases of war without nuclear war. What if something happens in the Middle East--let's pray to the gods it doesn't--

Kissinger: We are talking about the signatories. If something happens between Israel and the Arabs, it is their problem.

Gromyko: We are taking on an obligation.

Kissinger: If the Soviet Union or the United States engages in war against third countries, then we substantially return to the situation that now exists. Article II prohibits the use or threat of force against third countries and against us too. If you land in Alaska....

Gromyko: Both would be violated.

Kissinger: We don't want to say that if Article II is violated, Article I is enforced. The question is, if one of us--it is of course inconceivable--

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Gromyko: There are other articles in there--the UN Charter, self-defense. A treaty is after all signed in order to implement it. References to various articles are standard for a treaty.

Kissinger: To return, I can't defend the German treaty since I had nothing to do with it. But in our treaty I must establish that there is a connection between Articles I and II.

Gromyko: Yes, in the sense that they both try to stop war.

Kornienko: You mean when the Treaty is signed you will stop bombing Cambodia?

Kissinger: No. You can't prevent us from continuing a war we have started! Back to the Germans. You get in touch with us after your consultation with Bonn. We have no fixed view on the order of clauses and principles. We will certainly place no obstacles to the Germans and you. Let us know through your Ambassador.

Gromyko: We will certainly inform you after our visit on how matters stand.

So we can end our discussion of this.

Now another question that arises is one that concerns the Mediterranean and the Middle East in the context of the European Conference. We proceed from the fact that it would not be in either your or our interest to make the subject of the Middle East a subject of the discussion of the Conference or reflected in the document in any way. We have enough business on Europe. Otherwise we would have to invite representatives of the Middle East, North Africa and Israel. We would have to stop up our ears because they would all be willing to swear.

Kissinger: We basically agree with you. It may be that Cyprus or Greece may want some reference, but we basically don't want to get into the Mediterranean.

Gromyko: We are pleased to hear your attitude. If a country like Greece wants to say something in its statement, that is okay. But no discussion of the issue or inclusion in the final document.

Kissinger: We see it the same way--no wide-ranging discussion. But if when we meet, we find some countries won't sign the document without some reference in the document, then you and we should have reference. We can leave it to the Conference. I notice that some Africans are

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invited to submit written views.

We won't encourage that.

Gromyko: The important thing is not to discuss that question. Princess Grace might want to circulate a document and we can't prevent her.

Kissinger: I must confess that I am more interested from the point of view of personality than in her documents.

I would have to go to Monaco to explain the intractability of the Soviet Foreign Minister. It is a long subject.

Dobrynin: Two weeks it would take!

Gromyko: Then we would have to go to explain our position.

Kissinger: Peaceful competition! We don't claim exclusive rights!

Gromyko: Another question relative to the European Conference, which will probably come under item 3 of the agenda as it is today--exchange of people and cultural ties. We want you to know we are in no way afraid of the cultural exchange of people. But the sole point is--here, no one should try to grab someone by the throat and claim that one has forced that. The sole point is, this should take place on the basis of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. We are not the only one. There are many other countries who feel the same way. If this is the view of our two countries then there will be no difficulty at the Conference. We should rule out being bogged down in detailed discussions and trying to trip up someone.

There have never been any difficulties in negotiating cultural exchanges with the United States. We are doing it right now.

Kissinger: I can assure the Foreign Minister we are not approaching human contacts particularly with the aim of embarrassing the Soviet Union. We approach it concretely, not as a means to accomplish something abstract. We will treat it as embodying and reflecting the principles we have agreed upon.

Gromyko: I listen to that with satisfaction. That is exactly how we see it.

Kissinger: On many of these, after we have stated our general principles, we should stay in contact as specific issues come up.

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Gromyko: There is another matter: we gave you our draft of the possible final draft of the document on political issues [Tab A]. I am sure you have reviewed it. We did it with the aim of setting up on common ground.

Kissinger: We have studied your proposition and we have many comments and amendments and suggestions.

There are two problems: the evolution of the preliminary Conference has affected some of your draft.

We have not informed the French and the Germans. Have you?

Gromyko: Not concretely.

Kissinger: Not to the French at all. Some to the Germans. I was talking about it with Bahr in September. But I didn't show a draft.

Gromyko: You have studied it completely?

Kissinger: What we would like to do is do a counterdraft, after consultation with our allies. We would like your authorization to do it in a formal way. We will talk to the three and we will let you have our views by the end of the month.

Gromyko: All right.

The draft we handed you dealt with preliminary matters. It is not a principal question whether it would be one or two. You are free not to wait until our new draft. Let's leave it open, whether it will be an all-embracing document or two documents--on political matters and then on economic and cultural matters. Maybe one, maybe two.

As to the agenda, now we should look about the possibility of establishing some kind of organ--a committee, or commission. I would like to say a few words.

As I said at Camp David, we have no special interest in an organ. The Soviet Union will continue to exist even if it is not set up--but nevertheless, we feel it could be useful linkage between the Conference and a later meeting on troop reduction. Just a consultative, purely consultative organ, for preparation for consultation by governments. This would be all right. We think at least there is nothing bad in it.

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Kissinger: How do you visualize the consultative organ?

Gromyko: Since it will function between the first Conference and the second, in idea it will be permanent. It is a matter of convenience and open for consideration. We are open minded. One thing more: it should be written that it will be consultative.

Kissinger: We will reserve our judgment. We had thought of some kind of administrative organ for distributing papers--as a sort of a clearing house.

Gromyko: All right. In Vienna, it looks like the Hungary question has been solved. What is going on?

Kissinger: It took three months. It nearly broke up the NATO alliance. Our debates with our allies are more serious than with you.

Gromyko: If you ever need advice on allies, let us know.

Dobrynin: We will help you.

Gromyko: By September-October, the all-European Conference will be over. I hope, in view of the mountain of paper. Last fall we agreed on September-October.

Kissinger: Can we at least agree on a time interval between the end of the CSCE and the beginning of MBFR?

Gromyko: And you suggest?

Kissinger: Say one month?

Gromyko: I think it would be acceptable. I will tell the General Secretary.

Kissinger: Good.

Gromyko: Do you have any bright ideas for this?

Kissinger: It would be constructive if you pulled your forces out of East Germany. It would create a good atmosphere.

You are asking me in what direction the Conference should go and what it should accomplish?

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Gromyko: Yes. It is a sort of goal.

Kissinger: We submitted our analyses to our allies. Do you have it? My understanding is that whenever we distribute something to our allies you get in it in 48 hours. Is it true?

Gromyko: Why 48?

Dobrynin: Sometimes we get a distorted view from the allies and want to hear it from the horse's mouth!

Gromyko: You can wait until you are ready.

Kissinger: No we are ready. We want to treat this as seriously as SALT. We are genuinely trying to examine what proposals we can make which both sides can feel improves their security or at least doesn't hurt it. One question is whether the reductions should include only stationed or also national forces. The difficulty with national forces is it is hard to monitor reductions. And national forces are not of the quality of stationed forces. I am thinking of the Polish Army band.

The second point, what I said about maneuvers in connection with the CSCE--if it is not addressed in the CSCE it will at least have to be addressed in MBFR.

Another issue is whether we speak in terms of units or in terms of numbers. Do we say three regiments, or 50 men from each regiment? If we say 50 men it is harder to verify whether they have left. This will have to be addressed--for both sides.

Then ceilings. I joke about all Soviet forces. We won't reject it. But probably they will be smaller margins.

In the President's Foreign Policy Report we discuss this quite openly. In the Arms Control section. It discusses our philosophy, though not the numbers.

We are genuinely interested in achieving some common ceiling.

Then the countries in the area should not be used to circumvent the agreement. Some allies fear you might put into Budapest what you take from Central Europe. I asked why would they do it in Budapest if they can put them in Brest, which is closer to Central Europe.

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Dobrynin: When?

Kissinger: June, July. When the General Secretary comes we can begin discussion.

Of course, we look at it from our point of view. And certainly we are approaching it without giving ourselves the benefit of the doubt. But we also consider your point of view. So we are not making insolent proposals.

Once we know the views of our allies--by June or July--we can begin to exchange ideas.

[Kornienko gets up and gives Gromyko a paper]

Never in all our years has Kornienko not given a paper that was trouble.

Gromyko: This is a subject that I had in the back of my mind, but we could do it later.

Kissinger: No, he is a great professional.

Gromyko: This concerns the question of the two Germanies joining the United Nations.

Kissinger: Do you want to express a view? I saw it was a whole page.

Gromyko: It can be one sentence.

Kissinger: I accept.

Dobrynin: DeGaulle's method. But in a positive way.

Kissinger: Our view is that after ratification of the German Treaty--which will be before your visit.

Gromyko: By the Bundestag. Not the other formalities.

Kissinger: That is only another month.

Gromyko: It is the Bundestag that ratifies, then it goes to the Bundestat.

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Kissinger: The latter has two choices. If it rejects it, the Bundestag can override by an absolute majority. Last year it was a problem, but it wouldn't be this year. The Bundestag can also give an advisory opinion. But even if it rejects it, it won't be a problem.

Gromyko: I think before the visit to the United States it will be completed even from the formal point of view.

Kissinger: Yes, I agree. After the formal ratification, we will proceed with the recognition of the German Democratic Republic. Then we will be prepared to support, in conjunction with the Federal Republic of Germany, the admission of the two Germanies to the United Nations.

Gromyko: When?

Kissinger: We would prefer not to have a special session for it, but have it in a regular General Assembly session.

Gromyko: The outcome is the same.

Kissinger: The outcome is the same and we will not in any event oppose it. If you agree in Bonn, we won't disagree. As long as no other issue is raised at that session.

Gromyko: Preliminarily it can be agreed that no other question can be raised.

Kissinger: Preliminarily, if the Federal Republic of Germany is not opposed. I am not insulting their Foreign Minister if I say he doesn't have the new Politburo member's precision of mind. That is true of most Foreign Ministers.

Dobrynin: We won't go into detail!

Gromyko: Now it is 20 to 3. Americans are more punctual in regard to meals, so we won't deign to keep you more.

Kissinger: Anatol, can I see you for a minute?

[He hands over the list of Soviet Jews, Tab B ]

Can our Embassy reveal the meetings with Brezhnev, Gromyko and Dobrynin? Just to confirm the meetings with the people.

Dobrynin: Yes. Brezhnev and Gromyko.

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Document 26.  
Meeting of the MSZMP Political Committee.  
Verbatim Record of Minutes (Excerpts).  
*May 16, 1989.*



**Meeting of the MSZMP Political Committee**

May 16, 1989

**Verbatim Record of Minutes**

[Subject:] **Political conciliatory negotiations**

*(last quarter of the meeting)*

**György Fejti:** I would like to give a brief report to the Political Committee on the reflections with respect to the initiative of the Central Committee regarding this political conciliatory forum, in addition to the information published in the press. Up to now, the New March Front responded. The whole response can be considered as a substantial contribution. It does include references to the past and some reticence, but fundamentally I see the willingness to co-operate and that we should and could do something together. We received a response from the Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Society. This is not a substantial contribution. It confirms that the Society received our initiative, and it basically informs us about the fact that the Society does not assume the position of the Opposition Roundtable. And up until yesterday – as I have not seen today's mail yet – we received a response from SZOT, DEMISZ and the Ferenc Münnich Society as well. All three are substantial responses, that is they deal extensively with the proposal of going into details, in a supportive way, but making it clear that the two-party negotiation method proposed by the Opposition Roundtable is unacceptable for all three organisations.

All of us present are aware that a very quick rejection using a rather unusual tone has arrived from the Opposition Roundtable, effectively on the day of making the statement public. This has caused displeasure even among members of the opposition, and has generated certain internal disputes. So, it became obvious that the organisations were not able to conduct a substantial debate on the initiative of the Central Committee. According to our investigations at the various organisations, despite the response of the Opposition Roundtable, the important organisations intend to deal with this question this week at a separate meeting of the opposition leaders. To my knowledge, the Hungarian Democratic Forum shall discuss the issue today, but the social democrats and the representatives of the people's party have also informed me about wishing to form their own positions, therefore I believe that those statements of opinion were correct which maintained that the Opposition Roundtable is one thing, and it is quite another thing that we asked independent and autonomous organisations to give their opinions, and a detailed and substantial response, if possible, to the proposal.

I would like to tell the members of the Political Committee that on Wednesday the three of us with comrade Nyers and comrade Pozsgay have sat down together at the office of comrade Grósz, and we reached the conclusion that it would perhaps be useful if the participants initiated direct contact with the important organisations. Comrade Pozsgay undertook to establish contact with the Hungarian Democratic Forum, comrade Nyers undertook to negotiate with the social democrats, and comrade Grósz has two meetings pending as well (*Károly Grósz: Friday afternoon*). I expect that, partly, these have already taken place, or will take place in the near future. It would be important to ask these organisations to develop their own independent positions. And after receiving these, we could start considering our next steps.

The reflections make it obvious to me that the position of the Opposition Roundtable still reflects the dominant influence of the Alliance of Free Democrats. This

also means that basically, in effect trying to weigh the possibility of reaching a substantial result in case of a bilateral meeting, becomes doubtful. When I say a bilateral meeting, I mean the negotiations between the Opposition Roundtable and MSZMP lesz egy lista a rövidítésekről, nem?. As a matter of fact, the Alliance of Free Democrats has an absolutely negative position regarding the party law, just like regarding the Constitutional Court and the presidential system. Therefore, it is not just a matter of whether the technical preparatory phase can be completed, since this can be done if it becomes urgent, but it becomes doubtful whether any result can be achieved by a negotiation method dominated by the Alliance of Free Democrats. When the negotiating parties are already there. Therefore, after devoting a lot of time to this matter and gathering a lot of information I seriously suggest conducting substantial negotiations with the organisations with which we have well-balanced relations, or at least this was the case up until now, namely the socialist democrats, the People's Party and the Hungarian Democratic Forum, about the fact that it is only possible for us, together with them, to break this deadlock if they are able to think beyond the very negative position of the Alliance of Free Democrats.

I would like the Political Committee to have a clear understanding of this, that is all this is not due to some tactic on our part, that the Opposition Roundtable would need to be sliced up anyway, but we can clearly see today that if it continues its work with the same composition and along the same lines as before then reaching a compromise will be absolutely hopeless even after the beginning of substantial negotiations. The free democrats want to go public, to debate, want a forum for publicising their views. They don't want a compromise. My investigations have clearly, totally and unquestionably convinced me that this is the case unless a shift of power happens among the leaders of the free democrats. So those who set the tone today, this will possibly be confirmed by comrade Nyers as well, belong definitely to the militant section. I do not have extensive knowledge about their internal power structure. The more level-headed individuals we have negotiated with before, well, whether voluntarily or yielding to pressure, have definitely fallen into the background. Therefore, I would like to conclude by saying that the two-party meetings decided on should, if possible, be conducted until the end of this week, and it would be useful if these organisations realised the value of, well, acting as independent negotiating parties.

**Károly Grósz:** I will meet with the People's Party on Friday afternoon.

**Rezső Nyers:** With the People's Party on Friday afternoon. We will try maybe this week, if possible, I will request a date, and they will come, the social democrats. I don't know what's going on with the Smallholders.

**Károly Grósz:** I am expecting a message from them, because I am the go between... (*Rezső Nyers: Oh.*) through.... Yes, I am expecting a message. They said, I believe that they have a session today... no, tomorrow, they will convene the leaders on Wednesday, and they want to meet afterwards. Okay.

[...]

[Subject:] **The re-burial of Imre Nagy and his collaborators**

**György Fejti:** Third issue: a meeting with three members of the Committee for Historical Justice is coming up this week. The topic of this meeting is the 16<sup>th</sup> and the issue of



separate demonstrations linked to the 16<sup>th</sup>. Well, feelings towards this are changing everyday here. What I can say is that the position of the family and the Committee for Historical Justice is objective and fair. They are aware of the potential dangers of a possible separate program organised at a different place from the cemetery, and the university... As a matter of fact, the members of the Committee for Historical Justice have distanced themselves from the idea of a separate program as well, that is the separate program to be held in a different place away from the cemetery. At the same time this extreme group of the Alliance of Free Democrats, or the Circle of Democrats, this is a small marginal formation.

**Rezső Nyers:** This is the Republican?

**György Fejti:** The Republican Circle, yes. And a small fraction of the earlier group, three opposition organisations have started to make waves in order to win over all the democratic opposition to support such a separate event. So, until this is the business or the initiative of these three organisations, it is not really dangerous. In the event that it should spread, and become perhaps a leading issue with the Opposition Roundtable and the Federation of Hungarian Democrats [?], or more importantly, the historical parties should see an opportunity in this event for tactical manoeuvring, then this could become a time-bomb. Therefore, I will listen to what the Committee for Historical Justice has to say, and after consulting with them, I think it would be important to talk to each opposition organisation separately about the dangers it entails, the potential dangers in an international context as well as in a national context – and to prevent the formation of a coalition here. If a coalition should come into being in support of this, then it could become a very difficult political event to handle.

So, in addition to pointing this out at the political consultations, and as I see it, and I talked about this with the leaders of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, they do not wish to become involved, but are not unanimous... And it is to be feared that a temporary favourable environment may allow minority groups to come to the forefront, and a coalition will be organised again around this burial. This cannot be avoided by political consultations alone. It seems advisable to discuss with them the substance, aim, concept of the event in public administration organs, and to contain it or try to contain it strictly staying within the bounds of the act on right of assembly. Because as time goes by it becomes more and more difficult. So, I emphasise that until only these three organisations are involved, it is easy handle both politically and administratively. We should prevent the event becoming wider, sympathising with the events at the Hősök tere and in the Parliament to turn into a ...

**Károly Grósz:** Well, the government state administration is working on this, no more can be done directly in this matter. One question has been raised here while talking of the propaganda of this event, about whether the Party should make a statement before the Imre Nagy burial ceremony. I would not support it. I think that the government statement which calls for national reconciliation and whatever else is enough, because we have to separate the Imre Nagy case from the political rehabilitation aspect entirely from this, this is not the legal aspect. There is a passionate legal debate as well. The opinion of lawyers differs greatly in this respect, whether a law can be made at all, whether submitting a protest about the lawfulness is justified, because this is not such a straight forward matter. If we look further we might come across some interesting things. Maybe, it can be proven subsequently that Imre Nagy was a Hungarian citizen, and a lot of effort is expended to do

this, but the legitimacy of him acting as the prime minister becomes doubtful, and so on and so forth. So this is not a closed and evident matter. Testimonies are very contradictory.

Legally it would be more justified to hold a new trial, because so many new circumstances have been raised. To say just one example: the judge at the end of the hearing was different from the one who had started it. It is a strict rule in the Hungarian legal system that if the person of the judge, or even an assessor changes then the whole case must be retried. This was not respected, therefore legally a retrial would be necessary. However, a retrial would mean that everyone, who participated in public life at the time, or around that time, and could have played any role would need to be individually interrogated. So it would mean individual interrogations of lets say everyone from Béla Biskú to Jenő Fock and who knows who else. So, this case therefore is not closed, legally it is still. Such a ... Marosán, and a lot else. Now that Marosán letter needs to be found, the one he addressed to the Executive Committee, well whatever, these still need to be looked for. So, I say that we, as the Party should not take a public stand, we should wait. This has to be dealt with on a state channel.

**Miklós Németh:** It was very interesting that both of them [in the Polish negotiating party], Jaruzelski and Rakowski have said that they understood, but asked why we don't rehabilitate him politically. To them, he says it is absolutely obvious – from the Gomulka archives, or whatever – that Imre Nagy was the victim of a political assassination. This was said, unfortunately, word for word. Gomulka too...

**Károly Grósz:** Of course. No doubt. This is the precise way to put it. Victim of a political assassination. This is one thing. It is another thing what might be uncovered if we start to scratch the surface.

**Rezső Nyers:** What was Gomulka's role? How was he involved?

**Miklós Németh:** They didn't say anything more. I told them that we would be interested in these things. Interested. But it was surprising.

**Károly Grósz:** This is like the experience as Zhivkov was saying that when the fighting was taking place here, and the machine gun, they are in the meeting...

**Rezső Nyers:** Well, my position too is that his rehabilitation is politically justified. Different for the Party politics, right. It is a different matter, the re-establishment of his party membership is another... But it is politically justified and not necessarily legally. Although if legally as well, if such things happened like a different person beginning it and a different person completing it. I don't really know, Tunisz completed it, right?, or Vida?

**Károly Grósz:** He completed it, but it was started by ahmm Brahó or Rahó? He started it, he conducted it then, I don't remember anymore, I read the... and Vida...

**Károly Grósz:** Yes. No. They put the case aside for four months.

**Rezső Nyers:** Yes, then we are talking about the one in February.

**Károly Grósz:** The one in February. He put it aside for four months.

**Rezső Nyers:** Someone else started it in February, then came Vida, but Vida then completed it in June.

**Károly Grósz:** But he did not take the case from the start. This is the legal problem, that he did not launch the investigation from the start.

**Rezső Nyers:** But that is essentially a legal proceeding. (*Interjection: cannot be understood*) I also believe that now the political rehabilitation is more evident. Well, Imre Nagy is generally known to be the Hungarian Buharin. The Hungarian Buharin. Well, Buharin was rehabilitated politically. Then...

**Mihály Jassó:** To me the question is that – because we can be certain that we will have to deal with it – we [are making] a political judgement now before the legal settlement. We can be accused again of putting pressure on the legal system. So, maybe a previous legal settlement is a more attractive solution, but it is obvious, to me it's obvious that we cannot avoid the political and the party political settlement of this matter. It will be brought before us. Whether we want it or not.

**Miklós Németh:** They compared it to Katyn, that in this unfortunately... with the Russians..., as they put it, it is the same. Everyone knows who fired the shots in Katyn. The Russians know, we know as well, Jaruzelski said. But this...

**Károly Grósz:** The current Soviet leaders have a fair position in this Imre Nagy case. They said we should do as we deem fit, but they would not react. We cannot go further than this, well, what can we say. They said they would not react.

**Rezső Nyers:** This legal and political rehabilitation is so intertwined that they cannot be dealt with separately. Well, as we saw, the charge at the hearing, the charge: conspiring to subvert the political system. This charge is a political charge. If we acquit him of this legally then we acquit him politically. So, I do not think it would be a good idea in any way to separate the political and legal [concerns]. I believe the party political matter can be separated. That is a different matter.

**Károly Grósz:** Comrade Nyers, this is not so simple, because legally he could be sentenced to at least six years. What can the court do with a dead man? Sentence him to eight years now? This is completely illogical, a nightmare. Because, for example, the appointment of Maléter as the Minister of Defence was done altogether illegally, because according to the regulations at the time the Council of Ministers would have had to decide. Not the parliament, but the Council of Ministers. There was no Council of Ministers meeting. Second: the withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. The parliament would have been needed, there was no parliament, there was no meeting of the Council of Ministers. If the president of the Presidential Council were still alive, the late Dobi, even he could not assume the responsibility, because according to the papers of the time he didn't have [authority] either.

**Rezső Nyers:** This is a formal legal issue. This is why I say that we can pass judgement on him legally, but not politically. Politically we can't, because it is commonly known that the leadership at the time accepted the withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty Organisation with

the exception of György Lukács. Well except György Lukács and Zoltán Szántó – maybe not Lukács, except Zoltán Szántó.

**Károly Grósz:** Right, I do not support a public statement on the Imre Nagy case by the MSZMP before the closing of the proceedings.

**Document 27.**  
**Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable.**  
**Verbatim Record of Minutes (Excerpts).**  
*May 24, 1989.*



## Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable

May 24, 1989

(Verbatim text of the video-taped record. Excerpts.)

[...]

**Imre Boross:** ... Well, we have to face it that if in the next elections, if MSZMP were badly defeated, it would be bad for us. If their defeat would amount to less than 5 percent of the votes, that might tempt them to turn to arms ... *(Some words are unintelligible.)* Therefore it is in our interest to some extent that the reform wing within MSZMP should become stronger, and that this wing should receive the majority of the votes, not some fundamentalist, or God knows what. So we have an interest tied up with the reform wing, I have to say.

[...]

**László Morvay:** I feel The Opposition Roundtable may get into a terribly embarrassing situation after the [May] 29 meeting of the CC, when the reform wing will be commissioned to sit down and talk with us right away. I believe that the Opposition Roundtable has not yet formed a uniform position in the most important issues. Therefore I join the proposal made by FIDESZ and what has been said here, that four separate committees should be set up promptly, as soon as possible, with one member from each participating organization, which can work out the joint position and submit it to the plenum for approval. For time is really very pressing. I feel the government, together with the reform communist wing, will try to implement its own program, ignoring and excluding both the fundamentalists and the Opposition Roundtable – this is how and why these bills are being worked out one after the other.

We have prepared a proposal the essence of which is that four separate committees should be set up in order to discuss and work out the four major issues which we want to raise at the meeting of the Opposition Roundtable and at the one with the competent boards of MSZMP. For we do not yet have such a common position, not even in a single concrete question. We do not have any common position on the election act, the date of the general elections, neither on working out the conditions – financial as well as material – under which the political parties can function, and I could go on with a long list of crucial questions that we will have to face on the very first day when the Opposition Roundtable sits down with MSZMP. We do not have a concrete, elaborate joint position on these issues. This is why different people make different statements publicly on certain issues on behalf of the Opposition Roundtable.

We will not have problems like this when a common position can be formed in the special committees. These committees can start working promptly, even as early as this week, if all the participating organizations nominate one representative for each committee. There are lawyers here and economists too, not to mention the fact that the government has already worked out a short-term economic plan, a crisis plan, which has already been accepted by the National Council of Trade Unions. They will implement this plan. Because there is no force that could stand up against it. And this is the case of the other bills as well. The Parliament will pass them too. And then we can just run after our money. I propose that this should be the most important issue, this is where we have to make a decision, on setting up these four special committees.

[...]

**Iván Pető:** We have made a draft, which may, or should, of course be modified in several aspects, in several points. I want to present it. This does not include what György Szabad has said. That should definitely be included as a supplement. It has been made with knowledge of the statement András Tóth made yesterday. I now read it out. It is not written down in several copies, so I read it out. There is reference in it to the reform circles and the various statements. So then:

“The statement of the Opposition Roundtable. We welcome the plan for a platform made by the reform movement of MSZMP on May 20, 1989 in Szeged, considering it as a position which, if enforced within the party, will improve the chances of overcoming the crisis the country faces. We especially welcome the claim they made for starting prompt negotiations between representatives of the power holders and the Opposition Roundtable, taking it as support for the position we have always held. We trust that the initiation of the reform circles will have real consequences at the May 29 meeting of the MSZMP CC at the latest. The statement made by one expert of MSZMP, published in national dailies on May 23, 1989, appears to reformulate the position of his party, maybe as a result of learning about the opinion of the reform circles.

However, the fact that the ruling party allows the Opposition Roundtable to sit on one side of the table, with MSZMP on the other side, giving room at the same time to several other, not precisely defined organizations with a seemingly equal rank which ‘do not wish to sit on either side’, is nothing but an attempt to make the round table multiangular, the repeated rejection of bilateral negotiations, this time in an unofficial form. In order to be clear about it, we also indicate that the statement of the MSZMP’s expert – that the logistic talks have been suspended since the last meeting of the CC of his party because MSZMP has been waiting for the response of the various organizations to its so-called initiation – simply does not correspond to the facts. As it can be seen in the newspapers of May 12, the organizations participating in the Opposition Roundtable has responded to MSZMP’s statement by return of mail. So it is we now who are expecting a – this time official – reply from MSZMP which unilaterally suspended the talks started earlier. With the statement made by the reform circles we look forward to starting the talks as soon as possible with more hope and confidence. Signatures.”

So this part also includes what Tölgyessy mentioned yesterday – though not with full consent – and the logistic comments were accepted by everyone. So this is a draft. Period.

**György Szabad:** I believe this is a proposal with two diverging directions...

**Viktor Orbán:** Excuse me, what diverges from what?

**Imre Kónya:** Two diverging proposals.

**Csaba Varga:** I think we also have to add to our statement that what we are proposing now is that the Roundtable should sit down only with MSZMP, and in a short time. And this should be down at the highest possible party levels.

**Viktor Orbán:** Maybe I did not understand it properly, but I do not see any diverging proposals here. Both texts include the same things. The text, or draft prepared by SZDSZ



also says that we should negotiate with the party. I also think we have to consider all the questions in turn, and decide whether we want to negotiate with the government, the reform wing, or the main wing of MSZMP that is in power now, if this triple possibility exists at all. That is what we should decide, who to talk with. But I believe the proposal made by SZDSZ, they also say, if I understand well, that we have to talk with those who are right in the center of MSZMP now, who exercise real power now, and this is also what Csaba Varga said. Did I understand it right?

**Csaba Varga:** You did.

**Viktor Orbán:** But did we understand the text of SZDSZ well ...

**Iván Pető:** You did.



Document 28.  
Meeting of the MSZMP Political Committee.  
Verbatim Record of Minutes (Excerpts).  
*May 26, 1989.*



**Meeting of the MSZMP Political Committee**  
May 26, 1989

**[Subject:] Proposal on the rules for electing the President of the Republic, Members of Parliament and Council Members**

**György Fejtő:** There are two classical solutions: the first past the post system based on electoral lists or on constituencies. The electoral list method calls for a developed political infrastructure, established political affiliations in the society, clear manifestos, because these ensure that people have a real choice. Well, the conditions for this don't exist in Hungary. This is what we should aim for, but, I think that this cannot be the basis for the next elections.

The electoral list method, undoubtedly, has the advantage of making co-operation during elections possible. Perhaps, even joint electoral lists would be possible. Earlier on, we have thought about the possibility of this. Today, we can say with great certainty that it is not possible. And there is another advantage to the electoral list method: it guarantees a seat in the parliament for exposed leaders of the party, by putting as leading candidates on the electoral list. Contrary to the constituency method, where everyone has to take the risk. Individual electors, oh, excuse me, another thing. The longer the list the more impersonal it is. So, it means that increasingly the basic emotions toward parties determine votes.

I would like to add here a few words about the results of an opinion poll: it was based on a sample of one thousand people and one of the questions asked people to name parties that they know of that operated in Hungary. The responses of the sample were rather diverse, they could name perhaps a maximum of two or three parties. So, people are not fully conscious yet of the existence of parties and of which parties these are. When responding to another question about which party they would vote for if elections were held within one month, all eight parties received votes, even those who were not mentioned by anyone as an existing party known to them. So the rejection reflex is a pressure to choose at the same time. Therefore, an exclusively electoral list system is not at all favourable for MSZMP.

Constituencies, undoubtedly, bring about a competition of individuals, personalities. And a competition of local programs. So, the focus of the debate is not really the general program of the party, but events on the local level. This is why I believe that this is the advantageous method for the MSZMP. Let me add that essentially the Alliance of Free Democrats and the Hungarian Democratic Forum propose a compensation constituency system as well. Precisely for the reasons that I referred to as well, that there are no definite manifestos, and the results would be unpredictable. Individual party candidates should run in individual constituencies.

But this would be more appropriate for fractional votes not to be lost. So the basic solution, which could bring about the widest consensus, should be a compensation constituency system where the fractional votes could be used for to fill the 40-50 seats reserved for this purpose. Now then, undoubtedly, the historical parties who had run in the elections in 1945 and 1947, and are remembered from then, will be in favour of lists, the exclusivity electoral lists. So presumably, there will be a lot of debate on this. I firmly propose to use the German model where half the seats are decided on by constituencies and the other half through county lists, this is what we should propose, this would change completely the constituency boundaries, would make individual constituencies too large as well, with around 60 thousand electors. And this would not be an organic transition from

the present state of affairs into the next. Then creating lists in big towns where the number of residents is higher than 60 thousand would be a better solution than the combined system.

So, having three variations would drive people mad, and I am sure that the members of the Political Committee weren't too enthusiastic about having to read it either. The man of the street cannot keep track, one version is difficult enough to understand. This is why we proposed the announcement of a well-prepared draft bill in stead of a draft thesis describing several variations. This can be accomplished with relatively little effort.

[...]

**Rezső Nyers:** In general I would like to say that I agree with accepting this as the basis and with discussing it at negotiations. With respect to our final position we should allow some flexibility during negotiations, allow an opportunity for the party leadership negotiate an agreement. So we shouldn't take a rigid stand in favour of a certain solution, but we should adapt to the opportunities that are presented.

So now I will go over this proposal described in document "F". Regarding the first point: I propose to have a drafted option for a spring election in addition to the autumn option. Furthermore I believe that it would be desirable to include another point that doesn't exist yet, about setting a different date for council elections than for parliamentary elections. It should either be before or after. I still believe that our earlier position was logical, that is, to hold the council elections as a kind of political preliminary round of the parliamentary elections. There are many advantages to this for democratic transition. It wouldn't be a disadvantage for the MSZMP, but it wouldn't serve the interests of the MSZMP's predecessor either, but would recharge the whole democratic process in a way, right? So I propose the inclusion of a second point along these lines.

From among the issues raised, the candidature of the members of military organisations caused the biggest problems in the Government and was debated. Finally, the Government voted on this matter as comrade Mórocz on behalf of comrade Ferenc Kárpáti insisted very much on his proposal, but he was left alone, the Government voted unanimously, except for him, not to allow members of military organisations to become candidates. Due to the fact that it would cause many conflicts in the parliamentary life, where the superior of the member of parliament would sit in the Government – right? – and that would cause political conflicts. This would show and would undermine discipline. And his parliamentary duties would certainly conflict frequently with the regulations of military service and military discipline. So from this aspect, it is not right to consider standing as a candidate to be a part of their citizenship rights in case of representative members of military bodies. It is a much more important consideration for military organisations to... this is valid for the army as well as the staff of the Ministry of Home Affairs, I am not so sure about the Worker's Militia. The case of the Worker's Militia is very unique, it doesn't fit into any of our regulations. But it applies to the others. And it is an important national interest to keep military bodies as national bodies without party affiliations.

Finally, the Government decided that, that it is possible, but this does not need statutory regulation, so respecting the provisions of the law, if the member of the military organisation gets placed on the unattached list as soon as he stands as a candidate. So, then he would exercise his citizen's rights, but his being a member of parliament would not be mixed with being a member of a military organisation. Comrade Vastagh has suggested for them to be able to run as candidates at council elections, I have to say that this was not

debated by the Government, but I have to admit the arguments in this case not validated, are not valid, I can fully imagine that there, there such questions do not come into play, and his own commander does not sit in the council, right?, in the Government. So I think this can be considered.

Well, I propose to leave out the revocation right, and I support it. I think that this is a fake democratic system, democracy is a mechanism, this does not fit into the mechanism, it is a part of the mechanism, an inalienable part that it assigns a responsibility on the member of parliament for a definite period of time and he/she needs to exercise this responsibility freely. Their freedom must not be restricted by threats, it would be very, very damaging, we see this now, now not because it is now used against us, but this means must not be used by us either. So I categorically oppose it.

The... I agree with the proposal of comrade Vastagh about allowing the appointment of supervising representatives of the parties. So, foreign supervision should not be allowed, a supervisory body is another matter, allowing foreigners into all places, is not international supervision. So, we cannot accept international supervision, but supervision by the parties should be made possible. The... this certificate system for absentees. Right now I cannot determine my final position in this matter, about how many votes it would affect, and what, but... but to be careful I propose as well to give consideration to comrade Vastagh's worries, if it is not too important then we should rather let go of this thing reminiscent of the "blue tag" past. I agree with comrade Vastagh's concerns regarding the collection of supporting signatures as well. Thank you very much.

[...]

**Imre Nagy:** Honourable members of the Political Committee! I think it was a very good proposition. I would like to add a few things to the draft statement. I agree with the contribution of comrades Nyers and Berecz to the debate, and I suggest for the first article that we declare in the statement of the Political Committee our determination for multilateral party negotiations.

I raised the issue of negotiating with the Opposition Roundtable because I am convinced that preparations for the election should be accelerated. None the less, failing to strike an agreement with a significant part of the opposition it is impossible to carry out. So, I also raise the possibility that perhaps in this issue we should give up our earlier position that called for a wide-scale national Roundtable, because the cause of the elections first and foremost demands the bilateral agreement between the different parties. Consequently, I find it a plausible solution in this question to accept the suggestion for bilateral negotiations, as the parties are there to make an agreement with. If we are ready to negotiate, my opinion is also to leave open some questions, and all versions should be debated, even in the form of today's proposition.

What is at stake at the elections in my view, is whether it is possible to form a parliament with a steady, functional government majority. This is evident but I haste to emphasise it because I imagine the performance of MSZMP during the elections acceding to this. I only mention this because as a consequence I hold the individual constituency system and any of its combinations seriously problematic. I must add that the clean first past the post system is out of the question for me in the present state of affairs. That would be the other extreme. It is obvious that in the individual constituency system, however it is amended, we can be stronger. Simply because non of the other parties have a built-up network and solid basis. They are unable to present personalities in all those places.

Nevertheless, I am afraid that should such a system be initiated, there will be hosts of independent candidates, who will immediately use the slogan: Mr. X is the communists' candidate, Mr. Y is the opposition's candidate, but I am independent, the voters' candidate, representing exclusively my voters, instead of a party or any other interest. That's what the climate of public opinion suggests. With 300 independent candidates the parliament is dysfunctional, for want of a government majority. None the less, should MSZMP candidates, I mean dedicated MSZMP candidates, win the elections, they would be just as confused as they are today: are they representing their party or their constituency? And if they are not recallable, which ensures that they can be kept at bay, the dichotomy will persist, causing them a serious moral dilemma. I am afraid, even if we win the elections, with perhaps a seemingly overwhelming majority, in actual fact the government will not be able to rely on a steady parliament. In that case our victory is all in vain!

I understand those counter-arguments that reason against such a double-mandate hybrid system. These are viable reasons. Nonetheless, I believe that this very system is the best option for doing away with the aforementioned dilemma. Namely resolving the problem that everybody wants to represent a wide variety of interests. All the same, my opinion is that we should keep all three versions on the agenda in the course of negotiations.

From this point of view the standpoint of opposition organisations is quite important, we have to come to terms with them, only we have to see that the majority of them is not considering how a steady and functioning government will stand up after the elections, one that is able to rescue the country out of the present crisis. They cannot think big, on a national scale, but they are rather heeding to their own personal interests, and their opinion is strongly derivative. Obviously the historical parties count on the fact that a bit of nostalgia buys them a few votes on the electoral list, because otherwise they are unable to come up with personalities. SZDSZ and MDF, on the other hand, rely on the fact that they are able to present a few personalities, so for them the constituency system is much better.

I am also for separating the three elections in time – i.e. parliamentary elections, council by-elections, and voting for the president of the republic. Even though I understand the obvious reasoning that both the council system, that is the local governments, and the parliament are in need of renewal. Members of parliament and council members feel the same need for competition. However, I think that during this far-reaching process of reshuffle that is going on in Hungary at the moment rendering the two pillars of public administration, namely the government and local administration, unstable at the same time and exposing them to a competitive event is too much of a risk. It is better to have at least half a year between the two. About the upper house of the parliament there has been no debate yet. I don't know (*Károly Grósz: We'll get back to that later.*) if there will be any; if so, I will give my opinion then.

**Fejti György:** I think that things can be eased up a bit. That is if we can agree that such an advanced election is more favourable for the country that we must reason for it. Nevertheless, the possibility of reasoning for another version during the negotiations should not be excluded either. In the meantime we have to make a decision. So, now we don't have to exclude the possibility that the date will be negotiated. To the best of our knowledge it seems that this year is more favourable. Let's also hear the reasoning of the other party, though. Let's hope that the majority of those organisations will accept our rationale.

I would like to stress once again the documented fact that three organisations voted



for advanced [...] elections. (*Interruption not understandable.*) It will be difficult, yes, we can talk about it, gentlemen, tell me what has changed, what is on your mind. It will be difficult to set the date but I also think that in the course of negotiations we should not refrain from any topic, saying that it is not negotiable, the date of elections among them. Let us try to reason with them.

**Kulcsár Kálmán:** Once again let me call your attention to the fact that every negotiation is a bargain. So, if we say that there are two possibilities: elections in November or elections in December, and the fight goes on, or we are ready to accept the elections in spring, which means that we must stop (*Rezső Nyers: That's it.*) our manoeuvres against (*Rezső Nyers: That's it.*) the parliament and the government. (*Rezső Nyers: To let the legislation work.*) And then, then it will be alright if they accept it. All the same, it has to be accepted, fixed and observed. We have such an argument in our hands, because rational arguments cannot be brought up against such rationale. We say, if you don't accept it we cannot continue, and elections are at the end of November; full stop. (*Rezső Nyers: And then it is theirs.*) It has to be announced publicly, of course mentioning the alternatives that they rejected. I don't think that our negotiating position is that bad after all.

Of course there are always a few surprises in waiting. Especially if one or two organisations could be distanced from this conglomeration. I suspect that one or two organisations are in fact terrorising the rest. Free Democrats and FIDESZ are the radical ones, their emphasis is overwhelming and the others seem to be afraid of acting against them. It is a most complicated situation, to be sure, but we must not spare our energies to somehow loosen up this rigid Opposition Roundtable, which is perhaps not that rigid after all.

[...]

[Subject:] **Suggestion for public announcements on the occasion of the burial of Imre Nagy. Suggestions by the Social Policy Department of the Central Committee, and by the Institute of Party History.**

**János Berecz:** Honourable members of the Political Committee! Hightened interest and suggestions from inside the party on the one hand – bearing in mind the gathering of reform circles in Szeged – and our exchange of ideas with leading representatives of the party press – on two occasions so far – on the other hand lead to a conclusion that the Central Committee should come forward with a statement. Silence in this case seems worse than giving a not entirely satisfactory explanation. That would be my second remark: the issue cannot be closed terminally with the statement of the Central Committee. Firstly the inspection and assessment are in transition, secondly the burial ceremony is in preparation, which is not without sentimental residuals, what is more, sentiments are sometimes more effective than facts and reason. My third remark: there are two different drafts that the comrades have to consider; however, the shorter one is the same as the longer one, save for a synopsis, a summary. It is not entirely self-evident but the expert comrades think that a synopsis would be advisable after all, and they suggest the longer version. This was my introduction.

**Károly Grósz:** Thank you very much. Comrades, who wants to make a remark? There you go.

**Miklós Németh:** I agree I find it necessary that the Central Committee give their opinion in a statement. [...] From a political point of view I find it quite slim what is included in this statement. Not necessarily a more settled opinion is needed from the party but perhaps a shorter, terse but distinctive statement would be helpful. As to its political assessment, I think that this issue will be the focal point and a prime target of debate in home policy between 16 June and 23 October. It is not for the advantage, considering the latent danger of public climate before such a mass-scale event as the burial.

So far there have been roughly, or rather exactly twelve charter flights registered, and they are all fully booked. This alone means three and a half thousand people from abroad. Only from Canada and the United States. We got news that special trains have been booked and prepared to bring people from other cities all over the country: many are coming from Kaposvár, Kecskemét, Békéscsaba, from other places like Győr. Whole compartments and trains are booked. Things have changed; so far we thought that a mass of 50-100 thousand people could gather for the occasion, now it is more likely that 300-500 thousand will come. Taken that as a premise, we must talk about it in the assessment, what we could do. That is my suggestion, and the statement should be drafted accordingly.

Another thing... one of these days, two days ago I received a letter from two representatives of the ... Committee for [Historical] Justice, Miklós Vásárhelyi and András B. Hegedűs. They are officially asking for those things that we had received information about earlier on from various reports. They are asking for a disciplined, peaceful burial. In order to preserve the ambience of the event but taking into consideration the mass of people attending the service, they suggest and request that instead of the cemetery of Rákoskeresztúr the catafalque and the coffins be on Hősök tere. The family agrees with them now and they want the catafalque to be on Hősök tere from 10 a.m. to 12.30 p.m., leaving enough time for the public to pay the tribute of respect, then at 12.30 a burial ceremony would start and last for one and a half hours. Afterwards, the coffins will be taken on a secured route, followed by the procession of relatives, representatives of certain – not specified – social organisations, and foreign guests, to lot 301 in the cemetery, where the burial proper takes place according to both secular and religious rites.

There would be four speeches: by Vásárhelyi, Király, Mécs and Sándor Rácz, and they would make an announcement, asking the people not to go to the cemetery with the procession because of the limited space around the lot, and because they consider it as an intimate family event where only relatives and a few chosen guests would participate. They are asking for securing the route of procession. First and foremost they want a permit to use the Hősök tere for the event, then they are asking for securing the route at the given time between Hősök tere and the cemetery, and thirdly they are asking for amplifiers and loudspeakers on Hősök tere and in the cemetery. Fourthly, they ask for roughly sixty coaches for transporting the selected guest to the cemetery for the burial ceremony. Those who are entitled to take part would be given some kind of a badge or certificate. As I have said, they would announce that the procession is divided at a certain point, that the ceremony proper is in a narrow circle, a family event, paying tribute, and... so they want only the invited guests to go there.

They have another request: it would facilitate the peaceful organisation of the event if a few hundred troops of the people's army helped forming a line – unarmed, without their barrettes, and with a black armband. At the Cabinet meeting we discussed using the soldiers for such a purpose, and agreed that the government distances itself from the problem. As to amplifiers and loudspeakers, we have to find a different solution, but seemingly it is all sorted. Nevertheless, soldiers cannot take part in this, there is no point.

*(Rezső Nyers: Police corps will help though) (Károly Grósz: Then it will be trouble again.) (Rezső Nyers: There will be too many people.)*

[...]

**György Fejti:** I would like to add a few words, not to the text, though – it needs further work, I believe so – but to the situation. The family and the Historical Justice Committee have changed their attitude, which they explain with technical reasons. The technical reason is that the cemetery is too small, so the danger of commotion in the crowd is impending, something that everybody would like to avoid: the family, the relatives and the responsible state organisations alike, I suppose. However, resolving this technical problem within the cemetery is not impossible. The catafalque could be there from the 15<sup>th</sup> of June on, and people could pay their tribute for two days. Other solutions are also close at hand to distribute the burial ceremony in time.

In my experience political pressure is exerted on the Historical Justice Committee and the families. I must tell you that family members and most representatives of the Historical Justice Committee are aware of the risk and danger involved, they are worrying in a major way, but eventually they came to a conclusion that it is in their interest to change their point of view. Why is it a radical change? First and foremost because until the ceremony is confined to the burial site it is – though publicly observed – a rite of tribute and a family event. If the ceremony is brought outside the cemetery, though, into the public space, especially to Hősök tere, it is not a family event any more, but it becomes an occasion of mixed sort, more or less semi official, so to speak, and this, namely that it becomes a semi official event, impels immediate consideration – we have talked about it earlier – of possible governmental presence and the context of the government's participation.

Consequently the investigation that the department of justice initiated has to get certain results, so it cannot be left entirely open. Now, there are negotiations about these things in different places, locations and at different levels. Partly political and partly technical negotiations. I think that the seriousness and importance of the affair calls for state management, and the rank of negotiating partners should be raised accordingly. I don't think it is a feasible solution that the vice commander of the Ministry of Justice and, say, a colonel of the Ministry of Home Affairs talk about this issue, because they cannot make agreements that ensure the organisation of such an event without atrocities.

Can we distance ourselves from such a ceremony to be held at Hősök tere? Now it is pretty difficult because it has been announced, and so on, but there is still the possibility of not giving consent for plausible reasons. I personally would not suggest it, though, because even if the ceremony will be held in the cemetery, the scale of the ensuing political event can be suspected. It cannot be discussed, however, only guessed that political organisations are preparing for a demonstration either on Hősök tere or elsewhere. Obviously that would be a demonstration against a negative behaviour, which is impossible or at least difficult to handle with administrative methods alone.

That is why I approached the issue as follows: since the family and the Historical Justice Committee are both seriously determined to seek co-operation and mutual guarantees, we had better reciprocate their co-operation and guarantees. Mutual guarantee means that it is made clear: apart from the Historical Justice Committee, who are those political organisations that line up behind such a tribute ceremony and give guarantees that it is in no one's interest to trade in peaceful reconciliation and turn the capital into the arena of unwanted events on 16 June. There are leaders of certain organisations who are

ready to appear on television or in the radio or elsewhere, and properly distance themselves from the possibility that unwanted events might happen in the streets of Budapest on 16 June.

Apart from the hosts of foreigners it is also important because it has been announced, too early in my opinion, that the Hungarian Television will broadcast a live coverage of the event. In such cases for instance I think it is unavoidable that the authorities are informed about the speeches in details and verbatim. I cannot conceive that speeches are broadcast live, without having checked. In many countries all around the world – I dare not say in all the countries – it must be adjusted what is said in a live broadcast on television, even if it is Béla Király or Sándor Rác who gives the speech. There might be disagreement between us over the text but it can be rectified a compromise found. I see the possibility of compromise that is needed for a minimal content that live television coverage requires.

We should avoid getting into an awkward situation. Sooner or later we must decide whether we accept this semi-official character of the event, and if so, with what content. Because there are slight differences. Ours could be a quiescent participation or active participation. Activity has different levels even. If we want to avoid that the event is used as a quiet, dignified demonstration against the powers that be, perhaps we should think about something more than passive participation. I suggest that the Minister of the Interior, who is not only a statesman but a politician too, or someone in a similar position, should keep the event in control and make political agreements. Clear, obvious agreements.

I want to raise another issue, although it might sound a bit farfetched, that things could be treated globally for the time being. Namely that we are dealing not only with 16 June but with 23 October here. It is possible to talk about the 23<sup>rd</sup> now, exactly in the light of the 16<sup>th</sup> of June and their readiness to compromise, because we have to make an agreement with the very same organisations on 23 October. I see the predilection for both 16 June and 23 [October] to be organised in the name of piece and reconciliation – even though a considerable part of these organisations are obviously divided –, provided that we all have different views of what happened but we will not confront in the street. The basis is of course that the conception of that event needs to be amended and clarified – mistakes should be revealed. And the sooner... [mistakes] or sins, for that matter. The sooner we say it, the smaller the damage.

**Károly Grósz:** Comrade Szűrös.

**Mátyás Szűrös:** My opinion is as follows: I do not find these texts appropriate. Not only because it is meager but also because it is fraught with contradictions and its main argument is that research needs time, and so on. At the same breath, it slips into assessment. It also states that according to the opinion of MSZMP it is a mistake to sentence anyone to death for his political activity. There's more to it than that, of course. Then it says: Imre Nagy and his line is a precursor to the policy that the MSZMP would like to realise. Well, it is not entirely like that. Yes. So, I would rather avoid assessment. What is really needed is a declaration of political nature, and the Supreme Prosecutor should give a statement too about the legal protest, it is of course a government statement, or at least needed for the government's standpoint, it must be a starting point. All the same, we can say as much that it was a show trial, can't we? And that justice must be given. We consider it unfortunate. Something like that, even if ... if we cannot say it, this is the task of lawyers, to assess whether it was a show trial because that is the order of things. We might say, though, that we find it unfortunate, exactly on the basis of what is written in the

draft, that they were sentenced to death for their political views and activity. The needs thorough survey, though, it is impossible to rewrite here on the spot.

Another thing is that I can only support what comrade Fejti was saying, i.e. that the whole process needs to be thought over, I think, for the time being, it cannot be side-stepped. He is absolutely right, it creates an entirely new situation, because then we have to guarantee the security and all that. Then the government has to step in firmly. It must be considered whether the police should secure the procession route or some other corps, that provocation and unpleasant incidents is avoided. It is hard for me to see why the government refuses categorically the presence of army troops. Obviously it is still... I don't know what reasons the government has, because on such occasions it is usual to ... military tribute is quite conceivable, but this... I would not go into details, the main thing is that the government has to secure in such cases... and the question of participation would not come up otherwise. I do not go into details as comrade Fejti did.

A single exception is that the speeches should not be censored. Rather the other way round, we should do whatever is in the right of the government: not to broadcast live coverage. This is the way to do it, and the government has the right. Conversely, that we rewrite the speeches or ask them to transform them this way and that way, I think it is difficult to carry out. Preventing live coverage is not easy either but the government has the right. This is a funeral... (*György Fejti: Sorry, but that is what I thought.*) Is that what you had in mind? (*György Fejti: I did not say that it should be written here at the Department of Agitation and Propaganda, but agreeing on live coverage is impossible when [...] (not understandable)*) Then I am sorry. Yes, yes. Thank you very much.

**Károly Grósz:** Comrade Nyers.

**Rezső Nyers:** I also agree with the reasoning of comrade Fejti, and I believe that the semi-official nature of the event must be realised. Accordingly, the Ministry of Home Affairs should be a partner in the preparations from the beginning. It would be much worse if the rite of tribute in the cemetery and the demonstration on Hősök tere were separated. I think it would be the worst option, so I changed my opinion in the meantime, with the hindsight that the rite of tribute is less likely to turn into a political demonstration against the powers that be and against the regime.

As to military troops and the police are concerned, I'd say that the government should be trusted with this, since we cannot decide about it now. We were not... entirely against the presence of soldiers. Nevertheless, army leaders were strongly against the idea. That is why we should not compel the army to take part. This is a decision for the government to make. Somehow it can be done.

I agree with the opinion that the funeral should get television coverage, on one condition: they give guarantees that the speeches do not contain thoughts against the regime. I think that international obligations of the power, the regime or Hungary – or how to put it? – so that should not be in it either. They must be told what it is that...

(*Interruption: nothing that hurts [the country's] international interests*) there should be nothing that hurts the international interests. What kind of a guarantee could they give? These days it is tasteless to scan speeches but all the same, we need guarantees. It is also a task for the government to... to get the guarantees and then we sort it out somehow. Perhaps at the end we'll ask for the speeches, but again, it can only be done informally. If they get to Miklós Vásárhelyi we can get hold of it. If not, then I don't know how we can get it.

As far as the foreigners are concerned, we also need guarantees that they will



behave themselves. One thing cropped up in the Advisory Board, or another forum, I don't remember as I took part in many different debates, namely that our embassy in Washington agitated foreigners to come to the funeral, and apparently the Pongrácz brothers too (*Károly Grósz: They were agitating from Budapest; official civil servants*) Civil servants? From here? (*Károly Grósz: Yes, from here.*) Whatever, the embassy relayed the message and took measures. (*Károly Grósz: That is true.*) Well, if it's true then it is not a feather on the cap for the whole government here... Not from government circles but many raised the question (*Interruption: Eager beavers.*) whether it is right to let the Pongrácz brothers come here, considering that they were shooting around with Maléter? [Shot] at Maléter or Maléter at them. Anyway, it is somewhat strange that they come here as – I have no idea what to call them now – national heroes, even though they used arms against the deceased. I am not that much familiar with that part of history, I know about the Corvin close and that's it. I always was a superficial politician and never cared for the Pongrácz brothers. However, if that's the truth about them it is a strange thing. I don't know if it is possible to keep them from coming. Maybe it's not a wise thing to prevent it, after all.

**Károly Grósz:** Of course it is difficult to draw the line (*Rezső Nyers: Yes*) – who do we let in and who is refused.

**Rezső Nyers:** Yes, yes, yes. Still it can be disregarded, not many things depend on it. I think the Central Committee should give a statement, if we can determine ourselves, it is an optimal case. I am glad because I never thought that we would make up our minds, but it is on behalf of the future, very much so. I also find it absolutely necessary that the government, that is the Central Committee at first, then a week later (*Interruption: a few days earlier*) – a few days before the 10<sup>th</sup> [of June] the government makes a statement of reconciliation, in that or slightly different spirit. I fully agree!

Having read the text, I think that the second, longer version is better. It can be and has to be further elaborated, comrade Szűrös is right in that sense. It should be submitted to the Central Committee, it doesn't work otherwise. I suggest that we amend a few things and then it is slightly better already. On the first page the first sentence of the third paragraph says "Imre Nagy and his line is the precursor to the policy that the MSZMP wants to carry out". Allow me to say but it connects the whole thing to one particular person. I would say that the 1953 reform initiative and within this the role of Imre Nagy, we can say that this was the precursor to ... this is correct.

Then on the first page, the last paragraph starts with the phrase "salute". Let's not salute but restrain ourselves because to an extent we are responsible too, the present generation, as the MSZMP..., let's not salute but start with the fact that Imre Nagy created something outstanding, and so we should march objectively instead. The following text is alright. On the second page it reads once again in the second sentence of the first paragraph: "the 20<sup>th</sup> congress of the SCP [Soviet Communist Party] justified him". Justification was given not to him but to the 1953 initiative, the reform initiative. None the less, Imre Nagy could get back to position with the outburst of the 1956 people's revolution. It sounds different this way. In the last but one sentence of the same paragraph it reads: "He miscalculated the international support for his policy". I would swap support for international consequences. (*Interruption: conditions and consequences*) Conditions, that's even better. Misjudging the conditions and consequences. He misjudged the support as well but that's not what we want to emphasise. True enough, it is not even a misjudgement, because he was promised support. Conditions have changed, though, other ideas came up in Moscow. On the second page in the last but one paragraph...

**János Berecz:** Allow me for a second, comrade Berecz. It says here: "According to the MSZMP it is a mistake to sentence anyone to death for his political activity". Now, if we write "sin" instead, then it is a verdict, isn't it.

**Károly Grósz:** It should say that it is unacceptable for the MSZMP.

**János Berecz:** Good.

**Rezső Nyers:** Unacceptable.

**Károly Grósz:** Yes, because we do not label it a "sin".

**Rezső Nyers:** Not a sin but...

**Károly Grósz:** Mistake is too vague.

**János Berecz:** Mistake is vague but if I say "sin" then it is a verdict on someone. However, the Central Committee cannot do that.

**Rezső Nyers:** No, I am usually against sin. We cancelled it in the case of János Kádár too.

**János Berecz:** Now it cropped up with comrade Szűrös that we should make it clear (*Szűrös: I never said sin*) No, no, but you said that mistake is vague. How to solve it then?

**Rezső Nyers:** In the middle of the text, in the last but one paragraph it says twice about lawyers, that thorough legal assessment... that it disturbs thorough legal assessment. No way, we should not refer to that. And then we must give enough time for the representatives of justice. It should be cancelled. Of course they need time to work but... not as much time as they want. Well, it comes down to nothing by the end. So, this part about the legal... Science must be given time, historical sciences, as there the political principle still persists.

I agree with the rest. This is a very good material that you made and with minor adjustments we should get it through the Central Committee, provided that they are willing to consent. And finally, what else is left... the funeral, yes, that... that the government participates actively. I think that the MSZMP... I don't know what to do, since on this ground even the MSZMP could be represented. However, I don't recommend it directly, rather in some indirect way. Naturally, if comrade Grósz wants to attend I have no objections because, because (*Károly Grósz: But you do not recommend it, Comrade Nyers.*) No, I don't recommend it but I have no objections either. I myself will not attend the service, because people already insinuate that I was member of the Central Committee at the time. I think it is the right thing to do and this... is what the party wants from me anyway. Whoever took part in the decision should not go there. Even though it was not that kind of a decision, only we gave way to the jury to make their verdict.

Now, looking for the possibility of a neutral presence of the government. Placing a wreath on the catafalque is out of the question... due to the accusations. Miklós Németh, on the other hand, can pay tribute with a wreath, and I strongly recommend it that he makes that gesture as prime minister. Exactly like this: Prime Minister Miklós Németh. We should not go any further than that, as in the government gives no speeches, perhaps

the wreath is unnecessary, only a delegation should take part, headed by Miklós Németh. This text explains why. All the same, I recommend the wreath. That's my opinion.

[...]

**György Fejti:** Secondly, many organisations will join the proposal of the Historical Justice Committee. This is already under way. Consequently these organisations will participate in the events. Not for the purpose of paying tribute (*Interruption: with 3.500 people*) and together with their arrangers. Having said that, the family – that letter was not written without a purpose – will ask the participation of the police, as they have the right to do so, together with the arrangers. The rationale is that the Ministry of Home Affairs can organise it decently. This is only the question of agreement. For instance, if policemen are there in plain clothes, wearing the same badge as the civic arrangers, it causes no trouble. None the less, Home Affairs should be trusted with it entirely: whether plain clothes, how many troops, etc...

**Milós Németh:** Jenő Földesi can provide an operative group. Of course if three to four thousand people gather, Budapest comes to a halt, from Friday 10 a.m. until the whole thing finishes. At least that's the ...

**Ilona Tatai:** According to the Free Europe, 16<sup>th</sup> of June is declared a national holiday, a day of mourning, national mourning. They reported it yesterday noon, saying that the catafalque will be on Hősök tere.

**Károly Grósz:** This is... of course, they are putting pressure on us. If our nerves won't hold, we give in.

**Rezső Nyers:** Did Free Europe announce it?

**Ilona Tatai:** Yes, they did: it is a bank holiday, an official national day of mourning. (*private conversations*)

**Rezső Nyers:** And bank holiday as well?

**Károly Grósz:** Yes. Well, they are exerting pressure, the whole thing points in this direction, of course. Now, it was not a thoughtful announcement that the funeral will be on Hősök tere; for state organisations that are part of the agreement it causes much trouble.

**Rezső Nyers:** Because if the family and this Historical Justice Committee say that they want it there, it is a different thing. But saying that the family, the Historical Justice Committee and state organisations agreed that Hősök tere will be the location!?

**Miklós Németh:** ... Such a thing. I only heard yesterday in Magyar Hírlap that...

**Rezső Nyers:** No, we simply acknowledged the request but did not make an agreement, that's what happened. Now it passed through a few hands. The Magyar Hírlap also made a mistake (*Károly Grósz: Yes, they caused a huge commotion*) but when the Magyar Hírlap came out foreign papers already knew about it... they were in the know. That's why they [Magyar Hírlap] published it...



[Subject:] **Political conciliatory negotiations**

**Károly Grósz:** Comrades, we should discuss this report or overview about the Opposition Roundtable, or rather our response to the statement of the Opposition Roundtable, and our attitude. Comrade Fejti, would you like to say something? No? (*György Fejti: no*) Okay. This is a report by the Ministry of the Interior, of course, literally. It is not signed either. (*Interjection: ...?*) (*amusement*) That's why we knew it, yes. (*János Lukács: Pál Vastagh is in illegality too*) Well, comrades, here is this statement, this has been issued today, this is what we have to respond to. (*Interjection: ...?*) Of course, of course. (*Szűrös: I have to go*) Okay, tell us your opinion.

**Mátyás Szűrös:** A few words, I would like to say the following: an idea has come up to involve the Parliament. So, I was approached by the Endre Bajcsi-Zsilinszky Society before the Opposition Roundtable talks, to get informed about what possibilities there are of involving the Parliament, what is desirable to convey toward the Roundtable, that is the Opposition Roundtable. An idea has developed there that perhaps it could be speeded up, somehow speeded up or at least the deadlock could be broken with the following solution of an MSZMP, Opposition Roundtable conference, or group, and involving as a third force from the People's Front, and the trade union, youth movement and Government and the Parliament such an impartial chairmanship... chairmanship would be formed which would mean something like this, that the rules of procedure would be under control, then a certain professional report... about the draft bills, if legal or other issues arise. This was not confirmed afterwards. This is one of the variations that would be useful to think about what we should do.

The other. I think comrade Kulcsár .. more.. comrade sent a letter in which he made a proposal with these aims, to break the current deadlock. The copy he sent me shows that he sent it to comrade Fejti, comrade Grósz, comrades Miklós Németh and Imre Pozsgay. The essence of it is that the Parliament could invite these negotiating parties to such a talk about these draft bills. So the Parliament's role would be linked to this. And since it came up several times to make the Parliament the venue, according to the who-ever-comes principle.

[...]

**Rezső Nyers:** I urgently propose [to make] bilateral [contact] with the historical parties and signal our willingness to have trilateral and quadrilateral negotiations. About everything, informally, and principally about the process of drawing up the new Constitution and the elections. And the correlation between the two.

This is the basic problem, that comrade Kulcsár mentioned, that either elections this year, then it is not so important, but the party law and the election law still need to be done. Or, if they want elections later, then they should do their best as well to ensure that the Parliament can continue working and legislating to the extent that this Parliament is able to reach the first stage of drawing up the Constitution, to reach the stage of the first reading of the new Constitution and the second reading to be heard by the new Parliament, the final version to be decided on by the new Parliament. I think that this is a constructive proposal on our part which cannot seriously be countered, just on the basis of prestige, but that is revealed sooner or later.

Now, the Parliament: I agree without qualms with having negotiations in the

Parliament. If they want to negotiate about the current laws, the transformation law and separately about the laws to be presented now, then I think that the Government should signal its willingness to negotiate. But then this is not a general political negotiation, but about these with the Government. In the first phase, I think it would be a mistake for the Speaker of the Parliament to undertake it, because if it doesn't lead to an agreement then the Speaker of the House gets into a very difficult situation, right?, because he can say nothing but that the Government is, the Parliament has to go. But then this, how shall I put it, this position of being above party politics is lost. However, I think that if we can see serious signs of reaching an agreement, then the Speaker of the House should become involved. So he should keep this... even if he is a party politician, he cannot change, free of it, and it wouldn't be good either, but even so he is a, a national figure. So now we shouldn't accept his involvement.

**Mátyás Szűrös:** That would be absolutely unacceptable for the Government or the Parliament to negotiate with parties. Only an impartial chairmanship could be undertaken.

**Rezső Nyers:** Yes, but (*Szűrös: what they propose*) yes, only the impartial chairmanship can get into trouble too, if there is no agreement. Then it can get into trouble. Especially at the beginning, if we clash. I don't know what they want with this transformation law. We have to stick by this, I think. And then there will be trouble. It has to be, the Government has to explain to them that the immediate start of an opening up to the West is at stake. Well, this is their philosophy and now they are bidding over each other because of some pseudo-radicalism and are stopping the whole thing. But this should be very quickly. Oh, I am afraid that time will run out. So, I don't know how much time we need with the historical parties to, well, one of them is done, right?, but (*Károly Grósz: the other is done too, that will be again next week*) Two are done? (*Károly Grósz: next week*) If this is quickly...

**Szűrös:** Comrade Grósz, I'm leaving, I will make contact with comrade Fejti. Excuse me. So that they don't finish before.

**György Fejti:** I don't really want to speak on this matter. Principally because I don't feel that I have been given adequate support, sometimes not even fundamental solidarity, to succeed in these matters more or less.

Now, my experience is that to begin such a war of statements, so now they published a statement then we publish another statement, is completely pointless and irritating. It irritates the party members and the public as well. And, actually, the tactic of the Opposition Roundtable is based on that the wider public, so the uninitiated public, only half listening to and watching events, will blame the MSZMP anyway, I admit. Well, partly because of the smooth misinforming declarations and demagoguery of the spokespersons of the Opposition Roundtable. And what we tried to respond to in our own way with varying talent and success. But naturally not so coarsely and not with the same arrogance, so as not to have to adopt the same style. As a result the overall picture is that here is this big, mammoth party, unable to act, enormous, sluggish, unable even to complete a series of technical negotiations.

Nonetheless, we should break the deadlock, I propose as well to try once more. And I say once, because afterwards it becomes physically inoperable. So it should be tried once more, to break the deadlock. But this involves harmonised actions, because it is not the first time that I found myself in a situation where the Hungarian Democratic Forum,

the Social Democratic Party and the People's Party go back on agreements made orally. And it is awkward to ask for everything in writing, it is, well, embarrassing since this whole thing should be based on trust, but we are almost at the stage that it is pointless to sit down to talk without witnesses.

The Opposition Roundtable is definitely dominated by the Alliance of Free Democrats and the Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ), and their negotiation methods are clear from this paper. They want to make the news in the TV, disorganise the party, incite conflict between the leaders of the parties, the leaders of FIDESZ and the MSZMP, to pit the Parliament against the party, the party against the Government and to prove if possible that negotiation cannot begin due to the unwillingness of the ruling power to reach a compromise. But as soon as the negotiations will start it will become obvious that their co-op... willingness to agree is non-existent. So, they don't want a party law, they don't want a presidential system, they don't want a Constitutional Court. In fact they want a few things that are closely related to the elections, or their earlier obligations, so they are ready to negotiate about the elections. About the amendment of the Penal Code, redistribution of property and the press, access to the press. Well, these are their narrowly defined interests.

So we can easily get into a situation where the negotiations begin, but positions freeze immediately, just like with respect to the technicalities. Nonetheless, I propose to take initiative and propose a trilateral or quadrilateral negotiation. This would mean that one delegation will be sent by the MSZMP, another by the Opposition Roundtable and a third one by independent organisations. And an observer status could be ensured for those who wish to participate as observers. I think that the level of the negotiations should be higher, so it should be declared that the MSZMP is appointing its own negotiation delegation with the involvement of the competent government officials in order to launch the political negotiations. I don't think it is a possibility to have a separate delegation for the MSZMP and the Government, this would create a completely impossible situation, this is, by the way, one of the weaknesses of comrade Kulcsár's proposal. So a joint MSZMP and Government delegation would take part.

And it would be useful to determine the last date until which the avoidance of substantial negotiations is advisable. So, a slight pressure regarding until when we are interested in beginning this thing. I think that if we can't begin substantial negotiations until the first week of June, the end, the first two weeks of June, then the whole construction becomes pointless. And we will just get trapped, because if we pass the stage of technical negotiations, then there will be some kind of ceremonial overture, and I think this is unavoidable, because the organisations insist on it. And if there is obstruction after the ceremonious overture that we will be put into an impossible situation, as a party.

This is why, besides this experiment, that I outlined, another option should be seriously considered, this option is legally absolutely proper, with lower political value, and this is for the Government to publish all the "fundamental" laws, as it has partially done so, already, and guarantee that the comments of the organisations separately, if they wish, or of the Opposition Roundtable shall be presented to the Parliament. Legally this is a proper and doable solution.

These are the two options I see, this is what I propose. It is a matter of consideration whether comrade Grósz should be involved. There are arguments for and against it too, of course, since I'm here to assume the responsibility of failure, so this shouldn't be another thing to burden the General Secretary. It would certainly be useful if comrade Pozsgay, comrade Nyers would be involved in the delegation. So even a three or four member group could be appointed. And to continue preparations orally.

So, I don't think that we should respond to this statement. It would not be too useful, and the content is such anyway that makes a response very difficult. By the way, our people are in contact with Mr. Tölgyessy today, and two of our experts are negotiating with Sólyom. Just to explore the grounds. It is difficult to cope with the Free Democrats, because all they are interested in is publicity, this has to be seen clearly, they would sacrifice anything for publicity. Anything. And the other organisations, I talked about this with Bíró yesterday while having a bilateral meeting, complain that this is intolerable, an impossible situation, they feel like hostages. No-one dares to leave this thing, because then they would be stigmatised, that the great historical opportunity, which created the unity of the opposition, this is what it symbolises, to break this, this... this would be an unforgivable sin.

Breaking it is an obsession of mine. I tried to break it up because I can clearly see that it is impossible to agree upon this things with the Free Democrats. So, as much as possible the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the three historical parties should be convinced about seriously considering it. It is possible that when the substantial negotiations begin, this will become obvious. If the substantial negotiations begin and the Alliance of Free Democrats has a very rigid stand then maybe the other parties, three or four parties will distance themselves from them. But if not, then we will get trapped, we'll sit around for three weeks then we'll have to say, sorry, it doesn't work. That is very embarrassing too, especially if, as I say, the General Secretary is involved as well.

**Károly Grósz:** It is not embarrassing if we tried, but it doesn't work easily...

**Rezső Nyers:** I don't think it's embarrassing either, nothing embarrassing about it...

**Károly Grósz:** if we tried, and it doesn't work, that is not embarrassing, it is embarrassing if we don't try and it doesn't work.

**Rezső Nyers:** And then, then it becomes embarrassing if we don't agree in the Parliament and we can't carry the laws further. But if we can, there is nothing embarrassing about it. Nothing at all.

**György Fejti:** Then this is what should be done. Offer the trilateral, the quadrilateral.

**Rezső Nyers:** Trade unions should be on one side, and both of them. That is what I suggest. The National Council of Trade Unions (SZOT) as well, the other ... Liga, the one that is mentioned here, approached the Government separately and now we.. a relationship, wanted strictly economic, crisis management things, they came forward, they requested the negotiations, the team of Bruszt, and it began with talks between advisors. (*Tatai: We were told off for it too*) Here they are told off, yes. So those should be on the third side.

**György Fejti:** They are in the Opposition Roundtable, Bruszt and his team.

**Rezső Nyers:** Yes, but separately at the same time, they have left it.

**György Fejti:** Yes, but then they rejoined.

**Rezső Nyers:** Okay, but the relationship continued with the former...

**György Fejti:** In this trilateral construction...everyone who is important for us, fits in

**Rezső Nyers:** Yes, the fourth can be the People's Front and the young communists.

**György Fejti:** If they accept the trilateral format, then the same circle can be set up (*both talking at the same time*) with which we negotiated.

**Rezső Nyers:** They can say nothing against youth either.

**György Fejti:** Well, they can't, in their team there is...

**Rezső Nyers:** But if FIDESZ is included, what kind of talking is that... okay, yes, as the fourth side they can be there.

**Imre Nagy:** But they are not bothered if we are there, they only say that we should sit with the MSZMP. This is not such a big problem, for us, let's sit there, the trade union is the big question here, which cannot be told to sit with the MSZMP.

**Rezső Nyers:** The trade union cannot sit there, especially because...

**Imre Nagy:** because for us it's no problem, it can be done.

**György Fejti:** Triangle, with equal sides, I can already see the table.

**Rezső Nyers:** It can be a triangle. But, now, this would have to be tried headed by comrade Grósz. Well, comrade Fejti has made enough sacrifices. He shouldn't go under the guillotine voluntarily.

**Károly Grósz:** Yes. Well, I thought that it would go parallel. So, I would sit down with the three historical parties separately, where they want, so, independently from this. That is why I emphasised 'unofficial' and this anytime, anytime next week, even on one day one after the other, in order not to – to write it in the letter – that the intention is not to break up the Roundtable. Not that, because I feel there is distrust.

Now the distrust. The other side has different tactics. Propaganda is needed, and this is needed, and they need to prove themselves. But these three might have a different position, at least I see a different position. And meet not together with all three, but separately with these three. (*Rezső Nyers: Yes*) To do that, the General Secretary next week, once, unofficially. I wouldn't publish anything on it. The fact alone that we offer such a meeting and if we persuade them to consider it official or unofficial, is a response to this letter. A response, in the first instance.

Second, simultaneously, we should signal immediately on Monday that we are ready to ... about the three sides of a triangle... we are willing in this formation. And then we should try a third channel immediately, and bombard simultaneously, so at the same time with three proposals at the same time, that the Government is willing to consult with them about these plans, where the representatives of the parties would be invited by the Government, I don't know if comrade Nyers would undertake it, comrade Pozsgay would undertake it, about these topics. This should be launched on three channels at the same time. Launch it on Monday morning. (*Interjection: But there is only the party law among these*) Well, there is the party law, the election, - sorry? (*Miklós Németh: through the*

*current channel, well, one month from now*) but no, well, we are far from the election law yet. (Miklós Németh: the party law, the amendments to the Constitution etc. shall be put forward tomorrow or on Monday) alright, but we talked about undertaking to put the opinion formed over there beside every MP.

**György Fejti:** It is possible if there is a press conference, it can be said that there is a trilateral initiative... and appointed new MSZMP.

**Károly Grósz:** I say that, I don't know...

**Miklós Németh:** The General Secretary's .. is one thing, that is .. has one problem that if it is discovered, and it will be discovered, because they will read the letter, boast about it and the reflexes on their part will enter into force immediately, these, and we will face exactly what we want to avoid, we don't want to divide it. Because we avoid even the appearance of it.

**Károly Grósz:** That is exactly why we should phrase it so bluntly and harshly, with great naivety, as if we didn't know that it would reach everyone.

**Miklós Németh:** But, well, they don't do first motive or even second motive politics, so they would translate a blunt text immediately. Well, they decode.

**Rezső Nyers:** Okay, but this is not negotiation...

**Károly Grósz:** this is not a negotiation, this is a meeting (*Rezső Nyers: this is a meeting*) meeting, not public.

**Miklós Németh:** I understand, comrade Nyers, but it would be difficult to explain that this is just a meeting.

**Rezső Nyers:** yes, but they won't have arguments to attack it.

**Károly Grósz:** But if we write the letter well, I am thinking still about not saying anything for now. We get our proposals to them. We can wait with publicity one week after, or I don't know when, that we did this and that. The General Secretary's letter can then be published, then the invitation letter by the competent leader of the Government to invite them can be. It has to be published, that's all. And this is what they refused to come to. That's it. So now, now we need a different behaviour. It is obvious that we cannot continue along this path. So, now we should act like a steam-roller on all fronts at the same time. And we shouldn't try to gain a temporary propagandistic advantage, it will be advantageous for us in the future. (*Rezső Nyers: Could be*) We can take another week, I'm sure, there are enough...

Because comrade Fejti could take part in these three channels by holding the three angles together. Comrade Nyers, or with someone, I don't know if comrade Pozsgay would undertake the Governmental part (*Rezső Nyers: Pozsgay needs to*) Pozsgay would undertake the Governmental part, then he should discuss it with him alone throughout.. And I will write about an unofficial, consultative meeting to the three historical parties, in a normal letter I will offer the ahhm, about where...

**Miklós Németh:** Pozsgay is not at home yet.

**Rezső Nyers:** Until when?

**Miklós Németh:** He will be here on the 5<sup>th</sup> for the first time. He wrote me a letter detailing his program. So he is not there at CB or in the Parliament. So that week is out. And that is a lot.

**Rezső Nyers:** Okay, but we can't do anything.

[...]





Document 29.  
Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable.  
Verbatim Record of Minutes (Excerpts).  
*May 31, 1989.*



**Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable**  
May 31, 1989  
(Verbatim text of the video-taped record. Excerpts.)

[...]

**Viktor Orbán:** I'm not convinced by the arguments, the truth is that ... with respect to timing I still say we should not ... We can feed them with promises, this much of machiavellism would not hurt, but we should not give them the chance that a communiqué is made public before the 16th which says that we have agreed on starting the negotiations ... [...] I believe the supposition you have built your arguments on, I mean it is not sure that it's true. I wouldn't say that mine is better or real, but I'm just not [sure] it is true. ... For I think what will press them to negotiate is not that some concrete, threatening date will come, and before it comes, they have to, because they fear that date or day. I believe it is not these concrete threats that press them to negotiate, but rather some more general fears. So what presses them to negotiate is that public feeling in the country is increasingly hostile towards them. That is, it is more and more obvious in public feelings that in the most critical issues the society holds an opposite view to that of MSZMP. This public feeling ... I believe this is the pressing factor, not the 16th, which is a possible date for turbulence. But in my view it is definitely this public feeling. And they're afraid ... the opposition is getting stronger not because it is doing a bloody good policy but rather because there are events taking place all the time in the society which make it evident that society is against them. From this logic, however it follows that after every such event we have a better chance than previously. [...]

**Károly Vigh:** Can I make a comment on this? Doubtless, the situation has improved since March 15, the position of the opposition, and this can be seen in the talks and in any other respect as well. Still, I would not compare March 15 with this upcoming June 16. Because there are several signs, there is information that they are worried about June 16 indeed. They are worried. Some circles in the ministry of the interior, the police, etc. They were not reassured at all by our endeavor to hold a memorial with utmost dignity. The semi-official, inquiring talks with people at the ministry of the interior, and what our friends and others who are in charge of organizing the June 16 events have heard in private conversations all convince us that yes, there is a lot of worry among them. They are worried indeed. We have heard such words from the Marxist circles, the reform circles, particularly from the Budapest reform circles that people in the White House are worried about it. So this is obviously true.

I agree that yes, we should start the negotiations in this direction. This does not yet mean an agreement. And this is the start of the negotiations. Nobody can say in the country that now then, the opposition is having underhand dealings with MSZMP by making concessions. We have started the negotiations but we have to take into consideration that the public opinion, the society does expect us to make some concessions, because you should just ask the ordinary people what they think about these roundtable talks, the behavior of the Roundtable; we should not think of ourselves that the society, the ordinary folk have such a high opinion, a clearly positive view about these talks. No. So I definitely propose that we should start, not on the 10th but on the 11th, and then we will go on after the 16th, we will go on.

[...]

**Péter Tölgyessy:** In my view it is not important when the first meeting should be held. But it has to be decided before the funeral. If we want an agreement then we will have to bring this matter to a decision more or less before the funeral. Then, whether the television and the radio should be present at this first big talk, or before or after it, well, this is not a terribly important issue. But making a decision before the 16<sup>th</sup> serves us good. Afterwards it may happen ... the consideration ... what you say, but I find it likely that they will breath a big sigh and might get tough.

Document 30.  
Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable.  
Verbatim Record of Minutes (Excerpts).  
*June 9, 1989.*



**Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable**  
June 9, 1989  
(Verbatim text of the video-taped record. Excerpts.)

[...]

**Péter Tölgyessy:** We have to give a compensation for everything, therefore the text is extremely fragile. Here a little modification, and then they will claim their own in return. The text is perhaps seven pages long [together] with the signatures, but we worked on it from 5 to half past 11. They had a complete one ... Thus they did not compose it there. They signed a ready-made text. And well, there is another fact. It is almost certain that they know everything we are talking about here. Now it looks like they do, it looks very much like it. *(Only fragments of the interruption made by Zsolt Zétényi is intelligible ... what we talk about on the phone.)* Yes. I more and more think of this possibility. They were very very well-informed. Even on points in which I would have liked to put in some sentences. The knew everything very precisely, even the nuances. It was a lousy feeling. *(Csaba Óri: Otherwise, we have to change the site.)* Especially if there is something important, then I propose we'd rather talk right before it. If it is a very important issue. The news will not reach them. We have to talk right before it, if the matter is very important. It was very bad to talk with them like that. It was very bad to talk with them when ... *(György Szakolczai: Yes, you can feel that.)* You can feel that.

[...]

**Péter Tölgyessy:** Then I would now talk about the date. Their proposal for the schedule is this. Today László Sólyom and I will sign this text at 12. This is right, I believe. Then we will make it public. They don't want it to happen. If they don't, then in a separate communiqué ... we will not make the text public, we just inform the Hungarian News Agency that the document has been signed. The reason why this is so important is that at the moment there are only two parties, the third party will come in later. So, this has to be communicated to the public by all means that the signing parties are us and MSZMP. The third party will come in later. Our further proposal is the following: the document should be signed tomorrow, tomorrow is Saturday, yes, on Saturday at 15 hours at the party headquarters, followed by a press conference. And they would definitely insist on starting it. They proposed the 13th. The 13th is a Tuesday this month, which is not convenient for us because of the meeting with the American ambassador, as it turned out later. In the morning? Not? But if we don't start the negotiations, then ... *(Károly Vigh: Can't it be the 14th?)* Yes, it can. We can bring it up. But we did not remember the American ambassador. This is getting closer and closer to the funeral... But we have to see that they have warned us that if we don't start real negotiations then they will say to the public that we are just playing the time and we are not constructive. The document is signed, and there is no reason for disturbing real negotiations. So they will go for us.





Document 31.  
Record of Conversation  
between Erich Honecker and E. Shevardnadze in Berlin.  
*June 9, 1989.*



**Record of the Talks between General Secretary of the Central Committee of the SED  
and Chairman of the Council of State of the GDR Comrade Erich Honecker, and  
Member of the Politburo and the Central Committee of the CPSU and Minister for  
Foreign Affairs the USSR, Eduard A. Shevardnadze,**

June 9, 1989

**Eduard Shevardnadze.** Our friends in the GDR need not worry. The Party will remain the leading force in society. It exercises control over all important processes, despite great difficulties. The most important decisions which the Politburo or the Central Committee has put before the Congress, meet with the consent of the Congress. The development of the situation at the Congress is being followed very attentively. In the first days ambitious and demagogic speeches received support. As the Congress proceeded, the ability of the deputies to differentiate between the truth lies and demagoguery has grown. A similar learning process is taking place among the people as well. In the beginning there were threats of strikes in case certain representatives would not be elected to the Supreme Soviet. The publishing of everything from Congress has proved to be correct. The CPSU must in the future adapt itself in its style of work to the new conditions.

Altogether one can be content with the results of the People's Congress. The Party has passed a difficult test. Henceforth the task is to solve urgent sociopolitical matters. Here the Soviet Union can learn much from the GDR. A compelling example of this was the most recent exhibition in Moscow on "Berlin Days," in which the mastery of social problems was vividly shown. Millions of Soviet citizens live in poverty. 20 million pensioners receive less than 70 rubles a month. In spite of great financial difficulties the Congress decided to raise the minimum pension to 80 rubles, for which the State must spend in all 4 to 5 billion rubles per year. This happens [despite] the awareness of the fact, that buying power has already considerably exceeded the supply of goods as it is. A further task of greater political importance is to increase the production of consumer goods. In addition it is necessary to solve the issue of housing. The GDR has correctly and in a timely manner focused on. A third difficulty is the extremely complicated national question. The assessment found earlier that the national question was forever solved was a big mistake. These problems existed long ago and have built up over the years. During the course of democratization they have been revealed. Special problems exist in the Transcaucuses, in the Baltic republics, and recently in Uzbekistan as well. One cannot be sure whether tomorrow will see new conflicts erupting in other regions. The Party requires a new nationality policy. In this respect, the CPSU is preparing itself for a corresponding plenary session. The writing of a new constitution is also a pressing matter.

"One knows that our friends in the GDR are well informed on the developments in the GDR, and are compassionate. Your valuable support would be highly appreciated in the Soviet Union."

Comrade Eduard Shevardnadze stated that Comrade Yakovlev will be received on Saturday by Comrade Czyrek at the request of Comrade Jaruzelski. to receive information on the domestic developments in Poland. At the moment it is still difficult to guess how the situation in Poland will continue to develop. The most recent events have serious consequences.<sup>2</sup> A profound analysis is necessary. It should be taken into account that

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<sup>2</sup> In the 4 and 18. June 1989 elections to the *Sejm* in Poland, candidates from the opposition "Solidarity" achieved an overwhelming victory. In the *Senat* they won 99 of 100 seats, in the House of Representatives Not for citation or publication without permission.

"Solidarity" represents a real force. The PUWP must accept a real defeat and finds itself in a very difficult position. In Hungary as well an unsettling development is taking place.

Comrade Erich Honecker emphasized that he shares fully the evaluation made of Poland. At a meeting with Comrade Jaruzelski, [Jaruzelski] still gave an optimistic evaluation of the expected election results, although the defeat was already becoming apparent.<sup>3</sup>

It is well known that Poland lies between the GDR and the USSR. Socialism cannot be lost in Poland.

In Hungary the processes are most probably unstoppable. Many Hungarian comrades fear that in connection with the planned reburial of the Prime Minister of 1956, Nagy, counterrevolution will break out again.<sup>4</sup> What Pozsgay proclaimed has nothing at all to do with socialism.<sup>5</sup> The question is whether it is possible to prevent the splitting of the Hungarian working class. If not, Hungary will slip further into the bourgeois camp. Comrade Erich Honecker remarked that he remembers quite well the events of 1956 and the role Imre Nagy played.

*Source: Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR-Bundesarchiv, SED, ZK, JIV2/2A/3225*

Translated by Christiaan Hetzner  
The National Security Archive

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all 161 contested seats. (65% of these seats were reserved in advance for the ruling coalition).

<sup>3</sup> The discussion between Erich Honecker and Wojciech Jaruzelski took place on 22 May 1989 in Berlin.

<sup>4</sup> On the 16 June 1989 in Budapest, former Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy, executed in 1958, together with four other colleagues [Pal Maleter, Geza Losonczy, Miklos Gimes, Jozsef Szilagyi] similarly executed, were ceremoniously reburied.

<sup>5</sup> Imre Pozsgay, elected to the HSWP Politburo in March 1988, had for example, in a ZDF [West German] television program airing 3 June 1989, called "What now, Mr. Pozsgay?", described the Prague Spring of 1968 as a reform attempt, whose outcome must be awaited.

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Document 32.  
Agreement on the Establishment of a National Roundtable.  
The Full Text of the Signed Agreement.  
*June 10, 1989.*



**AGREEMENT**  
**on the commencement of substantial political negotiations**  
**between the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, the members of the Opposition**  
**Roundtable and the organisations of the Third Side**  
**June 10, 1989**

I.

The necessity to help the nation out of a serious political and economic crisis, and the democratic transformation of the conditions of power appropriate the dialogue between all the political circles that feel responsible for the future. Handling the crisis and creating a multiparty system is only possible with the agreement of the democratic forces. It presupposes that mutual interests and intents are taken into account, that all participants are willing to make an agreement, and it necessitates trust and self-restraint.

The fate of the nation can be bettered with respecting the requirements of the constitution and firmly refusing violence. It is our mutual interest that social conflicts are solved according to the generally agreed norms of the European political culture: with public consent. The transition from a single-party system to representational democracy and the constitutional state can only be realised with free elections. Well-functioning representative bodies and a firm, self-consistent government that is trusted by the people are needed to stop the aggravating social and economic crisis. The peaceful political transition and the relief of aggravated economic and social tension can only be realised in mutual correlation. An array of historical examples warn us that common problems can only be solved with consensus. All civil organisations and movements have to take part side by side in the hard and contradictory process of transition.

On the basis of these facts and correlation, organisations of the Opposition Roundtable, the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, the Left Wing Alternative Union; the Patriotic People's Front; the Hungarian Democratic Youth Association; the Association of Hungarian Resistance Fighters and Anti-Fascists; the National Council of Hungarian Women; the joint delegation of the Ferenc Münnich Society and the National Council of Trade Unions express their wish to commence substantial political negotiations. The equal negotiators accept the following governing principles for the talks:

- the basis of power is the sovereignty of the people; none of the political forces can monopolise it and declare themselves the sole repository of people's will, and none can aspire for unconstitutionally curtailing political rights;
- the will of the public has to be expressed without preceding limitations, in the course of free elections, the result of which is binding for everyone, and from which no political organisation that complies with the requirements of the constitution can be excluded;
- handling the crisis, ensuring a democratic transition and resolving political conflicts is only possible in a peaceful way, avoiding violence; none of the civil organisations can have direct control over military forces;
- an important condition of the successful and constructive political negotiations is that the nation and one another's interests are considered and respected; a further condition is the mutual and anticipatory confidence;
- only mutually acceptable conditions can be the basis of co-operation and agreement;
- when determining the participants of negotiations and their legal standing, exclusion of a political nature is unacceptable, although the functioning of the negotiation process must be considered;

- the objective of negotiations is the forming of political agreements that can be accompanied by the necessary government measures and bills, together with the deadline of their realisation; the negotiations themselves, however, do not directly exercise functions of constitutional law;
- during the course of negotiations the parties refrain from all unilateral steps that would obliterate the goal of negotiations; legislation cannot precede political agreement;
- all negotiating partners will have the political agreements accepted in their own organisations, and represent it in public as well, while assisting the enforcement of the agreements by every possible political means.

## II.

1. Three parties take part in the political conciliation talks, with the intent of reaching political agreements.

a) The Opposition Roundtable (Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Friendship Society; Alliance of Young Democrats; Independent Smallholders' and Farmers' Civic Party; Christian Democratic People's Party; Hungarian Democratic Forum; Hungarian People's Party; Hungarian Social Democratic Party; Alliance of Free Democrats; and the Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions as observer);

b) Hungarian Socialist Workers Party;

c) The following civil organisations and movements: Left Wing Alternative Union; the Patriotic People's Front; Hungarian Democratic Youth Association; the Association of Hungarian Resistance Fighters and Anti-Fascists; the National Council of Hungarian Women; the Ferenc Münnich Society and the National Council of Trade Unions.

All three negotiating partners are endowed with equal rights in forming a consensus. A speaker each represents all three parties, who express the opinions of the negotiating parties. Civil associations and movements listed under point c) above, whose participation in substantial negotiations was agreed by the Opposition Roundtable as a compromise during preparatory talks, do express that they support the intention of both the Hungarian Social Workers Party and the Opposition Roundtable to conduct a constructive dialogue and reach an agreement. They intend to take an active part in the negotiation process. The Opposition Roundtable determines the number and composition of their delegates. Civil associations and movements listed under point c) above decide between themselves about the way of reconciliation and the method of joint representation of their disputable issues.

1. Representatives of the partaking organisations are endowed with a written mandate, which contains their right to making agreements. They present their mandate to the president of the plenary session.

2. The fourth end of the negotiating table can be reserved for observers. Observers have the right of submitting their possible remarks in writing to the president of the meeting, who informs the negotiating parties about the observation.

3. The negotiating parties put on the agenda of conciliatory talks the following issues:

- defining the rules and principles of realising a democratic political transition;
- strategic tasks of overcoming the impending economic and social crisis.

Final definition of individual issues, based on specific interests, is the task of substantial negotiations.

1. The statutes and working order of the political conciliatory talks is as follows:

a) Substantial negotiations are conducted in plenary sessions and in committees.



The opening plenary session is scheduled on 13 June 1989 (Tuesday) in the Hunters' Hall of Parliament.

The Speaker of the House presides over the whole meeting.

Representatives of all three negotiating parties are given equal time to speak.

In the course of the opening plenary session, negotiating partners issue a declaration of intent. Then they form working committees.

b) Agreements are prepared by working committees, according to specific issues on the agenda. Statutes of the plenary session logically refer to committee sessions as well.

Working committees can form sub-committees — with the participation of experts.

c) Preparing bills for legislation must involve governmental bodies as well. In the course of political conciliatory talks, some propositions may be exposed to public debate. Final documents are ratified by the plenary session. Propositions of the working committees can only be submitted to the plenary session when heads of delegations have signed them. The approved documents are signed by the heads of the delegations who then take care of their publication. Every session is recorded in minutes, which has to be publicised in case the negotiations are intermitted.

d) Coming to an agreement is our mutual interest, based on the principle of consensus. Should discord persist in a particular detail, consensus can be reached nevertheless, provided that the dissenting negotiating partner admits that it does not concern the general principle of the agreement.

e) Plenary sessions are open for the press. Working committees, however, are operating behind closed doors. It has to be assured that the public receives regular and substantial information about the negotiation process. From time to time, negotiating parties issue a joint communiqué to the Hungarian Telegraphic Agency. Separate statements can only be issued if negotiations break off or a common declaration cannot be agreed on. Nevertheless, this does not concern the right of the parties to express their opinions about the content of certain issues on the agenda.

f) The parties think it necessary that expenses of the negotiations are covered by the state budget. Handling of documents, photocopying, postage, the costs of organising meetings, and the wages of possible experts are included in the expenses.

Representing the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party:

György Fejtő

Secretary of the Central Committee

Representing the Opposition Roundtable:

Dr. Zsolt Zétényi

Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Friendship Society

Dr. László Kövér

Federation of Young Democrats

Péter Hardi

Independent Smallholders' and Farmers' Civic Party

György Szakolczai

Christian Democratic People's Party

Dr. László Sólyom  
Hungarian Democratic Forum

Csaba Varga  
Hungarian People's Party

Tibor Baranyai  
Social Democratic Party of Hungary

Dr. Péter Tölgyessy  
Alliance of Free Democrats

Imre Kerényi  
Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions, as observer

Representing the Left Wing Alternative Union; the Patriotic People's Front; the Hungarian Democratic Youth Association; the Association of Hungarian Resistance Fighters and Anti-Fascists; the National Council of Hungarian Women; the joint delegation of the Ferenc Münnich Society and the National Council of Trade Unions:

Csaba Kemény  
Left Wing Alternative Union

Dr. István Kukorelli  
Patriotic People's Front

Ferenc Gyurcsány  
Hungarian Federation of Democratic Youth

Imre Kerekes  
Association of Hungarian Resistance Fighters and Anti-Fascists

Mrs. Soós Dr. Mária Dobos  
National Council of Hungarian Women

Ferenc Berényi  
Ferenc Münnich Society

Mrs. Kósa Dr. Magda Kovács  
National Council of Trade Unions

Document 33.

Record of Conversation between Gorbachev and Chancellor Kohl, Bonn  
[The End of the Brezhnev Doctrine]  
*June 12, 1989.*



**Record of Conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and Chancellor of FRG H. Kohl**  
**Bonn (one-on-one)**  
**[The End of the Brezhnev Doctrine]**  
June 12, 1989

**Kohl.** [ . . . ] I know George Bush for a long time, we have a very good friendly relationship. In giving him an evaluation as a President, after just several months on the job, we have to take into account his previous career.

George Bush was Vice President under President Reagan for eight years. He was always a loyal person, in this respect we probably have a common point of view, we perceive such qualities as positive. However, for George Bush personally, such an assessment had a negative aspect, hurt him, because everybody was constantly asking whether he would be able to come out of Reagan's shadow, and to acquire his own political face, or whether he would always remain in the position of loyalty.

In terms of public relations, Bush has a long way to go to compete with Reagan: he has neither the actor charisma, nor the art to communicate with people via TV, nor any other similar qualities. He is an intellectual. In America they distinguish between people from the West coast and from the East coast. People from California are very different from people from Western United States [sic - should be: Eastern United States -- trans.].

In this sense Bush, as a politician, is very important for Europe--he has a more European vision of things than Reagan had. By the way, Reagan, as a politician, grew literally in front of my eyes. I know him since 1979 when he still was the leader of the opposition. One time he came to Bonn, I received him, and we talked for 3 hours. Helmut Schmidt, who was Chancellor then, did not receive him, stating that he did not have time. I had a depressing impression from that conversation with Reagan. It came out that he did not understand anything in European affairs. My assistant [Horst] Telchik was present at that conversation, and he can tell you even now how discouraged we were then. But later Reagan became President, and you, Mr. Gorbachev, were able to find a common language with him.

Bush is a completely different person. Do not forget that he inherited a difficult domestic political situation, first of all in terms of the economy. Now the ghost of the united European market, which will be created in 1992, is knocking on the U.S. door. Japanese entrepreneurs are working in the United States, and they are capturing new positions all the time. The living standards of the U.S. population, and first of all of the disadvantaged strata, continue to stagnate.

Recently I had a chance to see it with my own eyes. Last week I flew to America on a personal, unofficial trip, to visit my son, who took exams at Harvard University. I spoke with students and with professors--and I did not hear any positive assessments of how the American people now live from anybody. Bush has an overwhelming load of things to do in the social sphere, which could become his Achilles heel. At the same time, in Congress his situation is more favorable than the one that Reagan had. I would say that dramatic changes have happened there. The current [Democratic] leader of Congress [i.e. House of Representatives], [Rep.] Tom Foley, represents a politician of a quiet, non-aggressive type. He is oriented toward cooperation, not confrontation, he wants to build a positive political capital for himself, so that in the future he could become a presidential candidate from the Democrats. In short, it is important to follow American domestic developments, and to account for them in formulating your own political line.

[...]

**Gorbachev.** I had many meetings with Bush, including personal meetings. Last time we talked in [New York City in] December of last year [1988], when he had already been elected President. We agreed on a confidential basis, that we would develop Soviet-American relations on the basis of the following formula: continuity, plus what we should supplement it with. There are a lot of sensitive issues in our relations, that is why it is important to improve the trust between Moscow and Washington. So far, I have not noticed any significant deviations from the agreement on Bush's part. However, as I have already mentioned, his last speeches gave us grounds for concern.

**Kohl.** Are you talking about his statements on arms control? What speeches do you have in mind?

**Gorbachev.** The speech at the University of Texas on May 12, and the speech at the Coast Guard Academy [on 24 May]. Also, he made quite unpleasant statements concerning Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union at the [6 March] conference "Veterans of Foreign Wars" before Americans of Polish origin, and so on. This is what comes to mind. However, there were other statements of this kind in the last months too. I don't see either a realism or a constructive line in those statements. Frankly speaking, those statements reminded us of Reagan's statements about the "crusade" against socialism. He appealed to the forces of freedom, called for the end to the "status quo," and for "pushing socialism back." And all this at a time when we are calling for de-ideologization of the relations. Unwillingly, the questions comes to mind--where is genuine Bush, and where is Bush rhetorical? Where does he just play up the rhetoric, and where does he lay down the state line?

**Kohl.** We will wait and see. I am convinced that everything will take its course, and with a good speed. There will be progress in disarmament also. Here everything depends on the two great powers.

If we can achieve a decisive progress in Vienna in the next 12-15 months, it would change the situation on all arms control issues in a crucial way. Now there are no taboos or unresolvable problems any more.

[...] We are watching the developments in Hungary with a great interest. The United States, and of course you, Mr. General Secretary, are following them too. I told Bush that as far as Hungary is concerned, we are acting on the basis of an old German proverb: let the church remain in the village. It means that the Hungarians should decide themselves what they want, but nobody should interfere in their affairs.

**Gorbachev.** We have a similar proverb: you do not go to somebody's monastery with your charter.

**Kohl.** Beautiful folk wisdom. Both sides adhere to it. And if so, there could be no talk about any "crusades".

**Gorbachev.** I am telling you honestly--there are serious shifts underway in the socialist countries. Their direction originates from concrete situations in each country. The West should not be concerned about it. Everything moves in the direction of a strengthening of

the democratic basis. Every country decides on its own how it does it. It is their internal affair. I think you would agree with me that you should not stick a pole into an anthill. Consequences of such an act could be absolutely unpredictable.

**Kohl.** There is an opinion of one side, there is an opinion of another side, but there is also a third opinion--a common opinion. This is a common opinion of the Soviet Union, of the United States, of the FRG, and of other countries. In short, we should not interfere with anybody's development.

**Gorbachev.** There is a very tense situation in a number of countries. If someone was going to try to destabilize the situation, it would disrupt the process of building trust between the West and the East, and destroy everything that has been achieved so far. We want a rapprochement, not a return to the positions of confrontation.

[...]

**Kohl.** However, it is not a secret to anybody, that Erich Honecker is not inclined to undertake any changes or reforms, and thus he himself destabilizes the situation.

I have problems because of that in the FRG. I say all the time that I am not interested in destabilizing the situation in the GDR. However, the people ask me all the time, why does the GDR remain on frozen positions[?] I am told that we should do something in order to let the people there experience the same freedom that now characterizes Hungary, Poland, and, of course, the Soviet Union.

You cannot imagine what was going on here when the GDR banned the distribution of Soviet magazine "Sputnik". Everybody was laughing. But I did not. Because they demanded that I, as Chancellor, take new steps for the improvement of relations with the GDR, and I could not do anything about it.

**Gorbachev.** As far as our friends are concerned, we have a firm principle: everyone is responsible for his own country. We are not going to teach anybody, but we are not asking anybody to teach us either. I think that what I have just said makes it clear whether there is any "Brezhnev Doctrine." We are in favor of positive changes in all spheres, in favor of political normalization, of strengthening of the economy, but at the same time also in favor of preserving the special features and traditions of the socialist states.

[...]

**Kohl.** I support your ideas. To tell you honestly, we understand Moscow much better, and we feel much closer to it than to [East] Berlin now. 90% of the population in the GDR watch our television. They are informed about everything, but afraid to speak publicly. I just feel sorry for the people. But let me reiterate that I am not doing anything to destabilize the situation. This applies to Hungary, and Poland, as well. To interfere with anybody's internal political development now would mean to take a destructive line which would throw Europe back to the times of caution and mistrust.

**Gorbachev.** This is a very important statement, it fits the spirit of the time.

**Kohl.** [...] As far as the conventional weapons are concerned, the key to this issue is in

your hands. We have a real opportunity to reach an agreement, and in a fundamental sense, on conventional weapons in the next 12, or if not, then in the next 14-15 months. An agreement on conventional weapons would put all the arms control agenda on a qualitatively new level. I will be one of those who will make a clear and sound statement about it.

I would like to propose to you, Mr. General Secretary, that in the next several months we should stay in direct contact--not via departments--on the issues of negotiations in Vienna. And in general, I believe that we should intensify our contacts, call each other more often, even if there is no concrete business to discuss. If we talk regularly, hear each other's voices, all problems would be easier to solve.

As far as special representatives are concerned, as I have already told you, I will send my closest assistant Telchik who is present here. And you can send Chernyaev to me.

**Gorbachev.** I agree.

**Kohl.** We are not exaggerating our role, but we are not underestimating it either. Others will listen to our opinion more and more. I can already feel it.

**Gorbachev.** We need to cooperate more closely, because our cooperation can produce very effective impulses and lead to positive changes on still unresolved issues.

*Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Notes of A.S. Chernyaev*

Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya  
for The National Security Archive



Document 34.  
Meeting of the MSZMP Political Committee.  
Verbatim Record of Minutes (Excerpts).  
*June 13, 1989.*



## Meeting of the MSZMP Political Committee

June 13, 1989

### Verbatim Record of Minutes

[Subject:] **Discussion on the domestic political situation and the state of affairs of the party**

**Imre Pozsgay:** [...] And now let us turn to the trends and groups. First I would like to speak about the Movement for Democratic Hungary. Some of our comrades are influenced by the over-zealous and the ones who interpret everything concerning this issue as well. This movement just came into being, this is not an authorized movement, it just came into being. I have always thought that one of the main problems of the party and the over-centralized organization, one of their problems of control has always been that only authorized movements existed, and I think we have left that era behind, and we realize that something has changed among party members. It might be only one fifth of the members, or one tenth, but something has definitely moved, and someone has to react to this movement somehow.

I did not set up a movement. The central committee members who are part of it did not set up a movement, they just reacted in a way to what had been voiced in Szeged, what had been [voiced] in the circles of the reform workshop. It has to be decided whether it is advantageous to the party or not, but I think it is. This firm belief has been my starting point. Since it is not the only task of our party to create its own centre – it does not bring far. Look at what has happened to the Polish United Workers' Party – the same thing could happen to us at the elections and then we are in trouble. This party should get to the centre of the people [sic]. And we would never win the elections if there were no movements and gestures like this, which may arise from this formation and may play the role of inspiring confidence, that is, it might prove that the party already has a great and valuable section which is already capable of communicating with the people. The fact that I say this does not mean I look down on other people's – I would like to say something about the one associated with Ribánszki in particular – and on other people's initiatives, but if we do not take this attitude, than the paralysis which had been characteristic of this party under democratic centralism will tie up our hands at the most critical historical turning points. Without this dynamism we could possibly drive together our own centre anyway, but it is more than likely that we would be still unable to get into the centre of the people. It will not happen through the Movement for a Democratic Hungary – it is only one factor, but it is worth paying attention to it, to its values. I mean one should not pay attention to the suspicious voices without suspicion and one should not be influenced by those who are suspicious, one had better try to find the advantageous aspects, the possible results.

[...] Now, to the question of whether the leadership had been aware of this or not. I would like to make it clear that I am not the leader of this movement. I was put on top of the list out of politeness; the same thing would be done to anyone else, and I volunteered in the spirit of ideas I have just been touching upon to... for the sake of people who are involved, some trend... not to organize a party, on the contrary, to create something that would also build relations with other parties... You should read the notice, and also what I said. In that very moment it would all be clear. The other thing is that this initiative and others like it – although I do not want to create a burden for

anyone else with my remarks here –, similar movements and gestures are either graspable for the party or destined to fade out. There are only these two alternatives.

[...] The defeats of this party have mostly originated in the fact that it had been unable to incorporate the initiatives coming from outside, from members in contact with the outside world; its first reaction to such initiatives has always been automatic rejection, and when it tried to grab them later, it did not get the credit, and the initiatives then did not become part of the movement of the party. What I have in mind is that a modern party which accepts party pluralism should be quite capable of internalising this chance for movement, or else it would be attracted by others, since people are trying to find orientation. If you believe me when I say that this is not about jockeying for power, in this sense I am not motivated by making my personal base stronger when I participate in a movement like this, then you have to accept that this is for the party, this is meant to be to the party's advantage.

[...] The Ribánszki-group, whatever, the Marxist centre, or whatever – it is a bit more complicated. What has been pointed out by comrade Grósz is its biggest risk. This group has opted out of the consensus which can even be secured – well, I believe in the afternoon we will see anyway – with the opposition. When the country is in trouble, resorting to social demagogy is a low and an evil thing to do in politics. It amounts to selling out the nation. This must be clearly stated. In order to achieve that the workers believe it – since they really have had enough, together with various other groups of society – to make them believe us, I have to say again what I have pointed out already at the press conference: we have to show who these people are. They are exactly the ones who are the depositaries of the system that pushed the country to where it is now, the system which induced this situation. And then we can point at the very persons, because if he does not take a step... I do not care, they can organize whatever they want to, they can make their own little nest to feel at home, let them feel great among each other. They cannot feel good anywhere else, anyway. Let them organize their own party, I do not care, but this lowly, evil thing should be rejected. Whoever starts to strike the cords of social demagogy – I can only imagine him on a flag of skull and bones. (*Nyers: What can we do? Should we put him into jail?*) No. We should... call the attention of the public to it. (*Nyers: Do we want to ban them?*) No, I do not want to ban them at all. God forbid! No. We should make it public who they are and what they want. (*Nyers: Then they will start making trouble, too, and we are going to be in it all the same.*) We have survived. (*Nyers: Of course we should do this politically, this exposure, I mean. But we should not do it, because everybody has a skeleton in the cupboard to a certain extent. If we look at politics from this perspective, which is of course a stupid perspective, everybody is in it to the waist.*) We will have to talk about it, what can be done with them. Anyway, publicity is the only thing that can be of any help. (*Nyers: The party should separate from them, that is what we should do.*) But we there is no danger in pointing out that social demagogy (*Nyers: Naturally, we should, but it is another issue-*) is a breach of the consensus. (*Nyers: Other types of demagogy as well, including the nationalistic demagogy, too.*) Yes, the same way.

[...] About statements abroad. If it is brought up at the session of the Central Committee, I am prepared to talk about it, of course. I do not think there have been no mistakes, but I take responsibility for all my words, my original statements – not interpretations of the press –, everything I said can be checked, it is open to enquiry, I said everything in the presence of responsible persons of our embassies. Obviously it will be me who has to react to those statements of mine if they come up at the session of the Central Committee.

[...]

**Rezső Nyers:** [...] As far as the internal affairs of the party are concerned – concerning the Ribánszki group, I agree. Comrade Grósz has characterized them in general, comrade Pozsgay has characterized them in particular, I agree with what they said, I agree with everything except for the expression 'selling out the nation'. Let us be careful with this expression, because it had been used by Rákosi and his circles, Stalin used expressions like that. Let us be careful with it. Selling out the nation is... this is not a debate on issues of the nation, this is a debate on issues of the society. Those people are stupid. Plain stupid. If they are selling out the nation, they should be thrown into jail. I am just asking. It is no use. But please understand this, this is dangerous... It indicates that Ribánszki and his circle are trying to attack where we are weak, where they can take some turf with their ideology. And that is the workers' group. The workers.

I am glad to read in *Népszabadság* that a thousand people were invited in Csepel, and only 300 showed up, saying it in a provocative way. But it is also a reason for lamenting that 300 people did actually show up. (*Interruption: It was not Ribánszki.*) Yes, it was him indeed. (*Interruption: It was definitely not Ribánszki and his people.*) Please, please, in Csepel. Then it was someone else. It was in the press that they were in Csepel, in Csepel indeed, and Ribánszki made a presentation on Sunday. He is also the Csepel secretary. I read it in *Népszabadság*. This morning, in today's paper. I read about this Csepel case, and they say it was a thousand people. (*Interruptions: It was there. And in DANUVIA. Both places. I have not read that, only in the Bányász.*) Yes, yes. The atmosphere tells us a lot, let us analyse this a little bit. One must learn from the opponent as well. Whether he is an opponent or an enemy is unclear yet. Probably he is more of an enemy. God knows who else is there. But until they act according to democratic rules, what can we do, we have to let them do it. But we will have to talk about the party policy.

As far as the Movement for a Democratic Hungary is concerned. It is a tendency, one must accept that. I think the only obvious complication has come up concerning the circumstances of organising it. Well, it would have been better if comrade Pozsgay had recounted what he was aware of when he became aware of it. He only recounted it, when... I do not know if it was the day before, or on the same day – but anyway, it was a mistake of presentation. (*Imre Pozsgay: I was not present at two meetings of the Political Committee.*) Well, even if it was not organized correctly, you know. (*Imre Pozsgay: I was invited.*) We are colleagues here, we are comrades, we are engaged in politics together. Here, this is not... It is also their fault. I know it is not you alone who is doing politics, other people are doing politics with you. They are making politics with you. We have to look at it this way as well. There are some nice people doing politics with you, and there are some who are not so nice. By the way the same is true of me, there are some nice people doing politics with me, and there are some who are not so nice. We have to take it like this. One should be careful when one is congratulated to. (*Laughter.*) Well, to what did you congratulate now? One should not accept every congratulation. Well, I see no problems here apart from this. If you read it, it is the same as that of the March Front. I am in the March Front, I have nothing against this. And there are some overlaps, people who are in this one and the other one as well. There is a group of people who are in both. So, for God's sake, I do not consider this to be on the same level as Ribánszki and his group.

Now, to comrade Berecz's organising job. Excuse me, but I do not know a better description of it than 'comrade Berecz's organising job'. Uniting, as it is, the silent majority. I think we should just accept it. It triggered panic in a lot of comrades, too. They thought, "You will see now, that it has started at the party academy as well"... All right, but then, the problem is that we are indeed becoming differentiated in this case when the phase of integration, or if not that, at least the phase of cooperation should be prevailing now. We are delayed in this respect as well. We have to think it over carefully – what we do next.

Well, there are positive things, too. We should also account for them. I consider the last session of Parliament a slight shift in the right direction. It might be the case that this Parliament will be able to accomplish its tasks until the end of the year, or the beginning of next year. It is not sure, but possible. But we still have to do something in this respect. I am still of the opinion that the party – all of us together – should take steps to stop this anti-democratic abuse of an insufficient constitution through calling them back. If we are unable to do this, if we can not make a stand together, then both the party and the government will be compromised. We should get rid of the ones who are intolerable. If Barcs is so intolerable, well, I can not name anyone off the cuff, Korom fortunately has already left. Perhaps we still have a couple of comrades there who just should not be there, but it is not György Aczél or István Sarlós, and I do not know who said that they would resign from the Central Committee and all that, and they would be organising a movement. It is not them who should leave. Those people belong to the centre. (*Károly Grósz: Yesterday in Baranya, the calling back of Lajos Horváth and Aczél has initiated.*) Well, Lajos Horváth. It is difficult to understand why, it is only a matter of cabinet policy. No political reason whatsoever. He has never been left-wing in his life, I guess. Maybe until '56? I do not know him. He was not on the left in '56, and he has not been on the left ever since. (*Károly Grósz: He was not conspicuous.*) Yes. These people. And so we pull ourselves together and...

The other thing is, well, that I can imagine as a political step – by the way, I see a chance in Parliament for us to get stronger, this is one of the key issues – the other thing is that we could organize our work in Parliament more efficiently.

Still another thing is that the opposition is perhaps also thinking hard, at least its real politicians. Not all of them are [smart]. There are, unfortunately, a lot of people of ideology among them as well. But the real politicians among them might think about these events in Poland, and in China, and in the Soviet Union. And perhaps they would realize what the interest of the nation, the real national interest is. So I regard this as a positive thing that we should make use of.

Now the press and this media thing. Now even outsiders are saying it, foreigners as well, I have talked about it with an ambassador, too, that they can not really digest television and radio like ours. They can not imagine it. So, something has to be done. The government, the party can not extend their influence. No. It is over-politicized, and it exposes the system every day. It can not be done like this any longer.

It should provide every opinion an opportunity to appear. Of course, it is also the fault of the political situation, not of the television alone. They are apolitical. Well, if this is the case, so be it... There is no need – but if our public life is also apolitical and ideological, I have to say this, this is what they report. But the government and the establishment can not be allowed to do this. We need to build up some serious influence to avoid the situation where the MSZMP appoints the president and the SZDSZ (Alliance of Free Democrats) and the MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum) provide the programmes. This is no good. No good at all. The social democrats are also

complaining, they are being excluded, too, they are not even allowed by [these]... well, little groups to come near. Therefore, perhaps you can not even say that they serve the opposition. Not even that. They are serving partial interests, and it is not even beneficial for those who they think are served by them. It is no good for them, either. Thus, there should be a government organ, an organ of Parliament, and between the two, a national administrative organization – something like this should be created in cooperation with them.

Now, as far as the right wing is concerned. Yes, we have to dissociate ourselves from the right in some way. We have to reflect on it. The *Népszabadság* has done it, more or less, comrade Grósz has been doing this for a long time, but we also have to state that on quite a few occasions he did it in an unfortunate way. This has caused some problems: [talking about] the counter-revolution and the white terror; there have been problems. Nevertheless, I do admit that it is necessary to dissociate ourselves from the right. It is still quite striking, the thing that happened at a sports event. I am glad that the *Népszabadság*'s attention also turned to it. Well, I was grabbed by at least ten people yesterday. I was just walking in the street and I was grabbed by people in the street, not the kind of left-wing people, there were also non-party men among them [who talked about] what happened in Békéscsaba. (*Interruptions: What happened? Fradi-fans again? They always pop into mind.*) No, not Fradi, something worse than that. Dózsa has a group like that as well. [...] Well, what happens? The team wins the cup – and this is a 'Liberation' cup – and the team does not accept it, someone says so, and the team says OK, as if they were paralysed. It is not true that everybody was thinking like that, but still, they followed the order, they do not accept the prize because it was the Russian occupation and not Liberation. But you have not heard everything yet. At the announcement of results, they read it out into the microphone, and the crowd is listening to it, appalled, the whole statement, that the Soviet troops in fact occupied us. It was not liberation, therefore we do not take this cup, whatever, and so on... And everybody is paralysed... Everybody is standing there... (*Interruption: What was it – a basketball game?*) I do not know. Basketball, or I would guess... it was basketball. (*Interruption: the finals of the Liberation Cup, four teams were playing, and TUNGSRAM was the winner.*) So it was basketball. The interesting thing is that they just did not take the cup. I can picture this, this stupid guy, talking the girls into it, not to take the cup. The worrying thing is that it was a gesture of propaganda and the country just take it in. Things like this do happen these days, this is where our political weakness lies.

[...] One has to be able to defend the Kádár-era. Its good side, that is, the decade of the '60s. We have to be able to pick it out. If we can not pick out the decade of the '60's, we are in trouble. I mean to include the reforms of '68 as well. Not because I was involved in it. No. Not at all... What do I care... I know its shortcomings and all its wonders. But if we talk about it like we do now, like it had been nothing... not us, we do not talk about it, we do not even defend ourselves, but the liberals, there are the bourgeois liberals and of course the anti-communists [who say] it was nothing and that the Stalinist system stayed the same. If the Stalinist system had stayed the same, then it has been a Stalinist system up to now, and then we have to realize that it can not be reformed at all. Then we can not reform it at all. But then we can not be reformed, either, and we are unable to reform anything. Then we have to state who is the one who wants to do something else, and what that would be. No one has said so far what anyone would want. So we have to defend this idea somehow, that the system of Kádár was a hybrid one. A shift – away from Stalinism. It was not complete and in a lot of

aspects – especially that of political institutions – it was not much of a change compared with the Stalinist system, but in terms of the economic system it was indeed a lot better. It did not fully transform into that other system, but it detached itself from the old one. But if the economy has anything to do with politics – and no Marxist can deny that –, then this has not been the same system, this hybrid one, this has not been the Stalinist system. And then it needs to be reformed, no revolution should be started against it. Because if someone talks about revolution, it is a completely different thing. Unfortunately, there are also hazy ideas like that in circulation. It even made me cross over into ideology – you see, this is what happens when you take part in these ideological struggles. Probably, this is impossible to clear up altogether as it is, but then at least we should not take part in it. We should think politically. And so I think we should strive to set up a more creditable leadership everywhere, if possible, and as soon as possible. Thank you.

[...]

**György Fejti:** I also agree that as much as possible, we should talk about the domestic political situation in a differentiated and balanced way but also openly, and pinpointing the problems themselves, and also about the state of affairs of the party and the events unfolding all around us, without distracting our attention too much, of course. Because it makes one really think what has happened in Poland and China. Those events are already affecting us today, and they will affect us even more in the long run. I have the feeling that these events – and the events in the Soviet Union, too – shrink the scope of our action domestically. Well, you can not see the whole picture of the Soviet Union either, but the events there also narrow the margins of our possibilities in a certain aspect. Even if I do not use the expression 'isolation'. Obviously, you can only have the full picture of the situation in Poland after the second round, but it is already quite apparent that the PUWP has suffered a spectacular defeat. It got into a very humiliating situation because, first of all, the reflex or attitude of rejection is very strong in society towards the past decades, and although the differences between the situations in Hungary and Poland are probably greater than the similarities, it is a warning sign in at least one aspect: it points out what potential dangers are hidden in a power vacuum.

Now the most important conclusion for me is that a situation has come about which could lead to explosion, or the break-up of the party. Or another road opens up, a path which has not been seriously considered in Poland, but it could be a good example for us, if it is solved the right way. One thing is certain – a completely new situation came about after the elections which was not anticipated by the Polish United Workers' Party before the elections. I think it is an essential condition of peaceful transition in Hungary to stop the MSZMP's break-up. It is necessary to have a force of integration in every society, while there are always quite significant forces of disintegration. A possible force of integration can be the church, another one can be the army. I do not think that they could play that role in Hungary at all. This is why I say our only option is keeping the party together, especially because the political re-segmentation of society, or at least the formation of a stable political structure will probably take more time than we thought. It is not just in the interest of the party when we urge the consolidation of our own state of affairs, it is a fundamental national interest as well. So, this is how we should approach it – the acceleration of integration and the improvement on our capacity of action are not simply in the interest of the party, they are necessary conditions of diverting a national catastrophe.



[...] I also agree with the people who say that in chaotic circumstances a lot of progressive processes are also under way in the confusion most people have a hard time living through. There are a lot of progressive elements, and there are good signs within the party as well, but if we look at the party as a whole we have to regard our position as critical, and its tendency as for the worse, especially if we consider the fact that in a couple of months there is a congress to be held, and the parliamentary elections are also held in a couple of months. A lot of new developments and trends are simultaneously surfacing within the party, but the position of the party as a whole is getting worse. I can not see any movement on the sides and on the surface of the party, not in the depth. The deep layers are still characterized by immobility, disintegration, scepticism, and the intensifying rejection of rhetorical struggles.

[...] I would not like to talk about the internal movements that have appeared one by one. I mostly agree with the people who have made distinctions when evaluating them. I would only add that these movements are not organized around 'ripe concepts' yet. They are groups organized around various ideologies, approaches, and essentially around personalities, which is, in itself, neither critical nor dangerous. What I consider dangerous and critical is that the efforts of the groups directed at exclusivity are strong in each case. Maybe this is only natural, perhaps it will pass, but at the moment it only intensifies desintegration and not a new unity. It is not about whether we should rehash former dreams of unity with a little nostalgia or not [*Sic!*], it is about the lack of signs of the smallest possible shift which would be more or less clear-cut, understandable, and not only for the wide-awake. To my mind, this is dangerous, and also that we lack the determination to fill in certain gaps. We are too busy fighting our more or less tactical wars.

[...] Where do we have too little energy, and where are we too late already? We were unable to re-evaluate the past as much as we could have. It can not be finished actually, but for the integrational trends to start within the party, in my opinion there are at least three conditions. The first thing we need is a more or less clear picture of our past in more than one sense, in fact, two. In terms of rejection, and in terms of keeping the values. It is a grave insufficiency that we have not moved forward concerning this issue.

The second thing is: an honest reaction to the problems of the present. These two things should and could... and what is an honest reaction to the problems of the present? – well, it can be phrased this way, it can be phrased that way. On the one hand there is this election programme which is, on the other hand, the programme of the party. For this we should pull our best resources together, the most excellent representatives of all those groups and movements.

The third thing is that we must put together a leadership which should consist of respectable persons who want to support each other and are able to support each other. If any of these three conditions is missing, the integration process will not start.

[...] Well, the most important question is whether the present leadership of our party, the wider leadership, the Central Committee, and the narrower leadership, the Political Committee, or the still narrower leadership, is able or wants to change the situation that has come about, or is its person-mix capable at all of stopping this tendency for the worse. For a long time I have been of the opinion that the composition of the narrow leadership of the party was ideal in principle since it has been able to convey messages to quite a few groups of society. I do not want to mention any names, but it has been so, that this leadership could have provided coverage of quite significant groups of society if support for each other and supplementing each other had been at the

centre of their activity. What I see is that for months it has not been so, it has been getting worse all the time. So it was not like strengthening and supplementing and providing opportunities for each other, but – and I do not imply it was purposeful, no, it was rather the result of the situation, the result of preconceptions – this process has irreversibly deteriorated. I might not see it as it really is.

A couple of months ago I still thought that the four most important leaders of our party should have appeared together in public more often, they should have held press conferences together more frequently, and they should have acted more in support of each other more often. I do not think it would be viable today. Therefore, concerning this fundamental issue of whether it is possible for us to reverse certain trends with these people, with this leadership, something must be said in the Central Committee. The answer may be yes. I do not see much of a chance personally, but it could still be yes, and then it will have to be a strategic decision, above differences of opinions and personal preferences. Putting this aside now, the members of this leadership either team up so that we would be able to prepare for an acceptable and balanced congress on the one hand, and on the other hand, for winning the elections, or we have to arrive at the necessary conclusions and create a new leadership which is more coherent and the members of which are more supportive of each other.

I think all this depends now not only on our intentions, since there is considerable polarization in the Central Committee as well, and even if we do not prepare ourselves for such a situation, it could still happen at the session of the Central Committee... it would be a disaster, the most devastating thing if we were unable to stand up against it all together, or if we were unable to pacify the situation with a constructive and careful proposal. If a self-destructive, aggravating fight was started at the session of the Central Committee. Thus, I suggest that we should use both this occasion and the time until the 19th to try and develop a position which is shared by everyone in respect of this fundamental question.

[...]

[Subject:] **The political conciliatory negotiations**

**György Fejti:** Comrade Grósz, I would like to add a couple of thoughts, especially concerning the future. I know that only the preparatory phase has been completed so far, and also that we have signalled again to society in view of the 16th that we are not sharpening the swords. The agreement today is not something the party would put together itself, but I think it is acceptable, it does not contain unbearable compromises at all. The main function of today's opening session is to provide an opportunity for the representatives of the three sides to make a political statement, that is, to outline their standpoints concerning the negotiations.

The significant talks will be essentially trilateral. We have suggested that an 'observer side' should also be set up in view of the fact that for some time it was uncertain whether the New March Front would like to take part as observers. A couple of days ago the Forum decided that this status was unacceptable for them. They preferred the initial concept – equal sides around a roundtable. It was not our fault that it was impossible to accomplish. At the same time, due to some kind of misunderstanding, the status of observer proved to be a flood lock, as within two days more than ten organizations called in, partly at comrade Szűrös, partly at others, to say they would like to participate in that status. Probably the three sides will have to decide

on some rational selection method, because from the Hungarian-Polish Countryside Exploring Students to the Hungarian Communist Party a couple of phantom organizations have called in as well. The rational basis of reduction would obviously be the criterium of registration – only registered organizations should participate, and of course the ones who have something to do with the topics on the agenda.

[...] An agreement has been reached on the time of the next round – it would be on 21 June. Experts would naturally go on with their discussions in the meantime as well. According to the plans, two working committees could be set up on 21 June. They would in turn create sub-committees of experts; the number of the sub-committees is to be determined later. One of the two committees would deal with the issues of political transition, the other would deal with issues of the economy and social policy. I would like to suggest that in the two committees comrade Pozsgay should be handling the political consultation concerning the issues of political transition, and comrade Nyers should be handling the issues of the economy. [...] We will be making a proposal concerning the experts who should be involved. It is enough to discuss this later.

[...] The further stages of the work is difficult to see now. Concerning the issues of political transition, it will probably be proceeding faster. There are four bills under preparation there, and consultations on them can be started right away. I would like to tell you that all the organizations know that Parliament will discuss these issues on the 27th. All organizations are prepared to talk about these four topics fast. But I still do not think we should force Parliament to deal with them on the 27th. We should work carefully, accurately and fast, of course. The experts would meet practically every day.

[...]

**György Fejti:** About another thing: we have signed an agreement which includes that legislation can not precede the political agreements. Only if the negotiations are stalled. So I do not think a confrontation would be reasonable in respect of this, especially because of the fact that before we signed it, we had talked about it, that is, that if the constructive discussions start concerning these bills and can not be finished by the 27th, then the negotiating sides should not be provoked with [Parliament] starting the debate on these bills. And it is possible to find a civilized solution to this. After all, we are able to influence the members of Parliament as well to a certain extent. It does not affect the sovereignty of Parliament; it flows from the fact that it is reasonable to prevent the disturbing of an ongoing negotiation by a debate in Parliament.

**Mátyás Szűrös:** Well, these expressions must not be used in reference to Parliament. Whatever sides are concerned. I object to this. I understand this now. The party should not have agreed to this, we should have formulated this in a more flexible way.

**György Fejti:** Dear Matyi, I asked you, did not I...

**Mátyás Szűrös:** A parliament can not be overridden like this.

**Károly Grósz:** But this is not so. Because if this is a transitional period now, then you are right. But in normal circumstances, where there is party pluralism, if the parties agree on something, they make their representatives implement the agreement. But we are on the road to somewhere now, like Uncle Kohn [of the joke]: there are no parties yet, and Parliament is still in its place.

[Subject:] **The reburial of Imre Nagy**

**Mihály Jassó:** I would like to ask whether the party is formulating a position concerning the burial. I guess you might want to talk about this, comrade Grósz. Do you not? Would you like to talk about this? If you would, then I would not.

**Károly Grósz:** I do not think there is a reason for us to make a decision on representation, since the Central Committee's position has been formulated.

**Mihály Jassó:** The Committee for Historical Justice has rejected it. We can not even be present as an official body.

**Károly Grósz:** I wanted to raise an issue that I already have, at the meeting of the apparatus. Whether there should be a flag on the house.

**Mihály Jassó:** The other thing is what we should do with the flag.

**Károly Grósz:** It does matter, the flag. A black one, the national flag, and a red one. But we do not have three poles. (*Iványi: A red ribbon and a black ribbon.*) That would be sufficient as well. That has been the second option. The third option has been a red one, the national one, and a black ribbon should be tied over or onto them. We... previously the tradition has been to have a black one. (*Rezső Nyers: If we put up a flag at all, then it should be black.*) (*Pozsgay: That is the most simple solution, a black flag.*) So nothing else: no red, no purple, no white. We have not declared him as our own dead anywhere. So it would not be problematic if we did not put up a flag at all. But why should not we do it? After the resolution of the Central Committee why should not we? (*Jassó: That is clear.*) There is no... reason for not doing it.

[...]

**Károly Grósz:** One could put up whatever one pleases. They do it differently everywhere. They put up whatever they think is right. We will put up the black flag on the house. (*Németh: There is no need to make a standard.*) They put up whatever they want. We will put up the black flag. (*Mrs. Takács: So we put up a black one?*) Yes, a black one. It has been black on other occasions. Only a black one. The other day it was raised what the three-flag option or the two-flag option implies. The most simple solution is this: let us put up the black one.

Document 35.  
The Opening Plenary Session of the National Roundtable Negotiations.  
Verbatim Record of Minutes.  
*June 13, 1989.*



## Opening Full Session of the National Roundtable Negotiations

June 13, 1989

(Transcript of the video recording. Excerpts.)

[...]

**Károly Grósz:** Ladies and Gentlemen, my Honourable Compatriots, there are few positive events going on in our hectic world nowadays. A lot of people face the future with anxiety and uncertainty. Against this background, let me greet with confidence and optimism the participants of this meeting and those who are going to follow the beginning of real political negotiations in front of the TV screens in Hungary and abroad. [...] Just a few months ago, at the February meeting of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, we arrived at the conclusion that we have to find a peaceful transition into the representative democracy based on party pluralism and presupposing a competition between the parties. Our resolution met with the political goals of all those, whose representatives are sitting at this table together. We are responsible for the success of this undertaking not only to the Hungarian people, but also to the community of nations. The public is looking forward to, and is concerned about the outcome of this attempt at the same time. [...]

Let me stress that we do not intend to exaggerate or appropriate the results of the building of the democratic constitutional state that have been attained so far. In our opinion, apart from the political realism of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, these results were due to the social organizations and movements present and the constructive efforts of the evolving parties. It is our solid determination to separate ourselves from the remnants of the Stalinist model. The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, together with other political forces, strives to build a democratic and socialist constitutional state which asserts the intention of the people. We expect the economic and political reforms based on public consensus to help us overcome the economic crisis and to enable us to approach the most developed regions of the world, instead of being irreversibly pushed to the periphery. Apart from the universal values of peace and humanism, we are trying to find socialist solutions that are particularly Hungarian. We observe our obligations towards our allies, at the same time, we are striving to create a Europe without blocks. [...] The stakes are high. The negotiations entering a new phase should provide programs based on a consensus in as many issues as possible. This is the precondition for the forming of a viable coalition and for avoiding that party pluralism in Hungary is paralyzed by the pettish disputes of the parties. For this reason we must concentrate on the common points instead of the differences between us. I am convinced that these negotiations can foster the development of a viable coalition and of future political alliances. It would be too early to predict the content of these. Reviewing interests and programs properly, however, can guarantee a lucrative political cooperation.

The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party has started to transform from a bureaucratic state-party into a left-wing socialist reform party. It urges, for example, differentiation based on performance, at the same time it also aims to reduce social differences that can not be accounted for by performance. It strives for economic efficiency, without disregarding social solidarity. Its goal is to achieve that private

property foments economic performance, while it insists on the determining role of efficiently operating public property.

[...]

**Imre Kónya:** Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, Hungary has belonged to the Hungarian people de jure for a thousand years. This is so, notwithstanding the fact that during its history the people could hardly dispose of their property as owners or free citizens, in spite of trying to take possession of it from time to time.

Assuming our historical responsibility and in accordance with our agreement with the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, we, the delegates of the Opposition Roundtable organizations, have appeared today at the Parliament in order to start negotiations with the representatives of the ruling Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the delegates of other organizations it invited. We wish to put it on record that the goal of the negotiations is to assure peaceful transition from the existing dictatorial ruling system into a representative democracy that really asserts the will of the people. In the course of the negotiations we do not wish to divide power between ourselves and those who are holding it now. We do not wish to exercise power above the people's head, without being entitled to it by the people. Our aim is to enable Hungarian citizens to decide who, which political forces they commission to exercise power during the periods extending from elections to elections. [...]

After thirty years of numbness, our society has finally risen. The formation of independent organizations and of large-scale demonstrations indicate that it wants to control its own fate. It is not only our moral obligation to facilitate that, but also our common interest, moreover, many of us believe that it has already become the precondition for our nation's survival. A reliable and already tested form of the continuous assertion of the will of the people is the representative democracy. The peaceful method of its creation is free elections.

We are convinced that free elections will not only lead to the significant revival of public life and policy-making, but it can also affect the fate and history of our nation. We must be aware that free elections can only be held in a society which has been freed from its fears and suspicions. And fears and suspicions take time to fade out.

Burying the martyrs of the Revolution and commencing these talks can mark the beginning of national reconciliation. Real reconciliation, however, can only be achieved by burying the existing dictatorial power system. That can only be done by depoliticizing repressive organizations and through free elections.

Therefore we wish to enter into negotiations with the power-holders on the basis of the following principles. The basis of power is the sovereignty of the people. None of the political forces can appropriate sovereignty and declare itself the only representative of the will of the people. The will of the people must be expressed at free elections with open outcome, not allowing the exclusion of any party or political organization that accepts the principles of democracy and rejects the use of repressive instruments. Until the political will of the society is expressed by the election of the members of parliament, no other nation-wide elections, for example election of the president of the republic or election of local authorities, should take place. The power-holders should also accept the result of the free elections and should not try to change it by any means afterwards. A strong opposition in parliament is a basic institution of democracy, counterbalancing the



operation of the government. No political party or organization can have its own armed forces. Parties and political organizations can not exert influence on the operation of armed forces through their members. Armed forces can not be used for solving political conflicts under any circumstances. It is constitutionally legitimate to react to violence only to the extent that is necessary for abating violence. It is not enough to resign using instruments of oppression, the possibility of using them must be excluded. Workers' militia should be disbanded, the operation of political police should be contained within well-defined limits, public security police should be subordinated to local governments and the use of guns should be controlled publicly.

This is the only way people can stop being afraid, this is the only way for – not the silent but for the silenced – majority to participate in politics. We, the organizations constituting the Opposition Roundtable, see the goal of the negotiations as regulating the way political forces are going to act and be compared publicly.

At the same time, we are ready to do anything within our own range of competence, anything that is necessary to solve the conflicts brought about by the crisis, we can, however, not take responsibility for liquidating the economic bankruptcy until the elections, since opposition organizations – being in opposition – can and would only monitor those who have governed this country for forty years and have caused this situation. We are aware that the economy is about to collapse and is burying under itself the lives of several thousand people every day. Their, that is to say, our situation will not be improved by any political demagogy. The precondition for stopping economic decline is to change the political system.

Finally, we would like to emphasize that the organizations of the Opposition Roundtable did not sit down to the negotiating table in order to acquire their share of power, but in order to give rise to a situation where the people itself can acquire power without using violence, with the help of peaceful means. Hungary is the property of the people, therefore it is not necessary for the people to take by force what is its own property. The people only has to lift its head up, organize itself and take possession of the country, of its own homeland with due self-consciousness.

[...]

**István Kukorelli:** Mr Chairman, our Honoured Political Partners, we have initiated today's roundtable talks and we are ready to take responsibility for it, though the table, let's face it, has turned out to be rather square. It is still very significant for peaceful social development.

The agreement we also signed is the result of mutual and realistic compromises. These compromises, the arrangement of the seats, will not give rise to illusions, will not deceive the public. These three sides express a lot of things and conceal a lot of other things as well. Placing the power-holders and the opposition opposite each other can not be disputed. Democracy can hardly be imagined without an opposition protected by minority rights in the future. There is no doubt that the opposition and some other civil organizations still lack an economic infrastructure, the creation of which is a task of our negotiations and of the government.

We also have to admit, however, that the way we are seated can not represent all the major break lines in society. To mention just a few of them: the country has started to break into two along lines separating public figures who

organize themselves into parties and become the so-called elite and people who reject the formation of parties; separating the capital from the countryside; separating the haves and the have nots. And other dividing lines also appear in the structure of society. All those tensions shall be tackled by us here – we are able to do it since around the table we represent a horizontal cross-section of society as well.

Organizations that make up the third side do not pretend to appear as a unified force. They are present as independent political organizations representing the interests of their membership and their policies are formed independently on the basis of the agenda along the way. I am well aware of the fact that few people are able to find a common characteristic in this heterogeneous group intending to participate in the negotiations as an independent force. We do not make a secret of the fact that we are not a homogeneous delegation, but we possess, we will possess a great amount of tolerance within our group. We wish the same to the unified delegations as well. We are drawn together through having a common interest in tackling the social and economic crisis. [...]

In the case of most organizations of the third side the role of being the formal partner of the old power structure is a common burden. That is why a lot of people wanted our delegation to take seats on the side of the MSZMP. But they do not take into account the recent developments of our accelerating times, that is, the significant modifications that have happened in the structure of the sphere of power. [...]

It could determine the success of our roundtable if we refrain from questioning the legitimacy of each other, since the legitimacy of all of us is debatable. It is a question which belongs to the future – who will be given credit by history and who will be forgotten. On our part, we do not intend to apply such arguments during the negotiations and we accept that all of us are negotiating partners of full rights representing smaller or bigger segments of society. [...]

We are in the year of the creation of the constitutional state; reliable professional workshops are offering us to „buy” various significant draft bills, and the government is working hard, it does what it has to. We should also pick up speed, because the socio-political foundations of laws, that is, the political consensus is still missing. We have stated in our agreement that the work of legislation can not precede the political agreements. We agree with this and also suggest that the Parliament should only include in its agenda the draft bills made public already – such as the party law – *after* the agreements are completed. Instead of being governed by decree Hungary needs consensus law; the rule of law is the most important feature of the constitutional state. [...]

The third side agrees that two main topics should be included in our agendas, namely, the definition of principles and rules that support the execution of the democratic political transition, and the strategic tasks in tackling the economic and social crisis. It would be a misunderstanding of our role to pull a government-level economic and political strategy out of the hat. It can not be the goal of the opening full session; its goal is that we declare to the public our intention to cooperate and to negotiate. [...]

Document 36.

Third Conversation between Gorbachev and Chancellor Kohl, Bonn.  
[Evaluation of the Changes in Eastern Europe].  
*June 14, 1989.*



**Third Conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl**  
**Bonn (one-on-one)**  
**[Evaluation of the Changes in Eastern Europe]**  
June 14, 1989

[...] **Kohl.** We would like to see your visit, Mr. Gorbachev, as the end of the hostility between the Russians and the Germans, as the beginning of a period of genuinely friendly, good neighborly relations. You understand that these are the words supported by the will of all people, by the will of the people who greet you in the streets and the squares. As a Chancellor I am joining this expression of people's will with pleasure, and I am telling you once again that I like your policy, and I like you as a person.

**Gorbachev.** Thank you for such warm words. They are very touching. I will respond with reciprocity, and I will try not to disappoint you.

I would like to tell you the following with all sincerity. According to our information, there is a special group charged with the discrediting of *perestroika* and me personally that was created in the National Security Council of the United States. When Baker was in Moscow, we openly asked him about that. He and his colleagues were somewhat confused, but did not give us any clear answer, they were just trying to convince us that it was not so. However, I have some evidence that such group does, in fact, exist. I think, you understand me well, Mr. Federal Chancellor, you understand how I feel about it.

**Kohl.** Thank you for your openness. I heard nothing about such a group. Even if it does exist, I do not think it was created on George Bush's initiative, or that it was charged with the tasks that you have just formulated. Maybe if it exists, it has some kind of monitoring, but not subversive tasks. [...]

**Kohl.** I would appreciate it; seeing this to the end will strengthen your international prestige even more.

Now a couple of words about our common friends. I will tell you directly that Erich Honecker does concern me a lot. His wife has just made a statement in which she called on the GDR youth to take up arms, and defend the achievements of socialism from external enemies if necessary. It is clear that she implied that the socialist countries which implement reforms, stimulate democratic processes, follow their own original road, were the enemies. First of all she had Poland and Hungary in mind. This is certainly a strange statement.

**Gorbachev.** What are your relations with Poland like?

**Kohl.** The country is in a difficult situation right now. But we want to help it to get out of the crisis. As well as in the case with the GDR, we do not want any destabilization.

Tomorrow Francois Mitterand will travel to Poland. We agreed that France will be the first to extend aid to Poland, to give them financial assistance in the form of credits. Then George Bush will visit Poland. As for me, I consciously decided to be the third to visit Poland--after the French and the American. The Germans and the Poles are connected by something else. This year will mark the 50th anniversary of the beginning of World War II. I will probably visit Poland on those dates. Anyway, I would like my visit to contribute to the improvement of relations between the Germans and the Poles, even

though I realize that it would be very very difficult.

**Gorbachev.** We need to support the Poles, they do not have anybody who has more authority and respect than Wojciech Jaruzelski now.

**Kohl.** We also plan to give Poland financial support. I understand your words, Mr. Gorbachev.

We have rather good relations with the Hungarians. However, we also do not want destabilization there. That is why when I meet with the Hungarians, I tell them: we consider the reforms that are underway in your country your internal affair, we are sympathetic. However, if you would like to hear our advice, we recommend that you do not accelerate too much, because you might lose control over your mechanism, and it will start to work to destroy itself.

In all the socialist countries we have the most hopeless relations with Romania. There is no movement at all, just complete darkness and stagnation. I do not understand Ceausescu. How does he not see what a ridiculous cult he created in his own country? I cannot believe that he can seriously think that he made the Romanians the happiest people on Earth.

**Gorbachev.** It is certainly strange that this kind of family clan would be established in the center of civilized Europe, in a state with rich historical traditions. I could imagine something like that to emerge somewhere else, like it has in Korea, but here, right next to us--it is such a primitive phenomenon.

**Kohl.** I like the Bulgarians. If you compare Bulgaria in the first post-war years and now--the progress is impressive--like day and night. Bulgarian representatives--leaders as well as simple professionals--often visit my country. They think and operate with very modern concepts, and they avidly absorb our economic experience. They also, as we can observe, implement it in their economic life quite effectively. I really like Todor Zhivkov. He has been in power for a very long time, I think, since 1956, when I was still taking final exams in high school. He is a very flexible politician. I met with him several times, and every time we met, he criticized those leaders of various branches of the Bulgarian economy who could not manage their responsibilities. It is curious that he speaks about it in such a way as if those individuals were not members of his own circle, and as if he did not give them any directives, just observed them from a distance.

I am mostly concerned by the situation in Yugoslavia. The economy there is choking, and nobody knows how to help it. We need to think about how to prevent the Balkans from becoming the source of destabilization.

I have already said that in our policy toward the Socialist countries, toward the Soviet Union, we are staying on the clear course of non-interference in their internal affairs. However, a policy of non-interference could be of two sorts. It is one thing to sit in a theater seat, to watch what is unfolding on the stage, and, when the play is almost over, to rise and say that we have foreseen all that happened, and that it could not have been otherwise. How smart we are.

[ . . . ]

Document 37.  
Record of the Telephone Conversation  
between Chancellor Kohl and President Bush.  
*June 15, 1989.*





**Telephone Conversation between Chancellor Kohl and President Bush**  
**[On Gorbachev's Politics]**  
June 15, 1989

After the greeting *President Bush* remarked that General Secretary Gorbachev's visit to the Federal Republic of Germany apparently went well.

**Chancellor Kohl** affirmed this and reported on his impressions. Gorbachev was well and was also considerably more optimistic concerning his own position than during the Chancellor's visit to Moscow last October. After his election as president and the internal political reorganization, he had obviously won terrain. The Chancellor also spoke with Jakolev, who told him that this was the overall view in the Soviet Union. Concerning the developments in the Warsaw Pact, Gorbachev had made it clear that he was close to Jaruzelski. He hoped that the situation in Poland would develop well. This similarly applied to Hungary. His distance to Bucharest is great. The distance from the GDR was also clear. Gorbachev expressed his dismay over events in China. Furthermore, he expressed his interest in an early solution to the Middle East conflict with regards to Israel. He fears the effects of Iranian fundamentalism on the Soviet Union.

The Chancellor had spoken a long time with GS Gorbachev about President Bush. After several hours of conversation, the Chancellor's impression was that Gorbachev definitely hoped for a good relationship with Bush. He hoped that this may be more easily possible than with President Reagan. He was strongly supported in this view by Mrs. Gorbachev. She spoke kindly about Barbara, but avoided talking about other women. The Chancellor continued that it is his impression that Gorbachev wants to deepen personal contacts personally with Bush. He explained to Gorbachev that it was not possible to drive a wedge between the U.S. and the Federal Republic of Germany or to push the Europeans away from the U.S. This also applies to the relationship between him [Kohl] and President Bush. Gorbachev reacted almost violently to this observation; it was not his intention to separate the Federal Republic of Germany [from the West]. Neutralization would lead to destabilization. This would be a threat to the Soviet Union as well. Gorbachev also spoke positively about a talk with Jim Baker...<sup>1</sup>

**The Chancellor** continued: he believed that if Bush were to accommodate Gorbachev a bit, it would open up a good possibility for discussion. The principled mistrust with regard to the U.S. is unmistakable. He was not acting in his [Gorbachev] desire to have good relations. Concerning arms control, the Chancellor was surprised that Gorbachev saw no insurmountable obstacle in the twelve months schedule. He said that it was possible to work faster. The INF treaty had been completed in only 12 months when they were really intent on concluding it. The Chancellor suggested that when the negotiations in Vienna were going well, President Bush might himself want to occasionally give direct reports to Gorbachev. This would be useful. It would also be a sign of growing trust between the U.S. and the SU.

For Gorbachev, a personal relationship of trust is very important. The "chemistry" had to be right.

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<sup>1</sup> Sentence not released

Also interesting was Gorbachev's report on developments in Moscow. He had ruthlessly [*schonungslos*] reported on the crimes of Stalin. Gorbachev was determined to lay everything out in the open. In this context he had explicitly approved of what Hungary is now doing. The economic troubles of the Soviet Union were obvious. Gorbachev spoke openly about this and also stated that he had difficult years ahead of him. His message to the Germans was that the war is over, that there was another generation, and that in spite of the differences in the systems, one should support cooperation. He, the Chancellor, had never questioned that there had been differences of opinion in fundamental questions, namely, the question concerning the division of Germany and Berlin. It struck him that Gorbachev's reaction to the Chancellor's dinner address was considerably milder than it had been last October in Moscow.

In conclusion, he would like to say that he was very satisfied with the visit. Gorbachev knows where he, the Chancellor, stood on the issues and that it was good to respect this position. They had tried to come to an agreement that could be a reasonable basis for policy.

**The Chancellor** asked if President Bush had received a copy of his afterdinner speech at the dinner for Gorbachev.

**President Bush** answered in the affirmative. He was pleased with the speech. He thanked the Chancellor for the timely and detailed report. He had listened carefully. If, after detailed analysis, there were additional points, he would be pleased to hear from us.

**The Chancellor** expressed his wish to discuss the World Economic Summit in a future telephone conversation. It was agreed to telephone again at the end of next week.

**President Bush** informed him that he would take the initiative for the conversation.

The conversation lasted approximately 20 minutes.

*Neuer*

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Translated by  
Catherine Nielsen  
National Security Archive  
The George Washington University

Document 38.  
Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable.  
Verbatim Record of Minutes (Excerpts).  
*June 19, 1989.*



## Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable

June 19, 1989

(Verbatim text of the video-taped record. Excerpts.)

[...]

**Csaba Varga:** Right. So this is not possible, because then we are not a serious partner. Let me tell you, the three levels are not bad at all, as you would think from the outside. We probably will not be able to avoid that the first level, the plenary session will be a mere formal, ceremonial event. We will announce the final decisions to the public in some form. There will be no room for a debate, for a bargain there, there will only be final results. Now if there are twelve or whatever working committees on a lower level, the people there must coordinate, on some level the various different issues have to be balanced, through bargains, which ... here we make concessions, there we don't. That's what the intermediate level is for, where the two state ministers represent MSZMP, not the government. So Nyers and Pozsgay represent MSZMP on this intermediate level, rather than the government. Even if the two are strongly related, they can not but represent their party, both politicians. So the intermediate level is important because it can be a kind of appeal process, a conciliatory phase involving political bargains. If we don't have something like this, we can never reach any decision or agreement. Now let's look at the six economic working teams. When we went there on Friday, we took – let me remind you here – six names for the six committees. Of these they finally accepted four, the first four that we have now here, what Bálint talked about.

**Bálint Magyar:** They accepted five, concerning four there is ... (*unintelligible words*)

**Csaba Varga:** Yes, and they extended the sixth point that we proposed. And they largely accepted what we had requested. And they asked us – at this Friday morning discussion – to accept the fifth committee in exchange. So it was a deal. What we have to decide on today is whether we should accept the deal offered by them, the one and a half offer as against our four and a half proposal. In principle Imre is right that these topics are not relevant now, and they should be discussed in another forum. But it is sure that the other two parties, especially the third one, will press these issues by all means. We well have to make an agreement there today, so we can not just raise it here as a matter of principle. Furthermore, if these 10-10 minute talks are held on Wednesdays, then it will not simply be a statement of intent in principle, but we will have to announce there the basic position of the Opposition Roundtable on these two sets of issues. That is, what we want to achieve in each of the two issues. Say, what sort of election law we want, when we want to have the elections, in what order. So we will have to indicate our specific intention in advance. So even this week on Wednesday, in these two 10 minute talks, the thing is not that we simply start negotiations, or what have you.

But they propose that we should clarify our position for the public. Now we can still evade this by saying it is too early to fix positions. But then the Wednesday meeting does not make sense, because the only thing we can do is that we attend it, Nyers or Szűrös say something, and that's it, we just stand up and leave. Now we have to consider it from our point of view – from the point of view of the Opposition Roundtable – what is more advantageous. What we could say to the public is that yes, we wanted to negotiate, and that's what we have accomplished. We have managed to fight out the twelve committees in such

and such issues. For such and such a reason. This is our position. This is how we want to proceed. This is our schedule.

**Károly Vigh:** It does not show that we have fought out these twelve points.

**Csaba Varga:** What we say in the speech is up to us. So we have to think it over whether we are going to need the one hour of publicity or not. And if we are, then what we are going to use it for.

Document 39.  
Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable.  
Verbatim Record of Minutes (Excerpt).  
*June 20, 1989.*





## Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable

June 20, 1989

(Verbatim text of the video-taped record. Excerpts.)

[...]

**László Bruszt:** Well, I think it's not worth jeopardizing the unity of the Opposition Roundtable and the continuity of the negotiations by ... I am sorry (*László Sólyom: We must negotiate separately in the meantime ...*) Then we will wait. (*László Sólyom: But we are listening, it's just the shortage of time that ...*) I think it's not worth raising the stakes in such a sharp situation. I think it's worth giving it a try to find out how we could accept this position. The thing is this. We have agreed (*Imre Kónya: Let's hear him out.*) We have agreed that the two issues, the political and the economic questions will have a very different weight and a different role in the negotiations. We have to achieve an agreement in the political issues as soon as possible, as for the economic issues, we do not have to make an agreement by all means. The point is that on the one hand MSZMP insisted on having some economic issues on the table, and we found some other questions that are very important from a social point of view, but we would like to follow the example of the Polish roundtable talks in this matter. In other words, while we have to reach a consensus by all means in the political issues, our primary goal with respect to the economic questions is that they should be put on the agenda, and in the worst case, the contrary views should be made public in the agreement.

So what we have to avoid is that the lack of consensus in economic issues should result in postponing an agreement on the political issues, we could build in some guarantees to prevent this, and the other thing is that we should make it clear in advance that we do not strive to achieve an agreement on economic issues, partly because ... (*Károly Vigh: by all means*) By all means. Partly because the various different parties may have a different opinion concerning these issues. Partly because a good part of these issues will concern the new independent, free Parliament. So they will have to be resolved by the new Parliament.

So the economic issues must be split into three parts. As for the whole package of economic issues we have to say that we do not strive to achieve an agreement, the main goal is to negotiate. That is, that we have to talk about these issues. We could perhaps include these in the agenda of the committees, or on any other level, including some other stuff. Second, we have to prevent ... we have to prevent the Parliament from passing acts in the questions discussed by these four committees, that is, we have to prevent any irreversible changes from happening in real processes. Concerning the issue of ownership in the first place. And third, the third thing is that we have to discuss these social issues, and provide as much publicity as possible to it without striving to achieve an agreement. So this is why I say that in my view if you accept these points, then I think the stake of this debate is not that high that we should break the unity of the Opposition Roundtable on one hand and stop the ongoing talks on the other.

**György Szabad:** I want to reflect on it very briefly. On the one hand Imre Mécs said he used to have the opinion that we should not negotiate in economic issues. We held the view that – given the well-known reservations – we should restrict the negotiations to a minimum level. If we agree to conduct negotiations in five or six committees in all the present issues, that would result in a very broad scope of negotiations. By this we would

not be able to fix anything what has been spoiled before, we would simply compromise ourselves. How can we so naive as to suppose that we will be able to turn around the transformation law in the course of the talks in the summer or early fall so that they withdraw it and submit a new one? And the framework for all this is the already existing basis making it possible for them to commit all those dirty things that Bálint has talked about so dramatically.

The other thing. As far as I know after very thorough discussion we have quite recently accepted our opposition statement that Imre Kónya presented. It says that we want to establish the conditions for a political transition here, with the elections in the center. This is what the whole communiqué is all about that we accepted unanimously, and there is just one very cautions sentence – one single sentence in the whole statement – that we are not indifferent to economic, social and other issues. This is just a signal in this respect. Then now there is a full, elaborate economic plan for talks emerging suddenly here, a deeply articulated schedule for negotiations at least structurally similar to the political talks. Don't tell me that this is just the consequence of that single sentence. There is a new situation here. The other thing is, let me tell you now, that it is drawn out absolutely unnecessarily. Because the positions mentioned here – I'm sorry to say this – are repeated ten times by ten different people. Nothing new has been raised since the first two remarks. So we should now turn to the discussion of the proposals, and then, if needed, we can come back to these.

Document 40.  
Plenary Session of the National Roundtable Negotiations.  
Verbatim Record of Minutes (Excerpts).  
*June 21, 1989.*



## Full Session of the National Roundtable Negotiations

June 21, 1989

(Minutes. Excerpts.)

**Mátyás Szűrös**, speaker of the Parliament: Ladies and Gentlemen, Honourable Negotiators! It is no exaggeration to say that last week the whole country watched closely the first full session of talks of the negotiating sides, the Opposition Roundtable, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, and the third side comprising various organizations and movements, and additional meetings of experts and the relevant news coverage of it all. [...]

The members of parliament are aware that the social and political background of their decisions can be provided – to a great extent – by the negotiations of the three sides. In the present situation we have no time to waste, but rush and the lack of reflection should not be our guiding principles either. Therefore when I ask You to set for yourselves the goal of successful and timely completion of these negotiations I agree with the people who point out that the accumulated tensions and problems of society are so complex that their solution does not only require a common effort, but also a lot of time and a lot of patience.

[...]

**Imre Pozsgay**: Mr Speaker, Ladies and Gentlemen! As a representative of the MSZMP I am glad to see that as a result of the meetings of experts we can hold a full session now. We have the opportunity to prove at this session that it is our common intention to take further steps in dealing with our problems. [...]

As far as the roles in the creation of a democratic Hungary are concerned, let me inform the negotiating sides of the standpoint of the MSZMP in this issue.

We strive to develop a political structure in which the political will originates with the citizen; where the political will is executed by institutions built upon the genuine initiatives of the civil society. Thus, based on the European political culture and on the historical experience of the 20th century, the MSZMP is willing to accept the electoral system based on free elections as a form of the expression of the citizens' will – in fact, as a valid form – manifesting the citizens' will and intentions in the competition of parties. All consequences of this will be drawn in respect to the MSZMP's political practice so far, especially the one that has been declared in a statement of intention during the first session – that it would cease to exercise its monopolistic power derived from the interpenetration of the party state and the state-party, and it would participate in the political process to win votes of the citizens in the framework of political pluralism and constitutional institutions with a fair program focusing on the nation's interests and with a relevant staff policy. [...]

The common rules of action in this political structure can only be based on patience and mutual understanding, which means that the MSZMP does not intend to make its own ideology and political pursuits the overall program for the society through the application of force or other instruments of oppression, only through a successful electoral campaign. During the electoral struggles the MSZMP expects and hopes that it would be able to advertise its own social program and ideological

and political views just as freely as the rest of the parties and movements in society.  
[...]

Concerning the existing draft bills we should reach a political agreement during our negotiations in advance, and then the government could introduce these bills in the Parliament in the spirit of our agreement, hoping that – as it has been mentioned by our Speaker – members of the Parliament do understand the ongoing political developments in the country, accept the agreement born at the negotiating table and give it the force of law.

[...]

**György Szabad:** ...Honoured Participants! In the declaration of the Opposition Roundtable on 13 June we have stated – and now hope together with Imre Pozsgay – that we think that the goal of the inter-party negotiations is the facilitation of a peaceful transition, the transition from the present power system based on one-party rule to a representational democracy functioning within the framework of the constitutional state to be created. Therefore, during the negotiations we aim first of all to arrive at an agreement to be enacted that could allow our representational democracy – the foundations of which were laid in 1848 – to be reborn in a modernized form, and to become the manifestation of the will of the people expressed in free elections.

Following the internal logic of the agenda but not the order of topics, as stated by our Speaker, Mátyás Szűrös, we suggest that we should first of all work out the new electoral system. We would like to propose that the draft bill to be worked out should guarantee that all voters could carefully ponder and then freely and secretly decide by whom or by which political force they would like to have their interests and political will represented. The new electoral system based on public consensus should also guarantee that all political parties and organizations that keep the basic principles of representational democracy unharmed and reject the forceful or fraudulent influencing of elections could appoint candidates under the same democratic conditions, and that they could fight for their election with lawful means under the same conditions. The draft bill should also ensure the democratic and clean management of elections, counting of votes, and announcing of the results.

Free elections also presuppose the need to amend the present Constitution as pointed out by Mátyás Szűrös. Among other things we think it is unavoidable to change the thesis of our present Constitution concerning one-party hegemony and legalize the functioning of party pluralism – as prescribed by the draft bill to be worked out in the framework of our negotiations.

It is important to note here that we also expect the new Parliament resulting from free elections to create the laws concerning the introduction of the institutions of the Presidency of the Republic and the Constitutional Court. It does not mean that we are not prepared to work out certain common basic principles during the present inter-party negotiations to help the new Parliament to be elected in its future legislative work concerning these issues as well – naturally, without doing anything final.

Third. Together with including party pluralism in the Constitution we also think it is necessary to regulate by law the founding of parties and the political, legal, and financial conditions of their functioning so that they could use the

opportunities provided by law for at least three months before the free elections. To ensure that all citizens and legal political organizations could freely exercise their rights until and during the elections, a relevant reform harmonizing with the extension of political rights should be brought about in the Penal Code and the regulations of criminal prosecution, including the abolishing of coercive action of police and the revision of present laws concerning offences. We are of the opinion that it is necessary to create a new information law in order to ensure that voters do not vote haphazardly, but rather for the representatives of their interests as they see them, as much protected from demagogic influences as possible. Therefore a further draft bill re-regulating the mass media as a whole should guarantee that all the political organizations running in the elections can use the opportunities presented by the press, the radio, and television through means and to an extent yet to be defined, and that neither of those organizations can abuse them. We would like to note here that it is necessary to extend the increased protection of personal rights to modern information systems in time.

Last but not least, in our opinion it is unavoidable – also in respect of ensuring that the elections to be held are free and democratic – to work out laws that would exclude the very possibility of the use of force in public life. This could be guaranteed by a detailed definition of the realm of authority of all organizations of force, especially that of the state security organization, by the introduction of a complete system of their constitutional control, and by the detachment of all armed bodies from the political sphere. We think it is necessary to reach an agreement concerning the issue of disbanding of Worker's Militia and other organizations of similar nature. In our opinion the Law Regulating the Carrying of Arms, the Codes of Service of Armed Bodies, and the Military Criminal Law need to be modified as well. [...]

The Opposition Roundtable is gladly taking notice that according to the statement of Imre Pozsgay, Minister of State, the government is ready to accept the inter-party agreement of June 9 in reference to the issue that, and I quote „during the negotiations the sides refrain from taking unilateral steps which would make it impossible to reach the goal of the negotiations”, that is, legislation can not precede political agreements.

[...]

**Pál Iványi:** Mr Speaker, Honoured Participants! It is the MSZMP's intention that during these negotiations an agreement should be reached regarding all vitally important national questions, an agreement based on the clear-cut expression of the pursuits of the participants. We believe that the economic crisis and the accumulation of social problems can turn into a destabilizing factor which could threaten the peaceful transition into the constitutional state based on democratic party pluralism. This is why we think it is essential to include issues of social politics in the topics covered during the negotiations.

The responsibility for the present situation lies with the MSZMP, and we do not intend to dilute that through the negotiations. But urgent measures that would serve our future and the responsibility we feel in regard to the fate of the nation require cooperation in carrying out our tasks. The MSZMP does have its own program concerning the reform of the political institutions, the creation of the democratic socialist constitutional state that would facilitate the assertion of the

people's will, but at the same time we think that the creation of a viable, mixed market economy which can integrate the processes of the world economy, can stop the decline of the living standards, and functions on the basis of the principle of rational decisions, is an equally important task. [...]

Our goal is the development of an efficiently functioning internal market, the development of market forces. We regard the market as the primary factor in the integration of the economy. We can only apply non-market mechanisms where the market proves to be socially inefficient. The intention of creating a market economy means the acceptance of the judgement of the market as a general guiding principle of the economy and requires state measures that are conforming to the market. But a market economy also has its unpleasant social consequences. Unemployment has appeared. We put the emphasis on full employment as much as possible, on the creation of jobs, and on re-training. Social guarantees and services need to be created for those who are temporarily unemployed. We would like to solve the problem of the protection of people who have got into an unfavorable situation through extending the guarantees of the social welfare institutions. [...]

What makes the situation extremely difficult politically is that we have to work simultaneously on the development of a coherent program of reforms and on the solution of an already acute economic and political crisis. In this situation it has become a fundamental question which income group will benefit from and which income group will lose on the economic breakthrough. [...] The problems in the economy are quite complicated and complex. We have to talk about them in an open, honest manner. We have to reach an agreement for the people, and not above the people's head.

[...]

**Iván Pető:** Mr Speaker, Honourable Participants! The original intention of the Opposition Roundtable was to deal with only the political conditions of peaceful transition in the framework of these negotiations. We wanted to avoid the economic issues not because we consider the present system viable or even curable with just a couple of corrections. On the contrary, we believe that this economic system is not able to function at all. [...]

In spite of knowing that, the Opposition Roundtable did not intend to talk about economic issues because, on the one hand, there are no guarantees that agreements are adhered to until the political guarantees – which are to be set up partly through our present negotiations – are not firmly in place, and on the other hand, the daily tasks of the government are difficult to separate from its strategic tasks concerning the economy. Moreover, members of the Opposition Roundtable do not aspire to hold government functions prior to the elections, and in lack of governmental powers we do not want to take on ourselves the responsibility for the consequences of the economic crisis. Nevertheless, the Opposition Roundtable has accepted that strategic issues of the economy would be raised during these negotiations. This was not merely a compromise to facilitate that the political negotiations indispensable for ensuring a peaceful transition should begin. We accepted it most importantly because we have seen that the MSZMP, or rather its government, has introduced and passed draft bills in Parliament that affect the institutions and the power relations of the economy, creating a fait accompli situation for the period after the democratic elections.



The essence of the bill passed at the last session of Parliament as part of the ownership reform is that proprietary rights over public property would be allowed to be distributed for free among heads of company councils and other top positions. These processes can not be controlled or influenced by those directly affected. The ownership structure resulting from this „reorganization” bill would solidify today’s monopolies and anti-market interpenetrations that prevent or distort competition, thus creating an obstacle to the development of a real capital market. Moreover, this bill makes it possible to transform positions, most of which have been acquired on a political basis, into economic power.

The legislative fervor of the government makes it necessary for the Opposition Roundtable to take part in preparing draft bills affecting the essential institutions of the economy and the ownership structure. What is at stake in the following months is: who would own the land, who would own the factory, and whether the new ownership structure is capable of generating income efficiently at all. However, it is only worth talking about these issues if our negotiations precede the government’s introducing draft bills in Parliament also in economic issues, in the area of economic legislation – as it was agreed last week and reinforced today by all sides around this table. [...]

The problem today is not the government’s failure to recognize that it is indispensable to transform ownership structures and the structure of the economy, to manage debts, curb inflation, and to moderate as far as possible the burdens of the economic crisis on the shoulders of the people, the problem is rather that the government – as a hostage of the MSZMP, of the state bureaucracy, and of interest groups in control of certain segments of the economy – is only capable of promoting the interests and intentions of the forces defining its scope of action. [...]

We do not and can not have any illusions. If we reach an agreement here with regard to the fundamental political questions, the results could be apparent in the immediate future, but through negotiations concerning economic issues we can only create the institutional framework that prevents collapse and further falling behind. As a result of political agreements and free elections we can win the present, whereas economic agreements can only secure our future.



Document 41.  
Meeting of the Medium-level Political Coordinating Committee  
of the National Roundtable Negotiations.  
Verbatim Record of Minutes (Excerpts).  
*June 26, 1989.*



**Meeting of the medium-level political coordinating committee  
of the National Roundtable Negotiations**

June 26, 1989

(Verbatim Record of Minutes. Excerpts.)

[...]

**Imre Pozsgay:** ...We suggest that for the time being only the six working committees should work that have been made up earlier, although we know that other ideas and recommendations have been also raised during the discussion. Committees working on the political transition should return to this discussion at a later stage – but not too late. So our suggestion is that presently the six working committees that have been set up in advance should work only, and the minutes should include the description of their make-up and scope of authority. [...]

I suggest that we, that is, the three delegations, should not interfere with the agendas of the committees; they should put together their agendas themselves, and they should bring the fewest possible unsettled questions to us to make it easier for us to make the decisions. I believe the committees are on the expert level and are politically conscious enough to deal with a lot of issues themselves. It is only a wish – but I think it would be appreciated anyway if our committee received as few disputed issues as possible. [...]

There have also been agreements in advance concerning the question of publicity. We suggest, if accepted by the rest of the committees, that the publicity of the activities of this committee should be the same as it is today. The press can cover the meeting, but they should not participate in the negotiations. Each delegation can inform the press in its own perspective after the meeting on what happened during the meeting. In my opinion this method would be useful with respect to the need of undisturbed proceedings. This would not apply to the full session, of course, which would continue with open doors just as it has been going on so far.

[...]

**László Sólyom:** Thank you very much in the name of the Opposition Roundtable, and now we are pleased to begin with the negotiations.

I would like to make an additional proposal concerning the question of publicity. We basically agree that the present system should hold, that is, we should communicate with the press before and after the meetings, but there could be some very important decisions to make when we could alter from this system together and let the press in for the whole meeting. We suggest it should be decided in each case separately.

[...]

**Csaba Öry:** The Opposition Roundtable has elected a special committee on TV affairs concerning this issue to think about the publicity of our meetings and to begin talking about it with the television people. On the one hand, we would like to inform the public: we have started talks with the television, not intending to put any

pressure on them but rather with the purpose of ensuring the appropriate publicity for the whole thing. On the other hand, I have a couple of suggestions in connection with this. We should carefully think about the issue of publicity. It would be useful if the other side also told us their opinion concerning this issue. The coverage of the negotiations is one thing. We are of the opinion that, the representation of these talks on TV should receive due emphasis, in accordance with their historic significance. We thought it could be a talk show that would fit the structure of the activities of the various committees. It would not be a live coverage of the negotiations; we should rather go on with the discussions started. This is the first question.

Now the second question. During our negotiations so far we made it possible for the Black Box to document the events, and I suggest we should give them the same opportunity in the future as well. Of course they always deposit the tapes. The 'black box' is therefore at the disposal of the negotiating delegations, and not of the Black Box.

[...]

**Imre Pozsgay:** Concerning the issue of publicity I have the following statement and suggestion to make. I consider László Sólyom's suggestion acceptable. I think it is a method that would not disturb our work, but at the same time it would guarantee the necessary publicity and public control. I accept it in the name of the delegation of the MSZMP.

The other suggestion is that of Csaba Öry's. I think we should talk about it, that is, it should be included in the agenda of our committee. Of course nothing can prevent anyone to go to the leadership of the television, as he did, to talk about giving publicity according to their internal rules and in a way they have thought to be appropriate so far. But in order to avoid a certain regularity which would give an opportunity to anyone to do harms and unfair things to someone else's disadvantage – concerning this, we should reach an agreement.

[...]

**István Huszár:** May I raise a theoretical question? To be exact, we are having political conciliation talks here. We are not codifying anything and we do not talk about issues of state administration.

I fully agree with György Szabad that for this reason we should not discuss paragraphs of law here, we do not have to make decisions like that. It should be done in Parliament, or in the framework of a codification process, or within the state administration. We should reach a consensus in fundamental political questions. This is why I think it is important for us to discuss fundamental issues.

**György Szabad:** Excuse me, I would like to respond to that directly. Of course, there might be cases when the two things coincide.

**István Huszár:** Well, I do not argue with that.

**László Sólyom:** I am sorry to see that István Huszár misunderstands our negotiations. In fact it is part of the agreement that wherever it is possible, we attach

the text of law to the political agreement. And yes, our special committees do take over codification from Parliament. So we would provide complete texts of provisions of law which would then be introduced by the government in Parliament. We have agreed on this.

**Péter Tölgyessy:** If the agreement is fully respected by all sides, then it means we have to go right down to the level of paragraphs and items of paragraphs. I think in a constitutional state one of the key roles of Parliament and politics in general is to make decisions of depth to avoid having solutions „up in the air”.

**László Sólyom:** It is included in a signed agreement.

**Magda Kósáné Kovács:** We are aware of the agreement since we have signed it ourselves. But I think – and forgive me for interpreting here – what István Huszár meant to emphasize was that codification is professionals’ job. It is no good if we just meet and start... (*interruption from the Opposition Roundtable: „We agree:”*) All right, we do agree. So it is necessary to carefully prepare and provide the right circumstances for that professional activity.





Document 42.

From Conversation of Gorbachev with Mitterrand during a Private Dinner  
at the President's Apartment, Paris.

[On certain political personalities: Ceausescu, Zhivkov, Bush].

*July 5, 1989.*



**From the Conversation of M. S. Gorbachev and Francois Mitterand  
during the Private Dinner with R. M. Gorbacheva and D. Mitterand  
at the President's Apartment  
France, Paris  
July 5, 1989**

[...]Mitterand. So, you are going to Romania tomorrow. I appreciated the answer about Romania that you gave during your TV interview to the TV show "Antenne-2" and to the radio station "Europe-1" (The interview took place after the press conference at the Elysee Palace on July 5). But at the same time, we all understand that Romania is a real dictatorship. The only unclear moment is whose dictatorship is it--Ceausescu's himself or his wife's?

Gorbachev. Still, we should make a realistic assessment of the situation. Romania used to be a backward agrarian country, and now it is an industrialized developed state. The challenge is to complete the economic and social base that has been created with a fitting political establishment. For example, Romania has completely solved the housing problem. This is a big victory.

But Ceausescu is scared of democracy. By the way, he told me that the measures that we are now undertaking in the USSR in the framework of *perestroika*, he had already implemented in Romania 10 years ago.

Mitterand. He told you that? Romania, of course, could use a *perestroika*. I visited Romania several years ago. After that I never came back.

Gorbachev. Ceausescu probably "wrote out" a whole plan of actions for you.

Mitterand. Precisely. Since what year is he the General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party?

Gorbachev. Since 1965.

Mitterand. Every power is seeking a way to find its place in history. Besides, and I have already quoted these words by Tacitus yesterday, "every man always reaches the limit of his own power." That is why democracy must have a mechanism of political balances.

Contrary to Ceausescu, who is cracking down, Todor Zhivkov is acting in a smarter, I would even say, more cunning, way. For how many years has he been in power?

Gorbachev. He has lead the Bulgarian Communist Party for 35 years now. I recall how I was at his meeting with students of the University of Sofia. They criticized him quite harshly, and he kept responding "They are right about everything."

Mitterand. 35 years!

Gorbacheva. And you thought that two presidential terms in France--14 years--is too long for you.

Mitterand. (Laughing). It is also long. Zhivkov is about eighty years old now.

**Gorbachev.** He is not in complete control of his legs, and facial muscles. When I see him, I remember Brezhnev. [...]

**Gorbachev.** We discussed with him, in particular, the difficulties of the political process in the United States, the situation, in which the President always has to keep Congress in mind, and therefore sometimes he has to act timidly, or not to respond to Soviet initiatives.

**Mitterand.** In the past, U.S. Presidents used to be the masters of the game. Roosevelt, and Truman made their own independent foreign policies. By impeaching Nixon, the Congress took its revenge. However, George Bush would make very moderate policy even without the congressional constraint because he is a conservative. Not all conservatives are alike. Bush, as a President, has a very big drawback--he lacks original thinking altogether.

**Gorbachev.** The question about the American internal political process interests me also in terms of building relations between the Parliament and the President. In Italy, for example, the complicated relations between various democratic institutions, lead sometimes to the incompleteness, to the disruption of political process. In our country we have to concentrate on the implementation of radical reforms. Therefore it is undesirable that the center's initiative was compromised by disorderly relations with regions, with other democratic institutions. We need to find some gold median here

[...] **Mitterand.** For a revolution you need a new class that could take power in its hands. The Decembrists were able to use a powerful popular burst of discontent, but they were not ready to take the power, and nothing came out of it.

**Gorbacheva.** There was a lot of violence during the French revolution. Names of such heroes as Robespierre, Danton, and Marat are associated with revolutionary terror.

I think that there is such a situation in the world now that when people want to change their regime, their government, it is not by the way of revolution any more.

**Gorbachev.** In Poland, for example, people want to avoid the repetition of the events of 1980 more than anything else. By the way, this is the reason why Jaruzelski's course for a dialogue with "Solidarity", Lech Walesa, and all of Poland's political forces is gaining a wide support among the Poles.

**Mitterand.** By employing the cruel methods, the leaders of the French revolution were able to unite the population against the foreign threat. They were very effective in this. Just as Stalin was in his time.

*Source: Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Notes of A.S. Chernyaev*

Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya  
for The National Security Archive

Document 43.  
Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable.  
Verbatim Record of Minutes (Excerpts)  
*July 6, 1989.*



**Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable**  
July 6, 1989  
(Verbatim text of the video-taped record. Excerpts.)

[...]

**Tibor Füzesy:** Right. Then I will tell you. The person of the president of the republic is strongly related to the institution of the president of the republic. I believe these days or months no one else than Imre Pozsgay can be counted as a likely person for the office of the president in the country. Should Pozsgay be elected president of the republic – either with or without our consent – this would have an effect, an impact on the general elections that could – very significantly – influence the final outcome of the elections. The issue of a “triumphal procession”, “going into heaven” has been mentioned several times here. I think if there were elections in this issue, then Pozsgay’s election as president of the republic would be unquestionable. This would have the consequence ... some additional effects which would greatly influence the outcome of the general elections. To put it bluntly, if a citizen votes yes in this issue, then the same citizen would have a hard time saying no – at the same, or approximately at the same time, with a difference of a few days or weeks – no to a policy, to the policy of a party represented by Pozsgay. For this very reason my view is that we should not raise difficulties in the issue of electing the president of the republic.

However, we should insist that there should be ample time, several months or half a year, between the election of the president and the parliamentary elections, and then this half a year would make it possible for all the parties to spell out their program and make it clear to the people at large. At the same time the election of Pozsgay as president would result in eliminating his chances to run any campaign for his party. That is to say, his position as president of the republic would make his office in the party incompatible. So this would exclude him from the election campaign. This would also make it possible to make the program of the various parties public safely and under relatively peaceful circumstances between the two elections, and the parliamentary elections could have real results. Thank you very much.

**László Kövér:** I believe, if I understood it properly what I have now heard, it means that we should help Pozsgay get the office of the president, as soon as possible, so that we could have enough time before the parliamentary elections to have the public forget all about this euphoria. Well, I have to tell you that I find this logic somewhat strange on the part of an opposition organization. This is my first problem. But after all, this is the personal business of everybody.

My second problem with this thing is that it is not at all the same what sort of office, what sort of institution and jurisdiction we are going to create for the president. This, I believe, can be done most appropriately by a newly elected Parliament with the necessary mandate to do so. Lots of ideas are floating around here about a semi-strong, semi-weak or weak and all sort of other versions of the institution of the president, thus about different types of presidency, and it is not hard to figure out the connection that some want to have Imre Pozsgay nominated for the office of the president because this way they can create a semi-strong or semi-weak, or what have you, kind of presidency, with the implicit thought that nobody would suppose that Imre Pozsgay would abuse this opportunity. I believe however, that it is not the suit of the president that should be tailored

to Imre Pozsgay's body, but rather that the president elected should take the seat of the president of the republic. Therefore I strongly object to creating the institution of the president before the parliamentary elections. And in this respect the two things are related, I believe.

[...]

**József Antall:** Since I was called upon to inform you about the position of the Hungarian Democratic Forum on this issue, I think we should now exclude Imre Pozsgay's person ... (*György Szabad: Right, right ... let's talk about the institution.*) I wouldn't consider it, regardless of the fact that at a later point it might be possible, but I believe a political decision, assessing the balance of forces, and I think that ... (*György Szabad: Situation...*) we would create a strange situation if the opposition decided now, supporting one person, so I simply feel, regardless of the fact, let me stress again, that maybe this is going to happen, in principle anything is possible.

But even in that case, I believe, the Opposition Roundtable should not be concerned with the issue whether we think Pozsgay is the right person or not Pozsgay. So I don't think this form of the discussion is appropriate, therefore I think it would not be in the personal interest of even Pozsgay that we should be concerned with it now. So I would suggest that a roundtable conference should not be concerned with personal issues in the first place. Because it is a matter of principle, a legal issue and we are commissioned to discuss institutions here and a framework for transition. When we are commissioned to find a person in inter-party negotiations whom several of us ... or not ... then we can discuss matters like this. If we want to, but this does not belong here. So I want to point it up, regardless of Pozsgay's person or anyone else. This does not belong here. So let's exclude it now.

Secondly I don't think it is appropriate to connect the examination of the system of institutions immediately with a person, as it emerged here when looking into the system of institutions. I know, I can even imagine, that it is obviously a republican Juan Carlos model, in this conception, in which I can see some political reality, that it is feasible, but again this does not belong here in this form. So let's try it, otherwise we go in a direction which is not our task.

The third thing is that regardless of anything else, the Roundtable has come to an agreement in that, and the committee of the Democratic Forum has approved of it, and now I'm presenting the position of the Democratic Forum – and every time when we present a personal position, I think it is absolutely important that everybody should add what the position of his organization is, or what is his personal opinion not yet confirmed by his organization. [...]

Following a discussion in the question of the president of the republic the presidency of the Democratic Forum has authorized us to state that we wouldn't find it appropriate to have the president elected before the parliamentary elections. So it matches the declaration of intent. The reason for this decision, which was passed by the committee, is that it would be a political advantage for the party – and it is not necessarily for Imre Pozsgay or anyone else – which can then say it was elected... Mitterand is elected President, that's obviously a pulling force, it is evident that Rocard would never have made it without Mitterand. So this is again a political question which has to be view from this angle.

The next question is what solution we can find. There were two different views. According to one only minimal changes are necessary in the 1949 constitution for the



transition. We also had a position in this respect that the institution of the office of the president should be involved in it. One view maintained that the institution of the Presidential Council should be kept for the time being, we should not touch it because it had already become quite weak. And the second, compromise proposal was accepted, and this is what we represent now here, which is based on the idea that the institution of the Presidential Council should be abolished, and it should be eliminated from the 49 constitution, and a provision should be included (*György Szabad: as a temporary provision...*), provisionally, which may otherwise harmonize with the future modification of the constitution that the jurisdiction of the president of the Presidential Council, by making it precise, circumscribing and weakening it, or perhaps making it compatible with the Parliament, but this is a separate question ... its provisional nature automatically determines that the rights of the president of the republic should be exercised by the speaker of the House. [...]

This thus means that we are not going to save, it would be not right for us to save and prolong the institution of the Presidential Council, and at the same time, in accordance with what I have said before we do not want to include the institution of the office of the president, and this is why we propose a solution that is compatible with the Hungarian traditions and the international parliamentary practice ... (*Imre Kónya: provisionally ...*) provisionally, which at the same time also means that concerning the institution of the office of the president we would also object to the office of the vice president as proposed by MSZMP, if this issue were discussed.



Document 44.  
Meeting of the Medium-level Political Coordinating Committee  
of the National Roundtable Negotiations.  
Verbatim Record of Minutes (Excerpts).  
*July 6, 1989.*



**Meeting of the medium-level political coordinating committee  
of the National Roundtable Negotiations**

July 6, 1989

(Verbatim Record of Minutes. Excerpts.)

[...]

**Péter Tölgyessy:** ...Nevertheless I would like to state now that the Opposition Roundtable insists on complete adherence to the original agreement, which means that would-be participants can join any of the delegations, otherwise they can take the position of the observer. This is how we must operate at the full session, on committee meetings, and on meetings of the sub-committees. Thus, the Hungarian Economic Chamber and similar organizations can only be present at the full session as observers in the spirit of the original agreement which had included a clear-cut statement that observers can only participate in the full session.

[...]

**István Huszár:** I agree with delaying our decision on further participants. I don't think our mandate makes it possible for us to take sides concerning this issue, because, I presume, the Economic Chamber and SZÖVOSZ (the National Organization of Co-operatives) do not intend to discuss political issues only, but also issues of the economy that fall under another committee. We would also like to keep to the original agreement as much as possible. Of course we have to be careful not to offend civil organizations, we need to find a consensus. Our political discussions shall be exposed to the public gaze and civil organizations should feel that they are not left out of these negotiations.

[...]

**Imre Pozsgay:** ...It has been proposed that our committee, that is, the political committee should initiate with the leadership of the Television and the Radio to start a regular program on TV and on the radio – in order to inform the public continuously – where the experts of all three sides could report what has come up in the working committees and set forth the standpoint of their delegations. Based on their consensus, the three sides agree with those competent at Hungarian Television and the Radio regarding the focus of each coverage, and these programs will be broadcast in prime time both on TV and on the radio. That has been the proposal.

I would like to add a rational, restrictive amendment to it, although the core of the report of the experts' committee is accepted by our side. In our opinion, we would be asking too much from the political bearing capacity of the Hungarian viewers if such a program was broadcast once a week, between 21:00 and 22:00 hours. We also think it is unnecessary to have a weekly broadcast, considering the political content of our work. [...] We would rather see a program on TV and on the radio after the sessions of the political committee, that is, when information is available for the public concerning actual issues that were discussed.

[...]

**László Sólyom:** On my part, and also for the Opposition Roundtable, it is acceptable to have that one-hour coverage following the sessions of the political committee, but I think, discussions of gripping subjects in certain sub-committees would also cry for the attention of the public. Let's not be inflexible in this respect.

[...]

**István Huszár:** ...The more publicity of our meeting is provided, the better. So I do agree that the television and the radio should devote time to it. I agree with Csaba Öry that it should only happen when we have something to say. How it can fit into the program flow should be decided by the programmers of television and radio, not by us. When we have something to say, we should show ourselves to the public.

I would appreciate it if we did not discriminate the activities of the second committee. We should be aware of the fact that the public is just as interested in economic and social issues as in political ones.

[...]

**Péter Tölgyessy:** A lot of people have said we wanted to make an agreement above the heads of the people. In these programs we should not announce agreements only. Some programs are also needed that would reflect the process of reaching the agreements, that is, the discussions themselves, so that the population would not feel that so far it has been one organization announcing things, and the only difference is that from now on there are three organizations doing so together. Therefore, the discussion itself should be represented – and the Opposition Roundtable is suggesting again that these programs should be mostly talk shows, not only the news.

**Imre Pozsgay:** I do not see any obstacles to that in principle, so let us quickly close this topic now. I have not sensed opposition to this kind of interpretation of publicity on any of the sides. [...] The debate has sprung up concerning the method of implementation. In this debate I am inclined to say again that these things should be handled with great flexibility, as and when needed. [...]

In the spirit of our original agreement – in so far as the publicity of the whole series of negotiations is concerned – the political committee and the economic committee provides information to the public through the press, which is present at the sessions in the first five minutes, and after the sessions the speakers of each delegation can make a statement to the press, to the radio, and to television, as they wish. The Opposition Roundtable requested at the previous meeting of our committee that all sides should agree that the Black Box could be video-recording at every level of the negotiations on the condition that the tapes are deposited with the Speaker of Parliament. Watching, publishing, program-editing, and copying of the tapes would only be possible with the consent of all three sides. The MSZMP considers the presence of the Black Box at all levels of the negotiations incompatible with our preliminary agreements. It should be the matter of further debate what intensity of their presence and what type of security measures would serve best the purpose of documentation, so I think it would be fair if those who initiated it elaborated their standpoint in connection with this issue.

[...]

**Magda Kósáné Kovács:** According to the original agreement the sessions of the working committees are closed and no unauthorized persons can participate in them. The persons who would be recording are unauthorized. We would like to suggest that we carefully consider whether it is worthwhile to discuss an issue like this, an issue that we don not regard as an important political or technical question and set a precedent like this.

**Imre Pozsgay:** Does it all refer to the level of the working committees as well?

**Magda Kósáné Kovács:** Yes, it does. The original agreement only referred to the full sessions, and I quote „The sides agree that they would like to make the full sessions open to observers”.

[...]

**Imre Pozsgay:** I would like to make the following proposal. Concerning the presence of the Black Box and video recordings with the purpose of documentation we seem to be unable to reach an agreement today. I would like to request that the special committee concerned with the issues of publicity should include this question in its agenda insisting on what has been written down in the original agreement and in the spirit that the three negotiating sides do not intend to shut themselves off from the public either during the political negotiations or on the occasion of any other events.

[...]





Document 45.  
Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable.  
Verbatim Record of Minutes (Excerpts).  
*July 10, 1989.*



**Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable**  
July 10, 1989  
(Verbatim text of the video-taped record. Excerpts.)

[...]

**Tibor Füzessy:** First I would like to comment on a rule of procedure. It was clearly determined at the June 28 meeting that three issues would be discussed by the Roundtable: specifying the date of the parliamentary elections, the method of elections and the need to elect the president of the republic. I accepted this proposal then because my opinion was that even the specification of the order of issues to be discussed has great significance. What happened however was that we raised the third issue at our last meeting, discussed it using much less time than the issue would have deserved, and much less than we have today devoted, one and a half hours, to several different questions. Therefore I explicitly propose that we should stick with this order, and take first the issue of the date of the elections, because logically this is the most important issue, and also because this is the question that has a definite effect on the other two. That is, the question for example how a party or an organization can present itself to the public, how it can spell out its principles is intimately related to the date of the elections. So we can not make a good decision on the question of individual electorates or regional lists without knowing how much time each party will have to present themselves and spell out their views. Therefore – but in the first place referring to our former decision – I suggest that first we should discuss the issue of the date of elections.

[...]

**József Torgyán:** I maximally agree with Tibor Füzessy's opinion, namely, that the date of the elections is decisive as to whether we get for regional lists or individual electorates, or the combination of the two, we should opt for. I hasten to add though that whatever date is decided by the Politburo, which they can later have accepted by the intermediary committee, the threat is still there as the sword of Damocles – that if we happen to agree on a date in spring, someone will stand up in the Parliament, you know, after we bring the election law to completion, and yet MSZMP is pressing the election law so hard for discussion that it is a quite likely possibility. So you see if anyone in the Parliament proposes that now that legislation has slipped out of the hands of the Parliament into the hands of the Opposition Roundtable, with respect to the future, if the Parliament can not perform any significant function any more, then it will dissolve itself, and whatever date you agree on, you know, the elections will have to be held much earlier than we would like it to happen.

Now, starting out from this dangerous situation, I stress, only because of this danger, the position of the Smallholder's Party is that in the present situation – after having weighed the advantages and the disadvantages of the individual electorates and the regional lists – but I stress again that only in this present situation – the only acceptable alternative for us is exclusively the regional lists. Why? You know, I can not agree with Péter Tölgyessy's argumentation that the elections based on regional lists brought disastrous result for France, you know France is in a special situation. As far as I know after 1944-45 France created the most democratic legislation system of the world in principle by making the laws regulating the constitutional process which were necessary

for the transition from a fascist dictatorship to a democratic state. You know, this solution was simply rejected by the French people, or the French General Assembly, or whoever it depended on. For this reason it is false, simply mistaken to refer to the French example in our own case.

What is really the point? Well, you know, the point is simply that for lack of the necessary infrastructure the different parties reorganizing their activities now do not have the possibility to publicize their candidates running on the different individual lists [sic!] in a proper way, or to find some popular people at all who can be run against the candidates favored by MSZMP for decades. For to show you how true this is, it is enough to refer to the person of the president, in which case the greatest problem of all the newly organized parties is that they can not find an appropriate candidate. So you know, when the press, the radio, the television is still not in our hands, when we still have a lag of several decades, when it is not we who can say who should be appointed to this or that position, then we can only be the loser in an individual race. Therefore in the present situation the only way for us is the regional lists that can take us, you know, into a democratic transition process.

[...]

**László Sólyom:** On behalf of MDF, I would like to reflect on everything said so far here. We do not want to stress the responsibility for the nation as a propagandistic turn, but rather the fact that it is in the interest of all of us that the will of the people should really be expressed here, and that we have to agree on a system that lifts all of us above the interests of any particular party and makes it possible for everyone to express their own will at the present moment, even if many will be obviously mistaken, not knowing what they are doing. This is one thing. So we definitely have to make a system that can integrate the advantages of the different alternatives and makes it possible that the mistakes balance each other.

The other thing is that it is clear from the discussion so far that there are two extreme position taking shape. It is obvious that we will have to make a compromise here at the table, for we can not go on, and we would like to submit a compromise proposal in the first place. That is, a system which comes closest to the German system, and it actually involves both extremes side by side, in a parallel fashion. The essence of it is that practically everyone has two votes. Once people vote in their individual electorate for an individual candidate, and concerning this we would support the two-round version, the advantages of what are obvious to everyone, I believe, and there would also be a party list in addition, in our proposal a regional county list, containing all the parties nicely side by side. The real possibility for discussion and a compromise is actually the percentage of individual candidates and party lists in the elections, that is, say 50% of the mandates should be won by individual candidates and 50% on the lists. This is the starting point in our proposal, which can then be changed by extending the individual mandates at the cost of the lists or vice versa. I believe this should be part of the consensus reached by the Roundtable.

Now, I would also like to say that in our view it is reasonable to decrease the number of electorates. For the Parliament is really too big for the country, and if we are really going to have professional representatives, then it would also be financially difficult to maintain a body of more than, I don't know, 300 members of Parliament. At the same time I put it up for consideration that the individual electorates should be adjusted to the size of the municipalities. An electorate of 60 thousand would really be too large for a

bigger village in the country to run a candidate, the different natural borders merge into one another there, so I think the optimal number should be found between 30 and 60 [thousand].

The other important thing is the issue of filters. I agree with SZDSZ that we must not allow that any boot-maker guild to constitute itself as a political party, for the new law will make it easier, anyone can be registered. Ten people can be registered as a party, which is right, but it would lead to a tragedy in the elections. So we have to have some sort of a filter, before and afterwards too. The filter afterwards is easy to find in the case of the lists, a certain percentage, either 5%, or if we do not want to be that strict now, then 3 %, this would be our proposal, though we do not object to the 5% either, so it could be the filter afterwards. And before the elections, yes I, or MDF thinks it necessary that some kind of nomination should be required – that is, collecting nomination signatures – for each party to be able to run candidates in the individual electorates. It is needed so that we should not have some small organizations to run candidates all over the country and then to be unable to fill the place, since it is a great risk that there might not be enough suitable people, somebody gets a lot of places by using a nice slogan and then there is nobody with the right character to fill the places. So there should be some sort of nomination beforehand. We would not even shrink from having a limit of 10 thousand, all over the country. It is a great responsibility to nominate 200 representatives, so I, we do not have any objections against 10 thousand.

In the case of the individual candidates, however, the official 600 suggested by the government is too high, for the people here have to show themselves, and in order for every party to get and run ... There, however, anyone can run. Anyone, any shoe-maker guild can run. So in order for them to run an individual candidate, who have their own individual face shown in the race against each other, the 600 is too much, 150 would be more than enough. Thank you very much for your attention, so this is our viewpoint.

As for the date, we have stated publicly earlier, MDF says if conditions are met, the elections can be held between November and March. We would urge to have the elections as soon as possible, for the situation in the country requires stabilization by early elections, so we would go to the polls in the end of November, if possible.



Document 46.  
Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable.  
Verbatim Record of Minutes (Excerpts).  
*July 17, 1989.*





**Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable**  
July 17, 1989  
(Verbatim text of the video-taped record. Excerpts.)

[...]

**László Kövér:** I would like to add to what was said last that our sub-committee members' experience can confirm the same. MSZMP appears to follow a tactic whereby the experts of MSZMP constantly stress their lack of competence in the sub-committees and say they can not take a stand on this, and that it should be advanced to the intermediate level. We should ask them sooner or later ... we should now ask them at the next intermediate committee meeting why these sub-committees were needed at all, why double the work and then start it all over again. They should authorize their representatives in the sub-committees in order to make an agreement in certain questions. So we should not start the whole thing all over again, and I believe we should put them under pressure through publicity as well, for I think it is not a question of guessing ... (*György Szabad: what is the number of this sub-committee?*) This is our general experience, that everywhere they say they can not now take a stand on this or that issue, because they do not have the authorization, or because this or that question does not belong there, to the topic of the sub-committee, and so on, and so forth. Perhaps we should put them under pressure publicly too, stating how we see things. What they are doing is obstruction, they have opted a tactic to play for the time more and more.

[...]

**László Kövér:** I think I, or we, representatives of FIDESZ, can take the liberty to use harsher words here, all the more so because after all we are not a party in the classical sense of the word, not even in the sense MDF or SZDSZ is. Therefore I can afford the indulgence – for which I apologize immediately – to say that I do not consider the arguments valid and credible which use the interests of the country as a cover, interpreting them in various different ways to support their own conceptions. Let us be honest at least to ourselves. It is absolutely clear why the historical parties think they endorse the regional lists, and it is also obvious why other organizations believe this system is not suitable for them. So I think this is really what we should be talking about then. And it is also evident that we will have to reach some compromise on these two views which is acceptable by all of us, and which can also be represented at the trilateral forum. I could sense some false arguments here, in the material put forth by the Christian Democratic Party as well as in the comments made earlier here, saying that it is not the individual electorates and the lists that are in opposition here. So we should not pretend as if these were the two poles. The point is that the free democrats and MDF have some proposals for a hybrid system which could be a feasible compromise, I believe, we believe.

At the same time we also have to consider the fact that if a purely list-based system were represented at the trilateral talks, then this would most likely – in my opinion 99% – not be accepted there. So if we cannot reach a compromise here, then we will have to find one there, for I think this is the single issue among all the questions we discuss at these meetings that is the only vital and inescapable. This is the only important question on which we have to come to a decision at all costs, otherwise they will decide for us. No, I haven't finished yet. My opinion is that everybody should think it over that we have to

arrive at some compromise. Anyway, the trilateral ... So as I said last the three sides will have to come to some decision on this issue by all means, because this is the only really important issue.

The other thing is that it appears to me – strangely enough – that the dividing line is, unfortunately, not between the three parties, or between two, but rather within the Opposition Roundtable. Though the three parties can easily agree on nearly all the issues, since everybody thinks in terms of some combination of the individual electorates and the regional lists, there is a group in the Opposition Roundtable which is fully committed to a purely list-based system.

This is what I wanted to say as an introduction, that in my view it is an untenable position, and I believe we should all see that what we want to achieve here is a compromise of different interests rather than the fabrication of different ideologies as to what is and what is not good for the country. Because if this is what we want to discuss, then I would have several questions concerning the material presented by the Christian Democratic Party, namely what they mean by the will of the people within a county, or why they think the county list can express local preferences better than the individual electorate system. This is fully contradictory. I believe I was astonished to read that they make reference to the present political and behavioral culture of the Hungarian people. As if I was reading a MSZMP document one or one and a half years earlier. It also talks about a minority turned into a majority by manipulating the elections, but the same way I think we could have a different kind of manipulation which would turn a real minority into a majority by a list-based system. Are there really marked Christian democratic and social democratic trends? Is it true that people are likely to know what sort of principles they vote for, when the Baranyai fraction in the MSZDP argued against the meeting of the party scheduled to reelect its officials that young people should first learn what social democracy is all about before they start voting. I believe this ... it is a pity that they are not here now, and I have to say such things behind their back, but perhaps it is not that obvious that people vote for established, existing programs, when polls clearly show – also published in *Magyar Nemzet* – that people voted non-existent parties simply based on their names. So these arguments do not really make sense for me.

And finally I would like to bring up the most serious point which says that political fight – it has also been mentioned here in words – the main arena for political fight is shifted from open elections to bargaining behind closed doors. My question is: why is it shifted to bargaining behind closed doors this way more than with a list system which is based on coalitions? The clear, in principle clear programs that the parties present to their electors preserve nothing on earth in the course of coalition bargaining behind closed doors. So why is it a counter-argument against the individual electorates and why is it not an equally valid argument against the list system? I think after all I have presented all the substantial arguments – though I have not intended to – concerning this thing.

[...]

**József Torgyán:** If I may... the drastic cut on the number of representatives is unacceptable for the following reasons. Well, you know, at present all the appointive rights are exercised by MSZMP. Every significant post is filled by MSZMP members or people and organizations controlled by MSZMP. We, the opposition have only one chance to break into this system, and it is not the elimination of nomenclature, because they will say they agree to it, but then nothing will practically happen. The only chance is to send as many of our representatives to the Parliament as we can, and at a given place the

representative should have enough authority to be able to push other people into different posts there. Now if we cut the number of representative, then we will automatically enhance the chances of MSZMP.

Therefore we propose that we should not change the present number. If we decide to change it, then the only thing to do is to increase the number. The pay and benefits of the representatives is another issue, we fully agree that we should consider it very carefully, that it should not be excessive, something that would put an unbearable burden on the state budget, but if it comes to talking about saving money, then our opinion is that it is not the Parliament where we should spare money. Thank you.



Document 47.  
Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable.  
Verbatim Record of Minutes (Excerpts).  
*July 21, 1989.*



**Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable**  
July 21, 1989  
(Verbatim text of the video-taped record. Excerpts.)

[...]

**Csaba Varga:** Dear representatives of the Opposition Roundtable! After the Monday meeting of the Opposition Roundtable the Hungarian People's Party discussed at length how these question should be resolved. Just because time is short an there are new agreements being formed we would like to present a proposal in six points to all the participating organizations [...] What are these six points?

First. We believe the Opposition Roundtable should present a package to the other two parties in the four most important questions – the date of the elections, the election tactics, the presidency and the election law – rather than negotiating with them separately on each issue. Thus we think the solution is good and possible only if... we should not get into negotiations in which we try to come to an agreement separately at the intermediate and the top levels, but we should submit a package to the other two sides.

Point two. We believe that in the last ten days or two weeks several circumstances have changed, both at home and abroad, which should be taken into consideration when we propose something to the other two parties. What new conditions do we have in mind? First, it seems that the foreign political situation is getting worse rather than better from the viewpoint of a change in the political model or system in Hungary. As a result of strikes and ethnic problems the situation in the Soviet Union is increasingly tense, and there is a real danger of the restoration of the old system there. Similarly, the inflexibility of the position taken by the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Rumania is not favorable to us either. There must be borne in mind when we decide what to offer to the Hungarian public in these four basic issues as a solution in the following days.

Second new condition. The economic situation is not improving at all, to the contrary, it is getting worse, and the social conditions are also getting worse for the country. From this it follows that there seems to be less guarantee for the situation in Hungary to stay peaceful in the coming half a year or three quarters of a year and no conflicts will arise. We would like to express our fears explicitly in this respect.

The third change in the circumstances is that it seems now that a significant counter-action has been launched in Hungary against the agreement between the three negotiating parties, not only against the Opposition Roundtable. I want to comment on one of them here, because it shocked all of us. The Budapest MSZMP members of the Parliament started arranging for a session of the House in September in which members of Parliament should resign and the House should be dissolved. This would mean, if they could pull it through in the coming one and a half months, that after the dissolution of the Parliament martial law would be enforced immediately. I think the goodwill delegation today should raise this issue as to what MSZMP knows about such a campaign launched by some of its members, because it seems quite dangerous. So we are mentioning these so that we can all see the sharpening of these new, or old problems, because we believe these must be taken into consideration when we decide on further steps.

The third point of our proposal. This concerns the date of the elections, one part of the package. The Hungarian People's Party, you may recall, has said before that we are authorized to support a date somewhere between December and March for the parliamentary elections. Earlier we tended to support the end of March. The People's Party

now believes that partly because of the problems mentioned before the Opposition Roundtable should propose to the other two parties to have the general elections at the beginning of December. December 10 or 11, Saturday or Sunday.

Second issue. The modification of the constitution, problems related to the office of the president. The Hungarian People's Party believes that its proposal presented here before ... (*Gábor Fodor: The fourth point?*) This is the fourth point, yes, I'm sorry. The fourth point. What we said, let me remind you, is that – contrary to the proposal made by MDF and SZDSZ – we propose to bridge this problem by setting up a new Presidential Council, for what would happen if the Parliament dissolves itself and calls the general elections, what should happen till the elections take place? This proposal is now withdrawn ... (*László Kónya: The presidency has withdrawn it.*) because we believe ... (*László Kónya: It has had it withdrawn*) it is so complicated, it would involve such a difficult solution which is simply not viable with the present inner state of the Parliament. Therefore we go back to the idea that in the transitional period the best solution is to have the office of the president. An office of the president with intermediate power.

Fifth point. The issue of election logistics and methods. There were two marked positions taking shape in the last session of the Opposition Roundtable last Monday. One was a purely national and county list-based system of elections, the other one was a compromise offered by MDF to the other parties involving a fifty-fifty percent of individual electorates and party lists. The People's Party believes that the compromise is inevitable. So we offer it as a compromise solution to have lists and individual electorates in a ration of three quarters to one quarter. One important argument for this solution is that the participating organizations should consider the fact that there are three thousand municipalities in Hungary. (*József Antall: What is the method? We don't understand until...*) Let me explain ... So one quarter should be individual electorates ... I will also explain that instantly. Let me tell you about the essence, which is extremely important for it. There are three thousand settlements in Hungary. If we think it over, the opposition parties can establish a local organization of their own at best in one thousand or one thousand and a few hundred places until the elections. In the rest of the places it is quite likely that we will have none. This means that we would hardly be able to organize the elections in the whole of the country, or even in half of the country in an individual electorate system.

How do we see the two possible combinations mentioned before? First we think what György Szakolczai said on Monday morning is basically right. Let me highlight a few things not mentioned in that proposal. Last time Jóska Torgyán indicated that we would like to have the residual votes in both the individual electorates and in the regional county lists to pass on to a national list. So no vote should be lost, because that would be fair to the small parties. The other thing is that we believe the parties should collect signatures, and the number here should be set at a limit of ten thousand, though the Hungarian People's Party believes the historical parties would not need anything like this, since they have been functioning continuously, but still, for the sake of unity we are willing to support it, as any other organization. So much about these issues.

An finally our last proposal is this. Number six. If the Opposition Roundtable accepts it that we should present a package concerning the four main issues, if it agrees to have the elections in December, the beginning of December, if it agrees that with a view to political guarantees we should still have the office of the president, and if it agrees to a division of three quarters list system and one quarter individual electorates, then, bearing all this in mind, we should count backwards and consider the timing of events. This means that in order to have the elections in December, we should have the Parliament call the



parliamentary elections in September, at the beginning of September. To this effect, however, we have to agree with all the three parties in August on every detail of the package. So we would like to propose for the next intermediate level meeting to be held on Tuesday, Wednesday, or whatever day, that the Opposition Roundtable should raise the issue of speeding up the process and try to urge the other party to come to an agreement on these issues in the middle of August.

[...]

**Péter Tölgyessy:** Our opinion is that this is a proposal which is meant to discuss again a number of issues already decided. Our organization is not willing to re-negotiate these questions. What we would like to discuss first – without entering a debate – is whether the Opposition Roundtable is willing to put these things on its agenda as compared to what is already on it – only what concerns the election system – because we believe it is not right, and we will represent this position firmly. So the first question is whether we are going to discuss other things as well, or just the elections system. The definite position of the Alliance of Free Democrats is that we should only discuss what is on the agenda, the issues of the elections system. All the other questions should either be taken later – in accordance with our earlier decision – or they come under the decision of the Opposition Roundtable, and we strongly object to discussing them again now. Our organization maintains that if we don't go back to our original agenda, but we have to re-negotiate certain things, then we will have to withdraw from the Opposition Roundtable. Thank you.

[...]

**József Antall:** Just to Csaba Varga, I would like to have it closed. My proposal is that because it is such a cardinal issue, an issue of such importance, and his analysis that he has just presented involves so many things worth considering, and I believe we all feel that, even if not everybody ... the same conclusions, or come to them, but the fact that it is a real analysis that is worth some attention, and further things .. I ... it cannot, the representatives of the Roundtable cannot make a decision now in this question, so all the organizations should submit it to their own presidency – as has the People's Party – to their own presidency, this is what I propose, that all the participating organizations, regardless of what their response to it will be, it's another question, but they should investigate the question in a way it was raised by the People's Party, and we should come back to it later. (*Gábor Fodor: Right, thank you for the useful proposal...*) And let's leave it at that now.

**Gábor Fodor:** I support the proposal. Yes...

**Viktor Orbán:** I have a comment of one sentence regarding this motion. The way I interpret it is that out of the six proposals put forward by Csaba Varga one or two are of a modifying nature. So the People's Party requests the modification of a decision made earlier by the Opposition Roundtable, in my judgment. So I think this is the way it should be submitted to our organizations. So FIDESZ will present it in such a way that the People's Party wishes to modify such and such a decision made by the Opposition Roundtable in a such and such a sense. Period. This is the way I will submit it, or this is the way we will do it, I believe. And I want to call everybody's attention to it.

**Péter Tölgyessy:** I would like to add two things here. In my view it is not a modification, but the proposal intends to re-negotiate and make a decision that is in sharp opposition – this is a more precise way to put it. And it has caught the parties unprepared. Personally, it was quite unexpected to me. We have to think it over what we should think even about putting this on the agenda. And it would have been better if we ... in advance ... The whole proposal is surprising, considering that I thought we would talk here about the election system, lists or individual electorates, and instead the issue of the presidency came back, which perhaps was not a good idea.

[...]

**Iván Pető:** I want to raise one single point. I believe we can expect from each other anything we would expect from MSZMP. If MSZMP were to say that all the agreements made so far that have not been approved of by Károly Grósz, that have not been signed by the top leaders of MSZMP, is re-negotiable, is re-interpretable – that's what we have here basically. But we can always go back to the starting point and negotiate all over again, that's what it would mean. Some progress has been made in all the sub-committees. If the representative of MSZMP said in the sub-committee that I am a member of, that we should go back to the starting point, then we would stand up and leave, I believe all the participating members of the Opposition Roundtable would uniformly do so. So this much can be expected.

If MSZMP proposed in one of the sub-committees to consider this or that question, then – as suggested by Gábor Fodor – we could go back to discussing it, but until a new agreement is reached, the old decision is in force. So I propose we should stick with the interpretation suggested by Gábor Fodor, that's what we expect from MSZMP, let's not provide a precedence for them – who are of course not present here – but still we should not provide a precedence for MSZMP that there is no completed agreement. So I agree with what has been said by Viktor, or Gábor that once we have agreed on something, until we re-discuss it and make a new decision, the old decision should be adhered to. And the same is true of the negotiations with MSZMP, obviously.

Document 48.

Meeting of the MSZMP Political Executive Committee  
[On Speeding Up the Political Coordinating Negotiations].

Excerpt.

*July 24, 1989.*



**Meeting of the MSzMP Political Executive Committee<sup>i</sup>**  
**[On Speeding Up the Political Conciliatory Negotiations]**

July 24, 1989

(Verbatim Record of Minutes. Excerpt.)

**György Fejti:** We are in a complicated situation now, but still, we have to make up our minds. In many questions, especially when it comes to specific details, we have made quite a progress. However, in a series of fundamental and cardinal questions the antagonism seems irreconcilable; apparently the date of the general elections is one of these argumentative issues. So, with the flexible negotiating strategy, namely that we give in to certain demands but stand our ground firmly in other issues, we could not resolve the prevailing antagonism for the time being. Yet time is pushing us. Technically, we have some three or four weeks left to work out the legal conditions of the parliamentary elections of late autumn<sup>ii</sup>. Three or four weeks, that's all we have.

On the other hand, this more or less open, hesitant, obstructing behaviour is physically impeding the process of calling elections. That's why we have to come to decision, on the basis of the previous issue on the agenda, as to what to do in the face of the present economic situation and the international financial conditions. Because we either accept the fact that we cannot make a compromise in this case, while emphasising that the ongoing negotiation process should not be jeopardised – it is another question, though, that the danger does not only hold for the elections – or, alternatively, we come up with overt reasoning and publicise in due time what is the rationale behind advancing the date of elections. In the latter case we should look for compromises in other issues, instead of this one. We undoubtedly jeopardise the success of negotiations; what is more, we even risk their termination. The later we express our intention to call earlier elections, the bigger the danger is.

**Rezső Nyers:** The only reason to hasten negotiations is to have advance elections? I believe that even if called elections for the next spring, we should speed things up all the same, shouldn't we?

**György Fejti:** It is a markedly different situation if we want to submit the fundamental laws to parliament in mid-September rather than in December. The meaning of hastening things now depends on whether we show up the magnanimous gesture of government – abolishing these laws – in a very broad sense or the government makes it clear that, even though they are curious how political negotiations will end, they want to submit the bills at the next seating anyway, so that nothing can change the date of election.

**Rezső Nyers:** I have one question – otherwise I completely agree that we hasten the process and the government keep to their schedule, with the one compromise of September. But why does it have to be connected with elections in November?

**György Fejti:** Because we have no other plausible reason for speeding things up.

[...]

**György Fejti:** Yes, but we have to get back to the unfortunately irrevocable question, that we should decide in a very short time, to what extent the elections of this year are

important for us. Until there is no decision in this issue, we cannot follow a clear and unequivocal guideline in negotiations. We might lose this, which I can imagine, so let me point out that despite all appearances there is no covert reason that would make it important for me. Yet we cannot carry on the negotiations under such pressure without knowing how important this issue is for our own party.

**Rezső Nyers:** Comrade Fejti, it is very important for us. In one condition: if they pass these fundamental laws in September, then the November elections are 100 percent for our advantage. If they do not vote for the bill in September, then nothing is good enough for us. Absolutely nothing. This is the decisive factor. So, I am totally and immediately for the November elections, if these three issues are accepted. Or at least two of the three. Three would be most expedient, though.

**György Fejti:** You mean that they accept it? It is still a bone of contention. There are and will be several disputable issues.

It is for sure that the documents can only be submitted in September with much controversy. This is part of the negotiation strategy. We shouldered responsibility for negotiating these bills. However, MSZMP cannot take the responsibility for striking a deal with those powers. We will not be able to come to terms; it is the Parliament's task to ask for a decision, with making known and objectively presenting the opposing views. In the present state of negotiations it is an illusion that in these questions – may it be the party law or election law – a total agreement and final consent can be reached. Illusion. Possibly we should reduce the number of points that induce confrontation – and there is a lot, at the moment. Just to mention one example: so far, when it came to the party law, the opposition have put it in the minutes at every single meeting that the MSZMP is not willing to give consent to proposing the bill to parliament if either the assessment or the redistribution of their total property is on the agenda. I think it is absolutely impossible that such a position would be acceptable for us right before the elections. I couldn't tell when they would take a U-turn in this issue. They will only relinquish if there is a final deadline, until which the negotiations should be completed, otherwise we can stand up, wash our hands and say that the agreement has fallen through but we are not the ones to blame. So that's why entirely clear statements are needed, saying that there is a set schedule and deadline for negotiations; the delegates of the MSZMP are unable to do this.

[...]

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<sup>i</sup> On 23-24 June, 1989 the MSZMP Central Committee established a 21 member Political Executive Committee replacing the former Political Committee.

<sup>ii</sup> The MSZMP considered early elections advantageous for themselves assuming that this way the parties of the opposition would have no sufficient time to publicise their programs. However, elections were held only in March, 1990 eventually.

Document 49.

Negotiation between Mihail S. Gorbachev and Rezső Nyers, President and  
Károly Grósz General Secretary of the MSZMP, Moscow.  
Report to the MSZMP Political Executive Committee. Excerpt.  
*July 24-25, 1989.*





**Negotiation between Mihail S. Gorbachev and Rezső Nyers, President and Károly Grósz General Secretary of the MSZMP, Moscow.**  
Report to the MSZMP Political Executive Committee.

24-25 July, 1989

Excerpt

Hungarian Socialist Workers Party  
Central Committee

TOP SECRET!  
Inf/1451/1989

**REPORT**  
to the Political Executive Committee

Invited by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party, comrades Rezső Nyers and Károly Grósz visited the Soviet Union on 24 and 25 July 1989. They took part in a two-hour negotiation with comrade Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party invited the delegates for dinner, with the participation of several Soviet leaders. Comrades Nyers and Grósz negotiated with leaders of the Soviet-Hungarian Friendship Society. Comrade Nyers met Soviet social scientists; comrade Grósz met leading officials of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party.

I.

Comrade Nyers described the situation of Hungary and the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. He said that the party is preparing for a working congress<sup>i</sup>. Decision has not been made in every issue yet but is quite definite that internal issues of the party will be on the agenda. A set task of the congress is to render the unity of the party. Comrade Nyers pointed out that the party is already getting spirited, new platforms are being formed. The basic concept of the congress is democratic socialism, self-government, parliamentary democracy, and economic democracy. Comrade Nyers emphasised that property reform is considered the primary element of reforms. We wish to democratise public property, indeed making it available for the public. We are considering a new system that utilises the available capital more efficiently. We are planning to increase the ratio of private capital in the economy, and the initiation of foreign capital.

Comrade Nyers mentioned the experiences of parliamentary by-elections<sup>ii</sup>. He emphasised that one should not jump to immediate conclusions from the results. We consider the elections neither a success nor a complete failure. The present state of paralysis within the party, however, has become apparent. He referred to the fact that in one constituency the opposition united their forces in the campaign against the MSZMP, but this is not expected as a general tendency when it comes to the general elections. Comrade Nyers stressed that there are three factors that can defeat the party. Firstly: the past, if we let ourselves smeared with it. Secondly: the disintegration of the party. The third factor that can defeat us is the paralysis of party membership.

Talking about Hungary, comrade Gorbachev said that Hungarian events are followed with much interest in the Soviet Union. The leadership of the Soviet Communist

Party refers to our policy with understanding. In the course of negotiations they understood our intention to find our way in the path of democratic socialism. At the same time, comrade Gorbachev posed several questions in relating to the situation of Hungary and the policy of the MSZMP. Among other things, he enquired about our orientation in foreign policy, the role of private property and foreign capital, the experiences of bye-elections, the goals of the party congress, and about the unity of the party. Comrade Gorbachev put special emphasis on the fact that Soviet leaders interpret the mass sympathy towards the MSZMP demonstrated at the funeral of János Kádár<sup>iii</sup> as an important political resource to rely on.

[...]

#### IV.

In the course of the visit, several issues of the bilateral relationships were discussed. Negotiators mutually agreed that we should widen the scope of relations between the MSZMP and the CPSU, and increase the exchange of experiences. In this way the recently aggravated laxity that has been hindering the co-operation of Soviet and Hungarian party organisations can be effectively eradicated. Hungarian negotiators suggested that the CPSU and other Soviet social organisations develop collaboration with Hungarian democratic organisations and newly forming parties as well<sup>iv</sup>.

The negotiations proved that it is our mutual intention to maintain the friendship of the Hungarian and Soviet nations, create a new basis for reinforcing the friendship movement, winning over the best professionals and the youth for the friendship of the two nations.

In the course of negotiations, Hungarian and Soviet leaders examined the most urgent issues regarding the stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary. Comrade Nyers reminded the negotiators that at the meeting between comrades Grósz and Gorbachev in Moscow in March, they agreed in principle that troops were continued to be withdrawn. At that time Soviet negotiators asked that this agreement should not be publicised. This time comrade Nyers suggested that the March agreement should be reinforced, the question of withdrawing Soviet troops further considered and publicised in one way or another. Speaking for the Soviet leadership, comrade Gorbachev agreed with the idea. His suggestion was that when dealing with the issue, one should start from what the Soviet press release says about the subject: "In the course of negotiations, the issue of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary was brought up, and the parties decided that steps will be made to further reduce the number of Soviet troops, in accordance with the European disarmament process and with the advance of the Vienna talks." Comrades Nyers and Grósz agreed with the suggestion.

In the course of negotiations we reassured our mutual political intent to seek the possibilities of establishing a new basis for Hungarian-Soviet economic co-operation. Comrade Nyers indicated that the Hungarian government is presently working on the new fiscal system, and possibly the propositions will be submitted this autumn.

The president of the MSZMP emphasised that the situation of Hungarian minorities in the Sub-Carpathian region is improving, which is of great importance for us in terms of home and foreign affairs alike. Comrade Gorbachev indicated that they are determined the head in this direction.

Another subject was raised: many Hungarian soldiers died in action on the Soviet front or in POW camps in World War 2. Hungarian public opinion is exerting pressure so that the memory of these victims is preserved in due fashion. Comrade Gorbachev

emphasised that the Soviet Union is ready to co-operate in this field as well. They said that mass graves on battlefields are virtually impossible to find now. However, they are ready to specify those cemeteries where Hungarian prisoners of war were buried. They would preserve the tombs, memorial monuments could be installed, and Hungarian citizens could visit these sites. The same practice is working well with the Federal Republic of Germany.

[...]

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<sup>i</sup> The 14th congress of the MSZMP was held on 6-10 October, 1989. During the congress the party dissolved itself and on 7 October a new party, the Hungarian Socialist Party was formed.

<sup>ii</sup> On 22 July, 1989 parliamentary by-elections were held in four constituencies but the first round brought a final result only in one of them, where the parties of the opposition formed a coalition and won. The second round of the elections were held on 5 August when candidates of the Hungarian Democratic Forum acquired two of the seats while in one constituency the election was void.

<sup>iii</sup> The ageing János Kádár, since the party conference in May, 1988 having the honorary title: president of the party died on 6 July; his funeral was held on 14 July, 1989 with the participation of several tens of thousand people.

<sup>iv</sup> It is more than interesting that just a few days after the return of the two MSZMP leaders from Moscow, on 27 July József Antall, representative of the Hungarian Democratic Forum made a proposal at the meeting of the Opposition Roundtable to invite the Soviet Ambassador in Budapest and inform him about the ideas of the opposition. This move strengthens the probability of secret communications having existed between the MSZMP and some representatives of the opposition as it was commonly believed (but never proved) at the time.



**Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable**  
July 25, 1989  
(Verbatim text of the video-taped record. Excerpts.)

[...]

**Viktor Orbán:** I believe there is a real danger of breaking up threatening the Opposition Roundtable, but I think the strongest attack on it does not come from our voters, I think we can find a solution to it. More alarming is the debate we had last time, namely the financial questions and the issue of the president, I think the threat of a split comes from this direction rather than that other one. (*József Antall: I meant this to cover that as well.*) I think we can bridge this – the one we have today – and I wanted to have the floor because I believe I can use our own example to present another way of thinking, another approach to the problem.

It is absolutely clear to all of us that if FIDESZ runs in the elections, for us, our interest as an organization is in the pure list system of elections. In an individual electorate system, with an age limit of 35 years, it is obviously very difficult to send a young person to the Parliament, considering the political culture we have now in Hungary. I think everybody can admit it. So our interests as an organization push us towards opting explicitly for a pure list system. But based just on the considerations put forward by József Antall, among others, I think it would be a grave mistake, for the whole of the Hungarian society, if the next parliamentary elections were based purely on regional lists. Therefore we do not endorse this option. Quite the contrary. We say our position is largely what is supported by MDF, and we say that because of the independent candidates we must have individual electorates in addition to the lists.

Secondly, in our view it is very important to be committed to a place, that a candidate's commitment to a particular place should be appreciated. It is another matter of principle debated between us that I don't want to bring in here now, which system is the best in a well-established civil democracy. I don't believe it would be a purely list-based system, but it is another matter. It doesn't matter now, I'm just saying I don't agree with what you have said, just to appreciate the present situation. So FIDESZ is willing to subordinate its own interest to the interest of what we see as that of the Hungarian society, that is, that we should have a combined system. We endorse this alternative on our part. It is a matter of further discussion then what the ratio of representatives should be, say whether the 50-50% ratio would be tenable.

At the cost of our own interests I would also add that it would be even better if more individual representatives could get a seat, but this is a trifle which we can discuss later, when we have reach a consensus in the major issue. So on our part we are willing to subordinate our own interest to that of the nation and say that starting out from the evaluation of the present situation presented József Antall we cannot accept anything else but a combined system.

**József Antall:** May I? It is only in a well-functioning democracy that it is all the same which system we have.

**Péter Tölgyessy:** It is not all the same. (*Disagreement, noise*)

**Imre Mécs:** Let's try to concentrate on József Antall's words, or I would like to forward a comment made by György Szabad to the rank of consensus. He said we wanted to work out a bill for one single election.

**Péter Tölgyessy:** Excuse me, I have to comment on this. Historical facts show us that it just does not work. Generally it involves everything. If we were to decide now to have a Parliament with 400 representatives, then it is absolutely impossible for the next Parliament to decrease this number, because the point is very simply that ... Let's stick with this nominal party, The Hungarian National Democratic Party, which has, say, 100 seats in the House, and then some wise guy comes forward and says it should be cut down to 50, because the country is poor and it can not maintain so many representatives. The party will continue to stick with the 100 seats. So both the elections system and ... will become inflexible. So the experience of Western democracies show us that once they are established, as they were after the Second World War, and an election system is approved, and a number is established for the parliamentary seats, then it remains to be so for 40-50 years. Until a major shock is inflicted on the country, it remains the same.

So considering the proposal that first we establish a provisional system, which is then changed by the next Parliament – it is just naive. This election system will underlie a party structure which should then decide to change for another system, but it would want to stay as it is, so the easiest decision to make will be to say that everything should stay as we think it should be. So it is quite unacceptable to me to say that we make a provisional law, work out a provisional number of seats for the Parliament. I want to request the chairman to put the question to the participants whether they agree on a combined system.

Document 51.  
Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable.  
Verbatim Record of Minutes (Excerpts).  
*July 27, 1989.*





**Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable**  
July 27, 1989  
(Verbatim text of the video-taped record. Excerpts.)

[...]

**Iván Pető:** [...] in the course of the technical preparations the delegation of MSZMP proposed to put three topics on the agenda, the ones which got stuck in the first three committees. We suggested that it was too large a bite for an afternoon discussion, so we should cut down on the range of topics to be discussed. We could not agree upon it. Starting out from this practical consideration they accepted our proposal that the order of topics should not be equivalent to the numbering of the committees, thus we should not take the constitution first, because it is too large a bite, but rather first we should take the topic of Committee No 2 concerning the management and operation of the parties, then the issues of the general elections, and finally as a third topic the constitution. Now the reason why it was worth telling them about it was that after MSZMP had agreed to it, it was obvious that the position of yesterday – which is in front of all of us now – was not known by MSZMP then. This is a much more complicated matter, a much tougher task than arguing about the question of the constitution. They presumably would not have accepted it as the first topic for discussion.

I don't wish to give an account of the content of this thing, that is, the content of the debate on financing the parties. It is quite obvious in the documents, I simply want to make it even more straightforward that so far MSZMP has taken the viewpoint that the financial matters of the transition and the issue of the division of party property should not be discussed in this committee – that is in Committee I/2 – but they have not questioned the need for negotiation. Until yesterday it appeared as if the only task of the Politburo meeting this afternoon were to decide in this matter without discussing any substantial questions as to which committee should discuss this issue, in a sub-committee linked to Committee 2, or in this committee by replacing some of its members. It turns out from the documents that there has been a sharp turn in the position of MSZMP. They are simply not willing to talk about this topic, and I would like to say a few words about the background of this problem.

Yesterday it became evident, and perhaps those who ... the representatives of the organizations who were present at the meeting of Committee I/2 and informed their fellow members, so it turned out to be a sudden and unexpected change. The delegates of MSZMP explicitly said that even their representatives participating at the meeting this afternoon did not know this position yet, it is so recent. We asked them if anything had happened in the past two days which could be traced back in the newspapers and related to this abrupt turn. We did not conceal at all that what we had in mind was the talks in Moscow. They explicitly stated that nothing had happened. Nothing had happened that should have lead to such a change. In other words, they made it more or less clear that it was the private opinion of the leader of their delegation, György Fejti, if you like. Now it's all the same whether if it's a private opinion, it is a position taken within the party. That is, without making a big deal out of it, I had the impression there – which was further strengthened by the delegation of MSZMP – that it was some kind of a putsch. A putsch by one wing of the party who would like to achieve something, or who want to stop something. So we propose to formulate our position with a view to this development. The position of the committee can be read in the document. Let me say again that it is most

likely not the position taken by the whole of MSZMP but only by one line of it within the party which goes right into the opposite direction with respect to what is represented by the negotiating delegation.

**József Antall:** Just briefly, could you repeat in one sentence ... not all the participants, with a view to some future comments.

**Iván Pető:** You mean the content of it?

**József Antall:** The content of it.

**Iván Pető:** So the way we started it – that is, Committee I/2 –, the Opposition Roundtable started the negotiations sometime at the end of June with the aim to discuss the bill concerning the financing and the management of the parties, and it was given green light with the provision that we can endorse the bill only if we can also agree on the financial issues of the transitional period and the division of party property. These were our preconditions. MSZMP has never rejected this proposal, but they always questioned the site of the talks, which committee should be concerned with the negotiations. So MSZMP showed some willingness – this is laid down on paper in the minutes of the meetings – to reveal its own financial situation and the range of properties it owns. In other words, they were ready to give us a detailed inventory of properties and a financial balance. The organizations sitting on the Third Side were also willing to do the same, except for the National Council of Trade Unions.

The sudden turn here is that in its note of yesterday MSZMP said they did not have to give an account to anyone else but to their members. If they decide to do so, they say, they might give some immovable properties back to the society, or to certain organizations under the heading “slenderization” – that’s how they call it – but no one from the outside should have a word on this. Now we took the view – this also belong here, though I’m just repeating myself – that the transition to a multiparty system should not incur extra costs for the society, so we should be able to manage our organizations using the already existing subsidies and immovable properties, and we should cut down on the budget of MSZMP and the other social organizations and give this money to the newly established organizations. Yesterday we said – and this is what is contained in our records – that the new position taken by MSZMP makes it impossible, or in their view further burdens should be placed on the shoulders of the society and separate sources should be found to cover the expenses of the political parties rather than those which are already available for financing the party and other social organizations.

I believe that’s the essence of it. This is just an impression, but it was quite evident that one of the members of the MSZMP delegation – it consists of two members – apparently learned about this new position right at the scene of the talks. This sheds completely new light on his work and also on that of their committee. It was essentially a quite successful committee, the bill on the management and financing of political parties was just round the corner, there are only one or two gaps in it, but with this turn yesterday practically the whole thing has lost its sense, for we – that is, the committee – are no longer willing to negotiate until something happens. These are the facts...

[...]

Document 52.

Meeting of the Medium-level Political Coordinating Committee  
of the National Roundtable Negotiations.

Verbatim Record of Minutes (Excerpts).

*July 27, 1989.*



**Meeting of the medium-level political coordinating committee  
of the National Roundtable Negotiations**

July 27, 1989

(Verbatim Record of Minutes. Excerpts.)

[...]

**György Szabad:** Honoured members of the committee! The Opposition Roundtable has decided to make a statement on its session today, on July 27 and I would like to read it out now on their request. „The organizations of the Opposition Roundtable are deeply worried about certain press releases detailing the alleged initiative of MSZMP members of Parliament that the Parliament should dissolve itself after the opening of its Autumn term. The organizations of the Opposition Roundtable would like to remind all those concerned that according to the inter-party agreement signed on June 10, 1989, the validation of the agreement hopefully reached through the political conciliation negotiations presupposes the enactment of bills of law with an identical content in Parliament. Therefore the dissolution of Parliament prior to reaching an inter-party agreement would prevent the realization of efforts aimed at the foundation of the democratic constitutional state.”

**Sándor Keresztes:** Would anyone like to express his reaction to the statement just read out?

**György Fejti:** I suggest we should make it clear if it was a procedural motion or not and what we should do with this statement which we heard for the first time and have not received in writing. I think that in connection with topic I/1. it has been worthwhile to discuss possible questions of time schedule. There has been an opportunity to discuss the statement, but we would like to get it in writing and in the future please give us a chance to ponder our response carefully.

[...]

**Iván Pető:** ...Coming back to the first item in the original agenda which I suggested to be covered last, that is, the questions of financing during the transitional period – the documents are known to everyone concerning the shift of the standpoint of the MSZMP that occurred yesterday. We have written down our position on this. It has been unusual so far during our negotiations for the sides to change their views on short notice. Concerning the content, in the opinion of the Opposition Roundtable it is extremely problematic that after the talks have been stalled on the medium-level the activities of expert committees would still continue and so the standpoint of the delegation of the MSZMP is that the medium-level committee has nothing to make decisions on, quits in ultimatum-style, and does not say it would further support the constructive cooperation. We agree with the position of the Third Side written down yesterday. The Opposition Roundtable thinks that this shift of position – both its style and content – threatens the possible consensus, thus, we suggest that the MSZMP should modify its categorical statement written down yesterday.

**Sándor Keresztes:** Would the Third Side like to add anything to that?

**Nándor Bugár:** The Third Side met yesterday for a discussion and looked into the activities of working committee I/2. We can interpret and accept as part of today's agenda the topic of relations between the parties and workplaces and the question raised in connection with the deadline as follows:

The position of the Third Side is that it is unreasonable and impossible to apply an administrative method in taking apart the party cells. We fully agree that professional and productive activities should be separated from political activities at the workplace, but I would leave it to the parties themselves to work out in what way they would be connected to the workplaces in the future.

**György Fejti:** To begin with, the authorization of the working committee I/2., as prescribed in the agreement signed by all three sides, covers the following: legislative regulation of the functioning of political parties. So this is our common task to accomplish. Of course there is room for discussion of interpretations, and we do have to interpret the conditions of the activities. In this respect we have shown both at the last session of the medium-level committee and during the meetings of expert committees our willingness to create a separate workgroup aside working committee I/2., in order to work out the conditions of functioning in the transition period, and our willingness is still unfaltering. Later I would like to outline our proposal in detail concerning the tasks and authority of this workgroup.

Staying with the introduction, I am glad to see the work done so far and I am glad to realize that the bill as a whole has been discussed for the most part. There are still some open questions, but it has been constructive work. That is partly why yesterday's developments caught us unaware, namely the fact that one of the sides deemed it necessary to halt the work. I do not think I am authorized to make a value judgement of this step, but I do not regard it as a particularly friendly one.

I would like to outline our opinion with respect to the so-called property issue. If, in accordance with the general international practice which I am unclear about, the registration of any political party requires the filing of a statement of assets, then the MSZMP is more than willing to fulfil this obligation, naturally along with the rest of the organizations. But it would like to file it to the court and in a manner defined by the bill under preparation. Therefore I would like to suggest that the Committee gives further authorization today to working committee I/2., so that it would provide information to us about the internationally accepted general rules of asset registration and asset statement, and if this is so, I would like to emphasize that the MSZMP will provide the court having jurisdiction over registration with the necessary information. That was the first part of what I have to say. Now, the second part. In our view the present financial condition of the MSZMP and a possible re-distribution of its assets are not included in the agenda of any forum of this series of trilateral negotiations. For this to happen, an extremely flexible interpretation would be needed of the text I quoted word for word. In this respect our position is nothing new. To the extent I could read through the minutes of meetings of working committee I/2., I think our position is impossible to misunderstand. We do not consider any forum of the trilateral negotiations authorized to ask a statement of assets from us, or especially to make decisions concerning its re-distribution in any way. I would like to explain why we have taken this position.

[...]

**Iván Pető:** I would like to tell you what our impressions are, that is, being aware of the content of the minutes of the meetings of working committee I/2., what misunderstanding we could recognize. What has happened, obviously, is that in connection with the two topics we had considered at the beginning, which were relatively easy to get over and done with, a significant retreat occurred compared to the agreement achieved in the working committee.

As I have mentioned briefly at the beginning, the three sides have reached a consensus in significant issues and now it seems that in these significant issues both the MSZMP and the third negotiating side have taken a step back relative to the positions they had taken in the Committee and in the working committee. During the negotiations we have developed a position concerning public service, and working committee I/2. has reached the stage, as I said at the beginning, where it has identified item by item from which circles of public service it intends to exclude parties (the wording is slightly unsophisticated).

The same is true of parties at the workplace. I have quoted what we all agreed on in this respect, and compared to that, what we could hear from the MSZMP and the third side is obviously a step back – and this is not a subjective judgement. [...]

In the working committee it was raised of course that it is not a simple task to do away with traditions of forty years, but the delegation of the MSZMP did accept the observation of the Opposition Roundtable that it is not fair that during the free elections one of the political parties should have cells at the workplace while the rest of the parties would not. This is especially problematic, since concerning these two topics a very significant step back has occurred considering what has been said here.

The delegation had nothing against the formation of a subcommittee which would negotiate through experts, but it is not inconsequential for the Opposition Roundtable at all, on what basis the expert committee starts its activities.

For the Opposition Roundtable it is an unacceptable position that the HSPW is not obliged to account for its financial situation to the society. Our standpoint is that it is not worth examining whether the MSZMP acquired its assets and properties legally and we have not raised the issue of the source of their assets. Our standpoint has been – and still is – that just as forty years ago nationalization was carried out in the name of social justice, accounting for the assets now can be carried out in the same way, and it is a necessary condition of switching to party pluralism (and I repeat, in the name of social justice) that the rest of the political parties should be informed about and should share the assets controlled by the MSZMP – a significant part of which is state property, at least formally. [...]

The position of the Opposition Roundtable has been so far – and I think it has not changed – that when we talk about the provision of the necessary financial conditions of the functioning of parties, it is also necessary to deal with the assets of social institutions and of the MSZMP, since – as we have written down and voiced it all along – we can only imagine the provision of necessary conditions of the functioning of parties if it does not result in additional burdens for the society within the sphere of provision of assets and state grants. If state organs and the MSZMP do not take part in this, no extra budgetary burdens can be placed on the population – it is contradictory to our position we have held right from the beginning.

[...]

**György Fejti:** [...] I would like to emphasize again that we have no objections to stating our assets. We only object to sitting down and accounting for our financial position if it does not happen in a framework set by law, but rather as it is dictated by someone else. In respect of that we have political and legal objections. We do not see a close connection between the financial situation of the MSZMP and the financial conditions of the functioning of parties entering into politics now. I think that connecting the two is a politically inspired notion and so we can not really sympathize with it. The basic idea is acceptable though, I would like to repeat this. It is acceptable that the parties founded in the meantime or parties revived should not significantly burden the budget. Therefore, of our own will we have decided to return part of the properties used by us to the state for public purposes. It is in the competence of the state to decide how it would utilize them in accordance with public interests.

[...]



Document 53.  
Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable.  
Verbatim Record of Minutes (Excerpts).  
*August 3, 1989.*



**Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable**  
August 3, 1989  
(The text of a video and audio tape. Excerpts.)

[...]

**Péter Tölgyessy:** ... Then for the sake of those who may not have read it, the newspaper of MSZMP published a statement made by our press chief this week on Tuesday, August 1, from which I want to cite a few passages. Our press chief states that (*He reads out.*)

"In the discussions of the last couple of weeks it has been brought up several times that certain organizations are partly self-conceited, partly overly aggressive. My view on this is that this is characteristic of certain tone-setting representatives rather than of the parties themselves. To me it was quite disturbing in England too that the representatives of SZDSZ and the Democratic League of Independent Trade unions were at times overly self-confident and did not evaluate political and social development in Hungary in a precise way." Another excerpt: "I consider it to be extremely important that representatives of every party should say to the public exactly what our consensus was at the Opposition Roundtable. In case there is no consensus – like in the case of the introduction of the institution of the president of the republic – then no statement in opposition to it should be made."

I'm asking Csaba Varga now if he knows that the opposition Roundtable made such a decision, which said the participants made an agreement concerning the office of the president with six votes for and two abstentions? (*Csaba Varga nods.*) Then can you explain your statement? SZDSZ calls Csaba Varga to request rectification in *Népszabadság* as our press chief, to inform *Népszabadság* in the same way that the Opposition Roundtable has already made its decision on the issue of the office of the president, and also to apologize to those who have made this statement. For our press chief interpreted the decision of the opposition Roundtable in the wrong way, and not only did he interpret it inappropriately but he also attacked those who had done the right thing. This is my first question.

The other one is this. As far as I know MSZMP is our political opponent. It is absolutely wrong... I can accept if the representatives of the Hungarian People's Party have objections to certain partner organizations. I have to say though that SZDSZ has always taken care not to give voice to such an opinion. When for example the honored representative of the people's Party, Mr. [Imre] Kónya stated that he had some objections to SZDSZ the Alliance of Free Democrats did not start a dispute over it. But we feel we can no longer maintain this position, and we believe it is very inappropriate that the representative of the People's Party as the press chief, spokesman of the Opposition Roundtable raises objections to some statements of the representatives of the Opposition Roundtable in the newspaper of MSZMP.

In addition to this I also have to say that Csaba Varga stated at the press conference yesterday that we had reach an agreement with MSZMP on not giving any information to the public about our negotiations. I have to say here that we have never made such an agreement with MSZMP. We have made a clear decision with MSZMP that the contents of our negotiations can be made public without any restriction. The original agreement has not been interpreted accurately by Csaba Varga. So what was the original agreement that we signed on June 10? Well, it said that the contents of the negotiations could be made public with no restrictions whatsoever. The parties agreed to inform the public regularly

about the progress of the negotiations, possibly in the form of a joint communiqué. But if the talks break off, or there is no way to issue a joint communiqué, then the parties are entitled to give voice to their own separate opinion. So we have never given up on informing the public but we have requested the publication of a joint communiqué, and thus we were not entitled to issue a separate statement. The claim made by press chief Csaba Varga that we have given up on informing the public was simply inappropriate... [...]

As a summary of my argument, the Alliance of Free Democrats requests that Csaba Varga should be dismissed as press chief of the Opposition Roundtable, and that we should elect a new press representative. Thank you.

**László Bruszt:** I ask now Csaba Varga if he wishes to respond to it.

**Csaba Varga:** Certainly. I have to start by saying, frankly, that I'm more than happy that SZDSZ, the trade unions and Endre Hann have brought up this issue in such a sharp tone. I'm very glad, and I'll tell you in detail why.

I have to start by saying that the Hungarian People's Party believes there have been hot debates dormant in the Opposition Roundtable for about two months now. The conflicts are serious, which unfortunately have so far been swept under the rug, swallowed, denied even by the Hungarian People's Party. It has not requested the replacement of Tölgyessy in such and such a function (*Interruption: Spokesman.*) It has not claimed that SZDSZ distorts the opinions this or that way, and at times it says things that are not really accurate, or true. Unfortunately, for the sake of representing an overly uniform position we have so far not wished to unleash such a dispute. But now such disputes are inevitable, I believe the one that has just broken out – even if I has broken out because of me – is extremely useful. If we can not bring this issues to a head and clarify the matters, if SZDSZ can not dispel the very tough objections of the Hungarian People's Party, then the unity and integrity of the Opposition Roundtable will be threatened. So the dispute ... I will tell you what I have in mind, don't worry.

**Péter Tölgyessy:** I want to ask a question...

**László Kónya:** Don't interrupt him now! [...]

**László Bruszt:** Excuse me, Péter, let's hear Csaba Varga out. [...]

**Csaba Varga:** Well then, first I believe there have been two different assaults on me. Partly because of Endre Hann, and partly as a result of the objections made by SZDSZ. One thing here is a misunderstanding from the very first. I didn't say yesterday: we have agreed with MSZMP not to give information to the public; I said in television that what we had agreed on in writing – all the three parties together – was that we would not give information, any account on the work of the committees. That was all I said, nothing more. This is a misunderstanding. The rest comprises questions which have to be discussed indeed, we have to see who is right, me or some other people. I think we can separate three different problems here among those that have emerged.

One is a concrete questions, the dispute with János Kis at the press conference yesterday, and the letter written by Endre Hann – these are the concrete problems. The second question is what I criticized yesterday, which was not mentioned here among the arguments: the tone of voice characteristic of SZDSZ. Their aggressive tone, if you like, or

their sometimes intolerable arrogance. The third question is a wide range of problems; I have put it down in 13 points what problems we have with the Opposition Roundtable, and within it especially with SZDSZ and at times with FIDESZ.

I propose now that either I present all the arguments one by one, and we discuss each of them, or we open a separate item on the agenda for them, and we start reconsidering the Opposition Roundtable from the outset and try to work out an accurate system of regulations for the Opposition Roundtable in writing. Otherwise any further work will be jeopardized, create misunderstandings and lead to a break-up of the ORT into several parts – let me say again I think this is imminent danger, not in my opinion, I always speak on behalf of the Hungarian People's Party. So which route shall we take?

[...]

**László Kónya:** I want to ask why Iván Pető, speaking for SZDSZ, says in the same issue of *Népszabadság* on August 1, Tuesday, after having agreed on a moratorium on the issues brought up at the July 27 meeting, the following, this is what we want to know: (*He reads.*): “SZDSZ believes, and there is consensus on this in ORT”, etc.; “that in the present transitional situation the introduction of the office of the president is unacceptable”, etc. (*Unintelligible interruption.*) I go on. We have had much to swallow so far. When for instance Péter Tölgyessy said that except for SZDSZ there was no organization with a comprehensive political or economic program ... (*Péter Tölgyessy: It was not me but Bálint Magyar.*) Or it was Bálint Magyar, it's all the same. I apologize then, but you were speaking for SZDSZ. We did not say anything then, though we could have created a problem out of it which... and maybe we should have done so at that time. But we would like to make it clear that we hate, have always hated, all the manipulations made by MSZMP, the Hungarian Communist Party included, but I equally dislike the fact that the same methods are adopted by others now, in a different color and guise.

[...]

**Péter Tölgyessy:** I'm glad that the People's Party have felt so far that these things have been swept under the rug and now they have come to light. I'm less happy hearing Csaba Varga say that truth can be interpreted in several different ways concerning the resolutions. For in my judgment the resolutions of ORT can only be interpreted in one way. The way I see it is that Csaba Varga has spoken in flat opposition to the resolutions at numerous places. There may be mistakes of coordination here, but I have very different information on several of our decisions, and let me now refer to a few of them.

One of them, also mentioned in the statement, is the issue of the head of state. I then asked our chairman, József Antall what to do – for I'm a member of this committee, Committee 1 –, whether I could represent ORT's resolution the same way I had done before. The answer of the chairman in office then was that the resolution of ORT was clear, for the following two weeks, without further ado, I was to follow the valid resolution of ORT. So it was not I who deviated from the valid resolution of ORT but our press chief. To begin with. I would like to learn about the position of the other negotiating parties on this, for it might decide matters; and I also want to refer to the minutes of the meeting.

Two. Concerning the division of powers. The position of ORT is clear on this issue too. As suggested by György Szabad, we have removed three issues from the jurisdiction of the committees, of the sub-committees. Namely, the issue of the head of state, the question of the date of the parliamentary elections, and the election system. The rest of the

functions stay within the sub-committees, all the more because everybody who works in these sub-committees – and I'm lucky to be one who is a member of two of them – knows that if we had all the issues at the table of ORT, we will have to be sitting in session all the time, even during the night. For the number of issues to be resolved is so great. So Csaba Varga gives a wrong interpretation of the resolution of ORT in this matter a as well. It is clear that we have full authorization in the sub-committees to represent what we have agreed on in the course of the negotiations, except for these three issues.

Document 54.  
Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable.  
Verbatim Record of Minutes (Excerpts).  
*August 10, 1989.*





## Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable

August 10, 1989

(Verbatim text of the video-taped record. Excerpts.)

[...]

**József Torgyán:** ... So the point essentially is that there is consensus within the Opposition Roundtable that we want to have a Parliament with one chamber, comprising roughly 350 members, in accordance with the number we have at present. The Roundtable made a decision, after hot debates, several discussions and voting by name, that 50% of the votes will come from lists – I will specify what sort of a list – and 50% from individual electorates, with the provision that elections in the individual electorates will take place in two rounds. Now, concerning the lists, the Roundtable decided on national lists, because in our view the population in most of the counties is such that, if I remember well, in the case of fourteen counties we could have seven mandates, in the case of one county three or four mandates, which would be definitely not enough for a county list. In case we had decided – the Roundtable judged – we had decided to merge several counties and formed districts, then we would end up with something close to a national list anyway, so then the county lists would not make sense. That was, in short, the position of the Opposition Roundtable.

Now, as for the nominations, we have taken the view that in the case of individual candidates 500, in the case of a national party, 10.000 nominations need to be collected in order to run candidates in any part of the country, thus no other kind of nomination would have been necessary for the national party to run candidates in the elections. Now, MSZMP has withdrawn its proposals in the trilateral negotiations, and adopted the view that in the case of individual candidates 1.000 nominations should be required, and with respect to the definition of a national party their starting points was that a party can be regarded as a national party if it can run one hundred individual candidates in Budapest and in at least four counties. So in other words, they have raised the original number of ten thousand to one hundred thousand.

Let me inform the joint Roundtable about something that, I have to say frankly, is a new development, so much so that is new even to me, because I have just noticed it after studying the minutes of the six political committees, so let me tell you that there has been an unfortunate mistake committed by our negotiating delegation, to be fixed soon, namely, that when MSZMP submitted its motion, then Péter Tölgyessy made a statement – but I stress we had no consensus on this – concerning twenty individual candidates... Individual candidates in twenty regions are required for a party to be recognized as a national party, which is just the double of what we have agreed on here. Or he said forty, I'm, sorry. Forty. This is how we get the twenty thousand. Thus... (*István Domonkos: We have accepted twenty.*) Yes, twenty...

[...]

**Imre Boross:** I want to add the following to what my colleague Torgyán has said. He spelled out the agreement made by the Opposition Roundtable. This is the present position of the Opposition Roundtable, until there is some modification in its opinion. This was the agreement. It does not mean, however, it cannot mean that the Independent Smallholder's Party, or any other party has a separate opinion of its own on the issue of the general elections. We stick to the agreement at the moment, though maybe we will make a

different decision in the Roundtable. As long as there is a valid agreement, we will stick to it while talking to the other party. However, the Independent Smallholder's Party believes that it is a proportionate elections system which is most compatible with a democratic country, and that's what we would prefer, that is, the 1945 or 1947 system. This is the opinion of the Smallholder's Party. This is one thing.

The second thing. I think it is quite inconceivable – let me stress again, we stick with the agreement, but our opinion is that I consider it to be inconceivable – to have one hundred sixty people on a list. The poor voter couldn't even read that much. As I do not agree with a purely individual electorate system – because in that case there is a lot of room for manipulating people – I equally can not agree with the full exclusion of people, for a list of one hundred and sixty would result in a complete exclusion of people.

[...]

**György Szabad:** Well, naturally, there is always a right for modifying one's position. But if we are conducting political negotiations here, then we cannot do it – let me ask our chairman to allow me to finish what I have to say – under the constant threat of changing views, as if we had the sword of Damocles hanging over our heads all the time. (*In a raised tone.*) Because it tries our temper, our earnest endeavors, and puts the hope of success at risk. This is my first comment. The other comment goes beyond the question of election rights. We mutually bring discredit to ourselves chiefly by saying that though we have come to an agreement, but everybody should know that we have our own true, separate opinion. As long as we are conducting a political fight for coming to agree on a joint position, this unfortunately can only be regarded as a move to jeopardize the success of forming a consensus, making team work extremely difficult. I just want to indicate the methodological aspect of this problem.

[...]

**István Prepeliczay:** Nothing has been said publicly concerning this issue yet. (*Noise.*) Imre Mécs was going to ask something, excuse me, Imre Mécs has long been ...

**Imre Mécs:** I want to call the attention – in full agreement with György Szabad – to the fact that we have made the decision after hot, tantalizing debates, and we should not put it under constant pressure of uncertainty. So until we find a new momentum, a change in conditions in the course of the negotiations, we should not press this issue, but let's move on so that we can provide directions for the negotiations for tomorrow.

[...]

Document 55.  
Meeting of the Opposition Roundtable.  
Verbatim Record of Minutes (Excerpts).  
*August 17, 1989.*



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TELEGRAM

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NODIS

DEPARTMENT PASS TO MOSCOW EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR STOESSER

MOSCOW ALSO EYES ONLY FOR SONNENFELDT AND HARTMAN WITH THE  
SECRETARY'S PARTY

FROM SHERER

EO 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR  
SUBJ: CSCE: BASKET III PREAMBLE

REF: GENEVA 4125

1. I INVITED KOVALEV AND HIS BASKET I AND III CHIEFS TO LUNCH JULY 1 TO DISCUSS FURTHER STEPS WITH REGARD TO BASKET III PREAMBLE OPERATION. SOVIETS BEGAN CONVERSATION BY SUMMARIZING THE EFFORTS THEY HAVE MADE IN RECENT DAYS TO IMPROVE THE CONFERENCE ATMOSPHERE AND MAKE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THEIR OPERATION MORE POSSIBLE. THESE EFFORTS HAVE INCLUDED SOMEWHAT INCREASED FLEXIBILITY ON BASKET III TEXTS COVERING ACCESS TO PRINTED INFORMATION AND REUNIFICATION OF FAMILIES. SOVIETS WERE OBVIOUSLY FRUSTRATED BY SLOWNESS OF WESTERN GROUP, ESPECIALLY EC-NINE, TO RESPOND TO SOVIET OVERTURES, OR EVEN TO COME TO AGREEMENT AMONG THEMSELVES ON ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THESE TEXTS. SOVIETS ALSO SAID THEY HAD INDICATED IN SUBCOMMITTEE ON PRINCIPLES THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLE INFORMALLY, OUTSIDE FORMAL SUBCOMMITTEE MEETINGS, WHILE PACKAGE DEAL IS BEING WORKED OUT.

2. WE NOTED THAT, DESPITE OPPOSITION OF SOME WESTERN DELS, CERTAIN NEUTRALS WERE GOING AHEAD WITH PREPARATION OF A PROPOSED PACKAGE DEAL, AND HOPED TO CIRCULATE IT INFORMALLY SOME TIME THIS WEEK. WE SAID WE THOUGHT SUCH A PACKAGE, TO BE GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE, WOULD HAVE TO CONTAIN MORE THAN

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S E C R E T GENEVA 4165  
EO 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR  
SUBJ: CSCE: BASKET III PREAMBLE  
REF: GENEVA 4125

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By MKARA Date 7-9-03



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-2- SECRET GENEVA 4165 NODIS

SIMPLE SIMULTANEOUS REGISTRATION OF FINNISH LANGUAGE FOR PRINCIPLES AND BASKET III PREAMBLE, AND ASKED WHAT ELEMENTS OF SUCH A PACKAGE WERE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS. KOVALEV SAID SOVIETS THOUGHT A PACKAGE DEAL COULD CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS: (A) REGISTRATION OF FULL FINNISH DRAFT OF BASKET III PREAMBLE, WITH REFERENCE TO PRINCIPLES EXACTLY AS PER US-SOVIET UNDERSTANDING, AND OTHER PARAGRAPHS SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME AS THE FINNISH DRAFT; (B) SIMULTANEOUS REGISTRATION OF FINNISH LANGUAGE ON "LEGISLATIVE AND REFUTATORY SYSTEMS" IN SOVEREIGN EQUALITY PRINCIPLE, EXACTLY AS PER US-SOVIET UNDERSTANDING; (C) REGISTRATION OF TEXTS ON ACCESS TO PRINTED INFORMATION AND FAMILY REUNIFICATION, NOT AS PART OF FORMAL PACKAGE BUT TO IMPROVE CONFERENCE ATMOSPHERE; (D) GENERAL UNDERTAKING NOT TO RE-INTRODUCE "LAWS AND CUSTOMS" TYPE LANGUAGE IN SO-CALLED MINI-PREAMBLES PRECEDING EACH SECTION OF BASKET III DOCUMENT; AND, (E) INFORMAL DISCUSSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLE WHILE PACKAGE DEAL WAS BEING WORKED OUT.

3. WE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOVIETS WERE MAKING EFFORTS TO IMPROVE ATMOSPHERE AND AGREED THAT DIFFERENCES WITHIN WESTERN GROUP MADE IT DIFFICULT TO MOVE QUICKLY TO REGISTRATION OF BASKET III TEXTS. WE SUGGESTED THAT THE SITUATION WAS FURTHER COMPLICATED BY A TIME ELEMENT, SINCE MANY WESTERN DELEGATIONS TAKE SITUATION THAT, UNLESS THERE IS SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE THIS WEEK, THE CONFERENCE SHOULD RECESS FOR THE SUMMER ON JULY 12. BECAUSE OF THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF BASKETS I AND III ON THE PREAMBLE ISSUE, A PACKAGE DEAL SEEMED TO PRESENT THE ONLY POSSIBILITY FOR PROGRESS THIS WEEK, AND THE CHANCES OF EARLY ACCEPTANCE OF THIS DEAL LOOKED QUITE DIM. AT THE VERY MENTION OF A SUMMER RECESS A DARK LOOK PASSED OVER KOVALEV'S BROW AND HE REITERATED THAT HE HAD FIRM INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTINUE STAGE II WORK WITHOUT INTERRUPTION UNTIL IT HAS BEEN COMPLETED. IF ANY DELEGATION SUGGESTED A RECESS, THE SOVIETS WOULD MAKE A POLITICAL ISSUE OUT OF IT AND THE COUNTRY CONCERNED WOULD HAVE TO BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY.

4. I NOTED THAT A SUMMER RECESS OF SOME KIND SEEMED ONLY REALISTIC OPTION IN CIRCUMSTANCES AND ASKED WHAT SOVIET REACTION WOULD BE TO A PACKAGE DEAL WHICH WENT BEYOND ELEMENTS SOVIETS SAY THEY CAN ACCEPT. KOVALEV DID NOT

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**TELEGRAM**

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REPLY DIRECTLY, BUT INDICATED THIS WOULD EPEND ON PRECISE NATURE OF TEXTS AND OTHER CONDITIONS PROPOSED AS PART OF THE PACKAGE. I ASSUME THIS MEANS THERE IS SOME FLEXIBILITY IN THE SOVIET POSITION OUTLINED IN PARA 2 ABOVE, ALTHOUGH I DO NOT BELIEVE HE HAS ANY INSTRUCTIONS TO THIS EFFECT.

5. KOVALEV ALLEGED THAT HE HAS RECEIVED NO REPORT ABOUT THE MOSCOW CSCE DISCUSSIONS SO FAR.  
ABRAMS

NOTE: NOT PASSED MOSCOW BY OC/T.

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E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR  
SUBJECT: CSCE: NEUTRAL PACKAGE DEAL

REF: GENEVA 4251; GENEVA 4213

FOR SONNENFELDT AND HARTMAN

1. SHERER HAS REPORTED (REFTELS) THAT NEUTRALS HAVE DEVELOPED A PACKAGE DEAL INCORPORATING BASKET 3 PREAMBLE COMPROMISE, TOGETHER WITH SOME ADDITIONAL TRIMMINGS, THAT HAS GAINED PROMISING SUPPORT FROM SOVIETS AND, APPARENTLY, WITH SOME MODIFICATION, WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIES, THOUGH SOME ARE NON-COMMITTAL AT THE MOMENT. HE HAS ASKED FOR DEPARTMENT'S AUTHORIZATION TO URGE THE ALLIES TO ACCEPT THE PACKAGE. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES (A) AN ANALYSIS OF THE PACKAGE DEAL, AND (B) A DRAFT MESSAGE FROM YOU TO SHERER AUTHORIZING HIM TO SUPPORT THE PACKAGE WITH THE ALLIES.

2. THE PACKAGE DEAL. IN LATE JUNE, THE NEUTRALS APPARENTLY RECOGNIZED THAT, TO GAIN ACCEPTANCE, THE BASKET 3 PREAMBLE COMPROMISE CENTAILING A REFERENCE TO "NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY SYSTEMS" IN THE NON-INTERVENTION OR SOVEREIGNTY PARAGRAPHS OF THE PRINCIPLES DECLARATION AND A REFERENCE IN THE BASKET 3 PREAMBLE TO CARRYING OUT AGREEMENTS ON CONTACTS AND

EXCHANGES IN FULL RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLES OUTLINED IN THE PRINCIPLES DOCUMENT) WOULD NEED TO BE IMBEDDED IN A BROADER FRAMEWORK WHICH TOOK INTO ACCOUNT ALLIED AND NEUTRAL DESIDERATA WITH REGARD TO (A) A STRONG STATEMENT IN THE PRINCIPLES DECLARATION ON THE FULFILLMENT IN GOOD FAITH OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, WHICH WOULD OULL SOMEWHAT THE CUTTING EDGE OF THE REFERENCE TO NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY SYSTEMS;

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(B) DROPPING THE REFERENCE TO RESPECT FOR "POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL FOUNDATIONS," WHICH THE FRG FOUND PARTICULARLY OFFENSIVE; (C) MOVING THE REFERENCE TO THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE ITS OWN "LAWS AND REGULATIONS" FROM THE NON-INTERVENTION PARAGRAPH TO THAT ON SOVEREIGN EQUALITY, A PLACEMENT PREFERRED BY THE ALLIES, AND A FORMULATION APPARENTLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS; (D) RETAINING THE STATEMENT IN THE BASKET 3 PREAMBLE THAT "COOPERATION SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN FULL RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS AMONG PARTICIPATING STATES, AS SET FORTH IN THE RELEVANT DOCUMENT" (I.E., THE PRINCIPLES DECLARATION); (E) ELIMINATING "LAWS AND REGULATIONS" TYPE LANGUAGE FROM THE SO-CALLED "MINI-PREAMBLES" TO THE AGREEMENTS REACHED UNDER EACH OF THE FOUR BASKET 3 SUB-TOPICS (HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION, INFORMATION, CULTURAL EXCHANGES AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES), AS DEMANDED BY THE ALLIES AND NEUTRALS. THE ALLIES ADDITIONALLY BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT A GENERAL UNDERTAKING NOT TO TRY TO REINTRODUCE RESTRICTIVE LANGUAGE IN BASKET 3 TEXTS WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO AGREEMENT ON THE BLAND INTRODUCTORY PASSAGES PUT FORTH IN THE NEUTRAL TEXT (GENEVA 4213).

IN SUM, THE PACKAGE DEAL WOULD REMOVE ENTIRELY FROM BASKET 3 ANY SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO "NATIONAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS," A BASIC OBJECTIVE OF THE ALLIES. IT IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT IS IN LINE WITH OUR UNDERSTANDING WITH REGARD TO THE BASKET 3 PREAMBLE COMPROMISE, BUT ALSO WOULD ENABLE CSCE TO MOVE AHEAD ON THE BASIS OF THE COMPROMISE WHICH THE SOVIETS COURTEOUSLY BELIEVE WILL PROTECT THEM IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF FINAL POSITIONS ON SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS BEING NEGOTIATED IN BASKET 3. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY PROBABLY FEEL THEY COULD ACCEPT MORE TEETH IN THE BASKET 3 AGREEMENTS WITH THE PADDING PROVIDED BY THE COMPROMISE.

THE ALLIES DO NOT WANT TO BE RUSHED, IT APPEARS. THEIR LATEST DISCUSSION ON THE PACKAGE DEAL (GENEVA 4251) WAS INCONCLUSIVE, THOUGH THERE WAS A GENERAL TENDENCY TO ENCOURAGE THE NEUTRAL EFFORTS, TO IMPROVE THE PACKAGE AND NOT RPT NOT TO REJECT IT.

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FOR THEIR PART, THE SOVIETS WERE CAUTIOUS WITH THE NEUTRALS, BUT TOLD SHERER PRIVATELY THEY MAY PRETEND TO BE RELUCTANT AT FIRST BUT MAY EVENTUALLY BE ABLE TO ACCEPT THE PACKAGE AS IT STANDS.

3. IN LIGHT OF FOREGOING, WE AGREE WITH SHERER THAT HE SHOULD SUPPORT THE PACKAGE WITH THE ALLIES, AND RECOMMEND YOU SEND HIM THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE:

BEGIN TEXT. FOR SHERER FROM SONNENFELDT AND HARTMAN.

CONCUR IN YOUR RECOMMENDATION IN PARA 6 OF GENEVA 4251 THAT YOU ENCOURAGE NATO CAUCUS TO ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE NEUTRAL PACKAGE DEAL AS BASIS FOR OVERCOMING IMPASSE ON BASKET 3 PREAMBLE. END TEXT.

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EUR:JGLOWENSTEIN  
C:VLEHOVICH

S/S: W. LUERS

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 4358

EXDIS

FOR SONNENFELDT AND HARTMAN FROM SHERER

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: CSCE: MINIMUM ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL  
CONCLUSION

REF: MADRID 4339

1. SUMMARY. REFTEL GAVE INSTRUCTIONS FOR INITIAL NAC DISCUSSION OF CSCE RESULTS. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST MADE DURING OUR CONVERSATION IN MUNICH, THIS TELEGRAM SUMMARIZES THE VIEWS OF US DEL CSCE ON WHAT MIGHT CONSTITUTE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL CSCE CONCLUSION, AND MAKES RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING OF FURTHER NATO CONSULTATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT. END SUMMARY.

2. TRANSMITTED BELOW IS OUR SUMMARY OF MINIMAL ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO CSCE. WE HAVE SEPARATED U.S. AND ALLIED DESIDERATA, SINCE THEY ARE NOT ALWAYS THE SAME AND IN SOME CASES CONFLICT. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT EACH OF THE POINTS WE HAVE DEFINED DEPENDS ON THE PHRASEOLOGY WHICH CAN BE AGREED UPON BY ALL CSCE PARTICIPANTS, AND THE GENERAL CONTEXT IN WHICH IT WILL APPEAR. FOR THIS REASON WE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT NATO CONSULTATIONS BE DIRECTED TOWARD AN AGREED DEFINITION OF ESSENTIALS, RATHER THAN AGREED NATO TEXTS. WE BELIEVE

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THAT AN ATTEMPT TO ARRIVE AT AGREED TEXTS AWAY FROM THE  
NEGOTIATING SITUATION COULD HINDER RATHER THAN PROMOTE  
PROGRESS, AND WE WOULD PREFER TO DEVELOP TEXTS AS NECES-  
SARY IN GENEVA.

3. BASKET I - PRINCIPLES.

(DOCUMENTS) SOVIET 1/3, YUGOSLAV 1/28, FRENCH 4/12) KEY  
ALLIES, FRG, FRANCE)

(A) FOR THE U.S. AND NATO ALLIES:

(1) PROTECTION OF LEGAL POSITIONS--ON FOUR POWER  
RIGHTS IN BERLIN AND GERMANY, THE BALTIC STATES AND OUT-  
STANDING TERRITORIAL CLAIMS.

(2) NO LEGAL OBLIGATIONS--A DOCUMENT WHICH IS A  
POLITICAL STATEMENT OF INTENT AND DOES NOT SET FORTH LEGAL  
OBLIGATIONS.

(3) HUMANITARIAN INTERESTS--A SATISFACTORY PRINCIPLE  
ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND AVOIDANCE OF ANY LANGUAGE WHICH NEGATES  
BASKET III AGREEMENTS.

(B) FOR NATO ALLIES:

(1) NO SUPERIOR STATUS--AVOIDANCE OF A SUPERIOR  
STATUS FOR THE PRINCIPLES DECLARATION.

(C) FOR FRANCE:

(1) ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE LANGUAGE--FORMULATIONS  
WHICH CLEARLY REFUTE THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE.

(D) FOR THE FRG:

(1) PEACEFUL CHANGE--SATISFACTORY FORMULATIONS ON  
PEACEFUL CHANGES OF FRONTIERS AND THE INTERRELATIONSHIP  
OF THE PRINCIPLES.

(2) SELF-DETERMINATION--A SATISFACTORY PRINCIPLE  
ON SELF-DETERMINATION.

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(A) FOR U.S. :

(2) MEDITERRANEAN--NO EXTENSION OF CBM'S TO THE MEDITERRANEAN.

(B) FOR U.S. AND NATO ALLIES:

(1) DISARMAMENT--NO COMMITMENTS ON DISARMAMENT.

(2) MBFR--NO LINKAGE TO MBFR.

(C) FOR NATO ALLIES:

(1) THREE MEANINGFUL CBM'S--PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJORITY MILITARY MANEUVERS; EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT MANEUVERS; EXCHANGES OF MILITARY PERSONNEL.

(2) MOVEMENTS--A TEXT OF CONCLUSION OF CSCE STUDY OF QUESTION OF NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS, WITHOUT REFERRAL TO FOLLOW-UP.

(3) PARAMETERS FOR MANEUVERS--

**A. DEFINITION - LAND FORCES OR COMBINED MANEUVERS.**

B. THRESHOLD - EITHER 20,000 - 25,000 MEN OR TWO DIVISIONS OR MORE.

C. AREA - "ALL OF EUROPE" WITH EXCEPTIONS AMOUNTING TO 500 KILOMETERS FROM WESTERN SOVIET FRONTIER.

D. TIME FOR NOTIFICATION - 30 DAYS.

E. CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION - AGREEMENT ALMOST REACHED

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(GENEVA 3646).

F. NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES - NOTIFICATION TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES.

5. BASKET II - ECONOMICS.  
(KEY ALLIES: UK, FRG, FRANCE)

(A) FOR U.S.:

(1) MINIMAL AND BALANCED TREATMENT OF MFN-- (DOCUMENTS D/9 AND D/13) MINIMUM FOCUS OF U.S. ASPECTS (TARIFFS); EQUAL APPLICABILITY TO EC-NINE QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS AND OBSTACLES TO TRADE OF STATE TRADING SYSTEMS.

(B) FOR U.S. AND NATO ALLIES:

(1) FREER ACCESS-- (DOCUMENTS D/10 AND D/11) COMMITMENT TO IMPROVED CONDITIONS FOR BUSINESS, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CONTACTS; BETTER ACCESS TO INFORMATION ON COMMERCIAL AND COOPERATION OPPORTUNITIES.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 GENEVA 4358

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FOR SONNENFELDT AND HARTMAN FROM SHERER

5. BASKET III - HUMANITARIAN.  
(KEY ALLIES: ALL)

(A) FOR U.S. AND NATO ALLIES:

(1) REUNIFICATION OF FAMILIES--(TEXT GENEVA 4110)  
COMMITMENT TO ALLOW FAMILY REUNIFICATION IN THE COUNTRY  
OF THEIR CHOICE WITHOUT UNDUE OR EXCESSIVE COSTS,  
LOSS OF PROPERTY, REPERCUSSIONS AGAINST APPLICANTS OR THEIR  
RELATIVES.

(2) MARRIAGE BETWEEN NATIONALS OF DIFFERENT STATES--  
(DOCUMENT I/22) COMMITMENT TO GIVE PERMITS FOR MARRIAGE,  
EXIT AND ENTRY FOR MARRIAGE AND SUBSEQUENT DOMICILE, ALL  
WITHOUT UNDULY BURDENSOME COSTS.

(3) RIGHT TO TRAVEL--(DOCUMENTS I/23 AND I/123 A GOOD STATEMENT ON THE GENERAL FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT BETWEEN COUNTRIES.

(4) WORKING CONDITIONS FOR JOURNALISTS--(NEW WESTERN TEXT UNDER PREPARATION BASED ON DOCUMENTS J/17 AND J/10) COMMITMENT FOR PROMPT ACTION ON ENTRY AND REENTRY VISAS, RESIDENCE AND INTERNAL TRAVEL PERMITS; PROTECTION AGAINST UNJUSTIFIED EXPULSION; AND THE RIGHT TO TRANSMIT PROMPTLY THE RESULTS OF THEIR PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITY.

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(B) FOR NATO ALLIES:

(1) ACCESS TO PRINTED INFORMATION--(TEXT GENEVA 4110)  
A COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE INCREASED OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE  
PURCHASE OF FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY  
OF SUBSCRIBING.

(C) FOR FRANCE AND EC-91

(1) READING ROOMS/LIBRARIES--(TEXT GENEVA 4110)  
SOME FAVORABLE MENTION OF THIS TOPIC.

7. BASKET IV--FOLLOW-UP BY SEPTTEL).

8. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS--IN ADDITION TO THE ESSENTIAL  
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF OUR ALLIES, THE NEUTRALS HAVE CER-  
TAIN REQUIREMENTS IN CSCE, WHICH FOR PRACTICAL AND POLITICAL  
REASONS SHOULD NOT BE IGNORED. THESE INCLUDE GREATER MILI-  
TARY CONTENT, A MORE SUBSTANTIAL MEDITERRANEAN DECLARATION  
AND A REGULARIZED FORM OF POLITICAL FOLLOW-UP. IN ADDITION  
CERTAIN COUNTRIES HAVE SPECIAL POSITIONS WITH WHICH WE WILL  
HAVE TO DEAL, SUCH AS THE SWISS PROPOSAL FOR A SYSTEM FOR  
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES.

9. CONCLUSIONS--WE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT NATO CONSULTATIONS  
BE AIMED A FORMULATING AN AGREED DEFINITION OF ESSENTIALS  
SIMILAR TO THE ONE OUTLINED ABOVE, AFTER WHICH TEXTS CAN  
BE DEVELOPED AS NECESSARY IN GENEVA. IN OUR VIEW SUCH AN  
APPROACH WOULD BE THE MOST USEFUL ONE FROM A NEGOTIATING  
POINT OF VIEW, AND WOULD LEAVE SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY FOR  
REALISTIC USE IN CSCE. BREVITY AND RELATIVE FACILITY OF  
COMPILING SUCH A DOCUMENT MAY ALSO MAKE THIS EXERCISE MORE  
ACCEPTABLE TO OUR ALLIES.  
DALE

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# TELEGRAM

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# Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 GENEVA 04444 121548Z

DIFFICULTIES BUT THIS IS THE FIRST TIME OUR SUSPICIONS HAVE  
BEEN CONFIRMED BY A COMMUNIST SOURCE, DALE

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 04496 161100Z

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ACTION 88-30

INFO: OCT-01 190-00 /031 W

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FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7000  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

SECRET GENEVA 4496

EXDIS

FOR SONNENFELDT AND HARTMAN FROM SHERER

MOSCOW FOR AMBASSADOR STOESSEL

F.O. 115521 GDS  
TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: CSCE: PACKAGE DEAL FOR RESOLUTION OF  
BASKET III PREAMBLE PROBLEM

REF: STATE 152040

1. WE MET WITH KOVALEV AND HIS TEAM ON JULY 15, AT HIS REQUEST, TO DISCUSS NEUTRAL PACKAGE DEAL FOR RESOLUTION OF BASKET III PREAMBLE PROBLEM. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPTEL WE INFORMED SOVIETS WE HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO ENCOURAGE EARLY TABLING AND ACCEPTANCE OF PACKAGE, AND TO WORK WITH SOVIETS TO ENSURE ITS SUCCESS. KOVALEV SAID HE HAD SIMILAR INSTRUCTIONS.

2. KOVALEV THEN EXPLAINED THAT THE ONE ELEMENT IN NEUTRAL PACKAGE DEAL WHICH SOVIETS FOUND DIFFICULT WAS PARAGRAPH 10 LANGUAGE FOR THE TENTH PRINCIPLE (SEE GENEVA 4405), WHICH WAS UNACCEPTABLE IN PRESENT FORM. KOVALEV NOTED THAT UNDER SOVIET SYSTEM ALL INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS WERE CARRIED OUT, BUT ONLY THOSE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS WHICH ARE LEGALLY ADOPTED THROUGH SOVIET LEGISLATIVE PROCESS NECESSARILY HAVE AN EFFECT

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SITUATION ROOM

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ON INTERNAL NATIONAL LEGISLATION. SOVIETS THEREFORE CONSIDERED IT ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO MAKE TWO CHANGES IN PARA 1B: (1) CHANGE "COMPLY ... WITH" TO "PAY DUE REGARD TO", AND (2) INSERT "LEGALLY ADOPTED" BEFORE "INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS". SOVIETS SAID THEY HAD NOT WORKED OUT AN ENGLISH-LANGUAGE TEXT, BUT THIS WAS THE SENSE OF THEIR FIRM INSTRUCTIONS.

3. KOVALEV INDICATED THAT, ASIDE FROM THIS POINT, SOVIETS COULD ACCEPT THE PACKAGE DEAL AS IT STANDS. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THEY HAD MADE A MAJOR CONCESSION TO THE WEST IN ADMITTING THE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING A PARAGRAPH 1B, BUT SAID THIS SHOULD BE CAREFULLY BALANCED AGAINST LANGUAGE OF PARA 1A AND NOT NEGATE IT. HE TOLD US SOVIETS HAD ASKED NEUTRALS TO POSTPONE PRESENTATION OF PACKAGE DEAL TO INFORMAL MEETING OF DELEGATION HEADS UNTIL THIS POINT COULD BE WORKED OUT.

4. WE TOLD KOVALEV THAT WE COULD LIVE WITHOUT A PARAGRAPH 1B, BUT THAT THIS IDEA OF BALANCING PARA 1A LANGUAGE ON "LAWS AND REGULATIONS" HAD NOW BEEN WIDELY ACCEPTED, AND WE THOUGHT PARA 1B WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCEPTED IN SOME FORM. WE POINTED OUT THAT LANGUAGE CHANGES PROPOSED BY SOVIETS RAISED FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF MEANING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO EAST AND WEST. IN CONTRAST TO SOVIET SYSTEM, IN MANY WESTERN COUNTRIES INTERNATIONAL LAW IS AUTOMATICALLY ACCEPTED AS LAW OF THE LAND. ONLY A SMALL PROPORTION OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ARE ENACTED INTO NATIONAL LAW. THUS, TO SPEAK ONLY OF "LEGALLY ADOPTED" INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE TOO NARROW TO ACCORD WITH WESTERN VIEW. "PAY DUE REGARD" ALSO PRESENTS PROBLEMS, SINCE IT IMPLIES THAT A STATE WILL PAY ATTENTION TO INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ONLY WHEN IT HAS AN INTEREST IN DOING SO.

5. WE INDICATED TO SOVIETS THAT WE WOULD BE DISCUSSING THE PACKAGE DEAL AT A NATO DELEGATION HEADS, CAUCUS JULY 16, AND WOULD HAVE A BETTER READING OF ALLIED VIEWS AT THAT TIME. WE REITERATED THAT THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE CONFERENCE IS MOST IMPORTANT FOR WESTERN AC-

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 GENEVA 04496 161100Z

CEPTANCE OF PACKAGE DEAL, AND SUGGESTED THAT SOVIETS SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO REGISTER THIRD BASKET TEXTS ON ACCESS TO PRINTED INFORMATION AND FAMILY REUNIFICATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO IMPROVE THIS ATMOSPHERE. SOVIETS WENT INTO A DETAILED EXPLANATION OF THEIR POSITIONS ON REMAINING DRAFTING DIFFERENCES IN THESE PAPERS, BUT ADDED NOTHING NEW TO OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION, AND WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT DUBININ IS NOT USING FLEXIBILITY AVAILABLE TO HIM HERE (SEE GENEVA 4444). WE POINTED OUT THAT, DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES, IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT FOR SUCCESS OF PACKAGE DEAL AND TO CREATE POSITIVE WESTERN VIEW OF CSCE THAT THERE BE SOME PROGRESS BEFORE THE SUMMER RECESS. WE NOTED FIVE AREAS IN WHICH THIS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE: ACCESS TO PRINTED INFORMATION, FAMILY REUNIFICATION, CBM ON EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS, PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, AND NEUTRAL PACKAGE DEAL. WITHOUT SOME PROGRESS IN THESE AREAS NEGATIVE WESTERN VIEW OF THE CONFERENCE WOULD BE REINFORCED OVER THE SUMMER, WHICH WOULD FURTHER HAMPER NEGOTIATIONS IN THE AUTUMN. WE AGREED TO REMAIN IN TOUCH AS PACKAGE DEAL DEVELOPS.

6. SUBSEQUENT TO OUR MEETING WITH SOVIETS, WE LEARNED THAT NEUTRALS PLAN TO GO AHEAD WITH PRESENTATION OF PACKAGE DEAL AT INFORMAL MEETING OF DELEGATION HEADS AFTERNOON OF JULY 16 DESPITE SOVIET OBJECTIONS TO PARA 1B. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFTTEL, WE PLAN TO USE NATO CAUCUS MORNING OF JULY 16 TO SUPPORT EARLY ACCEPTANCE. WE BELIEVE THAT CSCE AS A WHOLE HAS NOW TACITLY ACCEPTED CONCEPT OF A PACKAGE DEAL TO RESOLVE BASKET III PREAMBLE PROBLEM, AND EVEN IF PRESENT PACKAGE IS NOT ACCEPTED PRIOR TO THE BREAK, IT WILL EVENTUALLY BE AGREED IN SOME FORM.  
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Date: 7/11/02

BOX 11 - POL 3-1 CSCE

7425801



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ACTION MEMORANDUM

JUL 19 1974

F.L. CSCE  
Outline

S/S

SECRET/EXDIS/SENSITIVE

To: C - Mr. Sonnenfeldt

From: EUR - Arthur A. Hartman

*Hal- brass has done a  
1st class job on this  
and I recommend we  
get these messages  
out fast. There  
no issue for the  
Secretary.*

CSCE: Allied Study of Minimum Desired Results

We face, as you are aware, an uphill effort in achieving Allied agreement to pursue a study of minimum CSCE results that would justify a summit. The Nine paper presented in NAC is hardly more than a checklist of issues before CSCE, and the Nine apparently have no intention now of moving toward (a) narrowing the contentious issues in Basket 3 by excluding some Western desiderata now on the table in Geneva; or (b) defining more precisely their desiderata on various topics. The Nine position doubtless stems from recognition that they would be in domestic trouble, if the press and opposition parties got wind that the Allies were backing-off on Basket 3 issues which have not really been discussed yet with the Soviets. Nor do they feel under any time pressure to define satisfactory results before the autumn after the East-West debate resumes. In fact, the more we emphasize time pressures, the more their suspicions are aroused.

The issue then is how to nudge the Allies along toward a more precise and realistic definition of objectives in Basket 3 and toward an agreed fallback position on CBM's, without pressing them so hard we would risk a new US-European confrontation, but in a way that this autumn we would be in a position to show the Soviets that we have made a strong effort to bring CSCE to a conclusion.

We need not expend much effort on other CSCE issues, for the outline of satisfactory results on principles is in hand, Basket 2 issues are out of the woods, and conference follow-up will not be ripe for debate until the first three agenda items are largely cleared away.

But on CBM's, we will need to keep pressing the Allies, and especially the EC members, to come to an explicit understanding on the fallback positions that the British and

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Germans have signaled to us bilaterally. We informed the NAC on July 10, and instructed Rumsfeld to reiterate on July 17 and July 19, what we think the fallback should be:

-- On maneuvers, thirty days prior notification for reinforced division and above (about 20,000 men) taking place on the land mass of Europe, but in the European USSR, including only a broad band of territory on its Western border.

-- Drop prior notification of troop movements.

We will also need to press the Allies to have a serious discussion on basket 3 over the next weeks, and to get the results of the discussion recorded in a document that is more than a checklist of issues.

The Secretary should raise this problem with Genscher, and we will provide a paper and talking points for their forthcoming meeting. We may also want to move bilaterally with the British and French, depending on progress in NAC and at Geneva, where the study will be prepared for NAC review.

Beyond this, we need to give Bud Sherer detailed guidance on the basket 3 issues for his use in priming the study pump at Geneva.

To refresh your memory, here is a list of the 12 basket 3 issues which the EC Nine believe should be the subject of CSCE texts:

A. Human Contacts

1. Family Visits (Registered Text)
2. Family Reunification
3. Marriages
4. Right to Travel

B. Information

5. Written Information
6. Radio/TV
7. Working Conditions for Journalists

C. Culture

8. Access to Literary Works, etc.
9. Exchanges
10. Contacts among Artists

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D. Education

11. Contacts between Educators and Scientists  
(Registered Text)
12. Access to Educational and Scientific Institutions  
(Registered Text)

Three of these texts (family visits; contacts between educators and scientists; and access to educational and scientific institutions -- at Tab E) have already been registered in Geneva and are not likely to be seriously controversial. A fourth document (written information) has been under active discussion in Geneva for some time and may soon be registered; the current version of this paper on access to information, complementing an already registered text on dissemination of information, is at Tab F. As for the sensitive family reunification issue, the NATO caucus at Geneva produced a text on this in June and presented it informally to the Soviets (Tab G). Given the intense FRG interest in it, we believe it is too hot to handle in the NATO caucus and we should not propose tampering with it. Eventually, we might ask the Secretary to discuss the matter bilaterally with Genscher, if the Soviets find the text too much to swallow.

On the marriage issue, the Norwegian draft (Tab H) should not be too hard for the Soviets to digest, except for the passage that would require issuance of exit permits for the children of married couples (the defector problem). We believe we should leave it to the Soviets to eliminate children.

Our delegation in Geneva believes the two remaining topics under the cultural subheading (exchanges and contacts) are not key issues and should not provoke serious controversy.

The EC Nine have not listed two texts tabled by the Vatican, one on religious contacts and the other on access to religious information, although several of their delegations have expressed general support for them. Our judgment is that the Vatican, which has greatly strengthened its relations with Eastern European countries in recent years, is astute enough not to insist on the impossible and that the Soviets will make a few symbolic concessions. In any event, I do not think we should put ourselves in the middle of this issue.

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That leaves four texts that we believe the Allies should now discuss in detail with a view toward cutting out some non-negotiable fat. We have developed guidance to Sherer on each in the draft telegram at the tabs shown, and have also included the corresponding Western text(s), as well as spread sheets comparing the specific substantive aspects of the texts in play.

- Working Conditions for Journalists (Tab A)
- Right to Travel (Tab B)
- Broadcast and Filmed Information (Tab C)
- Access to Literary Works (Tab D)

Overall guidance to Sherer on the approach he should take to the review of Basket 3 issues is included in the draft telegram at Tab A. In summary, our proposed revisions would blunt the cutting edge of all four texts, especially those on journalists, radio broadcasts and access to literary works.

The Allies will not be pleased with our suggested changes to texts they have sponsored, and some of their disgruntlement is certain to leak to the media. But if we do not begin to move on these texts now, we will not have put the Allies on early notice that we are serious about searching for middle ground, and we will not be in a position to argue with the Soviets that we tried to meet some of their concerns. We come closest in these telegrams to having it both ways, that is neither antagonizing the Soviets or seeming to sell-out the Allies. If we push any harder, however, we may find ourselves isolated.

Recommendation:

That you approve the telegrams at Tabs A - D.

Attachments:

- Tab A - Draft telegram on journalists.
- Tab B - Draft telegram on right to travel.
- Tab C - Draft telegram on radio/TV.
- Tab D - Draft telegram on access to literary works.

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BOX 11 - POL 3-1 CSCE

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- Tab E - Texts already registered in Geneva (family visits; contacts between educators and scientists; and access to educational and scientific institutions).
- Tab F - Current working text (written information).
- Tab G - NATO caucus text on family reunification.
- Tab H - Norwegian draft text on marriages.

SECRET

Drafted: EUR/RPM:EJStreator/ACFloyd:gp  
x21626:7/19/74  
Concur: EUR - Mr. Lowenstein *JBV/*

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# TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 04697 230957Z

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AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 4897

EXDIS

F.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR  
SURJ: CSCE: THE CONFERENCE ONE YEAR LATER

SUMMARY: CSCE: BEGAN IN HELSINKI ONE YEAR AGO, AFTER LENGTHY PREPARATORY TALKS, AND WILL ADJOURN FOR FIVE WEEKS ON JULY 26. DESPITE DELAYS RESULTING FROM SOVIET OBSTINACY, AND SOME MAJOR UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS, THE CONFERENCE STILL OFFERS POSSIBILITIES FOR MEANINGFUL RESULTS AND A SUMMIT LEVEL FINALE. WE SHOULD NOW WORK CLOSELY WITH OUR ALLIES TO BRING ABOUT A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. END SUMMARY.

1. STATE OF WORK--CSCE HAS BEEN LARGELY STALEMATED SINCE THE EASTER BREAK BECAUSE THE SOVIETS, DESPITE PRE-EASTER ASSURANCES, HAVE BEEN UNWILLING TO ALLOW ANY MEANINGFUL PROGRESS ON BASKET III (HUMANITARIAN) ISSUES. THEIR FAILURE TO DO THIS IS CLEARLY THE REASON WHY CSCW HAS NOT BEEN CONCLUDED THIS SUMMER, AS VIRTUALLY ALL PARTICIPANTS THOUGHT IT WOULD BE. THE CAUSES OF THIS SOVIET OBSTINACY ARE UNCLEAR, BUT CAN PROBABLY BE ATTRIBUTED TO A COMBINATION OF FACTORS: INTERNAL OPPOSITION TO BREZHEV'S DETENTE POLICY; UNCERTAINTY OVER THE POLICY DIRECTION OF MAJOR NEW WESTERN GOVERNMENTS; AND UNDER-ESTIMATION OF WESTERN

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PAGE 02 GENEVA 04097 230957Z

INTEREST IN BASKET III. THE ASSURANCES MENTIONED ABOVE WERE MADE WITH GREAT SERIOUSNESS TO THE CHIEFS OF SEVERAL MAJOR WESTERN DELEGATIONS IN A SOVIET EFFORT TO GET A "CRYSTAL CLEAR" PRINCIPLE OF INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS. THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIETS TO LIVE UP TO THEIR WORD HAS REINFORCED THE SKEPTICISM AND STUBBORNNESS OF MANY WESTERN AND NEUTRAL COUNTRIES. CSCE HAS THUS FAILED TO MEET ITS EXPECTED SCHEDULE AND THE SOVIETS MUST BEAR THE MAJOR PART OF THE BLAME FOR THE DELAY.

2. UNRESOLVED ISSUES--THE OUTLINES OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS ON MOST CONFERENCE ISSUES HAVE BEEN DISCERNIBLE FOR SOME TIME, BUT SEVERAL MAJOR QUESTION MARKS REMAIN. PRIMARY AMONG THESE ARE:

A) FREER MOVEMENT--THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE SOVIETS WILL MEET WESTERN DEMANDS FOR FREER MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE, IDEAS AND INFORMATION IN BASKETS II (ECONOMIC) AND III (HUMANITARIAN) AREAS;

(B) MILITARY MOVEMENTS--HOW TO CLOSE THE CSCE "STUDY" OF THE QUESTION OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS WITHOUT PASSING THIS MANDATE ON TO CSCE FOLLOW-UP;

C) MFN--HOW TO PHRASE AN ALLUSION TO MFN WHICH WILL NOT SINGLE OUT THE US IN AN UNACCEPTABLE WAY, AND WILL MAKE BALANCED REFERENCE TO OBSTACLES TO TRADE OF STATE TRADING SYSTEMS AND EUROPEAN QUOTE RESTRICTIONS;

D) THE MEDITERRANEAN--HOW TO SATISFY AMBITIONS OF MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES FOR A FAR-REACHING DECLARATION WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING ESSENTIAL US AND NATO INTERESTS;

E) FOLLOW-UP--HOW TO COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE EC-NINE PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERIM PERIOD AND THE EASTERN/NEUTRAL DESIRE FOR A COMMITMENT NOW TO PERIODIC GENERAL FOLLOW-UP MEETINGS;

F) THIRD STAGE--HOW TO AGREE ON LEVEL AND TIMING OF THE THIRD STAGE.

3. US POLICY--RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS MENTIONED ABOVE, AND THE MANY SECONDARY ISSUES IN CSCE, CALLS FOR CLOSE AND ACTIVE WORK WITH OUR ALLIES AS STAGE II NEARS ITS END. THE PROGRAM OF CONSULTATION ON ESSENTIAL

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PAGE 04 GENEVA 04697 230957Z

FIRST EUROPE-WIDE MILITARY AGREEMENT IN RECENT HISTORY, AND SOME OF THE FIRST MULTILATERAL STEPS TOWARD NORMALIZATION OF CONTACTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. WHAT THE RESULTS OF CSCE WILL MEAN FOR THE FUTURE REMAINS TO BE SEEN, BUT THE RECENT APPRAISAL OF AN EASTERN DELEGATE HERE MAY WELL PROVE TO BE ACCURATE--THAT THE FINAL CSCE DOCUMENTS WILL SERVE TO "DEFINE THE RULES OF THE GAME OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE". ABRAMS

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
and Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, August 15, 1974  
9:00 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Shouldn't we get it out of the way?

Kissinger: The problem is getting a good statement. The thrust should  
now be different. You would be comfortable with next Thursday?

The President: It is up to you.

Kissinger: On the Saudi military -- I don't think you should leave any  
department that leverage. Just have Brent get the availability. You don't  
have to do anything now. Right now it just creates problems. Now it  
creates the impression of bad faith. It is not illegal but it would look  
like sharp practice. We can wait for the Saudi team. We can just give  
Egypt delivery times at my levels.

I think it is better to hold it all informally to avoid any possibility of a  
charge of sharp practice. If this is okay, we will do it this way and have  
Schlesinger and Clements over when the times comes.

The President: Does that break faith with Fahmy?

Kissinger: He just needs to know when we can deliver. The Saudis probably  
won't be here until early October. Then you get Defense in and tell them.  
It is one thing to sell something which then they wish to transfer; it is another  
to sell with the intent to transfer.

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger  
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National Security Adviser. Memorandum of Conversations.  
National Security Adviser. Ford, Kissinger.  
Box 5. August 15, 1974.

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By let NARA, Date 3/31/2000

it eases the problem but doesn't make a strategic difference. The Dulles idea of talking tough can't be sustained in practice. We talk softer than our actions. The Left is strong in Europe; we paralyze them by talking soft. That is what you are up against with McClellan.

The President: If I were the Soviets, I would use the Congress.

Kissinger: These numbers games on SALT miss the point. The firm approach means we must sustain a 10 to 15 percent budget increase, be prepared for crises like Berlin, and so forth.

I wanted to use this peculiar year -- with liberals going conservative -- to get a ceiling on strategic forces beyond which we wouldn't go anyway.

We couldn't sustain an arms race.

The President: Without a direct threat.

Kissinger: The Liberals will soon say we have too much. If we need more, it is in the tactical area.

I am pleased by Abrams' report on three more divisions.

The President: He is a great man. He made a real effort.

Kissinger: You have a good team. I don't know Holloway.

The President: Nor L. But I don't think he is another Zumwalt.

Scowcroft: No. Deliberately not so.

Kissinger: Zumwalt is an opportunist.

On CSCE -- we never wanted it but we went along with the Europeans. It includes some basic principles, something on human contacts, no change of frontiers, and what they call "confidence-building measures."

The Soviet Union wants it as a substitute for a peace treaty. They more or less have that. The big hang-up is on freedom of movement. It is meaningless -- it is just a grandstand play to the left. We are going along with it.



What you will face is whether to conclude it at the summit level or foreign minister level. My guess is the Europeans will decide on a summit. We have positioned with the Soviet Union, so we look like we are ahead of the Europeans.

The President: What is the timetable?

Kissinger: Maybe next March. The Soviet Union wants it this year, but that is not possible. If you meet Brezhnev in December, they won't want it before that.

There are no decisions to make now.

When you meet Gromyko the end of September you should give him the impression we are trying to be helpful.

There is no implementation in the treaty.

On MBFR -- we made an absurd proposal which couldn't fly. Now we are modifying it. The Soviets should cut more than us, but not so much. Then we should add the nuclear package -- 32 Pershings, 54 F-4, 1,000 nuclear warheads. It is strategically insignificant, but it does have the consequence of establishing some ceiling on our nuclear forces.

But we don't have targets for the nucs anyway.

Also we have to take care of FBS. To do it in SALT causes alliance problems. If we could get the Soviets to do it in MBFR, it would satisfy our allies and give the Soviet Union a facesaving way out.

Your coming into office will give a big boost. They will be looking for a success, especially if you make a meeting in December conditional.

The President: I have told Brent MBFR is more popular here than SALT.

Kissinger: At the VFW, you might give a tough Defense-oriented speech. It would be good for the Soviets.

The President: I have been doing that, and with no apologies.

Kissinger: We can probably get a 15-20,000 cut in MBFR. Maybe in December. We will have to manage with the allies so it doesn't look like bilateralism.





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 BAAARA Date 7/16/03

SECRET NODIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: September 20, 1974,  
 3:00-4:15 p.m.

PLACE: Soviet Embassy,  
 Washington

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: Soviets:

H.E. Andrey Gromyko, Soviet Minister of  
 Foreign Affairs

H.E. Anatoliy Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador  
 The Honorable Georgiy Markovich Korniyenko,  
 Chief, USA Division, Soviet Ministry of  
 Foreign Affairs

Mr. Viktor Mikhaylovich Sukhodrev, Counselor  
 and Interpreter, Soviet Ministry of  
 Foreign Affairs

U.S.:

The Secretary  
 Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor  
 Walter Stoessel, American Ambassador to USSR  
 Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for  
 European Affairs

SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION:

SECRETARY: We certainly expressed all the nuances of CSCE  
 to the President but I think he was a little  
 confused by Basket III.

SECRET NODIS

EUR:AAHartman/gw  
 9/21/74 ext 29626

NT  
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 F.L H.S

RG 59 ENTRY 5339  
 BOX 8 SOVIET UNION  
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KG 59 ENTRY 5339  
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AUG-SEPT 1974

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GROMYKO: Yes, I'd like to cut the bottom out of that Basket.

SECRETARY: Have you heard the news that Mao has been appointed either Commander-in-Chief or Defense Minister? That seems strange to me after looking around for three years that he would make himself Defense Minister. By the way, is he going to be in Moscow when I'm supposed to be there? Is that the reason for the conflict?

GROMYKO: No.

SECRETARY: It certainly is unusual that he should take such a post.

GROMYKO: Does General Haig have four stars? Do any of your Generals have five stars?

SECRETARY: Omar Bradley is the only one still alive.

GROMYKO: I remember awarding a medal to General Marshall.

SECRETARY: I have a lot of applications from Colonels now who want to be Generals. You can see what being a Deputy to me does for your military career. Have you ever seen General

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Bokassa? He wears medals on his back he has so many of them.

GROMYKO: Yes, I have seen him.

SECRETARY: Have you ever met General Amin? When I talked to your Syrian allies they told me when General Amin was in Damascus he insisted that his dreams be broadcast on the radio each morning. He said that that was what they always did for him at home.

GROMYKO: I like Kuanda.

SECRETARY: Seriously, on CSCE, can we discuss that a little further? I was a little confused by something you said when we were talking to the President. You said that the Germans mentioned something about voluntary observers.

GROMYKO: Yes, they said that the observers would be invited by the country in which the maneuver is taking place. Then there is the question of troop movements. Can't we agree that that matter can be postponed for later discussion and study?

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SECRETARY: We're relaxed about that problem. We know what you're doing anyway. We think that the size of the force which should be notified for maneuvers should be a reinforced division of, say, 40,000.

HARTMAN: I think you mean 20,000. A division is about 15,000 and a reinforced division would be roughly 20,000.

GROMYKO: That is an artificial number. It would be impossible. We would have so many clerical problems.

SECRETARY: Do you move a division that often?

GROMYKO: What importance does this have to Luxembourg? This is like using a microscope.

SECRETARY: How can we proceed in CSCE?

GROMYKO: We have to agree on the question of maneuvers and troop <sup>movements</sup> numbers. On the latter we should put it off for further study. Maybe we should examine this question of voluntary observers. This would be a moral obligation and would be much more flexible.

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SECRETARY: Are you saying that a moral obligation is heavier than a legal one or are you saying if it's moral you don't have to carry it out?

GROMYKO: As a rule it will be carried out.

SECRETARY: Just when you maneuver with nuclear weapons and we want to observe, you will not want us to.

GROMYKO: As a rule it will be carried out. I have a feeling that the Basket III problem is behind us.

SECRETARY: Why?

GROMYKO: Because we agreed on the Finnish compromise which makes it easier. Then we have the question of the relations <sup>among</sup> between the principles. We think that the formulation should be "the principles should be equally strictly observed."

HARTMAN: We have been talking about the equal validity of the principles.

GROMYKO: Equal validity is nonsense. How can you say that the question of frontier inviolability and giving visas are equally important. Some of the principles are fundamental.

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SECRETARY: All of the principles are equal but you are saying equally strictly observed. The thing that concerns us is that they be observed. I would be willing to examine your formulation. What did Genscher say?

GROMYKO: Genscher's attitude was positive.

SECRETARY: I am not intelligent enough to understand all these matters. To me it sounds all right. I will take it up with Callaghan and Genscher.

GROMYKO: On the peaceful change formula you have now tabled a new text which seems to imply that the most important purpose of international law is to change frontiers. That is the current U.S. draft.

SECRETARY: Where did you get that this was a U.S. draft? What did Genscher say?

GROMYKO: He said that it was an American proposal.

SECRETARY: You can see that Hartman has a lot to learn about diplomacy. Historically, let me say that we pointed out that it would be difficult to change the language we had originally agreed.

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This change is a German proposal. They are the ones who have the main concern. On maneuvers we will look at the problem again and I will talk to you on Tuesday.

On the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, you made the observation which implied to the President that if we include air <sup>and nuclear</sup> forces you would be willing to include a tank army.

Is that correct?

GROMYKO: Other countries must be prepared to reduce their forces.

SECRETARY: In the first stage?

GROMYKO: If not in the first stage, then we should define the second stage and specify what will happen.

SECRETARY: You mean that we should decide what is the end result of the second stage? For example, we could agree that the first stage has a certain numerical reduction or are we just talking about the principle of the second stage?

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GROMYKO: No, we would have to have numbers *and precise times.*

SECRETARY: Then we are talking about negotiating  
both the first and the second stage.

GROMYKO: If numbers are not mentioned, then when  
will we reach agreement on this? My idea  
is to agree to reduce X and then X should  
be multiplied by 10.

SECRETARY: In practice you would then be negotiating  
both stages but there would be a difference  
of timing.

GROMYKO: What we would be doing is leaving some  
details for later decision, for example,  
the kinds of forces and armaments, *and the*  
*time of fulfillment.*

SECRETARY: What you are saying is that following the  
reduction of this first stage, there would  
be a second stage. The only difference is  
timing.

GROMYKO: It will be a question of fulfillment and  
the degree of specificity.

SECRETARY: If you are worried about escaping obligations,  
you want to specify what happens in the second  
stage.

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GROMYKO: Yes. Otherwise we are talking generalities. There should be a general obligation to reduce by all countries.

SECRETARY: I don't believe we are going to finish this year. We haven't even begun to look at the second stage.

GROMYKO: It would be helpful in getting through the CSCE to be able to have progress in Vienna. Politically, it would help us. Why is that difficult?

SECRETARY: Are you prepared to accept a common ceiling at the end of the second stage?

GROMYKO: At the end? That would depend on the ceiling. I do not reject it.

SECRETARY: If you can accept that we can discuss this in greater detail, we are prepared to include tactical air if that would help.

GROMYKO: What kind of ceiling are you talking about? Is it possible to avoid a ceiling? You could have American and Soviet cuts and then other countries could reduce numbers as well. After that, it would be much easier to discuss a ceiling, ~~that is not projected~~.

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SECRETARY: I am talking about a common ceiling.

KORNIYENKO: What the Secretary means by a common ceiling  
are equal forces on both sides.

GROMYKO: No, that is not what I mean.

SECRETARY: But then you are offering me nothing.  
Obviously if you agree to a cut there is  
a ceiling but you cannot argue in the  
strategic field that we have more warheads  
than you do and therefore must cut greater  
numbers, while at the same time you argue  
that you cannot cut your forces more when  
you have greater numbers. We are prepared  
to be realistic and specific in the  
categories where we have an advantage. If  
we are ahead, we make a greater cut. For  
example, in air forces and nuclear forces  
we would cut more in such a program that  
would not be excluded. This is not a proposal  
but I am just citing an example.

GROMYKO: The general idea of an equal ceiling I do  
not like.

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SECRETARY: But as I said that is no concession. You are just talking about an agreed ceiling.

GROMYKO: Yes, an agreed ceiling.

SECRETARY: It is not clear to me how we can consider both stages if at the end of the second stage we don't reach agreement on a common-equal-ceiling.

GROMYKO: That is impossible. Maybe after five stages. Why, after the second stage?

SECRETARY: We could have a first stage only or we can have a first stage plus agreement to a second stage whose ultimate objective is a common ceiling.

GROMYKO: At the end of the second stage? How long would that take?

SECRETARY: We are open-minded.

GROMYKO: I do not see the possibility. This would be against our security interests because we will reduce more than you.

SECRETARY: This is not just a common ceiling of U.S. and Soviet forces. This would be the whole NATO area versus the Warsaw Pact.

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GROMYKO: You would have all of the advantages.  
You tell us we have more tanks.

SECRETARY: We do not insist on an equal ceiling in  
all parts including equipment. What we  
are talking about are equal numbers of  
personnel. Maybe you have a tank for  
every three men and maybe we have a tank  
for every ten men. It is up to each side.

GROMYKO: I do not think this will facilitate an  
agreement.

SECRETARY: Maybe we shouldn't agree on a second stage  
but agree on a first stage and no principles  
and say that the negotiation of the second  
stage would begin in three to six months.

GROMYKO: What if it doesn't come about?

SONNENFELDT: We have no interest in stopping because  
we are interested in moving toward a common  
ceiling.

GROMYKO: With a common ceiling we go down more.

SECRETARY: How can you maintain the principle of equality  
in the strategic area and not here. I remember

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your General Secretary telling us that we have 10,000 warheads and you only have 3,000 warheads. He insisted that we move toward a common level.

GROMYKO: We like equality but we mean equal security.

SECRETARY: In the strategic field you tell us that we are ahead in a ratio of three to one and that we should move to an equal level.

GROMYKO: No, we wish to take in many factors. What we must do is to define the correlation of the numbers. We want equal security, *not* equal numbers of personnel.

SECRETARY: We will have to look at all this again. Now let us turn to SALT. Over the long term, the basic point I was trying to make in my statement yesterday is that it would be impossible to maintain a realistic detente while increasing armaments. The arguments which we would have to use to increase our defense position are inconsistent with detente. People would begin asking why we should trade with you just in order to help build your military strength.

GROMYKO: We will have to take a fresh look and then come to some conclusions. The West wants

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an equal ceiling especially in the beginning but we don't reject this concept for later. We will continue to examine it. We attach importance to this problem. Do not be pessimistic.

SECRETARY: (Reading from a ticker): My colleagues at the State Department have just released the information that I have flown an average of 500 miles a day since I became Secretary of State. They say I have flown 200,000 miles since I became Secretary.

GROMYKO: I am sure it will become a million.

SECRETARY: Let me tell you about the status of my talks with Senator Jackson. We would send a letter which would say that our understanding of the Soviet position is that there would be no restriction on applications, no harrassment and no serious restriction on national security grounds. Dobrynin told me that these are only one percent of the cases.

DOBRYNIN: That's right. I gave you the figure.

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SECRETARY: You said one to one and a half percent. The Senators also want something about ~~that harassment~~ <sup>rule</sup> there will be no loss of apartments, jobs or other punitive action. What we plan to do is as follows: 1. We will write a letter to the Senators embodying our understanding of the Soviet position; 2. They will answer that letter; 3. I will write that I understand what they have said. Then they will agree to a waiver <sup>provision</sup> ~~position~~ in the Jackson Amendment. The real dispute is internal and does not concern <sup>us</sup> ~~us~~ Jackson wants to have the Congress vote each year to extend the waiver. We want <sup>the</sup> ~~to~~ waiver to be extended subject to a veto by Congress. Now what do we need? You can say that the Americans can publish whatever they like. But you cannot say that what we have published is a lie.

DOBRYNIN: Are you going to put figures in?

SECRETARY: Jackson may say in his letter that he has a yardstick in his mind of 60, <sup>60</sup> ~~percent~~ percent.

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GROMYKO: If he mentions a figure, that's just an estimate, his guess.

SECRETARY: He will say that he has a figure in mind and play that into a guideline. We will not mention a figure and we will not be bound by his figure but it will be in his letter.

DOBRYNIN: But he will say after a year, when the figures are not as high as his<sup>is</sup>, that the agreement has not been fulfilled. Let's be realistic.

*Secretary: 71*

If we can show that our relations are improving and he cannot positively show restrictions or harrassments, he can't very well insist on a figure.

GROMYKO: If a figure is mentioned by Jackson or others that is his responsibility. The Soviets have no responsibility. There is no harrassment. There has been no harrassment and there will not be any harrassment. Some people may say that there is. Person X will write or make a statement that he lost his job but maybe he just doesn't like to work. He prefers to

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make propaganda and politics. But the charge will be made that he has lost his job because he wanted to emigrate. But the reality is different. We cannot take responsibility for such acts. Certain actions might be called harrassments but maybe they are criminal acts but these will always be limited cases and we should not be held responsible. It is not harrassment.

SECRETARY:

I think that is clear but it is important that we understand certain things. First, there is no question that Jackson will try to make trouble but if our relations are good--if we make progress on SALT, CSCE and MBFR--then he won't be able to make any arguments in favor of stopping the waiver. Jackson will be looking for examples. A few of them won't hurt us but if there are 500 we will be in trouble. Second, something must happen to the numbers. If the total drops significantly or if there is evidence that people want to come and can't

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come then we will have difficulties.  
Third, we could also drop the whole idea.  
The Senators want to put in a special  
provision that denial of emigration for  
security reasons can only go on for so  
many years, three or four. They want to  
put that in their letter.

DOBRYNIN: How long is it before you let your classified  
scientists leave the country?

SECRETARY: There are various categories but you give  
us the number of years.

GROMYKO: I saw Jackson at the White House.

SECRETARY: I saw that you spoke to him. Think what  
you could accept on the national security  
point.

GROMYKO: We have to look at concrete cases. This  
could come up in a hundred forms.

SECRETARY: Maybe you could agree to review the security  
status of applicants from time to time.

GROMYKO: That might be possible. Some people have  
already received permission. Some are  
connected with production or other occupations

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
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in restricted fields. But time passes.  
Five to ten years and they have lost their  
skill. Who is to judge when the security  
problem disappears? We are the ones who  
will judge that. But it could be reviewed.  
Three years ago it might have been impossible  
for a person to leave but today it is possible.  
That may happen. In practice it takes place.

SECRETARY: We will leave this up to them. I think we  
have carried this as far as we can. We will  
have a longer talk Tuesday night.

SECRET NODIS





SECRET/NODIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

*HS  
WS  
# Romania*

DATE: Oct. 5, 1974,  
12:30 pm, Secretary's  
Office

SUBJECT: The Secretary's Meeting with the Romanian  
Foreign Minister: Cyprus, CSCE, and the  
Middle East

PARTICIPANTS: Romania

George Macovescu, Foreign Minister  
Corneliu Bogdan, Romanian Ambassador to the US  
Ion Datcu, Romanian Ambassador to the UN  
Nicolae Mateescu, Aide to the Foreign Minister (Note Taker)

United States

The Secretary  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor  
Dennis A. Clift, NSC  
Nicholas G. Andrews, Director, EUR/EE (Note Taker)

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Record Group 59. Records of the Department of State.  
Office of the Counselor, 1955-77. Box 3. HS Chron-Official  
Aug.-Oct. 1974  
*August-October*

Macovescu: I know how busy your time is.

Kissinger: Would you like a cup of coffee?


Macovescu: Thank you. I do not want to take too much time.

Kissinger: We will see each other in Bucharest.

Macovescu: That's right. We see you in a month's time.

Kissinger: Do I get a room with a swimming pool? That's what  
really impressed me.

EUR/EE:NGAndrews/lva  
(Drafting Office and Officer)



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Kissinger: I can tell you why. We are not uninterested in a European security conference even if we see it as nothing spectacular. I can understand your interest in it. You want to be able to avoid great power pressures on your country. If I were the Romanian Foreign Minister, I would pursue the same policies.

Macovescu: At the same time, the United States should be interested in this matter. There is movement in Europe at this time, things are happening. The United States is absent.

Kissinger: We are present.

Macovescu: We would like to see you more active. We would like to see more specific movement than is going on now. Two years ago I was surprised -- you were not here then as chief of this department -- here in the Department they didn't know exactly the problems of security.

Kissinger: Do they know now?

Sonnenfeldt: The State Department was more favorable to European security than the National Security Council staff. Your Ambassador can get out his dispatches.

Bogdan: It is more complex than that.

Kissinger: There are two separate problems. One is European security. The other is what contribution the conference will make to European security.


Macovescu: Yes, but taking into consideration the role the United States is playing in the world, I would like to see a bigger role.

Kissinger: We are not against it. But what can we concretely do to foster...

Macovescu: You must pay attention to what is going on.

Kissinger: I am paying attention although the effort is taxing my limited brain power to follow everything that is going on in Geneva. I learn a position and then our European friends produce variations on it and I have to learn it all over again. We are actively involved and we are prepared to do our part. But we are not prepared to jeopardize the interests of our allies to get the conference concluded. Our allies, whose bureaucracy constantly grows, come up with complicated problems that no one can understand. We are not willing to spend much capital with our allies to force them to a conclusion.

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Sonnenfeldt: The Soviets meanwhile have cooled down on follow-on steps.

Bogdan: That is not a reason for the United States to oppose follow-on steps.

Sonnenfeldt: Because they think it would interfere with their interests.

Macovescu: Because it would carry on a continuous process. What about the Middle East?

Kissinger: What do you think about my art? I'll get back to the Middle East in a moment. Don't you think that's social realism?

Macovescu: I have some art in my house which is similar.

Kissinger: In the Middle East, it is a very complicated situation. There are complexities and we have to decide what must be the next steps. We must work at finding a formula and procedures for the next stage. There must be several stages. There has to be some progress on the West Bank question. The West Bank and the Palestinian problem must be negotiated between Jordan and Israel without prejudice to the final position. It is necessary to bring up the Palestinian problem now to avoid the creation of a greater problem later. Therefore, we are in favor of talks concerning the West Bank between Jordan and Israel. Then we can face the next problem. We have finally persuaded Israel to put forward proposals for the next stage with Jordan. We have no position on the PLO! To insist now on negotiations with the Palestinians will lead to no negotiations at all. We are not in principle against negotiations, but we can not negotiate with the Palestinians. It would give us domestic problems. When I come to Bucharest we can talk more about this in a small circle.

Macovescu: Yes.

Kissinger: Since I read our ambassadors' cables in the New York Times.

Macovescu: I don't read your cables.

Kissinger: I would like to read your ambassador's cables.

Bogdan: Perhaps we could arrange an exchange -- your cables for our cables.

Kissinger: It is a very sensitive problem. Perhaps in Bucharest we can talk about it.

Macovescu: We had Syrian President Asad in Bucharest. What do you think about him?

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IN 10 ENTRY F 5433  
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By: SP NARA Date: 5/18/03

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Ove Guldberg, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Denmark  
Otto Borch, Political Director, Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs  
Other Danish Officials

CLASSIFIED BY FRANK WISNER  
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO-  
YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON  
DECEMBER 31, -----

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and  
Assistant to the President for National Security  
Affairs  
Amb. Philip K. Crowe, U.S. Ambassador to Denmark  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Dept. of State  
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for  
European Affairs  
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PMR*

DATE AND TIME:

Wednesday, October 23, 1974  
1:00 - 1:45 p.m.

PLACE:

VIP Lounge  
Kastrup Airport  
Copenhagen, Denmark

SUBJECTS:

Energy Cooperation; Middle East; European  
Security Conference; US-Soviet Relations

Guldberg: I'm glad we had this chance to talk.

Kissinger: You're very nice to come out.

Guldberg: We want to hear your views.

We are interested in the political situation in Europe.

Kissinger: My staff prepared me to discuss the SAS negotiations in  
New York. I hope it doesn't come up. [Laughter]

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Energy Cooperation

Guldborg: Our main problem in Denmark is that we feel in a very vulnerable position. The economic problem is serious, and the only way to solve it is on a European basis. Economic cooperation among the Nine is nearly smashed by this.

Kissinger: By the agricultural problem?

Guldborg: Yes, but without monetary cooperation, economic cooperation is sunk. Just oil prices -- for petrol, for fertilizers.

Kissinger: There is a worldwide problem.

Guldborg: Just for oil, the added expense is \$200 per capita per year.

[Mr. Lord comes in and is introduced.]

That's the size of the problem. So my main question is: Can the United States and Europe of the Nine find some way of recreating and rebuilding European economic cooperation? I can see some solutions, but not without close cooperation.

Kissinger: Let me say: We support the European unity. Last year the problems were created by unnecessary attempts by some to introduce theology. Now, everything we wanted to do are things the Europeans now insist we do -- to discuss military and economic issues, to discuss issues outside Europe. The Middle East gives no choice. But the question is, how can we help?

Guldborg: One subject is how to find a way for the financing of the deficits.

Kissinger: That's right. That's the principal question.

Guldborg: We'll have to live with deficits.

Kissinger: We have three choices: (1) to do it by inflation, which will wreck the political structure of countries; (2) to let the Arabs or the producers do it, and third is to set up some cooperative mechanism for handling it with Europe and Japan. The first is self-evident; the second will lead to a major political shift in the whole Western world. So the only real choice is to create a structure for recycling and for meeting the deficits. We are in favor of the German loan to Italy, but it doesn't help. It's money down a rat hole. We need an automatic mechanism, not stop-gap measures.

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We have no problem with European unity; in fact it is easier for us if Europe were unified.

We need some organization in the next stage of energy cooperation.

You have to do it within yourself [within Europe], and then within all the industrial nations.

Guldborg: Yes.

Kissinger: If we don't, we'll see in ten years a complete shift in the balance in the world.

Guldborg: In question of timing, there is a difference between the views of Europeans on how much time we have. Some Europeans see it too long. We're talking much with the Germans about this.

Kissinger: We think it's an urgent problem. Theoretically, we would like to have the structures negotiated by January 1, or at least by March 1. We won't turn it into a debate between Europe and the United States. We'll make some proposals in the next 6-8 weeks.

Borch: What will they be?

Kissinger: Basically, there should be a mechanism within the industrial nations for recycling and for the deficits; then we would work with OPEC on the developing countries. But the industrial countries must solve their own problem. If we ask OPEC to do a Marshall Plan for Europe, it will lead to a massive shift of political realities. Moreover, the OPEC countries have no concept of what to do.

Guldborg: The least developed are in the most difficult situation. How do they react?

Kissinger: I don't think we have a problem with the Third World if we know what we're doing.

Guldborg: I said something like that at the United Nations.

Kissinger: Many of the least developed congratulated me privately -- for example, India -- but they won't say it publicly.

Guldborg: A little country like Denmark can say it more easily.

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Kissinger: But you also have a more conciliatory manner. [Laughter]

You didn't get in trouble at the World Energy Conference.

Guldborg: That was an unnecessary squabble.

Kissinger: Yes. Actually the result turned out quite good.

Guldborg: There is still the problem of cooperation among the Nine and the U.S. and Japan.

Kissinger: It should be solved practically, not by theology.

Middle East

Guldborg: On the PLO question at the UN, you think there will be no more?

Kissinger: As you know, we made no particular attempt to influence votes. But there is this reality: The Israelis will negotiate only with Hussein; some Arabs want only the PLO. These are the realities. Throughout the whole tragedy of the Middle East, there is the choice they have to make between epic poetry.... No Israeli Government could survive if it negotiated with the PLO. So we think the solution is for the Israelis to negotiate with Hussein and the Arabs to settle the Palestinian issue among themselves. If the Arabs vote for the PLO, there will be a stalemate. That's fine with us too. But to make propositions that have no chance of being implemented...

Guldborg: It won't improve the atmosphere in the Middle East to allow the PLO to speak?

Kissinger: Well.... We voted against, but we're not significantly worse off than you. There were no demonstrations, no protests against us.

Borch: Why did the Egyptians come out so strongly for the PLO at the UN?

Kissinger: Maybe because they're considering going separately and want to prove their pan-Arab credibility.

Guldborg: Maybe to improve the atmosphere.

Kissinger: But you always have to make contact with reality. We don't think it will do any good, but each Arab has his own problems. For example, the Lebanese regard the Palestinians only slightly better than the Israelis, and are motivated only by the desire to get them out of Lebanon. [Laughter]

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Guldborg: The Saudis too.Kissinger: Yes.European Security ConferenceGuldborg: On the European Security Conference, the former Government invested a good deal in the third...Borch: Basket.Kissinger: It's having its first reading now.Guldborg: When you go to Russia, we're interested in knowing what the American position will be.Kissinger: Our position has been constant. We think there should be a Western position. Some say it has to be a minimum position. No, that's not our view. We're not pushing for a minimum position.

Incidentally, I'm doing a sociological study. I've asked every foreign minister I've met: Have you read any of the papers? [Laughter]

Guldborg: No. [Laughter]Kissinger: Me neither. Only Gromyko claims he has.

Now there are 13 national projects. If the Soviets make a concession to one, the national pride of all the others will require that the Soviets make concessions to all the others. Therefore if we want to get this negotiation concluded, we have to get a unified position. I'm not saying it has to be minimal. Only if we have that will we have a realistic negotiation.

We won't die unfulfilled if it doesn't end in one month or other. So we're not pushing it. But sooner or later we'll need a realistic position.

Guldborg: Will the next phase end on a high level?Kissinger: It won't be the U.S. that will agree to a high level first. I'm certain some of your partners in the Nine will agree to a high level before we do.SECRET/NODIS

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Guldberg: The Nordic countries.

Kissinger: Germany. We're not pressing for a high level. We're not going beyond the generally accepted position on this trip on the Summit. We can't anyway. To be frank -- we don't want to be in the position where we were at the beginning, where some of our friends put us into the position of being the obstacle. We can sell our own presence. We won't press it. This will not be an outcome of the meeting [in Moscow].

Guldberg: This is the first time we have had a good talk.

Kissinger: You're nice to come out. I recognize at the World Energy Conference you attempted to play a mediating role.

Guldberg: I tried to be soft.

Kissinger: I think Jobert -- whom I really personally like -- was under very firm instructions.

Guldberg: He was under firm instructions. We had to disagree among the Nine. I don't like the way it was handled.

Kissinger: I offered him three or four compromises which would have been really French victories, but he was not permitted.

#### US-Soviet Relations

Guldberg: As a general question, are you expecting anything from your meetings in Moscow on the Middle East?

Kissinger: On the Middle East, nothing will come out of Moscow. There is no question they will discuss the European Security Conference. A good part of it will be on the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks. You know the Russians have suggested a brief meeting with President Ford and Brezhnev. That will be discussed. A little on MBFR, but nothing will come out. A little on bilateral matters and trade.

Borch: Is there any leverage in offering concessions in CSCE to get progress in MBFR?

Kissinger: My personal preference would favor that. Some of our European allies feel differently. Some of our allies are accusing us simultancously of speeding up CSCE to get a summit and slowing it

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down by linking it to MBFR. [Laughter] As Soviets see the domestic situation in the West, they can see that cuts will be imposed by Parliaments anyway.

Borch: On human contacts, have the Soviets reacted to U.S. pressure on emigration?

Kissinger: No, you're seeing great press campaigns. We never explained our position in the negotiation while it was going on. What is now settled was granted by the Soviets ten months ago. The one who yielded was Senator Jackson. I'm worried about how the Soviets will react to this press campaign. It was put into final shape April 25 in Geneva. The proposition that President Ford made a new proposal was a lie; if anything, he toughened it up. I'm worried if the Soviets hear that pressure from Jackson yielded tremendous concessions. We wanted to let him have some of the credit. He's a rather demagogic politician; he just stepped into the White House press room and took all the credit. The letters were ready for signature when Ford took office.

But it is very dangerous to see a pattern here. There was not one Soviet concession in the last few months. The figure of 60,000 is Jackson's figure. He put in his letter. That's his privilege.

#### Other Topics

Guldberg: Are you going to Israel?

Kissinger: If I go to the Middle East, I'll certainly go to Israel. Whether I go to the Middle East depends on what happens at the Rabat Summit.

You have to go to Parliament now for interpellation? [Guldberg nods yes.]

I'm not planning anything in Moscow tonight. I'm pleased to talk as long as you want.

Guldberg: There is the possibility of a visit by our Prime Minister to Washington at the beginning of '75. Our Embassy asked me to raise it.

Kissinger: [To Hartman] Where does it stand?

Hartman: I don't know.

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Kissinger: [To Guldberg] Let me look into it.

Guldberg: We're shortly leaving the Government. We have a crisis every week.

Kissinger: Your Prime Minister had a spectacular visit in China.

Guldberg: Yes. Chou seemed very ill, but Mao was in better health than expected.

Kissinger: That usually happens.

Borch: Mao made an impression.

Kissinger: He's a very powerful personality.

Guldberg: They were very interested in Europe.

Kissinger: They're a better NATO member than many NATO members.  
[Laughter] I'll go there before the end of the year.

Borch: You are in contact with them on the Khmer and Korean questions?

Kissinger: On the Korean, yes. On the Khmer... They won't be a problem. What are you going to do on the Khmer?

Guldberg: It's coming up today. [Laughter]

Kissinger: We attach very great importance to it. We hope you'll support us.

Guldberg: It will have to be done in the Nordic or Nine context. We have to follow the pattern.

Borch: The other Nordics will abstain. France we presume will abstain. We'll see what the others do.

Kissinger: We'll have to take it into consideration, on an issue of grave concern to us, including domestic importance, that our allies don't take our concerns into account. This doesn't refer to Denmark.

I think we can get the majority of the Nine to stay with us, don't you?

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Guldborg: Yes, and it will be easier given what we did on the PLO. [Laughter]

Kissinger: I don't think you gained very much from your vote on the PLO question.

Borch: You don't think the Arabs will reopen retaliatory action?

Kissinger: No. I said to the Brazilian Foreign Minister, the Arabs respect strength. He said yes, especially in the strong. [Laughter] That was the perfect answer. [Laughter]

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the  
Central Committee, CPSU  
Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
of the USSR  
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the  
United States  
Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to  
the General Secretary  
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Chief, USA Dept.,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Second European Dept.,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)  
Oleg Sokolov, USA Dept., Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and  
Assistant to the President  
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., US Ambassador to the USSR  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State  
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State  
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs  
William G. Hyland, Director, INR  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PWR*

DATE AND TIME:

Thursday, October 24, 1974  
6:00 - 9:30 p.m.

PLACE:

Old Politburo Room  
Council of Ministers Building  
The Kremlin, Moscow

SUBJECTS:

Jackson Amendment; CSCE; Middle East;  
Nuclear War

Kissinger: I am sorry I'm so late. There is absolutely no excuse. Your  
Chief of Protocol told our people you were ready, and on one told me.

Brezhnev: No problem.

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Kissinger: It is a problem. I'm profoundly embarrassed.

Brezhnev: Did Gromyko give you soup for lunch?

Kissinger: About eight courses. I had enough energy to get here, believe me.

Brezhnev: I was able to get some work done.

Kissinger: I thought the meeting was being delayed, and I was getting some of my work done. There was no reason for me to delay. Your Chief of Protocol told three or four of my people, and each of them thought someone else was telling me.

Dobrynin: They're all afraid of Henry!

Brezhnev: Jackson would accuse the Soviet Union. I'm not angry.

Kissinger: You should be angry at me. But I'm not well disposed towards [this].

Brezhnev: Let's talk about logic, then. You remember we once discussed whether it was a science.

Kissinger: Yes. I don't remember what conclusion we came to.

Brezhnev: That it was a science.

Kissinger: I studied logic, symbolic logic. Military logic. I always had my doubts about. Wars are always lost by some general whose logic looked good at the beginning.

Brezhnev: Everyone loses.

[Brezhnev's alarm bell goes off in the center of the table.]

Kissinger: I need one of those. Is it to stop people when they talk too much?

Brezhnev: No, it's to start businesslike discussions.

At the end of this morning's meeting, you named four points you wanted to comment on.

Kissinger: Well, I commented on the points that dealt with the domestic situation.

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JACKSON AMENDMENT

Brezhnev: Incidentally -- [he gestures to the notetakers] -- this isn't for the record; don't write it -- how is the domestic situation now? Is the fever all over?

Kissinger: Your Ambassador is a better judge of it than I am. My judgment is that the high point of the fever has now passed. After the resignation of President Nixon, it continued to rise for a few more weeks. But now the high point has been passed, and as I pointed out earlier, after the [Congressional] elections we will be in a much stronger position. Regardless of the outcome. The Democrats will gain some seats, but I think we have public support on foreign policy.

Brezhnev: That's interesting.

[Dobrynin explains to Brezhnev that the elections are for the whole House and one-third of the Senate.]

What is your forecast as to the Congressional elections?

Kissinger: One-third of the Senate and all of the House of Representatives will be elected.

Brezhnev: How many in the Senate?

Kissinger: It's 100, so 33 or 34 are up for election -- I don't know which number is up this year. And the Democrats will make considerable gains. But this doesn't prove anything for the conduct of foreign policy, because they will make their gains largely on the domestic economic situation. On the other hand, there was a recent poll in the last two weeks -- which shows on foreign policy -- in which my personal popularity was at 80% -- which is extraordinary for a non-elected official. Or an elected official.

Dobrynin: Number one in history.

Kissinger: So that enables us, when we can make an issue in foreign policy, to be extremely effective. You cannot do that in a Congressional election because each representative runs in his own district, separately. So I think you will see a much stronger assertion of executive authority as soon as the election is over.

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We would welcome, ... for example, if we came to an understanding on strategic arms, we would welcome a debate on that issue to get started in America.

Dobrynin: After the election.

Kissinger: For example, when I made my statement on Soviet-American relations, we invited Senator Jackson to reply to it, because we wanted to get a debate started. And he refused to reply, because he was afraid of a confrontation. So I say this to you privately -- we intend to provoke a confrontation at an early date on foreign policy. But not before the elections.

Brezhnev: There is one thing I really fail to understand: What are really the underlying motives behind the individuals and groups that oppose the betterment of Soviet-American relations?

Kissinger: I'll give you my analysis. There are the conservatives, who have always been anti-Soviet, who represent the Dulles position of the 1950's. There is the Jewish Community, for two reasons: One on the question of Jewish emigration, and secondly, because they accuse me -- which you may find amusing -- of conducting our Middle East policy in too close cooperation with the Soviet Union. They would like a situation in the Middle East in which the Soviet Union is on one side and the United States is on the other side, so then there is unlimited support for Israel. Thirdly, there are the intellectuals, who were anti-Nixon and who had to find a reason to be against whatever he was for. And all these people combine for different reasons. And the intellectuals also because of what they claim is happening to intellectuals in the Soviet Union. But I don't rate intellectuals all that high.

So these are the different forces that are for different reasons at work. But I think they can now be defeated, because they are not dealing with a President who has no public support. Our problem has been, with the pardon, inflation and the election, that we have not been able to get sufficiently organized to launch a counterattack. But there is no question that between now and the beginning of the year we can get our position organized.

Brezhnev: Does the President or Secretary of State have any opportunities to influence the results of the election in this one-third of the seats?

Kissinger: The President is campaigning, and he will probably reduce the defeat.

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Brezhnev: I was asking just to clear my mind about the workings of the American political system.

Kissinger: I could have a big impact -- perhaps more than the President because I'm not considered a partisan political figure. But it would be extremely dangerous. If we had an issue on foreign policy, on which we could start a debate... This was my intention during the summer, to start a debate on detente. I nearly succeeded, because at that time Senator Jackson agreed to debate. I could have hurt him badly. But the debate was supposed to start during the week President Nixon resigned. And then Senator Jackson used that excuse to avoid the debate.

For me to participate in a debate, there has to be an issue. I cannot appear against a candidate. But if I can identify a candidate with an issue, and I debate on the issue, I can be very effective for a candidate -- or against.

For example, suppose we came to a SALT agreement in principle in Vladivostok. The strong probability is Senator Jackson will attack it. Then I can go around the country and defend the agreement, and thereby attacking Jackson. Or any other issue. But for me to be politically effective I have to have an issue; I can't just attack him.

[To Dobrynin:] Do you agree with my analysis?

Dobrynin: Yes. But it's not a question of the election, really, but of a public issue.

Kissinger: Yes, if I have a public issue, I'll almost certainly win.

Brezhnev: Can we help you in any way, by throwing in a problem or two? [Laughter]

Kissinger: The best way is if you and I are on the same side and Jackson is on the other.

Brezhnev: I agree.

Kissinger: Then we'll almost certainly win.

Brezhnev: Excuse me for this digressing, but I think it was useful. Now let's return to the questions you enumerated this morning.

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Kissinger: On the issues the General Secretary mentioned, there were two I didn't reply to -- one was the European Security Conference and the other was the Middle East.

Brezhnev: And MFN?

Dobrynin: He covered that.

Kissinger: I thought I covered MFN, but let me cover that too.

With respect to MFN, the reason we exchanged these letters was to make it possible to pass the Trade Bill before the end of the year. And we can be confident now the Trade Bill will pass before the end of December.

Brezhnev: The end of December.

Kissinger: Before the end of December, which will provide MFN as well as credits again for the Soviet Union.

Dobrynin: There are limitations there.

Kissinger: The limitations on credits were substantially eliminated. It has to be a Presidential determination...

Dobrynin: And there is a ceiling, over which the President has to go to Congress.

Kissinger: To report, not for approval.

Korniyenko: A \$300 million limitation.

Kissinger: That was eliminated.

Dobrynin: Our impression is that that remains.

Kissinger: But you don't understand. We have to notify Congress, but not for their approval.

Dobrynin: But they can raise it.

Kissinger: The point is, Congress has no mechanism for disapproving it. It's not subject to Congressional vote.

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Dobrynin: But to notify Congress, each Senator can say "look at this."

Kissinger: But so what? What can he do?

Dobrynin: They can raise objections.

Kissinger: No, there are several ways Congress can give an opinion. Congress can give an opinion in an affirmative vote. Not here. Or stop something by a negative vote. Not here. Here all we do is inform them. So therefore this has no practical consequence.

Dobrynin: [To Brezhnev] Information.

Kissinger: As a practical matter... the ceiling is a different matter. There are two separate questions. We have no intention of paying attention to what we're told up to \$300 million. Beyond \$300 million, we have the right to go back for more. Normally an authorization is limited, but this gives us the right to ask for more.

Dobrynin: They will have to vote again.

Kissinger: That is right.

[Dobrynin explains to Brezhnev.]

Our intention is, as soon as this Trade Bill is passed, to begin entertaining requests for credits, and to deal with them in the most expeditious and constructive manner. And we're prepared to ask for an extension beyond \$300 million. But we expect this to pass by the middle of December. The Bank has already passed; the Bank is tied to the Trade Bill.

Brezhnev: I've only mentioned the fact earlier: the trouble is that some countries get trade concessions without strings attached, and there are some strings attached to the Soviet Union.

Dobrynin: He is speaking about MFN.

Kissinger: I'm not sure MFN will be granted to China, as the General Secretary asked about.

Brezhnev: I mean the 18-month clause.

Kissinger: There is no question the Jackson Amendment is intended to be discriminatory against the Soviet Union.

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Brezhnev: That's clear.

Kissinger: I have fought it for two years, as the General Secretary knows, and as you can read in the American press this week, it's now described as a defeat for me. I say this only so the General Secretary knows my own personal views. It is our conviction that in the present Congressional situation this is the best we can do. And of course we have every intention, and I think every expectation, of renewing it when it comes up for renewal. And I'm sure President Ford will confirm this when you meet him. Nor do we have any intention -- and I can assure of this now -- of linking the renewal of MFN to any other conditions.

Brezhnev: All right, but as I understand it, the 18-month clause does relate only to the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: It relates technically to "non-market countries," which means all socialist countries.

[Dobrynin explains to Brezhnev that it's technical language and the Soviet Union is not named.]

The great anti-Communist Jackson is in favor of Most Favored Nation status for China, without conditions. Despite the well-known fact that emigration for China is absolutely free. But it is true there are no Jews in China who want to emigrate.

Brezhnev: Just the other day I heard there are about 200 million Chinese who want to emigrate to the United States.

Kissinger: [Laughs] If this were true, it would stop the emigration agitation immediately.

Gromyko: What would be the effect of 100 million Russians emigrating to the United States?

Kissinger: I tell you, if all your Jews wanted to emigrate to the United States, it would be a massive problem. It is true. I don't think Congress would let anyone immigrate.

As far as Most Favored Nation with China, I'm not aware of any discussions with China about giving them Most Favored Nation status. We haven't had any with them.

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Brezhnev: Be that as it may, it is a fact -- and let's admit that in this narrow circle -- that the discriminatory attitude toward the Soviet Union does remain, and this does run counter to the understanding we have reached on basic attitudes in each country towards each other.

Kissinger: I do not defend this particular arrangement, but it's the best we can do, and we're convinced we can continue it indefinitely.

Brezhnev: That doesn't mean we must accept that.

Kissinger: No. Unfortunately, the question of credits also has been tied to the question of Most Favored Nation.

Brezhnev: That is true.

[Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt confer.]

I don't want to run too far ahead; that would be wrong. But if we were to look 5-7 years ahead, the general picture -- including energy, oil gas, etc. -- can change drastically.

Kissinger: I don't get the point. Could you repeat that?

Sukhodrev: If we look ahead 5-7 years, we can see the general picture -- with respect to energy, oil gas -- can change drastically.

Brezhnev: Anyway, I do understand the general situation, and your situation, Dr. Kissinger. Let's end the discussion of that and turn to whatever you want to say on the Middle East or European Security Conference.

#### CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Kissinger: Let me turn to the European Security Conference.

Brezhnev: Please.

Kissinger: The General Secretary stated we were insufficiently cooperative.

Brezhnev: That's not right; I said "not enough activity [aktivnost']". There is cooperation; "activity" is another question.

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Kissinger: One of the difficulties, quite frankly, on the European Security Conference, is that some of the issues are so absurd that it's very hard to apply political influence to them. On some issues there are only three people in the world -- in whom the Foreign Minister belongs -- who understand what they're all about. I frankly, even after a night's reflection, Mr. Foreign Minister, don't understand the difference between "each principle has equal validity" and "each principle should be equally observed." I tell you now I will accept either formulation if the other participants agree, whichever it is.

Gromyko: That is only part of the general formula being suggested. Because there is also "equally valid and interdependent," which the Germans want.

Kissinger: [To Sonnenfeldt] Why do the nutty Germans want "inter-dependent?"

Sonnenfeldt: [To Kissinger] It's a French point.

Gromyko: Actually we understand the line pursued by proponents of that formula. When they say the principles should be interdependent -- actually it's "each principle should be equally valid and interdependent" -- they mean that if someone says, say, that a humane principle isn't being observed, for example, means that the others should not be observed.

Kissinger: But it works both ways.

Gromyko: It's like little wheels in a watch. If one stops revolving, the others do.

Kissinger: If you claim one isn't being observed, you can also say the others aren't applicable. It's much more dangerous to the Germans than to you.

Gromyko: Our point of view is different. We believe that even if somebody doesn't observe one principle, it doesn't mean an end should be put to observance of all the rest. Let's say some shouter, say in West Germany -- but let's not name any countries -- says because some principle, say a humane principle -- someone is refused an exit visa -- then all the other principles, like inviolability of frontiers, shouldn't be observed either. The objective position would be to say that all principles, from A to Z -- 10 or 11 or what have you -- should be equally strictly observed.

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Kissinger: My difficulty is I don't understand half of the issues being argued about. I understand this one, but let me be perfectly frank. If you have a concrete negotiation, you can go and use influence. But when the issue is where to place one phrase, whether to put it before or after another one, it's extremely difficult to use the prestige of the United States to put pressure and be accused of betraying an ally. What's happened with the European Security Conference is that every government is using it for purely domestic purposes, proving how tough it can be because it's running no risk. In Ottawa I told them what the result would be. But it's impossible to put pressure on a stupid point.

Gromyko: Tell them more energetically.

Kissinger: I don't want to go through all this before the General Secretary. Let me give you my own prediction. I believe it must be wound up. It's impossible to keep it going on these issues. It's an affront to logic. Probably the end of March is a reasonable time it should be wound up. Thirdly, what are the issues? On the principles, it's "peaceful change" and this point about "equally observed" and "equal validity."

Gromyko: That's two separate questions.

Kissinger: That's two separate questions. These are essentially German questions. No one else is interested in them. Then there is Basket III, and there is Confidence-Building Measures. Confidence-Building Measures will be settled, whatever the proposals are, because the difference between 50 and 100 kilometers, and between 20,000 and 40,000, can be compromised. So we're talking about Basket III and peaceful change.

With respect to Basket III, after the first reading, we have the approval of our allies to develop a common position. Until there is a common position, we understand your reluctance to compromise.

Regarding the two German points, Mr. Sonnenfeldt is leaving to see Schmidt before Schmidt comes here. He will express my personal view.

Gromyko: [To Sonnenfeldt] We will look at you!

Kissinger: And he may even be on time for Schmidt.

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And you'll see President Ford, and he will see Schmidt in Washington. We think it has to be brought to a conclusion. And he's between you, us, and Schmidt. Maybe also Giscard, whom we'll also see on the 15th. December will be a good time to work this out.

I wonder whether the Foreign Minister's fertile mind, aided by Korniyenko, can come up with an idea on peaceful change -- even if it's only to move the word "only" around in the center. So Genscher can say he's got a victory on something. I frankly don't believe that at the level of the Foreign Offices this can be settled, so when President Ford and Schmidt and Giscard meet, it can probably be settled.

Brezhnev: All right. Maybe we shouldn't now endeavor to go into every detail on this. Perhaps you and Gromyko and Korniyenko can spend some time on it before you leave.

Kissinger: [To Sukhodrev] Did you translate what I said about the end of March?

Sukhodrev: Yes. The conclusion of the Conference.

Kissinger: All I can do is repeat: The President and you will discuss it at Vladivostok, and by the end of December we can bring it to a concrete point.

Brezhnev: Since the United States is also a participant in the European Security Conference, we have a very earnest desire to write into the European Security Conference that the United States should notify us about all movements of its Navy and all movements of its troops in the United States all the way to California.

Kissinger: Dobrynin knows it anyway.

Brezhnev: Dobrynin hasn't told me about it. Because otherwise you say it doesn't concern the United States; that it's a German question, a French question. Let's all build confidence.

Kissinger: But the summer house where Dobrynin spends all his time has more electronic equipment... It goes out to the Atlantic. You want to cover California too?

Brezhnev: All the way to California.

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Brezhnev: You know, the unfortunate thing is, I turned out to be the author of this proposal about notification of troop movements. It sometimes happens that a man proceeds from the best of intentions and makes a mistake in not predicting what form it takes in someone else's eyes. I am admitting it very frankly. We had a discussion with the late President Pompidou at Zaslavoye, and the question didn't even exist then. I said to him, "Let's do something to strengthen confidence. After all, any army doesn't just live in barracks and go out to mess room. They conduct maneuvers; they move tanks and planes. Let's invite your representatives, and anyone's representatives, to attend these maneuvers to observe them, and that would strengthen confidence." No sooner did I say this than it was turned into an idea of opening up the whole Soviet Union, to the Urals. The question didn't exist before I mentioned it.

Brezhnev: I let the genie out of the bottle, and now every country is coming back at me -- the Greeks, the Turks, the Dutch, Belgium.

Brezhnev: It that is so, we have to report to you and Canada about any troop movement.

Kissinger: We already know what you're doing.

Kissinger: Not every company, but every substantial movement.

Brezhnev: In the last ten years, we've had no more than two major military exercises, "Dniepr" and "Dvina." One was "Dniepr," when the Kiev Military District was supposed to mount an offensive against the Belorussian Military District. Who won, I can't say, because there was no real firing. But all the general officers there watched the Air Force come in with correct precision, and other movements. So if Grechuk

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favors the Kiev Military District, he just announces Kiev has won. If for some reason he supports Belorussia, he announces they won. Thank God I wasn't present; I'd have said they both won.

The only extenuating factor for me is that I came out for that proposal guided by the noblest of intentions. But now others have turned it into a principle.

Kissinger: I'm aware of the differences of opinion that exist.

Brezhnev: Anyway, I raise the point by way of suggesting voluntary observers -- that is, if we want to invite them, we do, and if we don't, we don't. In short, I think we should at some point discuss it in greater detail, especially taking into account your view of reaching a solution.

One thing that troubles me is that you seem to agree with those who emphasize the great difficulty of reaching agreement on peaceful change of frontiers.

The second point is I'm sick and tired of endless delays in bringing the Conference to a close. It was once to be ended in 1972. Then it was supposed to be in 1973, then in 1974. Now we hear it's March 1975.

Kissinger: I myself think March 1975 is realistic. Don't you?

Gromyko: If that is so, it's only because there are some who artificially cling to that time limit, who try artificially to hold back on it.

Kissinger: There is no issue between the United States and the Soviet Union. If I had a major concern here, I'd insist on it. The General Secretary knows I'm not exactly bashful about stating my views. So it's a question of how between the two of us we can manage the ending of the Conference. It's now practically impossible to do it in November.

May I make a concrete proposal, Mr. General Secretary?

Brezhnev: Please.

Kissinger: We will make an effort in the next two months to move our allies to a conclusion. You will see Schmidt and Giscard, and you let us know what you discussed with them with respect to this Conference. We will see Schmidt and Giscard, and we'll let you know what we discussed.

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So as to avoid confusion. Then early in January, you may wish to send Korniyenko, or maybe you'd send Gromyko, to America, and we could after all these discussions see where we are.

Gromyko: The important thing is that in our contacts with Schmidt and Giscard we should act from one and the same position and not in different positions.

Kissinger: I agree. But I think we should do it in parallel, but not give the impression we have an agreement.

Gromyko: The French would be overenthusiastic if they felt we were acting jointly with you.

Kissinger: They would be delighted.

Brezhnev: I certainly agree we don't need to use virtually the same words in expounding our position with Giscard and Schmidt, but we should act in parallel and in one and the same direction.

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: Perhaps you could have a word or two with the Foreign Minister.

Gromyko: The basic thing is to talk in parallel.

Kissinger: Our basic talk with Schmidt is not when Sonnenfeldt is there, but when the President meets with Schmidt in Washington. But I'll send a message to Schmidt through Sonnenfeldt that we believe the Conference should be brought to a conclusion.

Brezhnev: When I say we should act along the same line, I mean while you are here in Moscow, you and Gromyko should agree on the main principles. Because if those basic principles are agreed on between us, Sonnenfeldt can be given more explicit instructions.

Kissinger: We can have a talk, but in our view the realistic time to make progress is when the President sees Schmidt.

Brezhnev: It's certainly true that more concrete results can be achieved in a summit, but at the lower level some preliminary work can be done.

Kissinger: I agree.

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Brezhnev: And I certainly could not conceive of this question not being touched upon when I meet President Ford.

Kissinger: No question. We are prepared to discuss it.

Are we finished with this question?

Gromyko: In effect, you were replying to the observations made by the General Secretary this morning.

Kissinger: That's correct.

Gromyko: Because the questions we did mention regarding the European Security Conference are the issues that are now holding up the Conference.

Kissinger: I agree. And my point is that your basic problem is not the United States.

Can we have a two-minute break?

Brezhnev: Yes. Then we can take up the Middle East.

Kissinger: I don't insist on it!

Brezhnev: Then tomorrow morning we can start with an easy subject -- SALT. Things are simpler there.

Kissinger: All right.

Brezhnev: And Dr. Kissinger, if you'd like to have a break now . . . .

Kissinger: Good.

[There was a break from 7:45 - 8:02 p.m.]

Brezhnev: I used the time in our interval to joke with my Secretary, Galya. I'm in a better mood.

Kissinger: I wish I could speak Russian.

Brezhnev: No, that's not for you anymore. Please.

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(...)



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, General Secretary and  
Member of the Politburo, CPSU Central Committee  
Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs;  
Member CPSU Politburo  
Anatoly Dobrynin, USSR Ambassador to the United  
States  
Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Aide to General  
Secretary Brezhnev  
Georgiy M. Korniyenko; Chief, USA Department,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Oleg Sokolov, USA Department, Ministry of Foreign  
Affairs  
Viktor M. Sukhodrev; Second European Department,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)  
  
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs  
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to USSR  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department,  
Department of State  
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European  
Affairs, Department of State  
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff,  
Department of State  
William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence  
and Research, Department of State  
A. Denis Clift, Senior Staff Member, National Security  
Council

FOIA Review  
Cat. A - Caption removed;  
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Cat. C - Caption and custody  
retained by OIG  
Reviewed by: *E. Kelly*  
Date: 3/9/94

TIME AND DATE:

Thursday, October 24, 1974  
11:00 a.m. - 2:00 p.m.

PLACE:

Old Politburo Room, Council of Ministers Building  
The Kremlin, Moscow, USSR

SUBJECT:

Secretary Kissinger's Visit to USSR, October 1974

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IS/FPC/CDR *HH*

Date: 5/19/94

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Returning to MFN, there are some groups and individuals in the United States who pretend that we are begging for MFN as some kind of special concession that we can't get by without. Of course, we can both note the increase in trade that has been of benefit for both sides -- an increase of \$1 billion with contracts for several billion dollars signed. It is very doubtful that a U.S. business man would sign a contract that is not to his advantage. I would go on to say that we have broad, long-term economic relations with the Europeans and with Japan. With them we have dozens more contracts than with the United States. This is a factor to be taken into account. I would emphasize the interests of the United States and of U.S. businessmen in business relations with the USSR.

Returning to the Middle East, the method you have chosen can only in the final analysis confuse matters, cause them to be more complicated than they were before the October war. At one stage what you were doing seemed not too bad. But now when you analyze Arab interests, you have to conclude that there can be a new flare-up, worse than October. We believe that only through the understanding we reached earlier can we bring our influence to bear and work to bring peace. In the past, this proved true in Vietnam. The situation there is still complicated, but there is no war. I could show you official documents from the Vietnamese saying that they won't violate the Paris Accords. If we did it in Vietnam, we can do it in the Middle East.

CSCE

Brezhnev: One last matter affecting us is that of the All European Conference. If you have any reproaches regarding our position I'm sure you will make them. There are no hidden dangers in the USSR position, no one-sided advantages. The Conference must serve the interests of all the participants. But, how is the United States acting?

I don't want to criticize your President. But, in practice, we don't feel that at Geneva the United States is acting vigorously with the Soviet Union to bring the Conference to a successful conclusion. I am sure that if the United States and the President wanted to act, agreement would be achieved rapidly. The United States and Soviet Union would not be showing hegemony, but would be safeguarding peace in Europe. If the United States took a stand, your friends would act. Now we have new delays, another interval. Then they will say it is too cold, then too hot. It is being dragged out. We feel the United States is far too passive. In words, the United States says it wants to act. At the conference, the United States sits in silence. France takes one position.

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The FRG has its position. We think the United States should take a resolute position. The Netherlands, Turkey and others are dragging it out. But, when questions regarding our territory to the Urals are raised, then European Security is really not the subject.

Please excuse me for discussing these questions and leaving easy matters such as nuclear issues, but all that I have raised here has an important bearing on confidence between the two countries. It has not all been negative. Some of your statements we have valued. Your statement to the Congress and your statements to newsmen, those we have valued highly indeed.

Dr. Kissinger, I must ask your forgiveness for starting out with all these questions. I got carried away. I forgot to ask you to give our very best regards and respects to the President and to express my appreciation for the fact that in the first day of his Administration he sent me a message expressing his desire to continue the improvement in our relations. I sent him a reply at the time of Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to the United States. Please put these remarks at the first place in our conversation.

Kissinger: I thought the General Secretary was going to say that after these introductory remarks he would move into substance.

Brezhnev: We can do that after lunch.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, first of all . . .

Brezhnev: Really, Dr. Kissinger, there have been some major events. Every month there have been new events that we cannot disregard. And, I do not regard as ordinary, run-of-the-mill events what has happened inside the United States. Whether we want it or not, all of this affects our relations. These problems depend on the position each side takes.

I have no need to describe the events in this country. Things are very normal. We regularly publish figures regarding our economic affairs. We are now developing final figures for the fifth Five Year Plan for 1975. We have discussed this plan and had a meeting of the Council of Ministers which I attended and addressed. In some fields there are, perhaps, certain hitches. Everyone wants to be allocated as much money as possible. Some have over-fulfilled the plan, and, of course, we don't punish them for that. At the close of the Five Year Plan, we will have a Party Congress, at the end of 1975 or in 1976 -- we haven't decided. During our Congresses we review not only foreign policy but also domestic affairs.

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In short, if I were graphically to portray the basic trends -- and Ambassador Stoessel can bear me out -- the line would be an upward one. We would prefer an even steeper upward line, but the trend of the line will without question be upward. And, as we develop economically, we are broadening and expanding our economic and commercial relations with a number of nations.

On October 15, it was ten years since I was vested with the great trust of our Party and became the head of the Central Committee of the Party. I received thousands of congratulatory letters and messages, but that is not what I wish to emphasize. And, in this 10 years -- a little more than 10 years -- we have had no rise in retail prices in such staples as bread, butter, sugar, rice and other staples. Not by one Kopek has there been any rise in rent, and this is something we take pride in. I say this not in any way to contrast the situation in this country with other facts...

Kissinger: There has not been one cent of increase in my salary during the same period.

Brezhnev: That is bad! How severely they are exploiting you. Dr. Kissinger, I have to complain that in these 10 years my salary hasn't increased one Kopek. They are all exploiters.

Kissinger: Dobrynin or Gromyko?

Brezhnev: Dobrynin is a nice man.

Kissinger: Gromyko is always at his country house.

Brezhnev: We should lower Kissinger's and Gromyko's salaries.

Gromyko: Dr. Kissinger's point was misunderstood.

Secretary Kissinger's Response to Points Raised

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, I appreciate the frankness of your presentation. When I arrived at the airport yesterday I said I was coming here to meet friends. In the 7 or 8 times I have been here there has developed a relationship of confidence that enables us to speak frankly.

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SONNENFELDT AND HARTMAN

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PGOV, GW, UR, US  
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH SCHMIDT AND GENSCHER

1. WE HAD A GOOD TALK WITH SCHMIDT AND GENSCHER LATE THIS AFTERNOON. BOTH WERE SOMEWHAT PREOCCUPIED WITH THE ELECTIONS IN BAVARIA AND HESSE, ESPECIALLY GENSCHER. AS IT TURNED OUT THEY HAD GOOD REASON SINCE BOTH THEIR PARTIES LOST SUBSTANTIALLY, ESPECIALLY THE FDP. SCHMIDT WAS MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR THOUGHTFULNESS IN HAVING US COME TO SEE HIM AND SENT YOU HIS WARMEST REGARDS.

2. WE SUMMARIZED THE MOSCOW TALKS FAIRLY BRIEFLY. WE NOTED THAT FIRST PORTION WAS TAKEN UP BY SOVIET RECITATION OF VARIOUS GRIEVANCES, PARTICULARLY ON EMIGRATION, TRADE, THE GRAIN DEAL AND OUR ALLEGED UNILATERALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE NOTED CONTINUED STRONG SOVIET SENSITIVITY TO ANYTHING THEY INTERPRET AS DISCRIMINATION. ON THE EMIGRATION ISSUE WE STRESSED THAT THE GERMANS IN THEIR TALKS SHOULD MAKE ABSOLUTELY NO REFERENCES, IMPLIED OR OTHERWISE, TO OUR EXCHANGES WITH JACKSON AND THAT THEY SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT ATTEMPT TO DRAW ANY ANALOGY BETWEEN THEIR PROBLEM AND THE ONE THAT

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WE HAD BEEN DEALING WITH. WE SAID THAT THE GERMANS SHOULD TREAT THEIR EMIGRATION PROBLEM SOLELY ON ITS OWN MERITS. SCHMIDT TOOK THIS IN AND WE ALSO REINFORCED IT WITH VAN WELL WHO HOPEFULLY UNDERSTANDS IT.

3. WE NEXT REVIEWED THE CSCE DISCUSSION, NOTING THAT THE SOVIETS WERE MOSTLY CONCERNED WITH THE "PEACEFUL CHANGE" PRINCIPLE AND WITH THE QUESTION OF "EQUAL VALIDITY" AND "INTERDEPENDENCE" OF PRINCIPLES. WE SAID THAT WE HAD TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT WE WOULD ACCEPT WHATEVER THEY MIGHT WORK OUT WITH THE GERMANS WHO WERE PRINCIPALLY INTERESTED IN THESE POINTS. WE TOLD SCHMIDT THAT IT WAS OUR FEELING THAT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OUGHT TO BE BROUGHT TO A FAIRLY QUICK END SINCE IT WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. WE NOTED THAT FOLLOWING HIS OWN VISIT TO MOSCOW AND THE PRESIDENT'S TALKS IN VLADIVOSTOK THERE WILL BE A SERIES OF INTRA-WESTERN MEETINGS WHICH WILL PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR REVIEWING THE STATUS OF THE CONFERENCE. AFTER THAT WE OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO REACH A CONCLUSION ON HOW BEST TO BRING THE CONFERENCE TO AN END. WE STRESSED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT ALL THE WESTERN NATIONS WERE UNITED IN THEIR STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN THIS REGARD AND URGED HIM NOT TO TAKE ANY STEPS OF HIS OWN IN MOSCOW BEYOND POSSIBLY GETTING SOME AGREEMENT ON THE TWO OUTSTANDING PRINCIPLES. SCHMIDT COMMENTED THAT IT HAD BEEN HIS IMPRESSION THAT THE US WANTED A QUICK CONCLUSION AT THE SUMMIT LEVEL. WE POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS INCORRECT AND THAT ON THE CONTRARY WE HAD HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT BOTH POMPIDOU AND BRANDT HAD EARLIER COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO A SUMMIT CONCLUSION. IN ANY EVENT, WE STRESSED, IT WAS NOW IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD ALL BE TOGETHER ON THIS MATTER. SCHMIDT INDICATED THAT HIS ONLY INTEREST WAS IN THE "PEACEFUL CHANGE" PRINCIPLE.

4. WE THEN SPOKE BRIEFLY OF SALT. WE NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN INTENSIVE DISCUSSION TOWARD THE END OF THE MEETINGS AND THAT WE THOUGHT THERE WAS SOME REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS, LIKE OURSELVES, WERE INTERESTED IN REACHING AGREEMENT NEXT YEAR. WE NOTED

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THAT WE DETECTED SOME INTEREST IN EQUAL AGGREGATE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS ALSO CONTINUED TO MANIFEST CONSIDERABLE CONCERN IN THE NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES OF THIRD COUNTRIES. WE NOTED OBVIOUS SOVIET SENSITIVITY TOWARD CHINA IN THIS REGARD. SCHMIDT COMMENTED THAT IT WAS NOT CLEAR TO HIM HOW WE OR THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE COMPENSATED FOR AN EVENTUAL CHINESE STRATEGIC CAPABILITY.

5. IN RESPONSE TO SCHMIDT'S QUESTION WE SAID THAT CYPRUS HAD NOT COME UP AT ALL IN THE FORMAL SESSIONS AND ONLY VERY BRIEFLY INFORMALLY. WE HAD MERELY TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT WE WOULD KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THEM. ALSO IN REPLY TO HIS QUESTION, WE SAID THAT THE MIDDLE EAST DISCUSSION DEALT MOSTLY WITH SOVIET IRRITATION OVER BEING LEFT OUT OF THE DIPLOMATIC GAME AND WITH THEIR EAGERNESS TO GET THE GENEVA CONFERENCE RECONVENED.

6. BY WAY OF GENERAL SUMMATION, WE SAID THAT AFTER THE INITIAL DISPLAY OF SOVIET IRRITATION THE MEETINGS HAD BECOME MORE SUBSTANTIVE AND HAD ON THE WHOLE GONE WELL.

7. SCHMIDT SAID HE APPRECIATED YOUR PROMPT REPLY TO HIS LETTER REGARDING THE PROPOSED DEAL FOR A NUCLEAR POWER STATION WITH THE SOVIETS. HE SAID HIS ONLY INTEREST IN THIS PROJECT RELATED TO BERLIN AND IF THAT ASPECT WOULD NOT BE SATISFIED, HE DOUBTED THAT HE WOULD PURSUE IT. BUT, HE SAID, IF THE BERLIN ANGLE WERE TAKEN CARE OF IT WOULD IN HIS VIEW OUTWEIGH THE SAFEGUARD ISSUE WHICH HAS BEEN RAISED IN COCOM. WE REVIEWED OUR REASONING IN ADVOCATING THAT THE GERMANS OBTAIN SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF SAFEGUARDS, NOTING IN PARTICULAR THE VALUE THIS WOULD HAVE IN CURRENT EFFORTS TO TIGHTEN UP CONTROLS ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES. WE ALSO NOTED THE GERMAN RECORD OF URGING US AND THE BRITISH TO ACCEPT IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON OUR

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REACTORS AS AN EXAMPLE FOR NON-NUCLEAR POWERS. SCHMIDT ACKNOWLEDGED THESE POINTS BUT ASKED US AGAIN TO CALL TO YOUR ATTENTION HIS POLITICAL INTEREST IN THE PROJECT BECAUSE OF ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR BERLIN. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE AND THE BRITISH WERE ACCEPTING SAFEGUARDS ON ONLY A SMALL PROPORTION OF OUR REACTORS. HE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT THE WHOLE DEAL WAS STILL VERY QUESTIONABLE.

8. IN RESPONSE TO SCHMIDT'S QUESTION, WE SAID THAT APART FROM THE CSCE CONTEXT AND FROM YOUR TELLING BREZHNEV THAT WE WERE COMING TO BRIEF SCHMIDT, GERMANY HAD NOT COME UP IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS NOR HAD BERLIN.

9. AFTER MOSCOW DISCUSSION, WE ASKED TO PASS ON YOUR VIEWS ON THE GISCARD INITIATIVE CALLING FOR A CONSUMER-PRODUCER CONFERENCE. WE EXPRESSED YOUR ASTONISHMENT THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CONSULTATION ON SUCH AN IMPORTANT MATTER AND ONE ON WHICH WE HAD BEEN ATTEMPTING TO MEET FRENCH SENSIBILITIES. WE RECALLED IN DETAIL THE DISCUSSIONS YOU HAD WITH GISCARD IN WHICH HE HAD SUGGESTED THE FIVE AS AN APPROPRIATE GROUP AND INDICATED HIS BASIC SYMPATHY WITH OUR APPROACH. HARTMAN ONCE AGAIN SET OUT BASIC US STRATEGY OF BUILDING CONSUMER COOPERATION AS THE NECESSARY FIRST STEP TO PREPARING CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS FOR ANY EVENTUAL APPROACH TO PRODUCERS. THE FRENCH ACTION IN SPRINGING THIS PROPOSAL COULD ONLY RAISE THE QUESTION IN OUR MIND AS TO WHETHER WE WERE HEADING DOWN LAST YEAR'S ROAD AFTER WE HAD THOUGHT US-FRENCH RELATIONS HAD TAKEN MORE HOPEFUL COURSE. WE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THIS CONFERENCE IN OUR VIEW CANNOT PRODUCE MORE THAN CONFRONTATION OR CAPITULATION AND THAT IF OTHERS NOW REJECTED CONCLUSIONS WE HAD ALL REACHED, THIS MIGHT MEAN WE WILL QUICKLY SLIP BACK INTO RABBLE, EACH SEEKING BILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

10. SCHMIDT RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT HE HAD TWO COMPLAINTS ABOUT GISCARD'S PRESS CONFERENCE--BOTH OF WHICH CAUSED HIM CONCERN BECAUSE OF LACK OF CONSULTATION. FIRST, GISCARD HAD ANNOUNCED SUMMIT OF THE NINE WHEN IT HAD BEEN CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS

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WOULD REACH THAT AGREEMENT AT THEIR MEETING IN MID-NOVEMBER. SECOND, SCHMIDT HAD SAME IMPRESSION YOU DID THAT GISCARD WAS COMING TOWARD OUR POSITION ON ENERGY AND WANTED QUIET TALKS AND CONSULTATION. HE ADDED THAT HE WAS BASICALLY SYMPATHETIC TO IDEA OF SUCH A CONFERENCE AND FELT THAT HE HAD ALWAYS BEEN TOO NEGATIVE BECAUSE OF OUR STRONGER, LESS-DEPENDENT POSITION. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE THOUGHT GISCARD PERSONALLY WAS CLOSER TO A COOPERATIVE POSITION BUT THAT GAULLISTS, PARTICULARLY CHIPAC AND ELEMENTS IN THE QUAI AND ELSEWHERE, WERE PREVENTING HIM FROM MOVING. HE FEELS GISCARD IS A REMARKABLE MAN, GOOD ECONOMIST AND WORTHY OF SOME UNDERSTANDING. HE AGREES THAT THIS APPROACH IS ILL-TIMED AND NOT LIKELY TO BE HELPFUL. HE HAD NOT HEARD OF INDEXING ELEMENT AND FELT THAT WAS NONSENSE. HE SAID GISCARD COULD NOT SPEAK FOR THE NINE SINCE THEY HAD NO COMMON POLICY WHICH HE--SCHMIDT--WAS GOING TO PRESS FOR URGENTLY AT THE SUMMIT.

11. SCHMIDT WAS SUFFICIENTLY DISTURBED TO CONCLUDE THAT HE WOULD WRITE A LETTER TO GISCARD TAKING HIM TO TASK ON THESE ISSUES. HE ASKED THAT WE NOTE DOWN POINTS OF CONCERN TO AID HIM IN WRITING LETTER. HARTMAN GAVE POINTS (IMMEDIATELY SUCCEEDING SEPTEL) TO GEMHOFF WITH STRICT NOTICE THAT THIS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED OFFICIAL US POSITION BUT ONLY AS ASSISTANCE TO SCHMIDT. GERMANS PROMISED TO TREAT IT AS NON-PAPER.

12. IN LATER EVENING DISCUSSION OF SAME ISSUE WITH SENIOR FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS, ALL AGREED THAT TIMING WAS WRONG AND PARTICULARLY THAT PREPARATORY MEETING WHICH THEY HAD NOT YET EVEN BEEN INFORMED ABOUT WAS A NON-STARTER PRIOR TO EC-9 DISCUSSIONS AND DECISIONS ON ENERGY POLICY AND BEFORE ECG ESTABLISHED IN OECD. HERMES SUGGESTED US MIGHT WISH--SINCE FRENCH HAD TALKED MORE TO US--TO SAY THAT FRENCH COULD NOT HAVE IT BOTH WAYS. IF THEY WANTED OTHERS TO GIVE THEIR VIEW SERIOUS CONSIDERATION, THEY HAD TO BE MEMBERS OF ECG. HE REPLIED THAT EC MEMBERS OF ECG MIGHT MAKE THAT SUGGESTION TO FRENCH WHEN THEY TALKED TO THEM. BUT WE ALSO EMPHASIZED OUR BASIC SUBSTANTIVE POINT

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# Department of State

TELEGRAM

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-6- BONN 16889

THAT ONLY AFTER CONSUMER COOPERATION IS WELL IN HAND WOULD WE BE IN POSITION TO PREPARE CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS FOR PRESENTATION TO PRODUCERS.

13. THE FINAL PART OF OUR DISCUSSION WAS DEVOTED TO A PRESENTATION BY SCHMIDT OF HIS STANDARD PESSIMISTIC EVALUATION AND PROGNOSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SITUATION. HE ASSERTED THAT, IN HIS VIEW, THE ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD ARE ALREADY IN A STATE OF SEVERE ECONOMIC RECESSION AND THAT THEIR ATTENTION WILL INEVITABLY MOVE FROM THE FIGHT AGAINST INFLATION TO THE FIGHT AGAINST UNEMPLOYMENT. HE PREDICTED THAT BY NEXT SPRING THIS CHANGE OF FOCUS WOULD HEIGHTEN INFLATIONARY PRESSURES AND CONTRIBUTE TO A FURTHER WORSENING OF INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS IMBALANCES. HE IMPLIED THAT HE SAW NO REAL SOLUTION TO THIS DOWNWARD CYCLE. HE DESCRIBED US POLICY AS RECENTLY ANNOUNCED BY THE PRESIDENT AS A SORT OF CAMOUFLAGED ATTEMPT TO GRAPPLE WITH UNEMPLOYMENT WHILE STILL USING THE LANGUAGE OF THE FIGHT AGAINST INFLATION. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO TAKE MORE SERIOUS AND EFFECTIVE MEASURES AFTER OUR CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS.

14. MARTY HILLENBRAND TELLS US THAT IN SCHMIDT'S VIEW THE ONLY MAN IN WASHINGTON REMOTELY CAPABLE OF HANDLING OUR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS FOR THE MOMENT IS ARTHUR BURNS. BUT SCHMIDT WAS COMPLIMENTARY ABOUT YOUR HAVING TAKEN THE LEAD IN RECENT EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ISSUES.

15. AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND WAS WITH US DURING THE MEETING. STATE SECRETARY GEHLHOFF PARTICIPATED ON THE GERMAN SIDE.

16. WE HAVE NOT REPEATED THIS AND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM TO THE DEPARTMENT AND LEAVE IT UP TO YOU WHETHER YOU WISH TO DO SO.  
HILLENBRAND

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NODIS REVIEW

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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TASMANIA TO O/GADRC  
CAT. B - T. TASMANIA TO O/GADRC  
W. TASMANIA TO O/GADRC  
CAT. C - T. TASMANIA TO O/GADRC  
W. TASMANIA TO O/GADRC  
CAT. D - T. TASMANIA TO O/GADRC  
W. TASMANIA TO O/GADRC

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE 3.3 1978

PARTICIPANTS: George Macovescu, Foreign Minister of the Socialist Republic of Romania  
Vasile Gliga, Deputy Foreign Minister  
Constantin Oancea, Director, Directorate III  
Nicolae Blejan, Director, Synthesis Directorate  
Corneliu Bogdan, Ambassador to the United States  
Juliu Dobroiu, Deputy Director, Directorate III  
Valentin Lipatti, CSCE Representative  
Mirian Petrescu, U.S. Desk Officer, MFA  
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State  
Harry G. Barnes, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Romania  
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs  
A. Denis Clift, National Security Council

CLASSIFIED BY FRANK WISNER  
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO-  
YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON  
DECEMBER 31,-----

TIME AND DATE: Sunday, November 3, 1974  
4:40 p.m. - 5:25 p.m.

PLACE: Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Bucharest, Romania

SUBJECT: Secretary Kissinger's Meeting with Romanian Foreign Minister Macovescu

Macovescu: On behalf of the Romanian Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs I welcome you to Romania. And, although your stay is short, I wish it to be as pleasant and as useful as possible. Relations between our two countries are good and fast developing. Whenever our representatives meet -- or our Presidents or our Foreign Ministers meet -- all that permits us to have a friendly exchange of opinions that we consider useful.

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Mr. Secretary of State, your stay here is short; and, consequently, your stay at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is short. According to the Chief of Protocol (Romania side laughs) at 5:25 you have to leave for your meeting with the President. So, unfortunately -- and again -- in the time we have we can fulfill our stated desire for a philosophic exchange of opinions.

For practical reasons, what is your view on what we should discuss. I know that your talk with our President will be long dealing both with bilateral and international issues.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, first let me express our pleasure at being here. I personally have had more contact with Romania than any other country in Eastern Europe. Relations between our two governments are very friendly. I am grateful for your invitation, and I am delighted to accept it. We attach importance to our relations. On subjects to discuss, I leave it to you.

Macovescu: Mr. Secretary of State, I will attempt a short synthesis of certain issues of concern for us. Again, the great international issues will be discussed in your talks with the President.

As far as I am concerned, I understand your position as Secretary of State of the United States. Wherever you go all over the world you are faced with requests. Don't take this talk that way. But, I do want to discuss certain aspects of our relations. Lately, all of us have been confronted with developments of common concern. All of the international conferences that have taken place recently are one aspect of this development. Chronologically speaking: The Stockholm Conference on the Environment; in April last year the Special U. N. Session on Energy; the World Conference on Population in Bucharest; the Rome Conference on Food which will be attended by you; next, a conference on Technology and Science and a Conference on Industrial Development. These are a few aspects of the problems of common interest.

The essential aspect of these problems is economic. People speak of an economic crisis. Perhaps economists can tell us if it is in fact a crisis. It is not, perhaps, a crisis of growth. It's, perhaps, for the economists to tell us how long it will last. As political people, we will have to see how to face this crisis and how to overcome the situation. We Romanians watch developments in the world keenly. We are not, in fact, of the opinion that

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the phenomenon of crisis should not have an impact on us. We are part and parcel of the world flow -- economically, culturally, etc. -- so that it is impossible for us not to have a certain impact on events in other corners of the world. We have to consider seriously how to make contributions as a middle-sized country.

I have, of course, in mind that we are not larger than Nebraska, and not as developed. We think how to make contributions and how to establish a new order of relations between states. I know that the expression "new order" is not to your liking, but it is not a label, rather, a concept. Starting from the new realities -- the phenomena that have taken place in the world, we should be in position to face the great issues with which we are confronted. I could describe a lot of aspects of this, but we are pressed for time.

We will, for example, have to consider seriously a new round of GATT. This concerns one aspect of our economic relations. Our membership in this organization is of a recent date, and I would express the hope that the United States will make a substantial contribution to discussing the problem of a new round of talks. We have mentioned such an idea to the people of GATT.

On the one hand, I recognize the part played by the United States; on the other hand, as long as trade legislation is not passed by your Congress no progress can be made or decisions taken. The critical stage has been reached. We do hope the United States will play its part in this respect. We mentioned this in our talks in Washington. What we have in mind is not only short-term problems but a long-term approach to all the problems in the world. We will appreciate the United States' contributions in this respect. Of course, if the trade legislation is passed, it will contribute to the development of our relations.

Mr. Secretary of State, I must say (Macovescu laughs) that you are the fourth Secretary of State with whom I have discussed MFN.

Kissinger: The fourth?

Macovescu: Herter, Rusk, Rogers and you.

Kissinger: What about Jackson? (laughter)

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Macovescu: I'm quite aware of the situation. I am also familiar with the efforts made by you personally, Mr. Secretary of State, and by the Administration. We think it may now be possible to get beyond this vicious circle, and to reach the completion of normalization of relations.

Personally, I am happy to say, Mr. Secretary of State, that when I left the United States as the Romanian representative to your country the volume of trade both ways was \$4 million. At present, it amounts to \$270 million for this year. Of course, this figure may not seem too large to the United States, but for us it does represent something -- and, all the more so -- there is political importance to it.

At the same time, I hope to start negotiations in other areas of cooperation between our countries. The effect, of course, will have consequences on our political and cultural relations.

In this respect, the latest event is that we have approached the U. S. Government for a CCC loan. We know that the matter now depends on political considerations. I hope that the political decision will be taken, because its influence will not only be at the economic level. And, to be frank with you, if we don't get this \$30 million we can live on, but we will be disappointed.

Kissinger: What is the political decision?

Macovescu: The Administration has to take this decision...

Kissinger: Have all our economic agencies favored it and is only a political decision required?

Bogdan: They favor it; Agriculture is in favor.

Kissinger: You see, with respect to all those who are saying that I am going to lose my job, you have to bear in mind that were that to happen all the other agencies of government would lose their alibis. (laughter) You are saying that Agriculture has approved it?

Barnes: No they haven't.

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for three years, almost exclusively. I took to it, and it is difficult to forget one's first love. Our expert in Geneva informs us daily; we get papers daily (he gestures a stack four inches thick). But, that is not what I want to mention today.

Kissinger: I want you to know that I don't read all the documents. There are some things beyond my capacity. . .

Macovescu: You have other things to think about . . .

Kissinger: For example, the German instruction on peaceful change, and the question of which paragraph is the right paragraph.

Macovescu: Today, we read that they want to change their position.

Kissinger: The Germans?

Sonnenfeldt: They have gone to the July formula.

Kissinger: Let's not get into it. You (to Macovescu) are not interested -- but, you are!

Macovescu: In our case, it's a dialectical game concerning the change of frontiers. Perhaps I will have the time to impart our thinking to you. After the Washington talks one month ago, the U.S. delegation at Geneva was much more active, but, of course, I don't link this to our talks. However, your delegation does have to make a certain effort so that agreement can be reached. It has an influence on other delegations, in particular, with the other Western delegations. I am not going to mention all of the problems and areas where agreement can be reached, but I would like to say a few words on the IV Basket.

Kissinger: You think we'll sell the III Basket?

Macovescu: Yes.

Kissinger: You'll all change your systems <sup>in</sup> Eastern Europe (laughter). I don't want the Dutch Foreign Minister to be unhappy.

Macovescu: I had it out with him in New York recently.

Kissinger: Let's talk about the follow-on machinery.

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Macovescu: We don't understand the reason, in particular the French reason, that if a certain body were to continue the activities of the conference, it would give the opportunity to certain big powers to interfere in the internal affairs of European countries. Some are afraid the United States will have a permanent presence in Europe. On the other hand, the Soviet Union could interfere through this body in the affairs of Western Europe.

Kissinger: They have two choices. They can do this through the Communist Parties in the European countries, or through the follow-on machinery.

Macovescu: These possibilities are not on an equal level. (Sonnenfeldt comments to the Secretary) I see Mr. Sonnenfeldt is going to tell you about his talks with the Secretary of our Party.

I would like the United States Delegation to consider more deeply the question of follow-up. Mr. Secretary of State, there is no reason to continue this follow-up discussion if the United States is not interested in European security. We won't follow-up.

Kissinger: We are interested. Our problem is that we haven't taken a clear position on what we want. We wanted first, to see what would happen in the other categories. We are skeptical for the very reason that you want it. You want a mechanism by which certain pressures are balanced (Macovescu hears translation and starts to indicate disagreement) or, rather are warded off. We don't want constant Soviet interference in Western European affairs. If we can find a formula that prevents that and that has continuity we will be open-minded about it.

Macovescu: To be practical, Mr. Secretary of State, since time does not allow long talks, it would be best to let our representatives here and yours have a long talk in order to impart our ideas about the follow-up.

Kissinger: I agree.

Macovescu: We are not interested in interference in internal affairs.

Kissinger: (Looking to Sonnenfeldt and Hartman) We'll have our two representatives get together. I'm beginning an immediate negotiation with my colleagues to insure that their report on this meeting is the one cable they will let me read. They'll do it if I promise I won't make a habit of it.

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Well, on CSCE we in the past haven't attached the same importance to it that some of our friends have, and frankly some of the negotiations are now at a level best suited for a student of theology. I don't want to offend your Ambassador (Lipatti) who I'm sure studies these questions very hard. But, even with the many attractions in Geneva, I think our diplomats have almost exhausted the possibilities for continuing the talks. In the next six months, we should reach the conclusion.

On Basket III, we want to convince our Western European allies of the need for a unified position. (Looking to the U.S. side) Are we through the first reading? (Heads shake, indicating a negative) Once we have a unified position, then negotiations will be a possibility.

On Basket IV, our representatives will be instructed to talk to yours. We are open-minded. If a formula can be found that prevents interference, then we will look seriously at it. On other items, such as confidence building, this is really more a matter for the Soviet Union and Western Europe.

Macovescu: As far as Basket III is concerned, we think an acceptable agreement will be reached by both sides soon -- by the end of the year. A solution acceptable to both sides will be reached.

Mr. Secretary of State, there are certain things the USSR can accept. There are other things that can't be accepted in the III Basket even by you. It is not in our interest to reach the point of clashing on every item.

Kissinger: Respecting Basket III there is an underlying assumption of some countries who think that through an international agreement it will be possible to undermine the political structure of certain countries. This is naive in the extreme. If, assuming the political structure remains, we can work something out practically, the United States will be flexible. However, we don't want to pay a heavy price with our allies.

Macovescu: No, neither do we.

Kissinger: We'll let the process continue -- probably not by the end of this year, but next spring.

Macovescu: Us too.

Kissinger: Schmidt has been in Moscow. I don't know what was discussed. We will be seeing Schmidt, the French President and Brezhnev. Out of these discussions, we should be able to crystalize attitudes. The subject (CSCE) isn't worth prolonging.

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Macovescu: Actually then, after we reach certain agreements then we will continue follow-up contacts with you.

Kissinger: On follow-up, I would not consider my diplomatic career unfulfilled if there were to be no other security conference. I am not eager to prepare for another.

Macovescu: We do not have another conference in mind. But, we don't want the first conference to be considered a peace conference -- to replace a peace treaty with Germany. I don't know if there will be a peace treaty with Germany. Next year will be the 30th year.

Kissinger: Why do you object?

Macovescu: I don't know if everybody is willing to have a peace treaty. The cake is being eaten in small slices, some outside of the banquet. We don't need a peace conference on Germany, but we don't want this conference to replace one. European security should not mean looking backward; on the other hand we should look forward. We want to avoid what happened in the last six or seven years.

Kissinger: Do you think this is possible in Yugoslavia?

Macovescu: Yes, it's possible, but only if we look backward. We have to look forward.

Kissinger: Of course.

Macovescu: It's possible that that's going to turn into a case, but we act and think in a direction so that it won't become a case.

Kissinger: Our two Ambassadors should work together.

Macovescu: Yes. Well, it's time for us to end this so that you can go to your meeting with the President.

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In Attendance (Thurs., 12/5/74)

Secretary of State Kissinger (presiding as Chairman)

D	Mr. Ingersoll
P	Mr. Sisco
T	Mr. Maw
C	Mr. Sonnenfeldt
AF	Mr. Blake
ARA	Mr. Rogers
EA	Mr. Hummel (Acting)
EUR	Mr. Hartman
NEA	Mr. Sober (Acting)
INR	Mr. Hyland
S/P	Mr. Lord
EB	Mr. Katz (Acting)
S/PRS	Mr. Anderson
PM	Mr. Stern
IO	Mr. Buffum
H	Mr. Holton
L	Mr. Aldrich (Acting)
S/S	Mr. Springsteen
S	Mr. Bremer

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go away wondering whether or not we have a firm line. And I think Arthur Burns, if he takes a strong line at the meeting, will help in convincing.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What are the two sides? What is Seidman's line?

MR. HARTMAN: Well, he seemed to be saying that the situation was gradually correcting itself.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Which situation?

MR. HARTMAN: Our situation -- that we would have an upturn and there would be revision in the policies of the Administration early in the new year. Simon, I think, was still saying that we were going to pursue the inflation problem. And you just got the impression from them -- at least, I got the impression -- that they were not on the same wicket. And I think if Arthur Burns can sort of take hold of this meeting this afternoon, he can answer Schmidt's points more directly, I think, than I could -- than the other two.

On the CSCE matters that we'll be discussing on the side in today's meetings, while you're talking to Schmidt and to Genscher, Schmidt has brought with him four state secretaries on the economic side and some of the

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political people from the Foreign Office. So what we've arranged is that Tom Enders and Jack Bennet will be talking to them in the Cabinet Room.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Can you explain to them the difference between "equally observed" and "equal <sup>identity</sup> identity"? It passes my understanding. What is the intellectual difference?

MR. HARTMAN: The intellectual difference is that if you say that all the principles have equal <sup>identity</sup> identity --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes.

MR. HARTMAN: -- then you're saying that the Soviet Union cannot say that the inviolability of frontiers is the most important principle. And that's the one that has to be applied above all.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If you say they must be equally observed, how can they say it then?

MR. HARTMAN: Well, you see, if you observe the inviolability principle strictly --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes.

MR. HARTMAN: -- it makes it less likely that you can persuade people that there is a case for peaceful change, because the Soviet Union will interpret that as saying

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that really inviolability means no change.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I mean, you guys are of course professionals, having worked in this field for so many years and having seen amateurs come and go.

Does anyone here understand that difference? If it's equal validity, then you cannot say one is more important than the other. But if they're equally observed, then you can say it's more important than the other?

It's beyond my comprehension.

MR. HARTMAN: Well, it's a political issue.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Does anyone understand it intellectually? I mean, at least, the peaceful-change argument is nuts, but understandable. (Laughter.)

MR. SONNENFELDT: The difference is between subjective observation and objective observation -- regardless of whether you observe them or not.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And they must be equally observed?

MR. SONNENFELDT: It depends on how you act with respect to them, which is why the Germans don't like that.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But, in other words, as long as they have equal validity, observation doesn't make

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any difference.

MR. SONNENFELDT: You have a legal and metaphysical case for arguing they're all equal. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Until there is some failure to observe.

MR. SONNENFELDT: Like the difference between a traffic law and laws against murder.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You might want to reconsider that! (Laughter.)

MR. MAW: I understand the physics of this, but not the law.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I remember an intelligence report at the end of the war that said the secret dream of every German is to be hit by a car, with a light in the street in his favor. (Laughter.)

I don't know -- my problem is I do not know how to resolve these issues. The one on peaceful change is only absurd, but at least I can grasp it intellectually. The absurdity of that is the placement of the word "only" will not determine whether there is a change in frontiers in Europe. In fact, there isn't going to be a goddam thing written in these principles. It isn't going to make the damndest difference as to whether there is peaceful

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change or not.

No one is going to point to a clause of principles and say only because it qualifies international law it prohibits peaceful change, while it only qualifies peaceful change. It permits it.

I think this is childish. This is German domestic politics.

MR. HARTMAN: Exactly. So let's forget the substance.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It's absurd. I must say in Vladivostok the President turned to me and said, "What's going on here?" (Laughter.)

MR. INGERSOLL: You couldn't explain it, heh?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I can explain.

Speaking of "equal validity," as I understand the German position, they will accept a sentence on peaceful change if it is in the section on inviolability of frontiers -- although if you're a metaphysicist, it doesn't make a damn bit of difference where it appears if it's "equal validity."

MR. SONNENFELDT: It doesn't have any equal validity, in the first place. It has psychological and \_\_\_\_\_

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validity. You are modifying the inviolability principle, but if you put it there -- if you put it someplace else --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As long as you change the frontier.

MR. HARTMAN: Only if you put in the French sentence, which says the principle should be interpreted in terms of the other principles. In other words, there's a connection between the other principles.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Oh, come on; the whole thing is totally ridiculous!

MR. HARTMAN: It is. I think the Germans are coming around to the view that the longer they stick on these questions dealing with the principles, the more the finger is going to be pointed at them for holding up this conference.

Now, if we can get an early agreement on a minimum package in the humanitarian third basket --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes. But we can't get there until we get a common position.

MR. HARTMAN: Well, there are indications now that the French are now saying the conference ought to be brought to an early conclusion.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There's only one issue: Who

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going to sell out whom?

And I think Giscard is selling out us.

MR. HARTMAN: Fine.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Unless Schmidt has already sold out in Moscow.

MR. HARTMAN: Well, if he has, he doesn't seem to have gotten anything for it in terms of his own concerns.

MR. SONNENFELDT: I think the Europeans are all taking a position -- I think with two exceptions: Norway and Denmark -- that we must no longer hurry.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Because we've gotten so much up to now? What have we gotten; what exactly have we gotten? (Laughter.)

I heard Trudeau on this subject. He said --

MR. SONNENFELDT: He's got a real domestic issue.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Which is what?

MR. SONNENFELDT: ~~Country~~ The family issue. And that's an issue for him. He and the Germans there are the only ones that have an issue on Basket 3. Everyone else is pursuing --

MR. HARTMAN: But if over this period someone from

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the Western side -- and it doesn't necessarily have to be us; if we can keep the French out, it would be fine -- he could come to the Soviet Union and say, "Here is what you've got to accept in Basket 3, but to really wind up this conference you have to show some sensitivity to these ridiculous issues that the Germans are raising. Make that the trade. This is how you can end that conference early. Otherwise you drag it out."

We may not want to, but that seems to be the position, it seems to me.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I just want someone else to get blamed for ending it late. What do we get for ending it early?

MR. HARTMAN: Except to get rid of it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I wouldn't mind extending it beyond the next extension. They may not want to blow up the Middle East before the European Security Conference.

MR. HARTMAN: They've got every other linkage; you might as well have that one! (Laughter.)

MR. HYLAND: Keep it open until after Brezhnev's visit to the Middle East.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That for sure.

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MR. HYLAND: Then we shouldn't try to straighten out that language. We should let that stalemate continue.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But we can discuss that with Schmidt and tell him we shouldn't settle it before early February. But isn't it true that after it's all settled that it would still take months?

MR. HARTMAN: I think the Finns said that it would take six weeks for them to get ready for a final meeting.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That's going to be the most unbelievable circus. You have how many heads of state there?

MR. HARTMAN: No -- but someone was suggesting that we ought to get a cruise ship and send it up to Helskinky with the number of people.

MR. HYLAND: 34.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why are we going to have so many people?

MR. HARTMAN: Because if the President goes there, we have a lot of people.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But they're all going to speak, aren't they?

MR. HARTMAN: Oh, yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There's no way of terminating

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a conference like this without having every head of state having spoken at least once.

Is the Pope coming too?

MR. HARTMAN: It could be. I just want to make sure whether we should bring Butz! (Laughter.)

The other issue to settle with Schmidt is the agreed sequence on the energy conference -- that is, what it is that he will go back and try to sell at the Summit. And I have a little checklist to put in your pocket.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Try to give it to me before I see the President, before the arrival ceremony.

MR. HARTMAN: I will give it to you right now. These are reminders.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: O.K.

What is the compulsion -- to have 50 people at lunch -- guarantee that nothing serious can be discussed?

MR. HARTMAN: Well, I think the numbers began to go up when he began to bring his state secretaries.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But the state secretaries to come?

MR. HARTMAN: The Germans are very anxious.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: "The Germans" means the German Ambassador. How about Schmidt?

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECORDS

TRANSCRIPT OF SECRETARY OF STATE

HAK STAFF MEETINGS, 1973-1977



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SECRETARY'S STAFF MEETING

MONDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1974

PRESENT:

The Secretary of State -- HENRY A. KISSINGER

MR. INGERSOLL  
MR. MAW  
MR. SONNENFELDT  
MR. MULCAHY  
MR. BOWDLER  
MR. HUMMEL  
MR. STABLER  
MR. ATHERTON  
MR. HYLAND  
MR. LEWIS  
MR. ENDERS  
MR. ANDERSON  
AMBASSADOR McCLOSKEY  
MR. STERN  
GOVERNOR HOLTON  
AMBASSADOR BUFFUM  
MR. EAGLEBURGER  
MR. SPRINGSTEEN

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P R O C E E D I N G S

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Bob.

MR. INGERSOLL: Just one quick thing. Dixie Lee Ray was in on Saturday and said she was hosting a tour of AEC facilities for the French AEC Chief. This will be Friday, Saturday and Sunday. She is going to show him non-classified facilities. But she wanted to know whether she should tease him a little bit on our centrifuge process.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. Look -- we have to get one thing straight. I am not as wild on the non-proliferation as the Policy Planning Group is. I am not as wild on French cooperation as Dixie Lee Ray is. And we are not going to go on a crusade. France is not the key to our European policy, after what they keep doing. And I don't want the Exporters Conference pushed to a confrontation before we talk to the French.

MR. INGERSOLL: No, there is nothing being done this week except this visit.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That's fine. But on the other hand, I don't want to give the French special treatment, considering their general behavior.

MR. INGERSOLL: Fine. Do you want to talk about CERDS now?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I want to hear first about

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this French communique with the Soviets. I have yet to read the text.

MR. STABLER: On the summit, you mean. Well, on that, it is quite true that they have gone much further than anybody else. They have indicated --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Can I hear the text? Incidentally, where is Hartman?

MR. STABLER: He left last night for London. He had a commitment there today.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Like what?

MR. STABLER: Well, apparently he is speaking to a group of bankers, financial people. I think it was arranged some time ago. It says the two sides pointed out considerable progress was made during the second stage of the Geneva Conference particularly in the last week, in preparing the drafts of the final documents. "The Soviet Union and France declared their determination to step up efforts in considering questions which are not yet agreed upon within the framework of the agenda adopted in Helsinki, so as to conclude the second stage of the conference. They state that good prerequisites have been created for the conclusion of the conference at an early date, for holding its third stage, and for signing its final documents at summit level."

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, you know damned well if we had said this, the Europeans would be climbing<sup>b</sup> the walls.

MR. STABLER: And that is particularly so --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If you remember that dinner -- I forget when it was -- we had at the Quai D'Orsay, when the French would not let us say privately that the efforts had to be speeded up. In July.

MR. SONNENFELDT: Even in Ottawa.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I know. But in July. They would not even let us put down a desirable position on paper, lest it leak to the Soviets.

MR. STABLER: It is also quite true that as far as the Schmidt visit in Moscow is concerned, that that was absolutely just completely devoid of anything: discussed questions relating to the Conference on Security Cooperation, they would agree to its successful conclusion as soon as possible. And there is absolutely total refusal on the part of the Germans to agree to any reference to the level at all. So they sidestepped it neatly.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We could have at successive summit meetings gone quite far in that direction. And time and again we have been dissuaded by the Europeans, and time

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and again the Europeans have told us that this would be handled on a united basis. I don't think we should take it. I have always known -- as you know, I have always said the only question is which European will sell out first. In fact, I said it to Schmidt last week. I said if he didn't do it, then Giscard would certainly do it, and if he doesn't do it, Wilson will do it. But somebody is going to do it. It is no great loss to us.

MR. STABLER: There is one press report, which I have no way of checking at the moment. It said that he agreed to this in exchange for concessions by the Soviets to Basket Three.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That too is not acceptable. Supposing we came back from a summit meeting and said we had bought the following concessions.

MR. SONNENFELDT: We have known for ten days that the Soviets and the French are working out a basket -- one portion of the Basket Three.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What is Basket One?

MR. SONNENFELDT: Basket One is the Declaration of Principles. On one of the humanitarian paragraphs in Basket Three they have been -- I think the Germans told us, didn't they -- or maybe even the French themselves, in Geneva.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But the basic point is --

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I couldn't care less what they do in the European Security Conference. They can write it in Swahili for all I care. But that isn't the point to me at all. The Conference can never end up with a meaningful document. And I think precisely because it wasn't meaningful, it seems to me totally undermining confidence. Or am I wrong? What do you think, Hal?

MR. SONNENFELDT: You know, I think everybody has been talking to the Russians on their own. And we have been, I think, the most meticulous in telling everybody what we have been talking about, when it has come to points of substance. And the French, if they are dickering with the Soviets on Basket Three --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Both on substance and procedure, we have stuck meticulously to the agreements. I mean we have even privately never gone beyond saying we won't be an obstacle, but it depends on our allies -- and it is not an issue on which we are going to fight our allies -- which is fair enough.

MR. SONNENFELDT: I think that the French are undoubtedly further along than anybody else in taking privately to the Soviets.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Shall we make a point to some of the other countries?

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MR. SONNENFELDT: I would imagine that Giscard will make it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Giscard is not yet the United States.

MR. SONNENFELDT: Yes -- I think we ought to make a point that we can all run this thing on our own, or we can do it together.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And that sort of procedure has rather profound consequences in our perception of how far we can go in allied cooperation. I don't give a damn about the conference. But precisely because nothing big was involved -- the procedures are --

MR. SONNENFELDT: Well, the point is that we have always had the strongest reservations about multilateral dealings with the Soviets. And precisely --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Bilateral dealings.

MR. SONNENFELDT: I mean about going into this multilateral congress type of diplomacy -- in part because it is so tempting for individuals to make deals.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But the fact is that you know we could have gotten something from the Soviets on a number of occasions, if we had been willing to go as far as this. You know that we desisted. We went through that whole second reading exercise, which is a fraud.

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MR. SONNENFELDT: That was the point I was going to make.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We let four months go by, because the Europeans said they didn't even want to put down their optimum position on paper, much less what they may have settled for here. And then to be confronted by a communique, without warning, that gives it all away, that seems to me impossible.

MR. HYLAND: But the French will say this is pretty close to what was in the U.S.-Soviet communique over a year ago.

MR. SONNENFELDT: There we said we are proceeding from the premise, rather than the premise has been created.

MR. HYLAND: The French will say that broke the ice on the summit.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Nonsense. They never said that to us for a year. We didn't have it in this year's summit, we didn't have it in Vladivostok.

MR. HYLAND: We had it in San Clemente.

MR. SONNENFELDT: We have had the same formula. But the main point --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The fact is that we never made a move on substance, and that we never made a move towards the summit - and that we never said that the premise has been

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fulfilled.

MR. HYLAND: But we don't know what Brezhnev told Giscard, either. Knowing Brezhnev, he probably said "The Americans will agree to this. In fact, they want it."

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There is always a telegraph or telephone.

MR. HYLAND: He did this to Pompidou a year ago.

MR. SONNENFELDT: He has done it to everybody at various times. But I think we can fairly make the point to the Europeans that this is going to be even more important than MBFR, where you actually move troops around; if this is going to be the pattern.

MR. STABLER: For instance, do you make the point directly to the Europeans, or do we start first by asking the French what precisely this means. It seems to me just on the eve of the Martinique meeting --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't give a damn about the eve of the Martinique meeting. I think it is ridiculous for Giscard to be a great hero with Brezhnev, and then to go next week and meet the President and be a great hero with the President. I mean that is the tawdriest kind of politics.

MR. STABLER: I wonder whether we ought to go there

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first, rather than going round to the Europeans at this moment. I mean we may get to that point. But I wonder if we ought not to try first -- indicate what we are surprised on this point, and see what they have to say.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is going to be like the producers' conference. By the time the French get through explaining it, they were carrying out our proposals, they were doing us a favor. What can this mean? Did we tell the French about what was discussed at Vladivostok?

MR. SONNENFELDT: I had the Ambassador in.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: So they can be under no misapprehension.

MR. SONNENFELDT: Yes -- we talked to them.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Was it clear to them that we had not agreed to anything?

MR. SONNENFELDT: We were specifically asked by the Ambassador whether this passage on CSC in the communique meant any advance, and we specifically told them that it did not. And on the Middle East, too, for that matter.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Middle East -- that was also a lousy thing, to put themselves in the same category as the Soviets. Well, that at least they have a right to do unilaterally.

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# TELEGRAM

HE AT NOON TODAY SO THAT I COULD CARRY OUT REPEL  
INSTRUCTIONS. AS I ANTICIPATED, DE COURCEL EXPLAINED  
THAT FOREIGN MINISTER SAUVAGNARGUES WOULD BE COMPLETELY  
TIED UP WITH THE EC-9 SUMMIT CONFERENCE ALL DAY AND  
EVENING, AND REQUESTED THAT I MAKE MY DEMARCHE AT THE  
SECRETARY GENERAL LEVEL.

3. DE COURCEL RESPONDED THAT OUR INTERPRETATION OF THE FRENCH-SOVIET SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE IS COMPLETELY UNFOUNDED, AND THERE IS NO CAUSE FOR CONCERN WITH RESPECT TO FRANCE'S CONTINUED ADHERENCE TO THE PRECONDITION THAT STAGE II RESULTS MUST BE CONSIDERED SATISFACTORY BEFORE ANY COMMITMENT TO A SUMMIT CAN BE MADE.

5. AT THE PARIS SUMMIT JUST CONCLUDED, THE VOAGHIVOSTKA COMMUNIQUE WAS ON THE TABLE, DE GOURDEL SAID, AND HE INSISTED THAT THE BREZHNEV-GISSARD STATEMENT DID NOT GO AS FAR AS THE BREZHNEV-FORD STATEMENT. HE THEN ANALYZED THE LANGUAGE OF THE TWO COMMUNIQUEES TO DEMONSTRATE THIS. HE SAID THAT THE FRENCH TERM "DES BONNES PREMISSSES" SHOULD BE TRANSLATED AS "SOME GOOD PROSPECTS" RATHER

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THAN "GOOD PREREQUISITES" FOR THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING SENTENCE WHICH SAYS "FRANCE AND THE USSR DECLARE THEMSELVES RESOLVED TO INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE SUSPENDED QUESTIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK IMPOSED BY THE SCHEDULE AGREED AT HELSINKI AND BY THE CONCLUSION OF THE SECOND PHASE OF THE CONFERENCE." HE SAID THAT THIS CLEARLY COMMITTS THE GUP TO ACHIEVING SATISFACTORY RESULTS IN STAGE II AS A REQUIREMENT FOR A SUMMIT. THE VLADIVOSTOK COMMUNIQUE HAS NO SUCH LANGUAGE, DE COURCEL ARGUED, AND IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO EXTRACT THAT SENTENCE FROM BREZHNEV DURING THE TALKS IN PARIS LAST WEEKEND.

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ALL IN ALL, THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY IS NOT  
THE BEST. THE GOVT IS NOT FULLY AWARE OF THE SITUATION IN THE  
COUNTRY, AND IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT THE GOVT IS NOT AWARE OF THE  
FRENCH POSITION. THE GOVT IS NOT AWARE OF THE SITUATION IN THE  
COUNTRY, AND IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT THE GOVT IS NOT AWARE OF THE  
GOVT. IN LIGHT OF THIS, THE GOVT IS NOT AWARE OF THE  
SITUATION.

7. I EXPRESSED APPREHENSION FOR THE FUTURE OF THE GROUP AND SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FOR SOME OF THE MEMBERS.

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# TELEGRAM

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FLORATION OF THIS ISSUE IN BRUSSELS AND MARTINIQUE.


8. AS FOOTNOTE TO FOREGOING, I WANT TO POINT OUT THAT I DID NOT MENTION GISCARDI'S PRESS CONFERENCE AT ONLY AIRPORT (PARA. 3 REFTEL) BECAUSE HE USED THE TERM "COMPLETE CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS" ONLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE MIDDLE EAST. THIS WAS CONFUSED BY A NUMBER OF NEWSPAPER REPORTS. I DID MENTION SOVIET PRESS SPOKESMAN ZAMYATIN'S UNAMBIGUOUS STATEMENT THAT THE CSCE SUMMIT WILL TAKE PLACE IN HELSINKI DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 1975. DE COURCEL DISMISSED THIS AS A TYPICAL SOVIET PRESSURE TACTIC WHICH DID NOT SUCCEED.

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E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, CSCE  
SUBJECT: CSCE PAPER FOR MARTINIQUE

HOLD FOR OPENING OF BUSINESS

FOR HARTMAN AND SONNENFELOT

REQUEST COMMENT AND/OR APPROVAL ON FOLLOWING BRIEFING PAPER  
FOR SECRETARY'S USE AT MARTINIQUE.

BEGIN TEXT.

1. CSCE IS ONCE AGAIN APPROACHING A DECISIVE PHASE, AS MORE AND MORE PARTICIPANTS DECIDE THAT A PROMPT CONCLUSION IS POSSIBLE AND DESIRABLE. A NUMBER OF KEY ELEMENTS IN BASKET 3 SEEM TO BE FALLING INTO PLACE AND THE SOVIETS ARE APPARENTLY PUSHING TO WRAP UP THAT AREA OF THE CONFERENCE BEFORE THE CHRISTMAS BREAK. WORK ON THE PRINCIPLES ALSO SEEMS TO BE ADVANCING WELL; ONLY CBMS ARE NOT MOVING.

2. UNTIL THE RECENT MEETINGS BETWEEN GISCARD AND BREZHNEV,

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THE FRENCH TACTICAL APPROACH TO CSCE HAD GENERALLY BEEN MORE RESERVED THAN OUR OWN, WITNESS FRENCH LEADERSHIP OF EC NINE RESISTANCE TO OUR EFFORTS LAST SUMMER TO DEVELOP TRIMMED-DOWN WESTERN POSITIONS ON BASKET 3 FOR PRESENTATION TO THE SOVIETS. HOWEVER, IN PREPARING FOR THE BREZHNEV VISIT TO

PARIS DECEMBER 6-7, THE FRENCH CHANGED THEIR POSITION, TAKING THE LINE THAT THE SOVIETS WERE NOW PREPARED TO BE REASONABLE ON ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE WEST, AND THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPEDITE STAGE II, SO AS TO CONCLUDE CSCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE RESULT WAS A FRENCH/SOVIET COMMUNIQUE WHICH SEEMS TO CONCEDE THE SOVIET DESIRE FOR A SUMMIT-LEVEL STAGE III BEFORE ALL ISSUES HAVE BEEN RESOLVED IN STAGE II. THE FRENCH HAVE CLAIMED THAT THIS IS NOT THE CASE, INSISTING THAT THEY REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE ALLIANCE POSITION RESERVING A FINAL DECISION ON STAGE III UNTIL THE RESULTS OF STAGE II HAVE BEEN EVALUATED. ALTHOUGH THE FRENCH SHIFT COULD ENCOURAGE THE SOVIET UNION TO HOLD BACK ON FURTHER CONCESSIONS, IT SHOULD ALSO PROMPT OUR ALLIES TO COMPLETE THEIR DEFINITION OF ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS IN PREPARATION FOR THE FINAL ROUND OF TRADE-OFFS.

3. YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH SAUVAGNARGUES SHOULD STRESS THE NEED FOR ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY IN THE CRUCIAL FINAL WEEKS OF STAGE II EXPRESSED IN AN AGREED PACKAGE OF REMAINING ISSUES TO BE NEGOTIATED WITH THE SOVIETS.

4. THE ATTACHED PAPER PROVIDES ANALYSIS AND TALKING POINTS ON SPECIFIC CSCE ISSUES WHICH MAY COME UP.

BEGIN ATTACHMENT

ISSUES/TALKING POINTS -- CSCE

5. LEVEL AND TIMING OF STAGE III.

FRENCH POSITION: THE FRENCH HAVE LONG BEEN AMONG THE HARD LINERS ON THE QUESTION OF STAGE III, INSISTING IN NATO COUNCILS THAT WE SHOULD WITHHOLD AGREEMENT TO A SUMMIT-LEVEL FINALE UNTIL THE SOVIETS GIVE FULL SATISFACTION ON

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THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. WHILE A SOFTENING IN THEIR POSITION WAS DUE, THE CONCESSIONARY STATEMENTS IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF THE DECEMBER 5-7 BREZHNEV/GISCARD TALKS CAME AS A SHOCK, SINCE WE WERE NOT CONSULTED OR ADEQUATELY INFORMED BEFOREHAND. THE COMMUNIQUE AS PUBLISHED BY THE SOVIETS SPEAKS OF "GOOD PREREQUISITES," ("PREDPOSYLKI") HAVING BEEN CREATED FOR EARLIEST CSCE CONCLUSION AT THE SUMMIT, IMPLYING THAT THE IMPORTANT ISSUES HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. THE FRENCH MAINTAIN THAT THE KEY PHRASE "DE BONNES PREMISSES" (WHICH IS AT BEST VAGUE) SHOULD BE RENDERED IN ENGLISH AS "SOME GOOD PROSPECTS," A MORE LIMITED EXPRESSION WHICH WOULD SUPPORT THEIR CONTENTION THAT THEY HAVE RESERVED FINAL JUDGMENT. NEVERTHELESS, WE FEEL THIS

STATEMENT COULD GREATLY ASSIST THE SOVIETS IN ARGUING THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE CONCLUDED SOON ON THE BASIS OF AGREEMENTS ALREADY REACHED, AND COULD WELL RESULT IN A STIFFENING OF SOVIET POSITIONS ON REMAINING ISSUES. THIS IS LIKELY DESPITE THE REFERENCE IN THE COMMUNIQUE TO STEPPING UP EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE REMAINING ISSUES, WHICH THE FRENCH CLAIM QUALIFIES THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE SUMMIT.

6. PURSUANT TO YOUR INSTRUCTIONS, AMBASSADOR RUSH APPROACHED THE FRENCH AT HIGH LEVEL ON THIS. QUAT SECRETARY GENERAL DE COURCEL CLAIMED THAT THE COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE WENT NO FURTHER THAN THAT IN THE VLADIVOSTOK COMMUNIQUE AND SAID FRANCE ADHERED TO THE ALLIANCE POSITION THAT A FINAL DECISION ON LEVEL AND TIMING OF STAGE III WILL ONLY BE MADE WHEN THE RESULTS OF STAGE II ARE KNOWN. HE GAVE NO EXPLANATION FOR THE FAILURE TO CONSULT BEFOREHAND, BUT THIS MIGHT BE EXPLAINED IN PART BY REPORTS FROM OTHER SOURCES THAT GISCARD AND BREZHNEV NEGOTIATED THE COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE PERSONALLY.

7. THE BRITISH HAVE TOLD US THAT AFTER CLOSE STUDY OF THE TEXT, THEY HAVE CONCLUDED THAT IT DOES NOT ABANDON THE ALLIANCE POSITION.

8. US POSITION: THE FRENCH ACTION IN GIVING THE SOVIETS SUCH FORTHCOMING LANGUAGE ON A CSCE SUMMIT, APPARENTLY

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WITHOUT GETTING ANY SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS IN RETURN, IS UNFORTUNATE. IT IS COMPOUNDED BY THEIR FAILURE TO CONSULT OR ADEQUATELY INFORM US BEFOREHAND. WITHOUT GETTING INTO A SEMANTIC DISCUSSION OF THE AMBIGUOUS TEXT OF THE COMMUNIQUE, YOU MIGHT REGISTER WITH SAUVAGNARGUES OUR CONCERN THAT THE FRENCH WOULD EFFECT SUCH A DRAMATIC CHANGE IN THEIR POSITION--TO THE OBVIOUS DELIGHT OF THE SOVIET UNION--WITHOUT CONSULTING OR INFORMING THEIR ALLIES.

9. AT THE SAME TIME, YOU MIGHT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF FRENCH ASSURANCES THAT THEY STAND BY THE ALLIANCE POSITION TO URGE THEM TO JOIN IN WORKING UP A WESTERN PACKAGE DEAL OF FINAL TRADE-OFFS. ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY WILL BE CRUCIAL IF WE ARE TO GAIN SATISFACTORY RESULTS IN CSCE IN THE TIME REMAINING.

10. TALKING POINTS.

-- WE WERE SURPRISED THAT THE FRENCH WENT SO FAR IN THEIR COMMUNIQUE WITH THE SOVIETS TOWARD ENDORSEMENT OF A SUMMIT-LEVEL CONCLUSION OF CSCE, AND DISTURBED THAT THE ALLIES

WERE NOT CONSULTED OR EVEN INFORMED OF THE EXTENT OF THE APPARENT SHIFT IN FRENCH POLICY.

-- WE HAVE NOTED FRENCH EXPLANATIONS THAT THE COMMUNIQUE DOES NOT GO AS FAR AS IT SEEMS TO, AND WE WELCOME ASSURANCES ON FRENCH ADHERENCE TO THE ALLIANCE POSITION THAT THE LEVEL AND TIMING OF STAGE III WILL NOT BE FINALLY DECIDED UNTIL THE RESULTS OF STAGE II HAVE BEEN EVALUATED.

-- IN ANY CASE, THE IMPORTANT THING NOW IS TO REINFORCE ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY FOR THE FINAL PUSH IN GENEVA.

-- WE HOPE THE FRENCH WILL CONTINUE THEIR ACTIVE ROLE IN THE NATO CAUCUS AND SUPPORT ITS POSITIONS, AS WE INTEND TO DO.

-- WE SHOULD BEGIN NOW TO DEVELOP A WESTERN PACKAGE DEAL ON REMAINING ISSUES THAT COULD BE USED FOR FINAL BAR-

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GAINING WITH THE SOVIETS.

-- THIS PACKAGE COULD BE FIRMED UP BY THE NATO CAUCUS IN GENEVA AND REVIEWED BY A REINFORCED NAC MEETING, PERHAPS IN FEBRUARY.

## 11. BASKET 1--PRINCIPLES DECLARATION.

FRENCH POSITION: THE FRENCH TABLED IN OCTOBER 1973 A DRAFT DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES WHICH HAS SERVED AS THE BASIC WESTERN POSITION THROUGHOUT THE CONFERENCE. THEIR INTEREST IN THE PRINCIPLES REMAINS HIGH, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE ALLOWED THE FRG TO TAKE THE LEAD ON PEACEFUL CHANGE, EQUAL VALIDITY, ETC., WHILE GIVING FIRM BACKING TO GERMAN POSITIONS VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS. DURING THE BREZHNEV/GISCARD SUMMIT, THE FRENCH SECURED FINAL SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE BONN GROUP'S FOUR-POWER-RIGHTS FORMULATION, APPARENTLY BY AGREEING TO THE SOVIET DESIRE THAT IT BE PLACED IN THE FINAL PARAGRAPHS OF THE PRINCIPLES DECLARATION, RATHER THAN IN THE TENTH PRINCIPLE.

12. US POSITION: WE HAVE NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES WITH THE FRENCH ON THE PRINCIPLES.

## 13. TALKING POINTS.

-- WE SUPPORT ALLIANCE EFFORTS TO OBTAIN SATISFACTORY FORMULATIONS ON PEACEFUL BORDER CHANGES, AS WELL AS THE EQUAL VALIDITY OF THE CSCE PRINCIPLES AND THE INTERPRETATION OF EACH IN THE CONTEXT OF ALL THE OTHERS.

-- WE PARTICULARLY APPRECIATE FRENCH INITIATIVES ON BEHALF OF THE BONN GROUP TO SECURE LANGUAGE SAFEGUARDING ALLIED RIGHTS IN BERLIN AND GERMANY AS A WHOLE. WE ARE HAPPY TO SEE THIS ISSUE FINALLY RESOLVED.

## 14. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES.

FRENCH POSITION: THE FRENCH CONTINUE TO PLAY A PASSIVE ROLE, REFLECTING THEIR GENERAL DISTASTE FOR GETTING INTO

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MILITARY SUBJECTS AT CSCE. THEY NONETHELESS SUPPORT MODEST PROVISIONS ON NOTIFYING MANEUVERS AND EXCHANGING OBSERVERS, LARGELY TO STAY IN STEP WITH THE ALLIES.

15. US POSITION: WE ALSO FAVOR LIMITING CBMS TO EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AND NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS, ALTHOUGH WE ARE SOMEWHAT MORE CONCERNED THAN THE FRENCH WITH SECURING MEANINGFUL CONTENT IN A MANEUVERS CBM. WE HAVE NO REASON TO RAISE THIS ISSUE WITH THE FRENCH AT THIS TIME.

16. TALKING POINTS. (ONLY IF SAUVAGNARGUES RAISES THE ISSUE.)

-- WE CONTINUE TO FAVOR A CBM ON MANEUVERS WHICH HAS SOME MEANINGFUL CONTENT, AND TO OPPOSE THE NOTIFICATION OF TROOP MOVEMENTS.

17. BASKET 2--ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION.

FRENCH POSITION: THE FRENCH HAVE SUPPORTED EC NINE SOLIDARITY IN THIS AREA, WHERE THE ONLY SERIOUS SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE YET TO BE RESOLVED IS DRAFTING OF THE TEXT ON REDUCTION OF TRADE BARRIERS. THE MAIN FOCUS OF DEBATE IN THIS AREA HAS BEEN BETWEEN THE EC NINE AND THE EASTERN EUROPEANS, WITH US MFN PRACTICES COMING IN FOR ONLY INCIDENTAL CONSIDERATION.

18. US POSITION: WE DO NOT VIEW CSCE AS THE PROPER FORUM FOR SERIOUS ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS AND WOULD PREFER GENERAL FORMULATIONS WHICH WILL NOT COMPLICATE OTHER MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, SUCH AS MTN, OR OUR BILATERAL ACTIVITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE TRADE REFORM ACT. NEGOTIATIONS ARE CURRENTLY TENDING TOWARD THIS RESULT.

19. TALKING POINTS. (ONLY IF SAUVAGNARGUES RAISES THE ISSUE.)

-- WE HAVE BEEN PLEASED WITH BASKET 2 PROGRESS, WHICH HAS PRODUCED USEFUL AGREEMENTS ON THE ENVIRONMENT, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AND INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION WITHOUT GENERATING POLITICAL CONTROVERSY.

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-- WE HOPE AND EXPECT THAT THE REMAINING ECONOMIC ISSUES CAN BE RESOLVED IN A SIMILAR SPIRIT.

## 20. BASKET 3--FREER MOVEMENT.

FRENCH POSITION: THE FRENCH HAVE TAKEN THE LEAD ON CULTURAL COOPERATION AND EXCHANGES. THEY ARE CURRENTLY SEEKING TO OBTAIN SOVIET AGREEMENT ON A KEY PROPOSAL FOR THE OPENING OF READING ROOMS, OFFERING IN EXCHANGE TO DROP THEIR IDEA OF OPENING FOREIGN CINEMAS. THE SOVIETS HAVE STRONGLY RESISTED THE OPENING OF NEW READING ROOMS STOCKED WITH FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS, THOUGH SUCH FACILITIES HAVE LONG FUNCTIONED IN VARIOUS EASTERN EUROPEAN CITIES. THE FRENCH HAVE REQUESTED OUR SUPPORT FOR THEIR POSITION ON READING ROOMS. IN ADDITION, THEY CLAIM TO HAVE WORKED OUT A COMPROMISE WHICH WILL SATISFY THE SOVIET DESIRE FOR A REFERENCE TO "MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE-CONDITIONS" IN THE INTRODUCTORY LANGUAGE ON HUMAN CONTACTS, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT YET SEEN A TEXT. CURIOUSLY, THE FRENCH REPORT THAT BASKET 3 ISSUES RECEIVED LITTLE ATTENTION AT THE GISCARDI/BREZHNEV SUMMIT.

21. US POSITION: WE HAVE BEEN PLEASED TO SEE SOME SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT ON BASKET 3 ISSUES RECENTLY (E.G.,-- REGISTRATION OF THE FAMILY REUNIFICATION AND ACCESS TO PRINTED INFORMATION TEXTS) AND HOPE THIS TREND WILL CONTINUE. WE BELIEVE THAT IT REMAINS IMPORTANT TO SECURE RESULTS WHICH WILL SATISFY WESTERN PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY OPINION, BUT IT IS IMPORTANT ALSO TO MAINTAIN THE CURRENT MOMENTUM OF THE CONFERENCE.

## 22. TALKING POINTS.

-- IF THE ALLIES AND THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO DISPLAY REALISM AND FLEXIBILITY, WE BELIEVE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A REASONABLE BASKET 3 PACKAGE.

-- WE VALUE FRENCH EFFORTS IN THE CULTURAL AREA OF BASKET 3 AND LOOK FOR CONTRIBUTIONS IN THAT AREA.

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-- MANY DIFFICULT BASKET 3 ISSUES REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH OUR ALLIES ON WHAT WE SHOULD REALISTICALLY HOPE TO ACHIEVE.

## 23. BASKET 4--CONFERENCE FOLLOW-UP.

FRENCH POSITION: THE FRENCH HAVE LONG BEEN SUSPICIOUS OF POST-CSCE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH MIGHT GIVE THE SOVIETS AN INCREASING VOICE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN POLITICAL AND SECURITY QUESTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF A POSSIBLY DIMINISHING US PRESENCE. FOR THIS REASON, AS WELL AS FOR TACTICAL BARGAINING LEVERAGE, THEY HAVE REFUSED TO MOVE BEYOND THE DANISH PROPOSAL FOR A PROBATIONARY PERIOD FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER MEETING. FOLLOW-UP WAS REPORTEDLY NOT DISCUSSED AT THE BREZHNEV/GISCARD SUMMIT. HOWEVER, THE FRENCH MAY BE PREPARED EVENTUALLY TO GO ALONG WITH A CONSENSUS IN FAVOR OF SOMETHING LIKE THE FINNISH PROPOSAL FOR A CONTINUING COMMITTEE, WITHOUT SECRETARIAT, TO MONITOR TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CSCE AGREEMENTS, PLUS A WORKING GROUP TO PREPARE A HIGH LEVEL REVIEW IN ABOUT TWO YEARS. IN ANY CASE, THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO APPROACH THE FOLLOW-UP QUESTION WITH CONSIDERABLE PRUDENCE, UNTIL FINAL CSCE RESULTS ARE VIRTUALLY IN HAND.

24. US POSITION. LIKE THE FRENCH, WE CONTINUE TO SEE LITTLE BENEFIT AND SOME DANGERS IN ESTABLISHING A PERMANENT POST-CSCE COMMITTEE TO CONTINUE ORGANIZED DISCUSSION OF POLITICAL AND SECURITY ISSUES IN EUROPE. HOWEVER, IN THE INTEREST OF EVENTUAL CONSENSUS, WE COULD PROBABLY ACCEPT A LIMITED FOLLOW-UP STRUCTURE SIMILAR TO THE FINNISH PROPOSAL. TACTICALLY, THIS ISSUE SHOULD BE CLOSELY COORDINATED BY THE ALLIES TO KEEP THE SOVIETS IN THE POSITION OF DEMANDEUR.

## 25. TALKING POINTS.

-- WE REMAIN UNCONVINCED THAT ORGANIZED FOLLOW-UP, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE COVERAGE OF POLITICAL AND SECURITY TOPICS, IS NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE.

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-- WE CONTINUE TO PREFER THE CONCEPTS EMBODIED IN THE DANISH PROPOSAL FOR A PROBATIONARY PERIOD.

-- IT IS TACTICALLY USEFUL TO KEEP THE SOVIET UNION IN THE POSITION OF DEMANDEUR ON THIS ISSUE, AT LEAST UNTIL OTHER AREAS OF THE CONFERENCE HAVE BEEN CLARIFIED.

-- THERE SEEMS TO BE ROOM FOR EVENTUAL COMPROMISE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE FINNISH PROPOSAL IF THAT IS NECESSARY TO SECURE FINAL AGREEMENT, BUT NOW IS NOT THE TIME FOR MOVEMENT IN THIS AREA.

-- THE ALLIES SHOULD CONSULT CLOSELY AND MAINTAIN A STRONG COMMON POSITION ON FOLLOW-UP.

## 26. MEDITERRANEAN CONNECTION.

FRENCH POSITION: THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN AMONG THE MOST ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORTERS OF VARIOUS PROPOSALS FOR CSCE DECLARATIONS NOTING AFFINITIES BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA. THEY HAVE BACKED OFF SOMEWHAT IN VIEW OF OUR OBJECTIONS, BUT CONTINUE TO FAVOR SOME SUBSTANTIAL CSCE GESTURE TO THE NON-PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES.


27. US POSITION: ALTHOUGH WE ORIGINALLY OPPOSED THE IDEA OF A SEPARATE MEDITERRANEAN DECLARATION ON CSCE, WE DECIDED TO SUPPORT AN ITALIAN DRAFT ON THE SUBJECT, IN ORDER TO HEAD OFF MORE TROUBLESOME PROPOSALS BY YUGOSLAVIA, CYPRUS AND MALTA, WHICH WOULD EXTEND MILITARY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES TO THE MEDITERRANEAN. MALTA HAS SINCE TABLED AN EVEN MORE FAR-REACHING PROPOSAL FOR A PERMANENT "MONITORING COMMITTEE" ON MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY TO INCLUDE ALL MEDITERRANEAN LITTORAL COUNTRIES PLUS IRAN. THIS PROPOSAL IS CURRENTLY DORMANT IN COMMITTEE IN GENEVA. WHERE WE HOPE ITS MORE FAR-OUT IDEAS WILL QUIETLY EXPIRE. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF MALTA'S RECORD OF TROUBLEMAKING ON THIS ISSUE, WE CANNOT AFFORD TO BE SANGUINE, AND IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO REMIND THE FRENCH, WHO COULD PLAY A PIVOTAL ROLE, OF OUR STRONG OPPOSITION TO GOING BEYOND THE HELSINKI MANDATES, LIMITING REFERENCES TO THE MEDITERRANEAN IN CSCE DOCUMENTS.

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## 28. TALKING POINTS.

-- WE HAVE SUPPORTED THE ITALIAN DRAFT FOR A MEDITERRANEAN DECLARATION IN CSCE, RECOGNIZING ITALY'S--AND FRANCE'S-- SPECIAL INTEREST IN RELATIONS WITH THE NON-PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES.

-- HOWEVER, WE ALSO HAVE SIGNIFICANT INTERESTS INVOLVED, AND WE ARE CONCERNED THAT TOO MUCH ATTENTION TO THE MEDITERRANEAN IN CSCE--ESPECIALLY FROM THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY ANGLE--WOULD NOT ONLY DISRUPT THE CONFERENCE BUT COMPLICATE RATHER THAN FACILITATE RELATIONS WITH THE MEDITERRANEAN STATES.

-- IN PARTICULAR, WE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE NEUTRAL SUGGESTION FOR EXTENSION OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES TO THE MEDITERRANEAN OR THE COMPLETELY UNREALISTIC MALTESE PROPOSAL FOR A PERMANENT COMMITTEE ON

MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY.

-- WE ARE RELYING ON FRANCE TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT ALLIED EFFORTS TO SUBMERGE THESE IDEAS IN COMMITTEE IN GENEVA, AND TO WORK FOR A RESULT IN THIS AREA IN KEEPING WITH THE LIMITED HELSINKI MANDATE.

END TEXT. INGERSOLL

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Box 1

Presidential country files for Europe and Canada

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

6017

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INFORMATION

December 14, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Brent Scowcroft (B)

SUBJECT: Results of Brezhnev-Giscard Summit

Summary: General Secretary Brezhnev returned to Moscow on December 7 after a three day working visit to France. Early reports on the results of the visit suggest that Brezhnev probably was satisfied with Giscard's promises of continuity with the Pompidou/De Gaulle foreign policy and clearly reassured at the extent to which France is proving willing and able to participate in large-scale, long term economic cooperation. The French seem pleased that Giscard has reaffirmed the "privileged interlocutor" status which Pompidou had with Brezhnev. Apart from CSCE, discussions on the Middle East and other international subjects seem to have been limited to routine exchanges, stressing large convergence of views. The bilateral economic agreements which were signed, while broad in scope, are vague on specifics and contain no surprises. Giscard will make an official visit to the USSR in 1975, probably around September-October.

The principal results of the meeting were as follows:

--CSCE: Brezhnev succeeded in changing France's heretofore noncommittal attitude toward a CSCE summit, apparently without making any binding concessions on Basket III issues. CSCE apparently occupied a large part of the tete-a-tete meetings, during which Brezhnev obviously made a major effort to bring Giscard around. In gaining Giscard's agreement on a summit, Brezhnev achieved something always beyond his grasp with Pompidou. The French take the view that their position is a "yes, but" on the summit question; nevertheless, the communique wording is distinctly favorable to the Soviet view.

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--Bilateral Economic Issues: Brezhnev and Giscard signed a five year economic cooperation agreement. Originally, it was not planned that they personally would sign it, but the change was made at Soviet insistence. The agreement is vague and merely states that the two sides will cooperate to augment exchanges. Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev and French Finance Minister Fourcade signed three agreements: a ten year industrial cooperation agreement, a credit agreement, and an agreement for the purchase of Soviet natural gas.

--Middle East: Discussion seems to have been confined to a routine exchange stressing a close convergence of views. The Middle East portion of the communique contains no new elements. The French seem to have resisted Soviet pressure to call for the creation of a Palestinian state as rapidly as possible. Both sides called for the earliest possible reconvening of a Geneva peace conference.

--Brezhnev's Health: Several alterations in the program, late starting of several meetings and, in particular, Brezhnev's non-attendance at Giscard's December 6 luncheon, led inevitably to further speculation about Brezhnev's health. Brezhnev's schedule was in fact deliberately lightened on December 6. Brezhnev showed signs of fatigue after the tete-a-tetes, and his speech seemed more slurred than usual at his departure. In the absence of more persuasive evidence, however, the likely explanation is simply that he is weary from a recent heavy schedule -- including his meetings with you and a major visit to Mongolia -- which would take its toll on any man of 68.

General: Overall, there is no evidence of a measurable shift in Franco-Soviet relations as a result of the summit. If Brezhnev was a little anxious when he arrived, he had every reason to be satisfied when he left. He presumably was pleased by Giscard's give on CSCE and by the warm tone of the meetings, and reassured that the new French government has the same basic attitude toward the USSR as did the governments of De Gaulle and Pompidou. On the French side, the visit served to bolster Giscard's image as he turns this week to the EC summit and his meeting with you in Martinique. Nevertheless, some press commentary contained more than a hint that Moscow got the better of the exchange. It is too early to measure the impact of the meeting on France's relations with its European allies, but the possibility of a lasting negative impact exists.

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